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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Teaching students to “be like” a mathematician 
Mathematics instruction is an endeavor with many stakeholders, each of whom 
may have a different (and valid) claim as to the ultimate purpose of the endeavor.  
Among these purposes are, for example, to produce citizens who can use mathematics to 
compete in a global economy that increasingly calls for technological expertise 
(Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy 2007); to reduce social inequities by 
cultivating knowledge and skills in traditionally underserved communities (Gutstein 
2003, 2006; Moses, 2001); and, not least, to produce a citizenry that is culturally literate, 
including mathematical literacy (Kline 1953). 
In addition to these worthy goals, in recent years another perspective has become 
part of the discourse of mathematics education:  namely, that one of the goals of 
mathematics education is to enculturate students into a community of practice (Lampert 
2001; Sfard 1998; Wenger 1997).  From this point of view, the goal of mathematics 
instruction is, at least in part, to cultivate in students some of the practices, values and 
sensibilities that characterize the work of mathematicians — that is, to teach students 
what it is like to be like a mathematician; or, more succinctly still, to teach a 
mathematical sensibility (Ball & Bass 2003; Bass 2005).  This perspective has been put 
forth by Askew (2008), who argues that “the mathematical behaviours demonstrated by 
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effective teachers are still proxies for something else – a mathematical sensibility – that 
cannot be reduced to a list of mathematical topics.” 
This attention to the practices and values that are characteristic of mathematicians 
is connected to larger questions of the relationship of education to the various academic 
disciplines to which education is accountable — questions that have influenced and 
inspired scholars of education since the early twentieth century.  Dewey, writing in The 
Child and the Curriculum (1902), likened disciplinary content knowledge to a map: 
The map is not a substitute for personal experience.  The map does not 
take the place of an actual journey.  The logically formulated material of a 
science or branch of learning, of a study, is no substitute for the having of 
individual experiences…  But the map, a summary, an arranged and 
orderly view of previous experiences, serves as a guide to future 
experience; it gives direction; it facilitates control; it economizes effort, 
preventing useless wondering, and pointing out the paths which lead most 
quickly and most certainly to a desired result.  Through the map every new 
traveler may get for his own journey the benefits of the results of others’ 
explorations without the waste of energy and loss of time involved in their 
wanderings — wanderings which he himself would be obliged to repeat 
were it not for just the assistance of the objective and generalized record 
of their performances.  (pp. 26-28) 
 
For Dewey, then, the process of discovery is an essential element of education — 
but this discovery should be not fully idiosyncratic and self-directed, but rather a guided 
one that benefits from the accumulated experience of those who have previously made 
the journey.  Taking Dewey’s analogy further, one might say that it is desirable for the 
novice to learn from the more experienced traveller not only the territory under 
exploration — its landmarks and geographical features — but also the art of travelling; 
that is, how to choose a good road to travel down, how to blaze a trail, how and where to 
choose a site in which to pitch one’s tent, and so forth. 
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Half a century later Bruner (1960) made a similar point:  “An educated man 
should have a sense of what knowledge is like in some field of inquiry, to know it in its 
connectedness and with a feeling for how the knowledge is gained…  I do not mean that 
each man should be carried to the frontiers of knowledge, but I do mean that it is possible 
to take him far enough so that he himself can see how far he has come and by what 
means” (p. 618; emphasis added).   Bruner thus emphasizes the importance of 
metaknowledge, that is, an awareness not only of the content of a discipline, but also of 
the practices by which that content is constructed.  Schwab (1961/1974), writing at about 
the same time, made a similar argument: that instruction may be conceived as “concerned 
primarily with the imparting of knowledge”, or as “concerned primarily with the 
imparting of arts and skills”, but that in either case it is the structures of the individual 
disciplines themselves that determines what knowledge, what arts, and what skills matter.  
Thus, “learning mathematics” necessarily requires engagement with the structure, the 
practices, and the values — that is, the sensibility — that characterizes mathematics as a 
discipline. 
To these considerations, Chazan, Callis & Lehman (2008) add an additional 
argument based on egalitarian ideals.  Chazan et al. observe that, to the extent that 
mathematics instruction departs from the sensibility underlying mathematical practice — 
a sensibility that values reason, creativity and agency — it replaces that sensibility with 
another, one rooted ultimately in authority and elitism.  Thus a shift in emphasis towards 
the mathematical sensibility can be appreciated as an embrace of egalitarian values in 
education (Cusick ,1983).  
 
 4 
But despite the compelling nature of these arguments, it remains largely unclear 
what is really meant by the phrase “mathematical sensibility” — its architecture as a 
theoretical construct — and, perhaps more challenging, what it takes to translate this 
ambitious goal into actual classroom practice.  To illustrate this latter point, consider the 
following example:  One characteristic that seems to define the work of a research 
mathematician, but that typically does not form part of the experience of mathematics 
students, is that the professional mathematician chooses for herself what problems she 
will work on, rather than work always on assignments set by others.
1
  Indeed, research 
mathematicians are held accountable by their colleagues for choosing difficult and 
worthwhile problems to work on.  Could school mathematics help to foster an 
environment in which students are similarly free to choose, and be held accountable for 
choosing, their own problems?  The desire to shape education in such a way that this 
becomes part of the educational experience of students is reflected in the document 
Principles and Standards of School Mathematics (NCTM 2000), which ambitiously 
identifies as “a major goal of school mathematics programs” the creation of “autonomous 
learners” who “can take control of their learning by defining their goals and monitoring 
their progress” (p. 20), and asserts that “posing problems, that is, generating new 
questions in a problem context” is an important skill for teachers to nurture in their 
                                                
1
 It may be objected that this characterization distorts reality by valorizing the 
academic research mathematician over her counterpart who works in industry, finance, 
etc.  I concede the point; it is certainly true that the latter may have less discretion over 
her choice of problems on which to work.  Nevertheless it is still the case that a typical 
student in an elementary or secondary mathematics classroom has considerably less 
autonomy and freedom to choose a research problem than does her counterpart working 
in industrial and applied mathematics. 
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students (p. 116).  As an illustration of this goal, the Standards offer the following 
vignette: 
Lei wanted to know all the ways to cover the yellow hexagon using 
pattern blocks. At first she worked with the blocks using fairly undirected 
trial and error. Gradually she became more methodical and placed the 
various arrangements in rows. The teacher showed her a pattern-block 
program on the class computer and how to “glue” the pattern-block 
designs together on the screen. Lei organized the arrangements by the 
numbers of blocks used and began predicting which attempts would be 
transformations of other arrangements even before she completed the 
hexagons.  The next challenge Lei set for herself was to see if she could 
create a hexagonal figure using only the orange squares.... (p. 116) 
 
The student is presented here as an apprentice mathematical researcher, posing 
original (to her) problems and investigating them through various means, guided by a 
more experienced member of the community of practice (i.e., the teacher).  And yet this 
vignette is notable as much for what it leaves out as for what it shows.  What preceded 
Lei’s decision to investigate the ways to cover the yellow hexagon using pattern blocks? 
What was the task that the teacher set for the students, and how did working on that task 
create a context in which Lei’s question could arise?  What was the work that the teacher 
had to do to create a context for investigation that allowed Lei to decide what she 
“wanted to know”? Is it only coincidence that she happened to “want to know” at 
precisely the time when the class was supposed to be engaged in mathematical work? 
What were other students working on while Lei pursued her questions?   Did they all 
“want to know” the same things? Did students “want” to learn the findings of others, and, 
if not, were they free to ignore them?  Were some investigations deemed more valuable 
than others?  According to what criteria?  Who makes such an evaluation? 
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The above discussion is intended to highlight the fact that it is much easier to 
create a single illustration of an individual student engaged in serious mathematical 
inquiry than it is to describe the work of teaching that makes such inquiry possible in a 
classroom.  And this is only a small part of the challenge.  Posing problems to and for 
oneself is only one of the many things that a mathematician does as part of her practice; 
some of the other things are represented in Fig. 1.1, below.  The network of practices 
represented in Fig. 1.1 is merely an illustration based on the author’s own experiences, 
and as such should not to be taken too seriously or too literally; nevertheless it suggests 
some of the complexity that characterizes mathematical practice.  It is one thing (already 
very difficult) to aspire to engage students in the work of conjecturing, investigating, 
proving, and so forth (the individual nodes of the diagram in Fig. 1.1); it is yet another 
thing to cultivate the habits of mind that generate new questions from existing 
knowledge, or a refined conjecture from a partial but incomplete proof, and so on — the 
arrows in the diagram.  These arrows represent the question, “What should I do next?”, 
and this question is, fundamentally, one mathematical vision and values: vision because 
the practitioner needs to perceive at any given moment what the available possibilities 
are, and values because the practitioner needs a way of determining which among those 
possibilities are most worthwhile.  To what extent can mathematics instruction be held 
accountable for the goal of cultivating these habits of mind, this mathematical sensibility, 
in students? 
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Figure 1.1.  Some of the things mathematicians do. 
 
Why Geometry? 
For more than a century, a course in Geometry has been part of the standard high 
school curriculum.  During that time, a variety of arguments have been brought forth for 
why all students should take Geometry; in a survey of those arguments, González & 
Herbst (2006) identified four modal arguments for the Geometry course.  The third of 
those arguments, which they call the mathematical argument, holds that Geometry is 
uniquely well-suited for providing students with experiences that are close to those of 
research mathematicians.  Indeed, Geometry is the only high school course in which 
students routinely deal with necessary consequences of abstract properties, and in which 
students are held accountable for reading, writing, and understanding mathematical proof.  
To be sure, for years advocates of reform have called for changing that status quo by 
integrating mathematical proof and reasoning across all of K-12 mathematics (NCTM 
1991, 2000), but at the present time Geometry remains students’ closest encounter with 
mathematics as it is practiced by mathematicians.  For this reason, it seems reasonable 
that if any course can serve to cultivate in students a mathematical sensibility, it would be 
the Geometry course. 
Existing
knowledge
Recent
discoveries
Open
Questions
Observations
Conjectures
New Questions
Special case
Partial proof
Generalization
New knowledge
New questions
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And yet despite this, the Geometry course has been criticized for years as a 
caricature of authentic mathematics, characterized by a proliferation of unnecessary 
postulates and imprecise definitions, claims that are accepted without proof, and proofs 
that valorize form over substance (Christofferson 1930; Thurston 1994; Usiskin 1980; 
Weiss, Herbst & Chen 2009).  In light of the fact that the Geometry course has 
historically struggled to live up to its perceived potential as an opportunity to enculturate 
students into authentic mathematical habits of mind, I posit that there must be something 
— some combination of institutional or sociocultural or psychological features — that 
makes this goal particularly challenging.  Taking these considerations in mind, I set out in 
this dissertation to answer the following research question:  What is the capacity for the 
high school Geometry course to serve as an opportunity for students to learn the elements 
of a “mathematical sensibility”?  More specifically, I ask: 
1.  What, precisely, are the elements of the  “mathematical sensibility”? 
2.  Do Geometry teachers customarily hold their students accountable for learning 
those elements? 
3.  If students were to be held accountable for such learning, how could that 
accountability be represented in the form of assessments? 
4.  What are the factors that make it difficult to teach a course with the intention 
of holding students accountable for learning the elements of the mathematical sensibility? 
 
Towards answering these four questions, the dissertation is structured in three 
main parts.  In the first part, I unpack the construct to explain just what could be meant by 
“mathematical sensibility”.  In the second part, I document how experienced teachers of 
 
 9 
Geometry respond to episodes in which one or more facets of the mathematical 
sensibility are on display.  Finally, in the third part I present a kind of “existence proof” 
— an analysis of a corpus of assessment items from classroom in which a teacher set out 
to teach the mathematical sensibility, and to hold students accountable for learning its 
component parts. 
The three parts of this dissertation are, in one sense, separate studies:  each draws 
on its own set of records, theoretical frameworks, and methodologies for analysis.  These 
several frameworks and methodologies will be described in the appropriate chapters.  But 
from another point of view, the three parts of the dissertation are interconnected, both 
structurally and thematically.  The proceeds of the first study, the conceptual analysis of 
“mathematical sensibility”, yields an enumeration of 16 distinct mathematical 
dispositions which, collectively, comprise my construct.  These 16 dispositions are then 
used in both subsequent studies to code and aggregate the data.  Moreover the results of 
the second study, the analysis of teachers’ responses to proposed episodes in which one 
or more mathematical sensibility is in play, define a kind of baseline or context against 
which the data for the third study becomes particularly meaningful. 
 
Overview of the dissertation 
I turn now to a brief description of the data sources, methods, and theoretical 
frameworks for the three parts of the dissertation in slightly more detail.  These will be 
further elaborated on in the relevant chapters. 
In the first part of the dissertation (Chapter 2), I undertake a conceptual analysis 
of the notion of a mathematical sensibility.  I begin from the position that any practice 
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(such as playing poker, writing computer programs, or doing mathematics) is 
characterized by a practical rationality (Bourdieu 1998; Herbst & Chazan 2003a).  This 
rationality informs the practitioner’s judgment about what is appropriate to do at any 
given moment; it is the “feel for the game” that practitioners draw upon in making timely 
decisions.  Bourdieu describes practical rationality as a network of interacting 
“dispositions”, a technical term referring to shared categories of perception and 
appreciation
2
.  Dispositions are the metaphoric lenses through which a practitioner looks 
out on practice:  they give structure to what the practitioner sees, and what he or she 
values.   
In this dissertation, the phrase “mathematical sensibility” will be taken to mean 
the practical rationality of research mathematicians.  The phrase “elements of a 
mathematical sensibility” will refer to the mathematicians’ dispositions, in the sense 
above.  These dispositions, it must be stressed, are not characteristics of any individual 
practitioners, but rather belong to the practice itself.  That is, the extent to which two 
individuals can be said to belong to the same practice depends directly on whether they 
possess shared categories of perception and appreciation.  Informally, we might say:  Do 
they speak the same language?  It also should be stressed that dispositions are, in the 
main, tacit (Polanyi 1997; Schön 1983); that is, we should not make the assumption that 
practitioners are consciously aware of the dispositions that shape their world-view.  
Rather, recent scholarship (Bleakley 2000; Brown 2005; Tsoukas & Hatch 2005) has 
argued that practitioners’ knowledge is stored in the form of narratives of practice.  For 
                                                
2
 I discuss other common uses of the word “disposition” (and related terms, such 
as “values”, “beliefs”, and “habits of mind”) in Chapter 2. 
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this reason, I seek to reveal the mathematical sensibility through a review of narratives of 
mathematicians at work. 
This review then provides a grounded basis for the second part of the dissertation 
(Chapter 3), in which I investigate whether the practice of geometry teaching provides a 
customary place for the elements of a mathematical sensibility.  Put another way, I seek 
to understand whether the categories of perception and appreciation that comprise the 
practical rationality of mathematicians are also found within that of Geometry teachers.  
As a practice, the teaching of Geometry is characterized by its own practical rationality 
(Herbst & Chazan 2003b), which should not be presumed to be the same as that of 
research mathematics.  Fig. 1.2 shows a schematic representation of the question.  To be 
clear, the analysis in Chapter 2 yields a set of dispositions that are emic, i.e. they attempt 
to describe mathematical practice from a practitioner’s own point of view; these 
dispositions are then deployed in Chapter 3 as etic constructs to test the extent to which 
the dispositions of mathematicians map on to corresponding dispositions within teachers’ 
own practical rationality.  (For an overview of the distinction between emic and etic 
research paradigms, see Guba & Lincoln 1994). 
 
Figure 1.2.  Two practical rationalities. 
Categories of Perception
Categories of Appreciation
Categories of Perception
Categories of Appreciation
Geometry teachers’ 
practical rationality
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 Towards this end I analyze records from study groups composed of experienced 
geometry teachers, and ask to what extent the dispositions identified in the earlier parts of 
the dissertation are visible in those records, whether they appear to be valued by teachers, 
and what the attendant costs are for teaching that attempts to make room for such 
dispositions.  This study makes use of data collected within the NSF-funded research 
project “Thought Experiments in Mathematics Teaching”, or ThEMaT (Herbst & Chazan 
2003b, 2006).  In the ThEMaT project, teachers are gathered in monthly study groups to 
view, enact, and discuss representations of teaching in the form of animated cartoons, 
printed comics, and other media.  These representations depict students and teachers in 
situations that include a blend of real and invented narrative elements: they narrate stories 
of instruction that are conceivable, but not necessarily probable or desirable.  The 
representations are then used as research probes; teachers’ respond to the representations 
of teaching by narrating their own alternative stories, or by articulating the circumstances 
under which the story would be viable, desirable, etc.  The records of these conversations 
yield a corpus of data that can be mined for analysis of teachers’ own practical 
rationality. 
This analysis of the study group data helps to establish a baseline against which 
the third part of the dissertation is set (Chapters 4-5).  In that part, I analyze a corpus of 
examination questions, written by a secondary mathematics teacher and used in three 
Honors Geometry classes over a four-year period, and attempt to describe how (some of) 
these tasks may be understood as embodying an opportunity to learn not only 
mathematical content, but also some of the elements of the mathematical sensibility that 
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are characteristic of research mathematicians.  The same set of dispositions generated in 
the first part of the dissertation is used as a set of codes for the items in this third part.  As 
part of the analysis, I study how the tasks in the corpus cohere across the timescale of the 
year by explicitly revisiting past content and connecting new problems to heuristics that 
have been successful in the past.  Additionally, I study the evolution of certain tasks 
(including the abandonment of some and their replacement by others) and changes in the 
large-scale structure of assessments over the three-year history of the corpus to illustrate 
how the nature and goals of assessment adapted over time.  This provides indirect 
evidence as to the factors that obstructed or resisted the goal of holding students 
accountable for learning the mathematical sensibility. 
 
An example 
At this point a concrete example may help to make my point.  One of the 
dispositions that emerge from the analysis of mathematicians’ narratives is a propensity 
for wondering whether under specified conditions there exists a certain kind of 
mathematical “thing” (a number with certain properties, a set with certain structure, etc.).  
An essential part of the experience of working on such questions is that the answer is 
genuinely in doubt; the goal is not merely to prove a claim that is already known to be 
true, or to provide a counterexample for a claim that is already known to be false, but to 
settle the question.  Shiryaev (2000) recounts how on several occasions the 
mathematician A.N. Kolmogorov produced counterexamples to claims that were widely 
believed to be true, and even produced counterexamples to his own conjectures, which 
served to advance his long-term research goals even as they frustrated his own short-term 
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aims.  (Details may be found in Chapter 2.)  Work of this nature is common in 
mathematics; the whole of Lakatos’s (1976) Proofs and Refutations foregrounds the role 
that such existence questions and counterexamples can play in advancing mathematical 
knowledge. 
 Data from the ThEMaT study groups supports the contention that existence 
questions of this sort play little role in most Geometry teachers’ practice.  For example, in 
a discussion of a ThEMaT animation in which students work for an extended period with 
a diagram of a figure that could not exist (i.e., a figure that has been overlaid with a 
system of markings that are mutually inconsistent with each other and with the class’s 
usual convention for handling geometric diagrams), teachers expressed consistently that 
questions of the sort “Is this possible?” are uncommon in their classroom.  Teachers 
agreed that, if a proposal to consider such an impossible geometric object were to come 
from the mouth of a student (as may unavoidably happen from time to time), it would be 
preferable to handle such an event by asking “What’s wrong with this figure?” (signaling 
immediately that the figure is defective).  Moreover, they report that they would only be 
inclined to call the possibility of a figure into question if the figure were, in fact, 
impossible; that they would typically pose such a question in terms of diagrammatic 
objects, rather than in terms of concepts (Weiss & Herbst 2007); and that they would 
prefer to avoid such questions altogether, rather than seek out opportunities to ask them. 
In marked contrast to this, questions of existence can be seen to play a significant 
role in the corpus of examination questions that I examine in chapters 4 and 5.  An 
analysis of the assessments from the 2003-2004 school year shows that each test contains 
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one or more questions that ask whether something is possible, or, alternatively, ask under 
what conditions something would be possible.  Some examples include: 
• If an angle is bisected by a ray, can either of the two sub-angles ever be obtuse?  
Justify your answer.  (Chapter 1 Test, #7) 
• Suppose S is a set of points that are non-collinear.  What is the minimum possible 
number of points in S? (Chapter 1 Test, #9a) 
• Is it possible, using only a straightedge and compass, to construct a 45° angle?  
Describe how in words, and demonstrate below.  (Chapter 1 Test, #12). 
• Make up your own example of a sentence which is false, but has a true 
contrapositive.  If this is not possible, explain why.  (Chapter 2 Test, #6). 
• If two lines intersect, can they be non-coplanar?  If yes, what are lines like this 
called?  (Chapter 3 Test, #7). 
• If two lines are coplanar, can they be non-intersecting?  If yes, what are lines like 
this called?  (Chapter 3 Test, #8). 
• Can a triangle be both isosceles and obtuse?  If so, draw an example and indicate 
the measure of the three angles.  If not, explain why.  (Chapter 4 Test, #1) 
• Determine whether it is possible or not to draw a triangle with sides of the given 
lengths.  In each case, write P if it is possible, or N if it is not possible.  If not 
possible, state clearly why.  [3 proposed triplets of lengths follow.](Chapter 5 
Test, #4). 
• Is it possible for a regular polygon to have every angle equal to 155°?  If so, how 
many sides must it have?  If not, why not? (Chapter 6 Test, #4) 
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More examples could be offered; in fact, out of 545 points possible on these six 
tests, fully 81 points (approximately 15%) were constituted of questions of this type.  
Furthermore, roughly half of these questions describe a mathematical possibility, while 
the remainder describe objects or configurations that are impossible.  In this set of items, 
then, the question “Is it possible?” is a manifestly nontrivial one, in that the mere posing 
of the problem does not automatically signal the correct answer. 
It is also worth noting that, while all of these questions call for a proof of one kind 
or another, they are written using a kind of language that is different from those 
commonly associated with proof exercises.  The latter are typically posed in reference to 
objects represented as diagrams, while the examples above primarily use verbal 
descriptions that denote abstract classes of objects.  These two registers normally play 
different functions in the geometry classroom:  it has been shown (Weiss & Herbst 2007) 
that the diagrammatic register is commonly associated with proof exercises, while the 
conceptual register is reserved for the teaching of theorems.  The use of the conceptual 
register in the context of problems that call for proof is thus itself a departure from what 
is normal in Geometry.  
For purposes of comparison, the “chapter tests” printed at the end of every unit of 
the course textbook (Larson, Boswell and Stiff 2001) were coded using the same 
procedures; of the 229 items in the textbook corpus, none asked questions of existence. 
There is thus strong empirical evidence to support the claim that, in the classroom 
in which the assessment items were used, questions of existence played a significant role, 
corresponding to the role such questions play in mathematical practice; and there is 
further evidence that this constituted a significant deviation from the norm, as articulated 
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by the ThEMaT study group participants and as represented by the chapter tests printed in 
the textbook.  In the chapters below, I provide additional examples of such deviations, 
corresponding to the other dispositions identified in Chapter 2. 
 
Discussion 
The goal of this dissertation, then, is to stage an assault on the principal research 
question by attacking it from three directions:  a conceptual analysis of the “mathematical 
sensibility”, an empirical study documenting Geometry teachers’ customary practice vis-
à-vis teaching the sensibility, and a second empirical study examining both how teaching 
can hold students accountable for the sensibility and what happens when this is tried.  
Before undertaking this inquiry, it is appropriate to briefly anticipate what they might 
yield, and how those proceeds connect with the larger questions touched on at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
A study focused exclusively on the high school Geometry class may seem to have 
only limited relevance for those who are concerned with the larger-scale problems of K-
12 mathematics education.  But, as I have noted above, the Geometry class is 
traditionally students’ closest point of contact with many of the activities of mathematics, 
and as such it seems reasonable to expect that it would be the most likely context in 
which students could find opportunities to learn the mathematical sensibility.  Put another 
way, any challenges to teaching of the mathematical sensibility in a Geometry class are 
likely to be all the more difficult to overcome in other contexts.  Educators who call for a 
renewed emphasis on mathematical reasoning and practices in the elementary grades may 
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find that the issues raised in this dissertation only scratch the surface of the issues that 
will be faced in those settings. 
On the other hand, it may be valuable to consider the (generally accepted) 
perspective that educational experiences in the formative years can have a profound 
influence on children’s later intellectual development.  If so, then the challenges faced in 
trying to teach a mathematical sensibility to high-school Geometry students might, in 
part, be attributed to a failure to teach the sensibility at an earlier stage:  put simply, one 
might wonder whether by the time students reach Geometry, it might be too late to 
cultivate in them a mathematical sensibility.  If this is so, then the work reported in this 
dissertation has an additional value:  by articulating in some detail what the mathematical 
sensibility consists of, it can help to start a conversation about what it would mean to 
make those elements part of classroom practice in a developmentally appropriate way at 
the elementary school level. 
Finally, it seems appropriate to consider these matters from the perspective of 
teacher education.  To what extent can teacher education programs cultivate a 
mathematical sensibility in the teachers themselves?  Readers who are concerned with 
improvements in teacher education may benefit from considering the high school 
Geometry course as an analog of the “Geometry for teachers” course taken by most 
preservice teachers.  The illustration of how the former course can take on the 
responsibility for teaching students a mathematical sensibility may serve as a model for 
how a similar goal can be undertaken in the latter course; and the documentation of the 
challenges of doing so in the high school course may help teacher educators to anticipate 
and plan for the difficulties that will likely face themselves. 
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Chapter 2 
A mathematical sensibility:  Analyzing mathematical narratives to uncover 
mathematicians’ categories of perception and appreciation 
 
Mathematical practices and mathematical narratives 
In subsequent chapters of this dissertation I will undertake an exploration of the 
question:  Can a secondary geometry course provide a context in which students can be 
taught what it is like to be a mathematician?  This chapter lays the groundwork for that 
exploration by answering a necessary preliminary question:  What, after all, does it mean 
to “be like a mathematician”?  In this chapter I attempt to answer this question with some 
precision through a detailed analysis of a number of narratives of mathematicians’ 
practice.  Before undertaking this, however, it is necessary to clarify a few key terms and 
providing some theoretical grounding for the method of analysis.  Thus I now take up 
three basic questions: 
(1) What is meant here by practice, and why should educators care about the 
practice of mathematicians? 
(2) What kind of narratives are meant, and why should one expect them to be of 
use in answering the question of what it is like to “be a mathematician”? 
(3) Who are the mathematicians whose narratives will be considered, and by what 
criteria is that sampling of mathematicians to be determined? 
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The relevance of the first question stems from the perspective that “learning 
mathematics” can (and ought to) be understood not only as the acquisition of content 
knowledge, but also as the enculturation into a collection of practices that are 
characteristic of the community of mathematicians (Lampert 2001; Sfard 1998; Wenger 
1997).  That is, “learning mathematics” can be understood to include (among other 
things) “learning to be like a mathematician”.  Of course “being like a mathematician” 
requires extensive subject matter knowledge — mathematicians know things about 
numbers and shapes and logic, and anyone who is to be like a mathematician certainly 
needs to learn those things as well.  But there is more to knowledge of mathematics, or 
indeed any practice, than can be expressed in the form of declaratory statements.  
Additionally there is the tacit knowledge that is encoded in, and expressed through, one’s 
actions (Polanyi 1997; Schön 1983).  “Learning mathematics” in this sense includes a 
behavioral component, in which the learner comes to behave like the members of the 
community of practice.  In much the same way that “learning chess” includes not only 
coming to know the rules of the game but also the development of a sense of what 
distinguishes a good position from a poor one, when it is appropriate to sacrifice a piece 
in order to gain advantage on the board, anticipating what one’s opponent is likely to do, 
and so forth (Chase & Simon 1973; de Groot 1978), “learning mathematics” includes a 
sense of what kinds of moves are timely and appropriate in a given circumstance. 
It would, however, be over-stating things to suggest that the practice of 
mathematics includes only what one does; it also includes what one perceives, and how 
one values it.  To stay with the example of a chess player, for example:  when players 
watch a game in which they themselves are not playing, they nevertheless make 
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judgments about how the game is going, what ought to or is likely to happen next, which 
player is stronger than the other, and so forth.  That is to say, a practice consists not only 
of actions but also contains (and is from one point of view defined by) a set of lenses 
through which the practitioner looks out on the practice.  One who is not enculturated 
into the practice — a novice player, say — is likely to lack some of those lenses, and thus 
be unable to see what the practitioner sees. 
In the view of the French sociologist Bourdieu (1998), a practice is characterized 
by a habitus or practical reason composed of a set of shared categories of perception and 
appreciation, which he refers to as “dispositions”.  The word “disposition” has a wide 
range of uses in education research (Diez & Raths 2007; Dottin 2009).  The word is 
frequently used to refer to a propensity to act in a certain way under certain 
circumstances, as “tendencies or inclinations to act in particular ways” (Feiman-Nemser 
& Remillard; Schwab 1976).  Others use the word “disposition” as a virtual synonym for 
“values” (e.g. Misco & Shiveley 2007) or “habits of mind” (e.g. Bass 2005).  Here I use 
the term in the more technical sense of Bourdieu’s reflective sociology.  In this usage, 
“dispositions” are an observer’s reconstruction of the tacit regulatory mechanisms of 
practice.  As such they are “neither individual commitments nor institutional 
requirements; they are like requirements in so far as they create a sense of intersubjective 
normality but they are implicit; they are like commitments in that they also accommodate 
personal preferences, though they are also transposable among people who do similar 
work” (Herbst & Chazan 2003a). 
Taking this notion as a starting point, I seek to describe part of the network of 
dispositions that characterizes the community of mathematicians.  This construct, the 
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practical rationality of mathematicians, stands in this dissertation as my proxy for what 
Ball and Bass (2003) have referred to as a “mathematical sensibility”.  This sensibility 
makes it natural for mathematicians to ask certain kinds of questions rather than others, to 
work toward answering those questions using certain methods rather than others, and to 
value certain kinds of results over others.  The “categories of perception” are the 
metaphorical lenses through which a mathematician views mathematical practice; the 
“categories of appreciation” are the metaphoric scales with which the mathematician 
appraises his work and that of others. 
To be still more precise, I here take on the problem of describing the dispositions 
that characterize a particular zone of mathematical practice:  namely, that part of 
mathematical practice concerned with the perception and appreciation of results, where a 
“result” is understood as either an implication of the form “P implies Q”, or as a “non-
implication” of the form “P does not imply Q”.  I also include in this zone the posing of 
mathematical problems, which could be considered partial anticipations of results:  they 
may take the form “Does P imply Q?”, or “What P’s imply Q?”, or “What Q’s are 
implied by P?” 
I note that in demarcating this particular zone of mathematical practice, I 
deliberately exclude other significant zones of practice.  I bracket almost entirely the vast 
zones of mathematical problem-solving and proving, of defining and symbolization, and 
of discourse and conviction.  Much scholarship has attended to these areas of 
mathematical activity.  For my present purposes, they will be treated as a kind of black 
box.  I am interested in how the inputs and outputs of mathematical work — respectively, 
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the problem posed and the result obtained — are perceived and appreciated by 
mathematicians; the work that mediates between the two belongs to other studies. 
In stressing the practices of mathematicians (as opposed to the results eventually 
produced by those practices) this study stands in contrast to the view of mathematics 
contained, for example, in Wu (1999).  In that work, “the characteristic features of 
mathematics” are said to be “precise definitions as starting point, logical progression 
from topic to topic, and most importantly, explanations that accompany each step” (p. 5).  
Wu recognizes that this work may be preceded by a more informal stage in which one 
encounters mathematical concepts in a less orderly fashion, but he likens this to the 
scientist’s “data collecting phase”, and is not to be regarded as mathematics per se.  Here, 
I wish to argue to the contrary that the work of navigating around in an ill-defined 
conceptual space, generating questions in the context of provisional definitions, in fact 
lies at the heart of what it means to be a mathematician.  The mathematics described by 
Wu is not the practice of mathematics, but rather the result of a practice that erases its 
own tracks (Lakatos 1976).  This, paradoxically, is itself a characteristic of the 
mathematical sensibility, which publicly values product over practice, but which requires 
practice to generate product. 
The goal of this chapter is to identify some of the elements of this mathematical 
sensibility.  Towards this goal, it is important to consider what sources of information 
might contribute to that understanding.  There is of course no shortage of scholarly works 
on the history of mathematics, the philosophy of mathematics, and so forth.  One might 
also survey mathematicians’ own research publications, monographs, textbooks, and so 
forth with the intention of trying to extract from them some sense of how mathematical 
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knowledge grows and changes over time; this is essentially the method employed to great 
effect by Lakatos (1976).  Here I take a different approach.  In recent years many scholars 
have argued forcefully that the wisdom of a practice — that is, the network of explicit 
and tacit knowledge that practitioners draw upon in the course of their activity — is not 
primarily stored in the form of declarative, general principles (as one might find in a 
philosophy of mathematics or in a mathematics textbook), but rather in the form of 
narratives of practice (Bleakley 2000; Tsoukas & Hatch 2005).   John Seely Brown 
(2005) articulated the distinction between learning disciplinary content and disciplinary 
practices thus: 
Learning has to do, not only with learning about something — we 
all know how to learn about something by reading books and so on — but 
also with, how do you learn to be?  There’s an immense difference 
between learning about and learning to be...  How can you be a physicist?  
How can you be a doctor?  How do you enculturate someone into the 
profession?  There’s a massive amount of tacit practices and sensibilities 
and lenses that we use to see and make sense of the world and act 
effectively in the world. ....  You can never talk someone rationally 
through a change in religion.  You design or craft experiences.  You go to 
the gut.  That’s what stories can do.  They may be able to help us unlearn.   
(pp. 56-7, emphasis in original.) 
 
If Brown is right, then our best hope of understanding what it means to be a 
mathematician may be through close examination not of mathematics publications 
(textbooks, monographs, and the like), nor works on mathematical philosophy, but rather 
through narratives about mathematicians and their work. 
Such narratives come in many forms.  On the one hand there are first-person 
memoirs written by mathematicians, and third-person biographies written about them.  
There are also fictional accounts, as in the theatrical play Proof, the motion picture Good 
Will Hunting, and the TV series Numb3rs (all three of which, it should be noted, 
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employed research mathematicians as script consultants).  Straddling these categories are 
semi-fictionalized biographies (such as the film version of A Beautiful Mind, loosely 
based on Sylvia Nasar’s non-fictional account of the life of John Nash), as well as 
historical reconstructions narrated in a quasifictional form (as in Lakatos 1976).  Each of 
these could be regarded as a “mathematical narrative” in one sense or another.  To make 
progress towards defining a coherent sample of narratives for analysis, some criteria for 
inclusion are required. 
The first criterion I follow is perhaps obvious, but it deserves emphasis.  I am 
interested here in narratives about mathematicians and their work, not simply narratives 
by mathematicians or narratives that happen to have mathematical content.  Thus I will 
not consider “mathematical fantasies” such as Edwin Abbot’s Flatland or its many 
sequels, or the dialogue portions of Hofstadter’s (1979) Gödel, Escher, Bach; nor will I 
consider works of fiction that happen to have been written by mathematicians, such as 
Lewis Carroll’s Alice books or Martin Gardner’s short stories and novels.  For 
complementary reasons I will likewise exclude from consideration other work that does 
focus on mathematicians’ practices, but in a way that disconnects it from the biography; 
e.g., Polya’s  (1957) How to Solve It or Rothstein’s (1995) Emblems of mind: The inner 
life of music and mathematics. 
The second criterion I employ to define the sample is in a sense the reverse of the 
first one:  I am explicitly seeking narratives about mathematicians’ work, not the 
individuals themselves.  That is, I am not particularly interested in the biographical 
details of the subject’s personal life, except insofar as those details may help to illuminate 
the values and practices that undergirded his or her mathematical activity.  For this reason 
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a biography that does not provide at least some descriptive detail about the subject’s 
mathematical work is of little use here.  On the other hand, I am after more than just a 
collection of major mathematical results, as one might find in a festschrift survey of a 
scholar’s research output; rather the goal is to try to see, to the extent possible, how those 
results came about, how the mathematician worked on them.  (Or, to be even sharper:  the 
target is the after-the-fact reconstruction of how a mathematician poses, works on, and 
values problems.)  For this reason I also exclude any work that does not include at least 
some element of biographical detail. 
A third criterion I adopt is to consider only modern mathematicians in the current 
sample — where by “modern” I mean mathematicians who did the bulk of their work in 
or after the 20
th
 century.  This criterion is based in part on the pragmatic need to bound 
the extent of the literature reviewed, but also rests on theoretical considerations.  
Mathematics has been a human activity for thousands of years, and it would be naive to 
assume that the practices and values that characterize that activity have remained 
unchanged over such a great span of time.  Indeed it is well-known that the history of 
mathematics shows evidence of profound shifts in mathematicians’ notions of what 
constitutes a well-formed definition, proof, and so forth (see Grabiner 1974 for an 
exemplification of this point).  Thus, while there may be much that Euclid, Descartes, and 
Erdös have in common, any characterization of the practice of mathematics that attempts 
to be all-encompassing is likely to be too general to be of much value for the present 
study. 
This brings us to perhaps the most difficult question of all, namely:  Just what is 
meant by “mathematician”, after all?  The umbrella term “mathematician” is quite broad, 
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encompassing a variety of different professional and amateur practices.  Definitions range 
from the nearly tautological (as in Merriam-Webster’s “a specialist or expert in 
mathematics”) to the thoroughly whimsical (as in Alfréd Rényi’s much-quoted, but 
undocumented, quip “A mathematician is a machine for turning coffee into theorems”).  
For the present purpose it is helpful to narrow the focus by distinguishing between those 
who might be said to be users of mathematics (a broad field encompassing most 
scientists, engineers, accountants, actuaries, etc.) and those who can be considered 
producers of mathematics, and to restrict attention to the latter category.  Of course this 
distinction is somewhat artificial, as any significantly novel use of mathematics may 
arguably be considered as a contribution of something new to the field.  Still, as a 
heuristic it seems reasonable for the present study to understand the term 
“mathematician” as referring to an individual whose primary occupation is the generation 
of new mathematical knowledge.   In other words, I am primarily concerned in this 
chapter with mapping out the dispositions that characterize the practice of research 
mathematicians
3
. 
What remains, after all of the above considerations are taken into account, are 
narratives of two types: (a) memoirs, as in, e.g., Hardy (1941/1992), Wiener (1956), and 
                                                
3
 This criterion should not be misunderstood as a denigration of "applied 
mathematics" as in any way subordinate or inferior to "pure mathematics".  On the 
contrary, narratives of both applied and pure mathematicians may be included in the 
sample, with the proviso that in the case of applied mathematics we are interested in the 
ways novel mathematical methods are generated and refined, and not primarily in how 
those methods are applied to solve disciplinary problems in areas other than mathematics.  
Of course the two cannot be entirely disentangled from one another, but my focus is on 
the mathematics, not its application. 
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Poincaré (1913/2001);  (b) and biographies, as in Bell (1965), Kanigel (1991), and Parker 
(2005).  A full list of the narratives that made up the sample for this analysis can be found 
in Figure 2.1, below.   No claim is here made that Figure 2.1 represents an exhaustive 
survey of the literature.  The goal in the present chapter is not to produce a rigorous, 
evidence-based profile of mathematicians’ practical rationality, but rather to develop and 
flesh out my conceptualization of the construct “mathematical sensibility” by using these 
narratives as a source of inspiration and a context for testing out concepts as they 
develop. 
 
MEMOIRS  
Author Title 
Hardy, G.H. A mathematician’s apology 
Ulam, S. Adventures of a mathematician 
Wiener, N. I am a mathematician. 
Davis, P. The education of a mathematician. 
  
BIOGRAPHIES  
Subject Title and author 
Zariski, O. The unreal life of Oscar Zariski (C. Parikh) 
Kolmogorov, A.N. Kolmogorov in perspective (History of Mathematics series, American 
Mathematical Society and London Mathematical Society) 
Moore, R.L. R.L. Moore: Mathematician and teacher (J. Parker.) 
  
Figure 2.1.  The sample of mathematical narratives. 
 
Emergent themes:  An overview of the mathematical narratives 
In subsequent sections of this chapter, I will analyze in close detail the narratives 
listed in Fig. 2.1, seeking common themes.  From this analysis, certain recurring elements 
of the mathematical sensibility emerge.  Here I give an overview and brief discussion of 
three of those themes, which will be exemplified later in the subsequent detailed analysis. 
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The first of the emergent themes is perhaps the most basic.  Again and again, the 
narratives portray mathematicians as individuals who not only work to solve problems, 
but also are characterized by a propensity to pose mathematical questions to and for 
themselves (that is, to wonder what is true); in other words, mathematicians are curious.  
This may seem self-evident.  And yet a major question of the next two chapters is 
whether schooling can provide students with an opportunity to wonder as mathematicians 
do (cf. my critique of the “Lei” vignette in Chapter 1). 
Beyond the observation that mathematicians pose problems, the narratives 
provide evidence of certain standard ways in which they pose problems.  I describe in 
detail a model of mathematical problem-posing in which new questions, in the form of 
possible relationships between contingent possibilities, are generated from already-
known relationships by an iterative process of modifications to the hypothesis and 
conclusion of a conditional statement.  Several variations of this process will be 
discussed, each based on a close reading of a passage from the mathematical narratives.  
While I argue that these processes are typical of the way mathematicians work, they are 
not necessarily part of mathematicians’ explicit mathematical knowledge; they are rather 
part of the practitioner’s tacit knowledge, what Schön (1983) called “knowing-in-action”.  
In what follows I will explicate these processes in detail.  I will also provide examples of 
how they could conceivably be used to generate problems in the context of a secondary 
course in Geometry. 
But not all of the problems mathematicians pose are viewed as equally deserving 
of effort being expended on them.  Some are never pursued; and even among those that 
are solved, not all results are equally valued.  Mathematicians employ logical criteria for 
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judging the relative quality of mathematical claims (what makes some claims stronger or 
weaker than others). In addition to these logical criteria, mathematicians also possess 
(and for the most part share) aesthetic criteria (Sinclair 2002) that regard certain problems 
and results as more “beautiful”, “elegant”, or “deep” than others.  Among these criteria 
are simplicity and unexpectedness.  As will be shown below, another mathematical value 
is an orientation towards theory-building.  By this I mean that mathematicians place a 
high value on work that clarifies or reconfigures the organization of a large collection of 
mathematical propositions by foregrounding the interrelationships among them.  This 
disposition, I show below, is instantiated in narratives that value the organization of a 
mathematical theory (the classification of certain propositions as axioms and others as 
theorems, the definitions of key concepts, the sequence in which topics are covered and 
theorems proved, etc.) as always provisional, tentative, and subject to revision.  All of 
these categories of perception and appreciation will be based on examples from the 
mathematical narratives. 
It is worth noting here that the themes above stand in approximate correspondence 
to Bourdieu’s (1998) “categories of perception and appreciation”.  The analysis of the 
processes by which mathematicians generate new questions aims at a description of how 
mathematicians perceive new problems as emerging from the milieu composed both of 
that which is already known to be true and of the other problems that have already 
emerged:  the categories of perception are the actions that a mathematician sees as 
available to do next.  The categories of appreciation, on the other hand, are those values 
with which mathematicians judge the relative worth of those different possible courses of 
action, as well as judge the worthiness of expending effort on new results and new 
 
 31 
questions.  Understanding how mathematicians pose problems, and how they appraise 
both problems that have been posed and solutions to those problems, is thus tantamount 
to mapping out the practical rationality that mathematicians bring to bear when engaged 
in posing and selecting problems to work on. 
These three themes — that mathematicians are problem-posers, that they employ 
certain generative moves to produce new questions, and that they employ multiple 
categories of appreciation to value both problems and solutions — structure my analysis 
below.  I certainly do not claim that there is nothing more to a mathematical sensibility 
other than what fits within these three broad themes.  On the other hand it seems that any 
account of what it means to “be like a mathematician” ought to at the very least include 
all of these themes, and consequently it is worth investigating the question of whether a 
secondary course in Geometry can provide a context in which these dispositions in 
particular can be cultivated.  That question will occupy my attention in subsequent 
chapters of this dissertation. 
 
Encounters with the unknown:   Mathematicians as problem-posers 
I begin by recounting two anecdotes culled from the collection of mathematical 
narratives I analyzed.  The first anecdote is taken from Stanislaw Ulam’s (1976) account 
of a 1937 road trip from Princeton to Duke University accompanied by John von 
Neumann.  In this recount, Ulam intertwines his encounters with American culture, 
reflections on ancient and modern warfare, personal details of Von Neumann’s married 
life, and — not least — musings on various mathematical and metamathematical issues: 
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On the way back from the meeting I posed a mathematical problem 
about the relation between the topology and the purely algebraic properties 
of a structure like an abstract group:  when is it possible to introduce in an 
abstract group a topology such that the group will become a continuous 
topological group and be separable?....  The group, of course, has to be of 
power continuum at most — obviously a necessary condition.  It was one 
of the first questions which concern the relation between purely algebraic 
and purely geometric or topological notions, to see how they can influence 
or determine each other. 
We both thought about ways to do it.  Suddenly, while we were in 
a motel I found a combinatorial trick showing that it could not be done.  It 
was, if I say so myself, rather ingenious.  I explained it to Johnny.  As we 
drove Johnny later simplified the proof in the sense that he found an 
example of a continuum group which is even Abelian (commutative) and 
yet unable to assume a separable topology....  Johnny, who liked verbal 
games and to play on words, asked me what to call such a group.  I said, 
“nonseparabilizable.”  It is a difficult word to pronounce; on and off 
during the car ride we played at repeating it.  (p. 103) 
 
The second anecdote comes from Wiener’s (1956) account of his first years as a 
young faculty member at M.I.T.  Wiener describes how he sought mathematical 
inspiration from the landscape: 
 
It was at M.I.T. too that my ever-growing interest in the physical 
aspects of mathematics began to take definite shape.  The school buildings 
overlook the River Charles and command a never changing skyline of 
much beauty.  The moods of the waters of the river were always delightful 
to watch.  To me, as a mathematician and a physicist, they had another 
meaning as well.  How could one bring to a mathematical regularity the 
study of the mass of ever shifting ripples and waves, for was not the 
highest destiny of mathematics the discovery of order among disorder?  At 
one time the waves ran high, flecked with patches of foam, while at 
another they were barely noticeable ripples.  Sometimes the lengths of the 
waves were to be measured in inches, and again they might be many yards 
long.  What descriptive language could I use that would portray these 
clearly visible facts without involving me in the inextricable complexity of 
a complete description of the water surface?  This problem of the waves 
was clearly one for averaging and statistics, and in this way was closely 
related to the Lebesgue integral, which I was studying at the time...   (p. 
33) 
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In many ways these two anecdotes are quite different.  Ulam’s account is of 
mathematics emerging in a discourse that is essentially a social one:  the friendly give 
and take of ideas with Von Neumann provides the context for mathematical inquiry.  
Wiener’s account, on the other hand, is one of a solitary thinker pondering the natural 
world around him.  Of course one may well regard cognition of this sort as a kind of 
internal discourse (Sfard 1998), but the fact remains that Ulam’s discourse comes across 
as qualitatively very different from that of Wiener. 
Moreover the accounts differ to the extent that the authors attach importance to 
the experiential world as an object of inquiry for mathematics.  Wiener is inspired by the 
natural world around him, and ascribes great value to the problem of finding a 
mathematical language for the description of complex physical phenomena; in stark 
contrast Ulam’s musings on the algebraic and topological properties of groups seem to be 
entirely disconnected from the world of material experience. 
Nevertheless the two accounts have one key feature in common, a characteristic 
that is present in all of the mathematical narratives I have analyzed:  That is, they present 
the mathematician as someone who wonders mathematically.  By this I mean that the 
mathematician works on mathematical problems not out of obligation or coercion but out 
of an intrinsic curiosity to know what the truth is.  Of course, the mathematician may also 
be motivated by other concerns — e.g., by a desire for professional advancement and 
prestige —  but at least part of what drives the mathematicians’ inquiry is the desire to 
know what is true.  The questions a mathematician wonders about are typically ones for 
which no answer is currently known, and which may resist attempts at a solution for 
months, years or even centuries. 
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Where does this curiosity come from?  More precisely, to what do practitioners of 
mathematics attribute their own curiosity?  In asking this question I am fully aware that 
mathematicians, like all of us, are prone to self-deception and selective memory.   
However, to the extent that mathematicians may report, in their narratives, stories of how 
their interest in mathematics was kindled, it seems worthwhile to attend closely to those 
recounts.  It may be facile to take at face value a story that a mathematician tells about a 
childhood episode; we certainly have no basis for attributing any kind of causal link 
between childhood experiences and subsequent mathematical expertise in adulthood.  But 
what such narratives can offer us is insight into what adult mathematicians value about 
their practice.  Therefore I examine these stories not to study the embryology of the child 
mathematician, but rather to understand the sensibility of the adult mathematician 
reflecting back on formative mathematical experiences. 
Ulam recounts how, as a child, he was “intrigued by things which were not well 
understood” .  He enumerates among his early interests the question of the shortening of 
Encke’s comet (an astronomical phenomenon that could not be explained by the physics 
of the day), Einstein’s theory of special relativity (which, to an 11-year old Ulam, was 
fascinating precisely because none of the adults in his life understood it), Euler’s Algebra 
(in which the symbolic notation “looked like magic signs” and gave him “a mysterious 
feeling”), and the question of the existence of odd perfect numbers (an unsolved problem 
in Ulam’s adolescence, and today).   These examples include both “things which were not 
well understood” by him and “things which were not well understood” in general.  Ulam 
reports that these encounters with the unknown provoked in him a deep desire to 
understand, and by the age of 11 he had begun to record his mathematical discoveries in a 
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notebook.  In contrast to Ulam’s own exploration of these mysteries, the mathematics 
taught in school seemed to him to be “dry” and consisted of memorizing “formal 
procedures”. 
Ulam’s description of encountering the mysterious in mathematics finds parallels 
in other narratives.  For example, Davis (2000) narrates how a childhood encounter with 
number games (“Take a number, any number.  Double it, add three, reverse the digits.  
Tell me what you get.  Ah then, the number you first picked was such and such”) sparked 
a curiosity that led him not only to figure out why the games worked, but also to invent 
new variations of his own.  Like Ulam, Davis narrates how, as a child of 11 or 12, he 
used to record his mathematical discoveries in a notebook that had been given to him by 
an older cousin:  “Things such that the sum of two odd numbers is always even.  The 
product of three consecutive numbers is always divisible by six.  By the time I went to 
college, Cousin H.’s lab book contained what is known in mathematics as the Newton 
formula for polynomial interpolation, a substantial but by no means remarkable 
achievement”  (pp. 7-8).  A similar anecdote is told about the Russian mathematician 
A.N. Kolmogorov (Shiryaev, 2000, p.4), who wrote of noticing “at the age of five or six” 
the pattern 1 = 1
2
, 1+3 = 2
2
, 1+3+5 = 3
2
, 1+3+5+7=4
2
, and so on.  The discovery was 
printed in a school newsletter, together with arithmetic problems that Kolmogorov, like 
Davis, devised on his own initiative.   
Although Ulam, Davis, and Kolmogorov write of nurturing their curiosity outside 
the formal boundaries of schooling, there is also evidence from the mathematical 
narratives that vibrant and creative instruction can play a critical role in cultivating this 
curiosity.   In particular John Parker’s (2005) biography of R.L. Moore suggests that 
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instruction can spark mathematical curiosity in those who do not fit the “child prodigy” 
mold.  Moore, of course, is as well-known for his innovative teaching methods as he is 
for his impressive body of mathematical research. In fact many of Moore’s 
unconventional teaching methods seem to have been intended precisely to stimulate 
mathematical curiosity in those who might not otherwise have pursued careers in research 
mathematics.  Parker documents, for example, how many of Moore’s eventual doctoral 
students originally intended to study other fields, but “were ‘caught’ by happening to take 
one of his advanced courses as an elective to round out their main objectives,” which 
included actuarial mathematics (R.L. Wilder), chemistry (G.T. Whyburn and F. Burton 
Jones), medicine (John Worrell), and so on.  Referring to this years later, Moore’s student 
R.L. Wilder remarked, “If any proof were needed that the capability of doing creative 
work in mathematics is not the rare genetic accident that it is commonly considered, 
Moore certainly gave it during his career as a teacher”  (quoted in Parker, p. 131). 
It is perhaps no coincidence that this uncommon success at stimulating 
mathematical curiosity occurred in an educational setting that was, by design, equally 
uncommon. Moore would ask his students to prove plausible-seeming claims that were 
subsequently revealed to be false; he would assign his classes sets of theorems to be 
proved, with unsolved problems concealed among them.  In forbidding his students from 
reading textbooks, and in forcing them to develop the body of a theory on their own, 
Moore attempted to lead his students to confront the same qualities of mystery in 
mathematics that Ulam and Davis discovered in childhood. 
I close this section with one final illustration of how an encounter with the 
unknown can stimulate one’s curiosity in mathematics.  In Davis’s (2000) reflections on 
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his high school years, he recounts how an appendix to one of his schoolbooks contained a 
“proof” that every triangle is isosceles.  Realizing the result was nonsense, Davis set out 
to painstakingly check the details of the proof, ultimately determining that the error lay 
not in the proof itself but in a mistaken diagram on which the proof relied.  Davis 
compares his experience with that of the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, as reported in John 
Aubrey’s Brief Lives: 
He [Hobbes] was 40 yeares old before he looked on Geometry; 
which happened accidentally.  Being in a Gentleman’s Library, Euclid’s 
“Elements” lay open, and ‘twas the 47 El. Libri I.  By G—, sayd he (he 
would now and then sweare an emphaticall Oath by way of emphasis) this 
is impossible!  So he reads the Demonstration of it, which referred him 
back to such a Proposition; which proposition he read, That referred him 
back to another which he also read.  Et sic deinceps. That at last he was 
demonstratively convinced of that trueth.  This made him in love with 
Geometry. 
 
What unites Hobbes’s experience with Davis’s, and finds resonance in the 
teaching methods pioneered by Moore, was the role of doubt in stimulating mathematical 
curiosity.  Davis, like Hobbes before him, faced a claim that he disbelieved; it was the 
desire to disprove that led them down unexplored pathways of logical reasoning.  
Moore’s students learned to doubt what they were told and to distrust any argument that 
was not thoroughly rigorous: 
He [Moore] often told a class to prove something that he knew was 
not true, for example to prove that if a point set is closed so is its 
projection onto the x-axis.  Moore asked:  Isn’t this much better than to 
tell them to prove that the projection onto the x-axis of a closed and 
bounded point set is closed?  Why should any teacher want to follow the 
latter procedure and therefore deprive a student of the opportunity to 
discover independently that one of these propositions is true and the other 
one is false?  (Parker, 2005, p. 262) 
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What this approach to teaching takes for granted — and what, in a sense, is the 
essence of mathematical curiosity — is that discovering the truth is “an opportunity” to 
be embraced, not a burden to be borne.  Encountering such opportunities requires the 
discoverer to work precisely in regions where the truth is unclear and in doubt. 
 
Moves for generating new questions 
In the pages above I have argued that a mathematical sensibility is characterized 
by a propensity to pose questions to, and for, oneself — that is, by the tendency to 
wonder about what is true.  In this section I attempt to sharpen the discussion by 
describing the kinds of questions mathematicians ask, and characterizing some of the 
ways in which old questions (and their answers) give rise to new ones. 
As a point of entry I return to the excerpt from Ulam (1976), cited above, and step 
slowly through his account of his exchange of ideas with von Neumann.  As we will see, 
Ulam and von Neumann consider not just one question but a whole series of them, each 
produced by a modification of the one preceding it.  Based on these modifications I will 
describe a series of “generative moves” that, I argue, are typical of the ways in which 
mathematicians pose new problems. 
Ulam begins by posing to his driving companion the question, “When is it 
possible to introduce in an abstract group a topology such that the group will become a 
continuous topological group and be separable?” In other words Ulam seeks after 
conditions on a group G that are sufficient to ensure that G is “separabilizable”, i.e. that it 
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may be endowed with a separable topology
4
. In a sense Ulam is attempting to “solve” for 
the unknown predicate P in the implication  
 P G( )! Separabilizable G( )  (1) 
Mathematics has been described as “the science that draws necessary 
conclusions” (Peirce, 1882).  From this point of view, what matters most to a 
mathematician is whether two contingent propositions stand in a relationship of logical 
implication together.  That is to say, a mathematician considers a certain category of 
mathematical objects, and certain properties (say P and Q) that may or may not be held 
by each of those objects, and asks:  If a certain object x is one for which P holds, does Q 
necessarily hold for x as well? 
Ulam’s initial question exemplifies this point of view.  His account does not tell 
us what he was thinking about, or what he and von Neumann were discussing, before he 
posed the question, so we unfortunately have no way of knowing why Ulam was 
wondering about the topological properties that abstract groups may be endowed with.  
That is, we do not know where the conclusion (the “Q”) comes from in Ulam’s question.  
But we do know what happens next.  Before proceeding to work further on this problem 
directly, Ulam (in his narrative, immediately) observes that “the group, of course, has to 
be of power continuum
5
 at most — obviously, a necessary condition.”  In other words 
Ulam asserts as obvious (and hence not requiring a detailed proof) the related implication 
                                                
4
 A topological space is called separable if it contains a countable dense subset 
(Munkres, 1975, p. 191).  For example, the real plane is separable, because the set of 
points with rational coordinates comprise a countable, dense subset.  In general an 
abstract group may be given many different topological structures; the question here is, 
“Can a particular abstract group be endowed with a separable topology?”  
5
 A set is said to be of power continuum if it has the same cardinality as the set of 
real numbers. 
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 Separabilizable G( )! PowerContinuum(G)  (2) 
Now, where did (2) come from?  We note that Ulam has taken the conclusion of 
his original question (1) and swapped it into the position of the hypothesis of a new 
implication.  In other words he has temporarily replaced question (1) with the converse 
problem:  to find a property 
 
! P such that 
 
 
Separabilizable G( ) ! " P G( )  (3) 
Moreover, since he knows already something of the theory of separable topological 
spaces, he is able to immediately find a property 
 
! P  that holds under the hypothesis that 
G is separabilizable.  Thus, en route to finding a sufficient condition for separabilizability, 
he has identified a necessary condition. 
In his next paragraph Ulam reports having found “a combinatorial trick showing 
that it could not be done”.  But what is the “it” to which Ulam refers?  What was “it” that 
he found could not be done?  Does he mean to say that the problem (1) has no solutions 
— in other words that there are no conditions sufficient to ensure that G is 
separabilizable?  Surely not; on the contrary, all of the classical continuous groups have 
separable topologies, so one could simply take as a property P(G) that G is isomorphic 
(as a group) to one of those.  So Ulam cannot mean to say that there is no property P that 
will work as a solution to (1).  Rather, it appears from his next few sentences that the “it” 
to which he refers is a proof of the converse of the implication (2): 
 PowerContinuum(G)! Separabilizable G( )   (4) 
In other words, Ulam is seeking to determine whether the necessary condition he 
has already identified is also sufficient, as well.  An affirmative answer to this question 
would constitute not only a solution to the original question (1); it would in addition be a 
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“best possible” solution, insofar as no weaker hypothesis could possible exist.  On the 
basis of the narrative so far, we can identify one of the generative “moves” that produces 
new questions from old ones:  consideration of the converse.  By applying this move 
twice in rapid succession, Ulam has replaced the open-ended question (1) with the 
candidate solution (4). 
What Ulam discovered with his “combinatorial trick” was that he could produce 
an example of a group of power continuum that could not be endowed with a separable 
topology; in other words, he found a counterexample to establish that  
 PowerContinuum(G) /! Separabilizable G( )   (5)  
Ulam does not recount the details of his combinatorial trick, but in a sense it does not 
matter for the present purpose.  Here the goal is to describe not how mathematicians solve 
problems, but rather how they pose them, and in particular in the way one problem can 
generate others.  So far we have seen Ulam pose a problem that seeks a sufficient 
condition for a particular conclusion; replace that problem by its converse; find a (to him, 
obvious) solution to that converse problem; and then ask whether the solution to the 
converse problem works as a solution in the original.  Having resolved this latter question 
negatively, what could happen next? 
Ulam goes on to recount that after he explained his “combinatorial trick” to von 
Neumann,  “Johnny... found an example of a continuum group which is even Abelian 
(commutative) and yet unable to assume a separable topology”.  Ulam describes this as a 
simplification of the proof, but it might be more precise to say that von Neumann has 
asked (and answered) a new question generated from the last.  What von Neumann has 
done is to strengthen the hypothesis of the failed implication (5) to see whether so doing 
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produces, at last, a sufficient condition to answer Ulam’s original question (1).  That is, 
von Neumann considers the additional assumption that G is abelian, and produces an 
example to show that 
 PowerContinuum(G) + Abelian(G) /! Separabilizable G( )  (6) 
It is important to note that von Neumann’s proposed (and rejected) condition — 
that G is an abelian continuum group — does not come from the same generative move 
as Ulam’s earlier attempt.  Von Neumann did not come up with this proposed condition 
by considering a converse and finding a necessary condition; on the contrary, most 
separable continuous groups are not abelian.  Rather, von Neumann is putting into play a 
second and distinct generative move:  strengthen the hypothesis of an implication that is 
known to be false, and see whether it continues to be false. 
Here Ulam’s narrative stops — but the questions need not.  One could continue to 
ask whether one could further strengthen the hypotheses by adding additional conditions 
on G that might be sufficient to prove that G is separabilizable.   It may be that some such 
strengthening would eventually succeed.  If this were to happen, one natural next move 
would then be to see if the sufficient condition could be weakened at all to find a “better” 
one.  If this subsequent refinement were to prove unsuccessful, one might then (re-
)consider the converse, i.e. examine whether the (discovered) sufficient condition is also 
a necessary one. 
Alternatively, one could abandon (at least temporarily) the attempt to find a 
sufficient condition for (1), and instead try to weaken the conclusion of (6).  That is, one 
could say:  All right, it has now been established that not every abelian continuum group 
can be endowed with a separable topology.  Are there any different, weaker topological 
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properties that could be proven from the assumptions that G is abelian and of at most 
power continuum?  The process of strengthening and weakening hypotheses and 
conclusions, occasionally interchanging them, can continue in this fashion until one 
either finds a theorem that one can prove, or a large collection of counterexample that 
persuades (by weight of evidence) that the algebraic properties of an abstract group do 
not directly determine its topological properties. 
The analysis so far suggests that one of the ways in which mathematicians 
generate new questions from existing ones is by an iterative series of adjustments made to 
the hypothesis and conclusion of a “candidate” proposition.  These adjustments can be 
regarded as some of the “moves” in the “game” of mathematics.  Among the moves 
discussed so far are: 
(1)  Considering the converse.  In this move, the hypothesis and conclusion of a 
proposition under consideration are interchanged with one another to generate a new 
proposition. 
 (2)  Strengthening a hypothesis.  In this move, the hypothesis of the proposition 
under consideration is amended, while the conclusion is kept constant.  The goal here is 
to see whether a hypothesis that has so far proved insufficient for a desired conclusion 
can be bolstered into sufficiency, or alternatively whether it is still possible to produce a 
counterexample. 
In addition to these two, there are five obvious additional moves of a similar type. 
I now briefly list them; following that I exemplify each of them from the mathematical 
narratives and discuss them in some more detail.  The moves are: 
(3) Weakening a hypothesis. 
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(4) Weakening a conclusion. 
(5) Strengthening a conclusion. 
(6) Generalization. 
(7) Specialization. 
 
The move weakening a hypothesis is in some respects the opposite of (2).  This 
move can be brought into play when a hypothesis has already been established as 
sufficient; in weakening the hypothesis, one asks whether the result (i.e. the implication 
 
P! Q) can be improved upon (logically strengthened) by taking a weaker hypothesis.  
As in strengthening a hypothesis, in this move the hypothesis of a conditional statement 
is modified while the conclusion is left untouched (contrast with the related move 
generalizing, below). 
For an example of this move, we turn to Davis (2000).  Davis recalls (pp. 58-66) 
how we he was fascinated for years by what is known as Pappus’s Theorem.  This 
theorem asserts that given any two lines, and any choice of three points on each of the 
two lines, if certain segments are drawn joining the points to one another, then the 
segments will intersect in three points which will always be collinear.  Later, Davis 
learned of a generalization, known as Pascal’s Theorem.  This latter describes essentially 
the same phenomenon occurring when the six points are chosen on a conic section.  
Davis concludes his summary of the two theorems by noting that “Pascal implies Pappus.  
Why?  Simply because the initial two straight lines of Pappus can be considered a 
degenerate conic section” (p. 63).  We could describe Pascal’s theorem as being 
“generated” from Pappus’s by saying that the latter’s hypothesis of six points on two 
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lines is replaced by the weaker Pascal hypothesis of six points on a conic section — with 
the same result being proved under the weaker conditions.  I do not claim that historically 
Pascal’s theorem was produced this way.   But Pascal’s theorem could be generated from 
Pappus’s theorem by applying a kind of standard move (namely, “weaken the 
hypothesis”).  More importantly, the narrative shows that this way of regarding Pascal’s 
theorem has salience for the mathematician, i.e. Davis.  Notice, however, that Davis’s 
ability to recognize the Pascal hypothesis as a weakening of the Pappus hypothesis itself 
relies on the fact that he already knows that “two straight lines... can be considered a 
degenerate conic section”.  That is, one’s capacity to weaken or strengthen a hypothesis 
(or to recognize a weakened hypothesis as such) requires that one already knows a 
network of results related to that hypothesis. 
To illustrate how this mechanism might play out in a more elementary context, 
consider the following theorem of Euclidean geometry:  If ABCD is a rectangle, then its 
dual
6
 is a rhombus.  How might one attempt to weaken the hypothesis “ABCD is a 
rectangle”?  One could begin by generating a list of (already known to be true) 
propositions of the form “If ABCD  is a rectangle, then...”   For example, “If ABCD is a 
rectangle, then it is a parallelogram” would be one such proposition on that list.  One next 
takes, in turn, the conclusion of each of those propositions (e.g., “ABCD is a 
parallelogram”), and proposes it as a candidate hypothesis that might (or might not) 
imply that a dual quadrilateral is a rhombus.  In this fashion, one can generate a list of 
questions like the following: 
                                                
6
 The dual of any polygon is formed by joining the midpoints of successive sides 
so as to create a new polygon. 
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If ABCD is a parallelogram, will its dual necessarily be a rhombus? 
If ABCD contains a right angle, will its dual necessarily be a rhombus? 
If ABCD has reflection symmetry about a line that is not a diagonal, will its dual 
necessarily be a rhombus? 
If ABCD has two congruent diagonals, will its dual be a rhombus? 
And so forth.   In each of these questions we consider a property that is strictly weaker 
than “ABCD is a rectangle” and ask whether that weaker property is strong enough to 
force the necessary conclusion about the dual of ABCD.  The questions generated by this 
process are not trivial: note that of the four examples listed above, the first two must be 
answered “No” but the second two can be answered “Yes”.  Moreover, when this process 
yields a true proposition, a reconsideration of that proposition’s hypothesis could lead to 
the definition of a new mathematical entity, or a new definition for an existing one.  That 
is to say, the predicate “ABCD has reflection symmetry along a line that is not a 
diagonal” (the third example from the above list) describes both isosceles trapezoids and 
rectangles (and nothing else); recognizing this fact might suggest that an exclusionary 
definition of “trapezoid” be replaced with a more inclusive definition that subsumes 
“rectangle” within it as a special case.  On the other hand, the predicate “ABCD has two 
congruent diagonals” describes a still larger class of quadrilaterals, including but not 
limited to the isosceles trapezoids; this class has no conventional name, but the fact that 
this property has been identified it as a sufficient condition for a desired conclusion might 
warrant giving it one.  Thus the generative move of weakening a hypothesis not only 
generates new questions; it can lead to the recognition of entirely new classes of objects. 
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The move weakening a conclusion was hinted at above, when I suggested that 
Ulam and von Neumann might have continued their inquiry by investigating whether it 
might be possible to prove some weaker topological property about abelian groups of 
power continuum.  This move functions in more or less the same way as does 
strengthening a hypothesis:  That is, when a certain property has been shown to be not 
necessary under particular conditions, we might attempt to find some weaker property 
that is necessary under the same conditions.  On the other hand if we have succeeded in 
proving that a particular property is necessary under conditions, we might see if we can 
go farther by strengthening the conclusion. 
From a formal point of view, “weakening a hypothesis” and “strengthening a 
conclusion” can be regarded as the same thing; likewise “strengthening a hypothesis” and 
“weakening a conclusion” are, at a purely formal level, equivalent.  This is because every 
implication of the form 
 
P! Q is logically equivalent to its contrapositive; and 
“weakening the hypothesis” of one such implication is identical to “strengthening the 
conclusion” of its contrapositive (and vice versa).  Thus these two moves may be 
regarded as one and the same.  This is particularly clear when a proposition is stated in an 
“unparsed” or “succinct” form  — one in which the roles of P and Q are partially masked.  
For example, Hardy (1940) discusses at some length Pythagoras’s proof of the 
irrationality of 2 .  Now, the statement “ 2  is irrational” does not, on its face, have the 
form of an implication 
 
P! Q.  It can be translated into this form, however, in either of 
the two following ways: 
“If x is rational, then x
2
! 2 ” 
“If x
2
= 2 , then x is not rational” 
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The relevance of this example for the present discussion is that, almost 
immediately on completing his narration of the proof, Hardy makes use of one of the 
moves under discussion: 
We should observe first that Pythagoras’s argument is capable of 
far-reaching extension, and can be applied, with little change of principle, 
to very wide classes of ‘irrationals’.  We can prove very similarly (as 
Theodorus seems to have done) that 3 , 5 , 7 , 11 , 13 , 17  are 
irrational... 
 
Now this list of irrational numbers seems not to have been arbitrarily chosen.  
Only a few pages earlier, Hardy had presented Euclid’s proof of the existence of 
infinitely many primes, and illustrated the definition of “prime” with the sequence “2, 3, 
5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29...”  A reader who has been following Hardy’s arguments 
closely is likely to note the correspondence between these two lists of numbers.  So what 
Hardy seems to be saying in the paragraph quoted above is, in essence:  The square root 
of any prime number is irrational.  Comparing this with the two parsed statements above, 
one could regard this latter statement either as a weakening of the hypothesis in the first 
formulation (in that “x
2
 is prime” is weaker than “x
2
 = 2”), or a strengthening of the 
conclusion in the second formulation (in that “x
2
 is not prime” is stronger than “ x
2
! 2 ”.  
The distinction is immaterial.  What matters is that this movement (from “ 2  is 
irrational” to “the square root of any prime is irrational”) is an illustration of how 
mathematicians generate new questions (which may be answered affirmatively, as in this 
case, or negatively) by weakening or strengthening the hypothesis or conclusion of a 
proposition whose truth status has been already established. 
In the examples above, one side of an implication 
 
P! Q was modified 
(strengthened or weakened) while the other side was kept fixed.  Such moves produce 
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new implications, or new counterexamples, that are “better” than the original ones.  A 
related, but somewhat different, move consists of simultaneously weakening both sides of 
an implication.  That is to say, one might assume less, but also prove less.  The resulting 
implication cannot be regarded as “better” than the original one, but it can be appreciated 
as a generalization of the first result.  On the other hand one might proceed in the 
opposite direction, simultaneously strengthening both sides of an implication (proving 
more, but at the cost of stronger assumptions); such a move can be regarded as a 
specialization. 
Generalization and specialization form another pair of moves that a 
mathematician may make use of when maneuvering in a complex problem space.  
Shiryaev’s (2000) retrospective of Kolmogorov’s life and work illustrates how 
Kolmogorov and his contemporaries used these twin moves to generate research 
questions.  In a seminal 1928 paper, Kolmogorov found necessary and sufficient 
conditions for what he called the “generalized law of large numbers”.  Two years later, he 
found (stronger) sufficient conditions for a stronger conclusion, the “strong law of large 
numbers”.  This result was itself a strengthening of Borel’s original (1909) formulation of 
the strong law of large numbers, which required a sequence of independent Bernoulli 
random variables. This law was proved again in 1927 by Khinchin, “who gave a 
sufficient condition for it that is applicable also to dependent variables” (Shiryaev, p. 15). 
Khinchin’s result can be seen as an application of the move “weakening the hypotheses”, 
and Kolmogorov’s 1930 result is a further application of the same move.  Along similar 
lines, Kolmogorov produced generalizations of, specializations of, and strengthenings of 
the “law of the iterated logarithm”. 
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In fact much of Kolmogorov’s early work seems to have been motivated by the 
desire to generalize established results.  In a 1930 paper, he set out to produce a 
generalized, axiomatic theory of integration.  Writing in that paper he wrote that his goal 
was: 
... to clarify the logical nature of integration.  And while, besides a 
unification of different approaches, a generalization emerged of the 
concept of integral, the point here apparently is that a generalization of a 
concept is often useful for comprehending its essence...  It is not 
impossible that all these generalizations may be of interest also for 
applications, though I see the merits of the more general approach first and 
foremost in the simplicity and clearness introduced by the new concepts.  
(Quoted in Shiryaev, pp. 9-10) 
 
Part of the significance of this last passage is that Kolmogorov does more than 
argue that generalization has utility as a means for generating new questions; additionally 
he situates that utility in the context of a set of values that determines what kinds of 
questions are important ones.  In particular Kolmogorov places a high value here on work 
that illuminates a common “essence” that may be shared by seemingly disparate 
mathematical ideas.  In the next section, I will turn in more detail to an analysis of the 
values that mathematicians draw upon in appraising the relative value of a question 
and/or an answer. 
To illustrate how the twin moves of generalization and specialization could work 
in the context of geometry, consider again the problem of the angle bisectors of a 
quadrilateral, described earlier.  From the proposition “If ABCD is a parallelogram, then 
its angle bisectors form a rectangle” one could try to specialize the proposition by 
considering a stronger hypothesis and seeing what additional conclusions can be proved 
— e.g., “If ABCD is a rectangle, then its angle bisectors form a square”. Or one could try 
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to generalize it, by considering a weaker hypothesis and seeing what can be proven — 
e.g., one might find that “If ABCD is a trapezoid, then its angle bisectors form a 
quadrilateral with two right angles opposite each other”, or the still more general “If 
ABCD is any quadrilateral, then its angle bisectors form a quadrilateral in which 
opposite angles are supplementary”. 
 
Dialectic in mathematics 
The above example illustrates the way in which theorems and counterexamples 
can take shape through a series of modifications to a hypothesis and conclusion.  This 
indeed is one of the principle themes of Lakatos (1976), which characterizes the process 
of mathematical discovery as a dialectic between that which is assumed (e.g. the 
definitions and axioms of a theory) and that which is to be proved, and identifies proofs 
and refutations as opposing forces that drive the dialectic forward. 
The notion of dialectic is almost as old as philosophy itself.  At its root, dialectic 
means “the argumentative usage of language” (Popper 1940), in which theories are put 
forth and critiqued.  The dialogues of Plato are dialectics, in which the question-and-
answer dialogic structure reflects the underlying back-and-forth structure of the 
argument.  Hegel elevated the role of the dialectic, basing on it a dynamic model of 
history, and indeed of nature itself.  Hegel considered developmental processes in which 
each stage of development is generated as an attempt to resolve internal contradictions 
(or oppositions) present in the previous stage.  Thus in Lakatos, for example, the presence 
of a proof of a theorem, and the simultaneous proffer of a counterexample to that same 
theorem, forces a reconsideration of the proof, which can lead to the recognition of 
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certain unexamined assumptions, and eventually to a reformulation of the theorem and its 
proof to take account of the counterexample.  This resolution of the contradiction is 
likely, however, to contain within it further contradictions, which in turn generate 
additional refinements to the theorem, and so forth.  Processes that are dialectical in this 
manner are “self-moving” (Larvor 1999). 
The so-called “Hegelian dialectic” (named after, but not actually used by Hegel 
himself) is a particular formulation of this dynamic in which the dialectic unfolds through 
the three distinct stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.  Here, the thesis and antithesis 
are two opposing poles of an argument, or two opposing forces in history, and the 
synthesis is that which is generated by the confrontation of thesis with antithesis.  This 
triadic formulation is often understood to refer to distinct chronological stages: that is, 
the thesis is put forward first, the antithesis is put forward second as a response to the 
thesis, and the synthesis comes last as a resolution of the contradiction.  In the more 
general notion of dialectic, the thesis and synthesis need not be temporally separated in 
this fashion:  rather, any time two opposing forces or arguments are in play, they can be 
said to constitute a dialectical pair that may have generative force as their contradictions 
drive the process forward. 
Curiously, Hegel himself regarded mathematics as un-dialectical, and hence “inert 
and lifeless” (Hegel, 1807/1977, p. 26).  According to Larvor (1999), Hegel understood 
“mathematics” as a synonym for the formal product of mathematician’s work.  In this 
form, mathematics proceeds linearly from definitions and first principles to theorems.  
Hegel’s critique was that, despite the fact that each stage of a mathematical argument 
may be deduced from the previous stages, there is nevertheless nothing in the previous 
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stages that compels what the next stages ought to be.  At any point in a proof, there are 
many possible next lines; mathematicians make their selection of what should follow 
based on considerations that are external to mathematics itself; therefore “according to 
Hegel, a proof tells us more about the ingenuity of the mathematician than it does about 
the meaning of the theorem” (Larvor 1999, p. 1). 
Lakatos, in revealing the heuristic mathematics that precedes that formal product, 
reveals the fundamentally dialectic (and Hegelian) nature of mathematical work.  In his 
reconstruction of the proof of Euler’s Theorem, Lakatos shows how a series of proposed 
proofs and refutations led to a reconsideration of the basic assumptions of the theory of 
polyhedra, ultimately leading to an entirely new conceptualization of a polyhedron not as 
a solid but as a closed surface, and to a collection of modifications of Euler’s Theorem 
that both reduce the scope of the claim and extend it to other cases.  Thus the proofs and 
refutations mediate between a conclusion and a set of assumptions that are both 
continually in flux.  Lakatos writes, “Mathematics, this product of human activity, 
‘alienates itself’ from the human activity which has been producing it.  It becomes a 
living, growing organism, that acquires a certain autonomy from the activity which has 
produced it; it develops its own autonomous laws of growth, its own dialectic....  Any 
mathematician, if he has talent, spark, genius, communicates with, feels the sweep of, and 
obeys this dialectic of ideas” (p. 146). 
If Lakatos is right in claiming that “any mathematician... feels the sweep of” the 
dialectical driving force that pushes mathematics forward, then it is reasonable to suppose 
that any attempt to map out the elements of the mathematical sensibility is likely to find 
expression in the form of dialectical pairs.  Note the deliberate use of the plural, here:  As 
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Kiss (2006, p. 309) observes, Lakatos made no claims that the dialectic of proof and 
refutation was the sole motive force in mathematics; on the contrary, Kiss argues, 
Lakatos recognized translation and interpretation among other motive forces.  Nor did 
Lakatos insist on fitting all mathematical dialectics into the rigid triadic thesis-antithesis-
synthesis pattern: 
[Lakatos’s] approach to dialectic does not mean to accept a small 
set of schemes given by Hegel.  Dialectic is meant much more in a 
classical sense, where the dialogue and the debate are the basic sources of 
knowledge.  Hegel is a good source for Lakatos, because he emphasizes 
the positive role of contradiction in the development of knowledge.  (Kiss, 
p. 309) 
 
One of my chief goals in the remainder of this chapter will be to describe, on the 
basis of the mathematical narratives, a number of mathematical dispositions that, I argue, 
are organized in dialectical pairs in the Hegelian sense.  Each of these pairs points to two 
mathematical values that coexist and push against one another in a kind of dynamic 
tension.  It is important to reiterate, however, that I do not claim that mathematicians are 
consciously aware of these dialectical pairs, or that they deliberately “activate” certain 
generative moves when seeking ideas for what to do next.  Rather, my goal is something 
akin to Lakatos’s “rational reconstruction” of a mathematical argument.  Lakatos (1978, 
p. 103) distinguishes between heuristic and methodology:  the former refers to the rules 
of discovery, while the latter is a post hoc synthetic description of the apparent 
mechanism by which results were discovered.   It is the latter at which I aim.  In claiming 
that these pairs are among the categories of perception and appreciation of 
mathematicians, I am trying to show that mathematicians themselves perceive these 
categories as useful descriptors of their work. 
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In this context it is worth revisiting one of the generative moves described above; 
namely, Considering the converse problem.  From one point of view this move seems not 
to fit into a dialectical framework:  what is its partner?  But there is another way of 
regarding this move: namely, one can interpret Considering the converse as its own 
dialectical partner.  More explicitly, this move is “self-dual” in the sense that applying it 
twice in succession returns one to the problem originally under consideration.  
Significantly, though, such a double reversal does not leave one at a standstill; on the 
contrary, considering the converse and then reconsidering the preconverse can be 
generative in that one ends up with more than one began with.  Ulam’s narrative is an 
example of this:  he begins with a problem (“Find a condition P that implies 
separabilizability”), considers the converse problem (“Find a condition 
 
! P that  is implied 
by separabilizability”), solves that problem (“separabilizability implies ‘power 
continuum’”), and then considers the converse problem of that solution (“Does ‘power 
continuum’ imply separabilizability?”).  Because of its generative quality, I regard 
Considering the converse and Reconsidering the preconverse as a dialectical pair of 
generative moves. 
In summary, to this point I have identified in the mathematical narratives five 
generative moves that mathematicians use in determining what could be done next.  The 
five moves are organized in dialectical pairs (one of the moves is its own dialectical 
partner), in that the two members of each pair point in (so to speak) opposite directions.  
These generative moves, shown in Fig. 2.2, stand as a first approximation at mapping the 
categories of perception of mathematical practice in the context of problem-posing:  they 
provide a language for describing what a mathematician sees as visible possibilities.   In 
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the subsequent section I turn to the narratives again to build an inventory of categories of 
appreciation.  Together these two inventories will comprise a description of 
mathematicians’ practical rationality, or, as I have been referring to it, the mathematical 
sensibility, as it applies to posing and valuing mathematical problems and results. 
 
(strengthen/weaken) hypothesis (strengthen/weaken) conclusion 
generalize  specialize 
consider converse  consider converse 
 
Figure 2.2.  Categories of perception (generative moves). 
 
Categories of mathematical appreciation 
Overview 
It is important to note that while the generative moves described in the previous 
section can be instrumental for generating many new questions for a mathematician to 
investigate, not all of those questions will be deemed to be of equal value.  Indeed a 
mathematician may be aware of many problems that could potentially be investigated, 
but only choose to work on a small subset of those problems.  We may describe the 
problem space as filtered, in the sense that some problems are given a higher value than 
others.  To some extent this filtration is conditioned on pragmatism: at any given 
moment, some problems seem to be well within reach, while others seem more distant.  
The choice of what problem to work on may also be guided by a strategic sense that 
solving certain “nearby” problems may prove instrumental in a future attack on other 
“more distant” problems. 
But quite apart from pragmatic concerns about which problems are tractable and 
which are not, there is an additional set of criteria that mathematicians bring to bear in 
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determining which problems are important and which are not.  We can see this most 
clearly in the case of a mathematician reading a research report, or learning that a 
colleague has successfully solved a problem: some such accomplishments are esteemed 
very highly, others less so.  In this section, then, I turn again to the mathematical 
narratives to understand how mathematicians decide what is important, and what is not.  
How do mathematicians choose which questions to pursue and which to ignore?  In other 
words, what are the values that a mathematician brings to bear in judging a question 
(whether one of his own posing, or an extant open problem) as worthy of pursuit?  And 
are there other categories of appreciation, besides “importance”, that are shared among 
practicing mathematicians? 
In asking those questions one must be prepared to find that not all mathematicians 
care about the same things, and to some extent “what is important” may vary across 
mathematical sub-specialties.  A seminal result in logic and foundations of mathematics 
(e.g., the independence of the axiom of choice from the Zermelo-Frankel axioms of set 
theory) may be of only mild interest (or none at all) to a topologist.  Despite this, there 
may well be categories of appreciation that cut across content areas –values that are more 
or less universal among mathematicians. Andrew Wiles’s proof of Fermat’s Last 
Theorem, for example, was widely hailed as important, even among mathematicians far 
removed from the technical details of elliptic curves and modular forms (Singh 1998).  
What was it about this accomplishment that made it seem so significant? 
In his celebrated A Mathematician’s Apology, Hardy (1940/1992) identified two 
such categories of appreciation, namely beauty and seriousness.  Regarding beauty, he 
wrote: 
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The mathematician’s patterns, like the painter’s or the poet’s, must 
be beautiful; the ideas, like the colours or the words, must fit together in a 
harmonious way.  Beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place in 
the world for ugly mathematics....  It would be difficult now to find an 
educated man quite insensitive to the aesthetic appeal of mathematics  It 
may be very hard to define mathematical beauty, but that is just as true of 
beauty of any kind — we may not know quite what we mean by a 
beautiful poem, but that does not prevent us from recognizing one when 
we read it. 
 
Hardy freely admits to being unable to define mathematical beauty, and instead 
shifts towards a deeper analysis of the related notion of “mathematical seriousness”. He 
identifies two criteria that contribute to a judgment of the seriousness of a piece of 
mathematical work:  generality and depth, but concedes that “neither quality is easy to 
define at all precisely”.  Moreover he hastens to point out that “some measure of 
generality must be present in any high-class theorem, but too much tends inevitably to 
insipidity” (emphasis in original).  In regards to depth, Hardy likewise struggles to make 
explicit what he means: 
This is still more difficult to define.  It has something to do with 
difficulty; the ‘deeper’ ideas are usually the harder to grasp: but it is not at 
all the same....  It seems that mathematical ideas are arranged somehow in 
strata, the ideas in each stratum being linked by a complex of relations 
both among themselves and with those above and below.  The lower the 
stratum, the deeper (and in general the more difficult) the idea....  It may 
happen that [an idea in one stratum] can be comprehended completely, 
that we can recognize and prove, for example, some property of the 
integers, without any knowledge of the contents of lower strata....  But 
there are also many theorems about integers which we cannot appreciate 
properly, and still less prove, without digging deeper and considering what 
happens below....   This notion of ‘depth’ is an elusive one even for a 
mathematician who can recognize it, and I can hardly suppose that I could 
say anything more about it here which would be of much help to other 
readers. 
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Sinclair (2002), in her doctoral thesis on the mathematical aesthetic, surveys a 
number of prior attempts to go beyond Hardy’s theory of the aesthetic, but finds little in 
common among them.  Of particular note is the work of Le Lionnais (1948 / 1986, cited 
in Sinclair, pp 26-28).  The latter, according to Sinclair, identifies two distinct categories 
of mathematical conceptions of beauty, classicism and romanticism.  The former finds 
beauty in “equilibrium, harmony and order”; the latter, in “lack of balance, form 
obliteration and pathology”.  The classicist aesthetic values highly structured patterns, 
such as magic squares or Pascal’s triangle, and methods of proof that contain a regular 
structure, such as proofs by induction.  The romanticist aesthetic, on the contrary, highly 
regards “pathological” phenomena such as asymptotes and imaginary numbers, and 
“romantic methods, such as reductio ad absurdum proofs, [which] are characterised by 
indirectness.”  Although neither Le Lionnais nor Sinclair use the language of dialectic, 
we may see in these opposing categories an example of the kind of dialectical pair 
discussed above.  Le Lionnais suggests that mathematicians are either romantics or 
classicalists, and that being one or the other is a matter of personal preference, and so it 
may be; on the other hand we might say that both of these approaches are characteristic 
of the practice of mathematics, and that in any given instance, the individual practitioner 
may base a judgment on an appeal to one or the other of these factors.  Much the same 
approach is taken by Larvor (2001): 
First, the dialectical philosopher of mathematics adopts what I 
have just called the ‘inside-phenomenological stance’.  Do not let the word 
‘phenomenological’ mislead you.  This is not a study of what it feels like 
to do mathematics.  The phenomenologist takes up a point of view and 
studies its logical constitution as it were ‘from the inside’.  But we are not 
concerned with the individual mathematician.  We are interested in the 
‘point of view’ belonging to mathematics itself.  This way of speaking is 
of course analogical.  Mathematics has no subjectivity in the proper sense.  
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It feels neither joy nor pain.  Nevertheless, the analogy is not mysterious.  
We can say that the theory of projectile motion is ‘blind’ to the ethical 
difference between a distress flare and an assassin’s bullet (though 
theorists are not).  There is no mystery in the remark that analysis was 
‘conflicted’ over the rival versions of the early calculus (though individual 
mathematicians clearly supported one over the other)....  The point of the 
inside-phenomenological stance is to insist that changes in the body of 
mathematics normally take place for mathematical reasons.  (pp. 214-215). 
 
Sinclair’s work is also significant in that she pays particular attention to the 
generative and motivational role of the mathematical aesthetic.  By this she means that an 
aesthetic sensibility not only serves for making after-the-fact evaluations of completed 
mathematical work; additionally it can both guide work that is in progress, and play a 
crucial function in the posing of new mathematical problems.  In this respect, Sinclair’s 
“aesthetics” corresponds closely to the notion of practical rationality as I have described 
it above.  The main difference between the theoretical constructs rests in the role they 
ascribe to beauty.  A theory of aesthetics takes beauty as the object of inquiry, and 
attempts to elucidate the component qualities that combine to produce a judgment that 
something is or is not beautiful.  A theory of practical rationality, on the other hand, seeks 
to identify the full set of lenses with which the practitioner looks upon the world:  while 
beauty may be one of those lenses, it is not assumed to be an all-encompassing or even 
dominant one. 
Corfield (2001) takes on the question of how mathematicians describe the relative 
value of one mathematical concept (the notion of groupoid).  He proposes five broad 
categories of mathematical values: 
1. when a development allows new calculations to be performed 
in an existing problem domain, possibly leading to the solution 
of old conjectures; 
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2. when a development forges a connection between already 
existing domains, allowing the transfer of results and 
techniques between them; 
3. when a development provides a new way of organising results 
within existing domains, leading perhaps to a clarification or 
even a redrafting of domain boundaries; 
4. when a development opens up the prospect of new, 
conceptually motivated domains; 
5. when a development reasonably directly leads to successful 
applications outside of mathematics.  (p. 508-509). 
 
 
Corfield stresses that these categories are neither exclusive nor comprehensive.  In 
fact each of these five categories corresponds roughly to one of the categories of 
appreciation I outline below.  Here I simply note in passing that Corfield’s list of 
categories seems to possess, at least in part, an unrecognized dialectical structure:  the 
first two categories are in some sense directed opposite one another, as are the next two. 
In the pages that follow I return to the corpus of mathematical narratives to find 
evidence of multiple categories of appreciation that seem to be part of the mathematical 
sensibility.  As has been suggested above, these categories appear to be organized in 
dialectical pairs.  That is to say, instead of identifying a particular quality Q  (beauty, 
depth, etc.) and appraising a mathematical work by saying it either “has Q” or “lacks Q”, 
in some cases it seems more appropriate to identify pairs of qualities (Q1, Q2) that are in a 
sense opposed to one another, and show how the mathematical narratives characterize 
mathematical work as being “more Q1” or “more Q2”.  As Popper (1940) points out, the 
opposing pairs in a dialectic are in a relationship that is more accurately described by the 
metaphor of polarity than by the language of contradiction.  It is not contradictory to 
assert (as I do below) that, for example, “Mathematicians appreciate simplicity” and at 
the same time “Mathematicians appreciate complexity”.  Rather, the fact that both 
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simplicity and complexity are simultaneously held in regard by mathematicians creates 
an inner tension that provides a motive force generating new mathematics. 
In particular I identify the following categories of appreciation (the paired 
categories will be treated together): 
(1) Utility / Abstraction 
(2) Surprise / Confirmation 
(3) Theory-building / Problem-solving 
(4) Simplicity / Complexity 
(5) Formalism / Platonism 
 
I will devote most of my attention to the first three of these pairs, which appear to 
be the most prominently on display in the narratives; these three will also be the ones that 
I use as an organizing framework in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  The latter 
two pairs will be discussed in less detail. 
 
Utility / Abstraction 
It is generally accepted among the public at large that mathematics is a useful 
discipline.  Recent reports, such as the National Academies’ Rising above the gathering 
storm (Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy 2007), have argued forcefully 
that the economic and technological challenges of the future demand a mathematically 
sophisticated populace. The very first paragraphs of the NCTM’s Principles and 
Standards describe the increasing role of mathematics in everyday life: 
We live in a mathematical world. Whenever we decide on a 
purchase, choose an insurance or health plan, or use a spreadsheet, we rely 
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on mathematical understanding. The World Wide Web, CD-ROMs, and 
other media disseminate vast quantities of quantitative information. The 
level of mathematical thinking and problem solving needed in the 
workplace has increased dramatically. 
In such a world, those who understand and can do mathematics 
will have opportunities that others do not. Mathematical competence 
opens doors to productive futures. A lack of mathematical competence 
closes those doors. 
 
Mathematics that is not directly relevant to “real life” will be referred to here as 
“abstract” mathematics.  That is, “abstract” mathematics is understood to be disconnected 
from any kind of experiential context or warrant.  The distinction between “utilitarian” 
and “abstract” mathematics is not a sharp one; mathematics that is quite abstract (e.g. the 
classification of quadratic equations in two variables) may become quite useful when 
applied to a real-world context (e.g. the study of gravitational orbits in a two-body 
system).  “Utility” and “abstractness” are not presented here as mutually exclusive labels, 
nor as two ends of a continuum.  Rather, they are here used to refer to alternative 
categories of appreciation, categories which are opposed to one another and thus 
comprise a dialectical pair.  That is to say, it is not an individual “piece” of mathematics 
that is abstract or utilitarian; rather, “abstract” and “utilitarian” are distinct ways of 
appreciating mathematical work and of generating new mathematics.  The fact that these 
two opposing categories may both point to the same mathematical “thing” is an 
illustration of the workings of the dialectical triad:  the thesis and antithesis find their 
resolution in the production of a synthesis. 
Before proceeding it is important to clarify that by “useful” here is meant utility in 
a domain other than pure mathematics. Of course even the most abstract and rarified 
mathematical ideas and results may be instrumental in solving some other mathematical 
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problem; that is a different kind of usefulness.  Here we are concerned with what Hardy 
calls ‘practical utility’: 
It is undeniable that a good deal of elementary mathematics — and 
I use the word ‘elementary’ in the sense in which professional 
mathematicians use it, in which it includes, for example, a fair working 
knowledge of the differential and integral calculus — has considerable 
practical utility.  These parts of mathematics are, on the whole, rather dull; 
they are just the parts which have least aesthetic value.  The ‘real’ 
mathematics of the ‘real’ mathematicians, the mathematics of Fermat and 
Euler and Gauss and Abel and Riemann, is almost wholly ‘useless’ (and 
this is as true of ‘applied’ as of ‘pure’ mathematics)... 
But here I must deal with a misconception.  It is sometimes 
suggested that pure mathematicians glory in the uselessness of their work, 
and make it a boast that it has no practical applications.  The imputation is 
usually based on an incautious saying attributed to Gauss, to the effect 
that, if mathematics is the queen of the sciences, then the theory of 
numbers is, because of its supreme uselessness, the queen of mathematics 
— I have never been able to find an exact quotation.  I am sure that 
Gauss’s saying (if indeed it be his) has been rather crudely misinterpreted.  
If the theory of numbers could be employed for any practical and 
obviously honourable purpose... then surely neither Gauss nor any other 
mathematician would have been so foolish as to decry or regret such 
applications.   (pp. 119-121) 
 
 
In light of the widespread agreement on the usefulness of mathematics, it is 
notable that the mathematical narratives are frequently critical of the position that the 
primary function of education is to teach useful mathematics.  Davis (2000) for example, 
writes derisively about the commonplace perception that only “useful” mathematics 
belongs in school: 
In those days, it was considered part of a liberal education to know the 
quadratic formula.  I’m not sure how the formula fares now.  
Mathematical educators are apt to ask:  Does your average dentist have 
occasion in his practice to use the quadratic formula?  Does your average 
insurance salesman?  Will the solution to the quadratic equation bring 
peace on earth?  You’re not sure?  Then to hell with it. (p. 17) 
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The importance of this critique rests not in what it has to say about education, but 
in what it tells us implicitly about the values Davis attaches to his own work.  That is, his 
critique of “mathematical educators” serves to establish a contrast between “us” 
(mathematicians) and “them” (mathematical educators).  In caricaturing the other as 
preoccupied with utility to the exclusion of all other values, Davis indirectly 
communicates the extent to which his own practice can attach value to mathematics that 
has no overt utilitarian application. 
The above examples may give the impression that mathematicians look with 
unanimous disinterest on the utilitarian character of mathematics.  But this would be a 
misrepresentation.  Indeed, the mathematical narratives provide ample evidence that 
mathematicians also place a high value on mathematics that finds its origins and its 
application in real-world contexts.  The passage from Wiener (1956), quoted already at 
the beginning of this chapter, is but one example: 
The moods of the waters of the river were always delightful to watch.  To 
me, as a mathematician and a physicist, they had another meaning as well.  
How could one bring to a mathematical regularity the study of the mass of 
ever shifting ripples and waves, for was not the highest destiny of 
mathematics the discovery of order among disorder?  At one time the 
waves ran high, flecked with patches of foam, while at another they were 
barely noticeable ripples.  Sometimes the lengths of the waves were to be 
measured in inches, and again they might be many yards long.  What 
descriptive language could I use that would portray these clearly visible 
facts without involving me in the inextricable complexity of a complete 
description of the water surface? 
 
Nor is Wiener unique in this regard.  Ulam (1976) finds similar inspiration from 
pondering the meaning of the word “billowing”: 
‘Billowing’ is a motion of smoke, for example, in which puffs are emitted 
from puffs.  It is almost as common in nature as wave motion.  Such a 
word may give rise to a whole theory of transformations and 
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hydrodynamics.  I once tried to write an essay on the mathematics of 
three-dimensional space that would imitate it.  (p. 105) 
 
Wiener and Ulam begin from different places — Wiener gazes at the Charles 
River, Ulam ponders the meaning of words — but both are inspired mathematically by 
the challenge of modeling complex real-world phenomena with mathematics.  Thus 
Wiener’s use of the Lebesgue integral
7
 to study idealized Brownian motion
8
 — in which 
he showed that such motions corresponds to the class of continuous but nowhere-
differentiable curves (Wiener, p. 39) — can be appreciated both as utilitarian as well as 
abstract.  Much the same could be said of Ulam’s invention of Monte Carlo methods
9
 
(Ulam, pp. 196-201) for solving physical problems. 
Another example comes from the work of Kolmogorov.  Arnol’d (2000, p. 89-90) 
recounts how he had constructed for himself a hypothetical narrative of how Kolmogorov 
came to his groundbreaking research on invariant tori
10
.  Arnol’d supposed that 
Kolmogorov’s interest on invariant tori had emerged from his studies of turbulence.  
When, in 1984, he had the opportunity to ask Kolmogorov whether his supposition was 
correct, the latter replied that in fact his research had been motivated by problems in 
celestial mechanics.  It is interesting that Arnol’d was wrong about the particulars of 
Kolmogorov’s motivation, but right in ascribing it to a problem that emerges from 
                                                
7
 The Lebesgue integral is an extension of the familiar notion of the Riemann 
integral:  it allows for the integration of a broader class of functions. 
8
 Brownian motion is the random movement of particles suspended in a liquid or 
gas.  Although the motion of an individual particle undergoing Brownian motion is 
unpredictable, certain statistical measures of an ensemble of such particle may be 
calculated. 
9
 Monte Carlo methods refers to a class of computational methods in which a 
large number of random or semi-random processes are simulated numerically. 
10
 Invariant tori arise in the solution of many integrable systems of differential 
equations in classical mechanics. 
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attempting to mathematically model complex empirical phenomena.  This example shows 
that the category of “utility” is shared by both of these mathematicians. 
 
Surprise / Confirmation 
“Utility” and “abstraction” are not the only categories with which mathematicians 
appraise pieces of mathematical work.  Another dialectical pair of categories of 
appreciation that emerges from the mathematical narratives is “surprise” / 
“confirmation”. 
A mathematical result is surprising if it establishes something that was not 
expected to be true.  Often surprises come in the form of counterexamples.  A classic 
example is Weierstrass’s 1871 discovery of a function that is continuous but nowhere-
differentiable.  Weierstrass’s function was not the first example of a such a function, but 
it was the first to achieve wide recognition, and it called into question work done by prior 
mathematicians who had naively assumed that a continuous function would always be 
differentiable except, perhaps, at isolated points.  Peano’s 1890 example of a continuous, 
space-filling curve similarly came as a surprise to mathematicians of the time. 
The opposing category of appreciation for “surprise” is “confirmation”.  A 
mathematical result may be appreciated for confirming something that was widely 
believed to be true, but not yet proven.  Thomas Hales’s 1998 proof of the Kepler 
conjecture — that the face-centered cubic lattice has maximal density among all sphere 
packings — falls into this category:  the finding was seen as significant in no small part 
because it put to rest a long-standing conjecture.  A proof of Goldbach’s conjecture, if 
one were to be discovered, would similarly be hailed as an important confirmatory result.  
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(And, of course, if a counterexample to Goldbach’s conjecture were found, it would be 
hailed as a surprising counterexample.) 
 It should be noted that being “surprising” is a time-dependent quality.  At the time 
Weierstrass and Peano presented their counterexamples, they were quite unexpected; the 
same could not be said of successive counterexamples that showed the same thing.  If 
these other counterexamples are also valued, it must be with other categories of appraisal 
(such as “simplicity”; see below). 
Consider, for example, the history of Fermat’s Last Theorem (Singh 1998).  At 
the time Fermat made his infamous margin note, the result he claimed to have proven 
may have been quite surprising.  Why, after all, would anyone have expected that the 
equation a
n
+ b
n
= c
n
 have no whole-number solutions for n > 2?  On its face it seems 
quite an unlikely claim.  Of course, by the time Andrew Wiles came to work on the 
problem, it was generally taken for granted that it was true. Wiles’ result was not 
monumental for proving something surprising, but rather for confirming what generations 
of mathematicians had come to believe was true but were unable to prove themselves. 
Shiryaev’s (2000) biography of Kolmogorov notes that the latter made his initial 
mark by finding counterexamples to refute claims made by established mathematicians: 
During his first year [as a university student] (1920-1921) he attended 
N.N. Luzin’s lectures on the theory of analytic functions....  At one of the 
lectures devoted to a proof of Cauchy’s theorem Luzin used the following 
assertion: “Let a square be partitioned into finitely many squares.  Then 
for any constant C there is a number C! such that for every curve of length 
at most C the sum of the perimeters of the squares touching the curve does 
not exceed C!.”  Luzin posed this as a problem for his listeners to prove.  
“I was able to show that this assertion is actually erroneous,” recalled 
[Kolmogorov].  “[Luzin] at once saw the idea of the example disproving 
the supposition.  It was decided that I should report the counterexample at 
the student mathematical circle.”  (pp. 6-7) 
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Only two years later (1922) Kolmogorov constructed another counterexample, 
one that became “his most famous result in the area of trigonometric series: the 
construction of an example of a Fourier-Lebesgue series diverging almost everywhere” 
(Shiryaev, p. 8), a counterexample which he improved on in 1926 when he presented an 
example of an integrable function whose Fourier series diverges everywhere.
11
  Shiryaev 
remarks that “both these examples were completely unexpected for specialists and made 
an enormous impression”.  So deep was the impression, in fact, that Arnol’d (2000, p. 90) 
reports a conversation with the French mathematician M.R. Fréchet in 1965 (more than 
four decades later) in which the latter said, “... Kolmogorov, isn’t he the young fellow 
who constructed an integrable function with almost everywhere divergent Fourier 
series?”  As Arnol’d remarks, “All the subsequent achievements of Andrei Nikolaevich 
[Kolmogorov] — in probability theory, topology, functional analysis, the theory of 
turbulence, the theory of dynamical systems — were of less value in the eyes of Fréchet.” 
Parker’s (2005) biography of R.L. Moore narrates mathematical episodes in the 
life not only of its principal subject, but also of many of Moore’s students.  In describing 
the work of two of them, Edwin Moise and R. H. Bing, Parker discusses how Moise’s 
dissertation analyzed the properties of the “pseudo-arc”.   According to Parker, “Moise 
was convinced at the time that the pseudo-arc wasn’t homogeneous.  Bing became very 
interested, and... eventually [produced a] characterization of the pseudo-arc as a 
homogeneous indecomposable, chainable continuum.  This result contradicts most 
                                                
11
 I note in passing that this "improvement" is itself an exemplification of 
generative moves described above. 
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people’s intuition about the pseudo-arc, including, at the time, Moise’s, and directly 
contradicted a published, but erroneous, ‘proof’ to the contrary.” 
Moore appears to have made a particular effort to create opportunities in his 
classroom for students to experience this kind of surprise by finding counterexamples for 
theorems that were suspected of being true.  Parker cites F. Burton Jones, one of Moore’s 
former students, to this effect:   
“Quite frequently when a flaw would appear in a proof everyone would 
spend some time (possibly in class) trying to get an example to show that 
it couldn’t be ‘patched up’, i.e., a counterexample to the argument (even 
though the theorem might be correct).  This kind of experience is seldom 
encountered in courses or in any place outside of one’s own research 
work.  Yet this kind of activity is vitally necessary for the research 
worker.”   (Parker, p. 152) 
 
This practice can be regarded as an attempt to cultivate through pedagogy one of the 
mathematical dispositions.  As such it touches on and presages the substance of the 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation, which ask whether the high school Geometry 
class can serve as a site for cultivating in students the mathematical sensibility. 
 
Theory-building / Problem-solving 
 In this section I discuss two qualities that form another dialectical pair of 
categories of appreciation:  theory-building and problem-solving.  By theory-building I 
refer to an orientation towards mathematics that places a high value on the organization 
of a body of mathematical work.  Theory-building comes to the fore when, for example, a 
mathematician takes a collection of already established results and arranges (or 
rearranges) them into a theory, perhaps proposing new and more economical definitions 
and postulates.  From one point of view theory-building focuses less on proving “new” 
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mathematics than on illuminating the relationships among existing pieces of 
mathematical knowledge.  From another point of view, of course, establishing such a 
relationship can be regarded as a “new” and important result in its own right.  The 
following examples will help to clarify this point. 
John Parker’s (2005) biography of R.L. Moore describes the young Moore’s early 
work on the foundations of geometry.  In his studies of Hilbert’s then-recent Grundlagen 
der Geometrie (1899), Moore proved that one of Hilbert’s axioms (the fourth 
‘betweenness axiom’) was derivable from the remaining axioms, and thus could be 
regarded as a theorem rather than an axiom.  According to Parker, Moore was so excited 
at this finding that “he dashed over the campus late in the evening”, and, seeing a light 
shining in the window of his mentor G.B. Halsted, went at once to show the latter his 
proof (Parker, p. 35). 
What I wish to point out about this episode is that from one point of view it could 
be said that Moore’s discovery did not add any “new knowledge” to the field of 
geometry.  The property that Moore proved was already an established component of the 
theory.  But to view the episode in that way is to miss the point entirely.  A mathematical 
theory is more than a collection of properties; it is the organization of those properties 
into a web of contingent implications that makes a theory.  What Moore had done — and 
indeed what Hilbert had done before him — was to contribute to an ongoing project 
(spearheaded by Hilbert) of fundamentally restructuring an existing theory by placing it 
on a new set of foundations.  Indeed for the next decade much of Moore’s mathematical 
output concerned the independence and interdependence of various proposed 
axiomatizations of geometry. 
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In fact, as Parker goes on to explain, the fact that the fourth betweenness axiom 
followed from the others was already known, and had been published the previous 
January by his namesake, Professor E.H. Moore of the University of Chicago.  However, 
whereas the elder Moore’s proof was lengthy and awkward (Halsted referred to it as an 
“obscure and bungling adumbration”), the young Moore’s result was elegant and simple.  
Here again we see that the significance of a mathematical discovery may lie somewhere 
other than in its propositional content. 
This example is particularly important in the light of the analysis I will present in 
the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  Its importance resides in the fact that Moore 
was working on questions concerning the organization of the theory of Euclidean 
geometry — that is, the same theory that (in a simplified form) is the content of the high 
school Geometry curriculum. 
Parker reports that Moore made his most significant contributions in the emerging 
theory of point-set topology, or analysis situs as it was then known.  Here again Moore’s 
focus was primarily on the organization of the theory itself.  Moore’s seminal papers in 
the field explored the consequences of various proposed sets of axioms for topology and 
verified the independence of the axioms in those sets.  Moore’s goal appears in part to 
have been the development of a theory that contained just enough axioms, and no more, 
to produce all of point-set topology.  But of course “point-set topology” was itself a 
construct undergoing constant revision and reinvention at the time.  Moore’s work, and 
that of his contemporaries, was rooted in an approach to axioms and definitions that 
regarded them always as provisional and subject to revision. 
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Moore was, of course, not the only mathematician who placed a high value on the 
structural aspects of mathematical work.  Parikh’s (1991) biography of Oscar Zariski 
deals extensively with Zariski’s efforts to reorganize the projective geometry of the so-
called “Italian school” along more rigorous, algebraic lines.  So radical was Zariski’s 
restructuring of the field that a talk he gave at the University of Moscow in 1935 evoked 
open hostility from an earlier generation of mathematicians:  “Finikov and some other 
geometers of the old school who’d not been very much exposed to algebraic geometry 
rose up to complain: ‘Is this algebraic geometry?  What is the matter?  We’ve never seen 
such geometry!’...  Pontrjagin, Sobolev, and the other younger men tried to defend me, 
but it was no use” (p. 79).  In this work, Zariski was pushing the frontiers of algebraic 
geometry, discovering new theorems and defining new concepts, while simultaneously 
creating a new structure for the existing field: creating new definitions for existing 
concepts, discovering new proofs of existing theorems, and — perhaps most significantly 
— generalizing the theory to encompass fields of arbitrary prime characteristic.  Thus 
Parikh reports, 
By combining the algebraic notion of a regular local ring with the 
geometric notion of a simple point, he was eventually able to define both 
normal varieties and simple point in the case of characteristic p.  (p. 90) 
 
The idea that producing a definition may be rightfully regarded as a significant 
mathematical accomplishment is a good example of the theory-building point of view, as 
well as the value of generalization.  It stands in marked contrast with the position of Wu 
(1999), quoted above, which regards precise definition as the starting point of 
mathematics, and denigrates all work leading up to that moment as a kind of inductive 
“pre-mathematics” akin to the scientist’s “data collecting phase”. 
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The dialectical partner of theory-building is problem-solving.  Where theory-
building places a premium on the development (and re-development) of concepts and the 
organization of results about those concepts, problem-solving places high value on the 
development of a large and flexible toolkit of heuristics.  In recognizing problem-solving 
as the counterpart to theory-building, I am following the mathematician and Fields 
medalist W.T. Gowers, who wrote about the two frames in his essay on the “two cultures 
of mathematics” (Gowers 2000).  In that essay, Gowers wrote: 
The “two cultures” I wish to discuss will be familiar to all 
professional mathematicians.  Loosely speaking, I mean the distinction 
between mathematicians who regard their central aim as being to solve 
problems, and those who are more concerned with building and 
understanding theories.  This difference has been remarked on by many 
people, and I do not claim any credit for noticing it.  As with most 
categorizations, it involves a certain oversimplification, but not so much as 
to make it useless.....   When I say that mathematicians can be classified 
into theory-builders and problem-solvers, I am talking about their 
priorities, rather than making the ridiculous claim that they are exclusively 
devoted to only one sort of mathematical activity..... 
It is equally obvious that different branches of mathematics require 
di!erent aptitudes. In some, such as algebraic number theory, or the 
cluster of subjects now known simply as Geometry, it seems (to an 
outsider at least — I have no authority for what I am saying) to be 
important for many reasons to build up a considerable expertise and 
knowledge of the work of other mathematicians are doing, as progress is 
often the result of clever combinations of a wide range of existing results. 
Moreover, if one selects a problem, works on it in isolation for a few years 
and finally solves it, there is a danger, unless the problem is very famous, 
that it will no longer be regarded as all that significant.  
At the other end of the spectrum is, for example, graph theory, 
where the basic object, a graph, can be immediately comprehended. One 
will not get anywhere in graph theory by sitting in an armchair and trying 
to understand graphs better.  Neither is it particularly necessary to read 
much of the literature before tackling a problem: it is of course helpful to 
be aware of some of the most important techniques, but the interesting 
problems tend to be open precisely because the established techniques 
cannot easily be applied.  (pp. 1-3) 
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Gowers claims that there is a well-entrenched bias among many mathematicians 
for valuing theory-building more highly than problem-solving, and argues at length that 
this bias is unwarranted.  He argues that, contrary to appearances, combinatorics (his 
exemplar of the kind of mathematics that is attractive to those with a preference for 
problem-solving over theory-building) contains just as rich a structure as (for example) 
algebraic geometry; the difference, he claims, is that “the important ideas of 
combinatorics do not usually appear in the form of precisely stated theorems, but more 
often as general principles of wide applicability”.  By “principles” Gowers means (as his 
examples show) problem-solving heuristics, of which he says “they play the organizing 
role in combinatorics that deep theorems of great generality play in more theoretical 
subjects.” 
 The problem-solving disposition — which might also be referred to as an 
appreciation of “method” — finds little expression in the corpus of narratives analyzed 
for this study.  This may be a matter of  selection bias in the construction of the corpus; it 
may be that problem-solving, precisely because of its technical and heuristic nature, does 
not lend itself to story-telling as well as theory-building does.  Problem-solving finds its 
greatest expression in works such as Polya’s (1957) How to solve it — works, it will be 
recalled, that were specifically excluded from the corpus because of their non-narrative 
form. 
Nevertheless it would be incorrect to claim that problem-solving is entirely absent 
from the corpus of narratives.  One prominent example of it is in Ulam’s (1976) account 
of the development of Monte Carlo methods, already referred to above.  These methods 
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do not belong to a “theory” of anything; rather they constitute a toolkit for solving a 
variety of problems in diverse fields. 
 
Other categories of appreciation 
Utility / abstraction, surprise / confirmation, and theory-building / problem-
solving are the main categories of appreciation in evidence in the mathematical narratives 
analyzed.  They should not, however, be taken as an exhaustive list of the dispositions 
that constitute a mathematical sensibility. In addition to these, there are others that are 
present to a lesser extent in the narratives, and I here discuss a few of them. 
In undertaking my analysis of the narratives I anticipated that I would find 
evidence for formalism as a category of appreciation.  By formalism I mean an 
orientation towards the syntactical, rather than semantic, aspects of mathematics.  
Formalism is perhaps best exemplified by Russell & Whitehead’s opus Principia 
Mathematica, and by Hilbert’s famous declaration that “one must be able to say at all 
times — instead of points, lines, and planes — tables, chairs, and beer mugs.”  Formalism 
is more than an extreme variant of abstraction: for the formalist, mathematical objects 
and expressions have no intrinsic meaning other than that which can be encoded in the 
formal language of mathematical symbolism. 
The counterpart to formalism will be referred to as Platonism.  From the Platonist 
perspective, one regards mathematical objects as having some reality all their own; the 
purpose of formal definitions is to try to capture and reflect that reality.  To a Platonist, 
for example, the set of natural numbers is a real thing, with properties of its own, and the 
set if Peano axioms is merely an attempt to formally reproduce those properties.  From 
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such a point of view, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems serve as a caution that no formal 
system can fully capture the reality of the mathematical universe.  From the formalist 
point of view, on the other hand, these theorems teach us precisely the opposite: that 
there is no single “true” set of natural numbers, but only a multiplicity of incompletely 
specified models. 
Formalism and Platonism have been much discussed in the philosophy of 
mathematics.  My use of the terms here is intended not to contrast two different views of 
mathematical reality, but rather to foreground their role in shaping the professional vision 
of mathematicians.  That is to say, I am interested in the extent to which a mathematician 
will ascribe value (positive or negative) to a problem or a mathematical result on grounds 
that it is formalist or Platonist. 
To my surprise I found little sympathy for the formalist point of view in the 
narratives I examined.  On the contrary, Davis (2000) devotes an entire chapter to the 
topic “How I was turned off formalism” (pp. 50-53).  Davis recounts how in the fall of 
1942 he studied mathematical logic under W.V.O. Quine.  At the time, Davis was “madly 
in love with the logical notation in Whitehead and Russell and followed, more or less, by 
Quine...   I expressed a goodly fraction of my thesis in the notation of the Principia.  
Even as I was doing it, I realized that this notation was not eliciting any new substance 
from the basic questions I tackled.  But I did it anyway.  It was a useful exercise and led 
me to the conclusion that the relationship between form and substance in mathematics is 
an exceedingly complicated matter.  I don’t think that anyone has yet written deeply on 
this dialectical split.”  Unfortunately, Quine gave Davis a grade of B in his course, “and 
that,” says Davis, “is why ever since I have disliked the philosophy of formalism.” 
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Davis is not the sole example in the mathematical narratives of an explicit 
recognition of the opposition between formalism and Platonism.  Hardy (1940) writes: 
There is no sort of agreement about the nature of mathematical 
reality among either mathematicians or philosophers.  Some hold that it is 
‘mental’ and that in some sense we construct it, others that it is outside 
and independent of us....  I should not wish to argue any of these questions 
here even if I were competent to do so, but I will state my own position 
dogmatically in order to avoid minor misapprehensions.  I believe that 
mathematical reality lies outside us, that our function is to discover or 
observe it, and that the theorems which we prove, and which we describe 
grandiloquently as our ‘creations’, are simply our notes of our 
observations. 
 
Hardy’s Platonism does not seem to be exactly the same as Davis’s preference for 
substance over form, but they are alike in two respects:  they both reject formalism, and 
they both profess themselves unqualified (and to a degree uninterested) in any detailed or 
systematic discussion of philosophy of mathematics. 
Another dialectical pair of categories of appreciation in the narratives is simplicity 
and complexity.  The value of simplicity can be illustrated in the following anecdote, also 
from Davis.  He recounts how, as a young student of algebra, he was perplexed by why 
the left-hand side of a quadratic equation “should always add up to zero.”  Eventually, 
after the passage of some months, Davis realized the answer to his own question: “One 
simply moved all the terms to the left side of the equation, and zero was what was left on 
the right hand side.”  Some time later, Davis had the opportunity to discuss his confusion, 
and his eventual resolution of it, with the mathematician L.L. Silverman, who told him: 
Mathematicians have a tendency to throw everything onto the left-hand 
side...  They think it makes things neat.  You know who else did it 
recently?...  Einstein.  Einstein wrote down G + cT = 0 and that, he said, 
sums up the universe. 
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This brief anecdote illustrates well the aesthetic value of simplicity.  Although 
mathematicians often work in areas of great complexity, there is a profound appreciation 
for notation that allows complex notions to be expressed in a simple form, and for broad 
syntheses that, in the words of Wiener, find “order among disorder”.  It is notable in this 
connection that Einstein once claimed as one of his most significant discoveries in 
mathematics a notational convention that allowed complicated tensor equation to be 
written more economically
12
. 
It is important to note that notational simplicity — such as moving all the terms to 
one side of the equation — has more than merely aesthetic value.  As Davis notes, doing 
so allows for seemingly distinct problem types to be brought together under a single 
conceptual umbrella.  Davis notes that mathematicians who worked before the invention 
of negative numbers were forced to regard equations such as 3x
2
+10x = 30  and 
3x
2
+ 30x = 10  as belonging to essentially different classes of problems, requiring 
different methods of solution; “they could not have written down ax
2
+ bx + c = 0 , and 
think of it as the generic case.”  The value of “simplicity” thus has a strong connection 
with the production scheme “generalization” (see Kolmogorov’s remarks on his 
generalized, axiomatic theory of integration, quoted above). 
The antithetical partner of “simplicity” is “complexity”.  The collection of 
mathematical narratives used for the present study did not include any clear illustrations 
of this value, but I would be remiss if I did not note that some pieces of mathematical 
work are highly regarded precisely because of the enormous complexity of the 
                                                
12
 Einstein introduced his summation convention in 1916.  According to Pais 
(1982, p. 216) his later claim (in a letter to a friend) that the convention was a "great 
discovery in mathematics" was meant in jest, but I see no reason not to take it seriously. 
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undertaking.  One recent example in this regard is the successful mapping of the space of 
irreducible representations of the exceptional simple group E8, completed in March 2007.  
This accomplishment, the result of four years of collaboration by a group of 18 
mathematicians and computer scientists, involved staggeringly complicated computations 
that many believed were simply out of reach.  Certainly this result captured a great deal 
of attention in large part because of its great complexity.  Similar observations could be 
made regarding the computer-assisted proofs of the Four-Color Conjecture and Kepler’s 
Conjecture (both of which also could be appreciated for the value of “confirmation”). 
 
Summary 
In this chapter I have attempted to partially map out the network of dispositions 
— categories of perception and appreciation — that constitute the mathematical 
sensibility, as it is brought to bear on the valuing of results (implications of the form 
 
P! Q) and on the posing of questions (which can be regarded as partial anticipations of 
future results).  Following the view of scholars who argue that knowledge of a practice is 
recorded and exemplified in narratives of practice, I have turned to a collection of 
narratives by and about mathematicians to understand the particular features of the 
mathematicians’ worldview. 
In the course of this analysis I have described the mathematician as, primarily, 
one who wonders about what is true — more specifically, about the implications and 
interrelationships among complex sets of contingent properties of abstract objects.  This 
wondering is not, however, an aimless meander around a shapeless mathematical terrain; 
on the contrary, the narratives show that mathematicians structure the problem space 
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under investigation through the use of certain generative moves that generate new 
questions from old ones, and that in their appraisal of certain problems as being more or 
less important than others they are guided by a set of dispositions that are organized in 
dialectical pairs.  I have characterized the generative moves as categories of perception in 
the sense that they can be used to describe what kinds of questions a mathematician sees 
as a possible line of inquiry.  But I have also noted that mathematicians do not pursue 
every question that occurs to them; on the contrary, there are categories of appreciation 
with which the mathematician organizes the landscape of possibilities, deciding which 
are worthy of further inquiry and which are not.  Like the moves, these categories of 
value are organized in dialectical pairs. 
These categories of perception and appreciation are displayed in Figure 2.3.  
These eight dialectical pairs may be taken as a map of the mathematicians’ practical 
rationality with respect to posing and valuing mathematical results — the vision and 
values that make up that portion of the landscape of the mathematical sensibility. 
 
 
Categories of perception (generative moves): 
 (strengthen/weaken) hypothesis  (strengthen/weaken) conclusion 
 generalize   specialize 
 consider converse   consider converse 
 
Categories of appreciation 
 utility   abstraction 
 surprise   confirmation 
 theory-building  problem-solving 
 simplicity   complexity 
 formalism   Platonism 
 
Figure 2.3.  The mathematical sensibility with respect to posing problems and valuing 
results. 
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In the next chapter, I gather evidence from a corpus of study groups among 
groups of experienced teachers to show the role that these dispositions customarily play 
in the teaching of secondary geometry.  In the chapters after that, I use these dispositions 
to code a corpus of examination questions from one geometry teacher, and explore the 
question of whether the geometry classroom can serve as a site for teaching students the 
elements of a mathematical sensibility. 
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Chapter 3 
The mathematical sensibility in the practice of experienced geometry teachers 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I analyzed a collection of mathematical narratives to 
identify some of the dispositions that are characteristic of the mathematical sensibility.  In 
the present chapter, I use that conceptual analysis as an organizing framework for an 
empirical study of teachers’ practical rationality.  This study attempts to answer the 
question:  What role does geometry instruction customarily provide for the teaching and 
cultivation of the mathematical sensibility? 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the French sociologist Bourdieu (1998) 
describes a practice as being characterized by a collection of shared dispositions 
(categories of perception and appreciation).  In the last chapter I attempted to describe the 
dispositions that are characteristic of the practice of research mathematicians.  Here I 
undertake the analogous question for a different practice: that of the teaching of 
mathematics, and in particular secondary geometry. 
It is important to stress that here I wish to focus on the study of teaching, rather 
than the study of individual teachers or individual teaching performances. There is, of 
course, much about what teachers do that is personal and idiosyncratic; but there are also 
large components of teaching practice that seem to be shared in common among 
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practitioners.  These stable elements of instruction, replicated year after year, in 
classrooms across the country, have been approached by scholars in various ways:  via 
cross-cultural comparisons (Stigler & Hiebert 1999), studies that probe teachers’ practical 
rationality (Herbst & Chazan 2003a, 2006), and analyses of classroom discourse 
(Leinhardt & Ohlsson 1990; Leinhardt & Steele 2005; Lemke 2002).  In the case of the 
present work, such study provides a vital counterpoint to the conceptual analysis of the 
mathematical sensibility, on the one hand, and the corpus of examination questions from 
a single classroom, on the other:  it makes it possible to ask to what extent the values and 
practices described in detail through the analysis of tasks created by one individual 
teacher are like, or unlike, the values and practices of the profession writ large, and in 
turn to what extent those values and practices correspond to those of the discipline of 
mathematics. 
My data source for this study comes from an archive of focus groups and study 
groups collected by the research group GRIP (Geometry, Reasoning, and Instructional 
Practice), particularly those that are part of the research project ThEMaT (Thought 
Experiments in Mathematics Teaching), directed by Patricio Herbst of the University of 
Michigan and co-directed by Dan Chazan of the University of Maryland.  Building on the 
ethnomethodological tradition, and consistent with the theoretical position that 
knowledge of a practice is stored and recorded in the form of narratives (see Chapter 2), 
ThEMaT uses “breaching experiments” to probe the norms of a social practice (Herbst & 
Chazan 2006).  In a breaching experiment (Mehan & Wood 1975), individuals and 
groups who are hypothesized to share a (perhaps tacit) set of norms around certain social 
practices are placed into an artificially-constructed situation in which many of those 
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hypothesized norms are present but some are violated or subverted.  Through their 
behavior, participants both mark and repair those breaches; that is, they indicate how 
conditions could be altered so as to render the situation normal once more. 
The ThEMaT breaching episodes are narratives of teaching practice, represented 
with a variety of rich-media tools, including video, animations, comic books, and written 
vignettes.  The episodes are designed to blend together elements that are hypothesized to 
be normative of a situation, together with elements that are hypothesized to be breaches.  
These representations of teaching are then used to prompt discussions among experienced 
practitioners about planning, teaching, and assessing; about what it means to be a 
successful teacher, and what one can expect from one’s students; and about managing the 
tensions that arise as a result of the (normally unrecognized) competing imperatives that 
teachers must negotiate.  The practitioners respond to the represented teaching episode by 
noticing some things while ignoring others; by endorsing or indicting what they see there; 
by specifying the conditions under which such events would be possible or impossible, 
desirable or undesirable, etc.; and by narrating alternatives.  These alternatives comprise 
a web of interconnected possibilities — the “thought experiments” of the project’s title. 
In keeping with the goal of understanding the rationality of the practice, as 
opposed to the judgments of individual practitioners, Project ThEMaT brought together 
groups of experienced teachers to view and react to the representations of teaching 
collectively.  By doing so it is hypothesized that teachers will feel some obligation to not 
only express their own opinions, but also to defer to their perceptions of what is 
customary within the practice at large, as embodied by their peers.  This is not to say that 
teachers will completely elide their own individuality, but rather that they will do so in a 
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manner that simultaneously acknowledges the norms of the practice.  The word “norm” is 
meant to denote not a regulation, the violation of which carries a sense of transgression, 
but is rather used in the sense of a central tendency around and against which teachers 
position their idiosyncrasies (Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, submitted).  Thus, for 
example, a statement such as “Most teachers wouldn’t accept that as an answer, but I’m 
not so picky” provides confirmation of a norm while simultaneously critiquing it and 
alienating the speaker from it.  By gathering teachers in study groups composed of their 
own experienced colleagues, as opposed to conducting individual interviews, it is 
expected that teachers will feel some obligation to at the very least mark the norms, even 
if they do so by distancing themselves from them. 
During its first year, 17 teachers participated in the ThEMaT project.  These 
teachers were divided into two groups, each of which met once every month during the 
school year for an after-school study group.  In addition, all teachers met together for 
daytime study group meetings at the beginning and end of the school year. Some of the 
animations were designed to raise issues related to the teaching of theorems; others were 
intended to focus on the work of engaging students in proving.  In a typical study group 
session, teachers would watch a new animation or review a previously screened one, and 
discuss the mathematical and pedagogical issues these animations raised to them.  In the 
second year of the project, 23 teachers (including 11 returning participants from year 1) 
met for another set of study groups.  In all, the ThEMaT data corpus from the first two 
years of the project consists of more than forty study group meetings over a two-year 
period, each approximately three hours in length, yielding more than 120 hours’ worth of 
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videorecords and more than a thousand pages’ worth of transcript data, with 29 
participating teachers. 
In addition to the ThEMaT study groups, the GRIP data archives also include 
records from a smaller number of non-ThEMaT “focus groups”.  These focus groups 
were similar in structure to the study groups, with two principal differences.  First, each 
group meeting was self-contained, in that participants did not return on a monthly basis to 
meet again with the same people.  Second, the focus groups primarily made use of video 
records, rather than the ThEMaT animations that were at the heart of the study groups.  
Despite these differences, the GRIP focus groups have much in common with the 
ThEMaT study groups.  In both, participants were confronted with representations of 
teaching — representations that included deliberate breaches of hypothesized norms — 
and asked to discuss the extent to which the episodes depicted were like or unlike their 
own classroom experiences. 
As part of the process of preparing this corpus for analysis, sessions are parsed 
into intervals on the order of 2-8 minutes in length, on the basis of changes in patterns of 
activity, indicated by markers such as changes in speaker, turn length, attendant focus, 
use of material resources, and the like (Herbst, 2006-2009).  Intervals are then tagged 
with markers for various theoretical foci, allowing subsequent retrieval and analysis.  All 
of this data has been entered into a complex, multi-relational database, allowing rapid 
cross-referencing between transcript, intervals, video, information about participants, 
session agendas and animations, and artifacts, as well as searching and aggregating data 
both within specific sessions as well as across the entire corpus.  The result is a rich and 
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extensive archive of information, consisting of more than 66,000 turns of transcript, 
associated to 2945 intervals, that can be mined for various analytical purposes. 
In this chapter, I draw upon these records to develop a sense of what is usual and 
normal (in the sense of the word “norm” as used above)
 
in teaching.  Using the search 
and cross-referencing capabilities of the GRIP-ThEMaT database, I identify intervals and 
turns of transcript that appear to provide evidence concerning the various mathematical 
dispositions that were identified in the previous chapter.  In these intervals, teachers 
respond to animated vignettes that depict moves that might be either appreciated or 
indicted on grounds related to the elements of the mathematical sensibility described in 
Chapter 2, and look for evidence as to whether the elements of that sensibility are part of 
the teachers’ practical rationality.  In the sections that follow, I describe my method for 
locating this evidence within the database, and show how the evidence sheds light on the 
question of whether the practice of teaching secondary geometry provides a customary 
role for teaching the elements of a mathematical sensibility. 
 
Methods for searching the data corpus 
Searching through a data corpus on the scale of the ThEMaT archive for 
discussions of the mathematical sensibility poses a number of challenges.  To begin with, 
with the exception of only a few rare cases, neither the session agenda nor the 
representation of teaching used as a prompt in the study group were specifically targeted 
at provoking a discussion of one or more of the mathematical dispositions.  When 
discussion of those dispositions did occur, it often did so in the form of a digression.  For 
this reason it was not reasonable to narrow the scope of the search by focusing on only a 
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single session, or on a set of intervals that made reference to a specific animation.  
Rather, it proved necessary to search across the entire corpus.  But it must also be 
recalled that sessions were parsed into intervals not on the basis of changes in thematic 
content but rather on the basis of changes in participation structure.  For that reason, the 
metadata defining any particular interval contains little clue as to what participants were 
actually talking about. 
For these reasons, I began to look for relevant data by searching the text of the 
transcripts themselves.  I adopted an iterative search-and-retrieve algorithm: 
• I began by generating, for each of the dispositions, an initial set of 
keywords that I thought were likely to occur in discussions of the 
disposition. 
• A cross-corpus search for those keywords in the database generated a 
found set of transcript turns. 
• Each of those turns was read individually to see how the keyword was 
used in it; “false positives” were discarded. 
• The remaining turns were referred back to the intervals to which they 
belonged; the full transcripts of these intervals were then read in their 
entirety. 
• If an interval found in this fashion was deemed to have some relevance for 
the disposition under investigation, the interval was tagged after that 
disposition. 
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• In some cases, the transcript for a tagged interval would suggest additional 
words or phrases that could be used as keywords.  These keywords were 
then added to the list of search terms, and the process was repeated. 
 
The above procedure yielded a set of intervals for each of the dispositions under 
investigation.  Each of these intervals included one or more turns of speech in which 
participants invoked, disclaimed, or otherwise acknowledged a mathematical disposition 
as a warrant for pursuing a particular course of action. 
 
Students as problem-posers 
“Healthy confusion” as productive for problem-posing 
The examination of mathematical narratives in the last chapter provided evidence 
that mathematicians view themselves as wonderers; that is, they place great value on 
questions that seek to determine what is true.  While mathematicians certainly engage in 
other work as well — for example, seeking a new proof of a result already known to be 
true, or a simpler counterexample for a claim already known to be false — one dominant 
motif throughout those narratives was the motivating power of an encounter with the 
unknown.  And the excerpts presented from Parker’s (2005) biography of R.L. Moore 
offer a glimpse of how such an encounter with the unknown can be made a deliberate 
element of mathematical pedagogy.  As was shown in those excerpts, Moore would ask 
his students to prove plausible-seeming but false claims; he would assign homework sets 
in which unsolved problems were concealed among straightforward exercises.  These 
unconventional methods had in concert the effect of creating a learning environment in 
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which students could not rely on their instructor to serve as the final arbiter of truth, and 
thus had to rely on themselves and each other to determine what was and was not true. 
If, as these accounts suggest, the encounter with an unknown plays a significant 
role in supporting problem-posing, then one might wonder to what extent Geometry 
teaching provides a role for students to have such an encounter.  Do teachers create 
contexts in which mathematical truth is deliberately made unclear, and use those contexts 
as opportunities to cultivate a problem-posing orientation in their students?  If so, how 
are such contexts managed?  These questions recall the challenges I raised in Chapter 1 
concerning the “Lei” vignette found in Principles and Standards (NCTM 2000), and they 
lie at the heart of the problem of teaching students the mathematical sensibility. 
Throughout the study group corpus we find several occasions in which teachers 
discussed the role of doubt and uncertainty in stimulating student inquiry.  In the very 
first study group meeting in Year 1, teachers viewed and discussed “The Square”
13
 — an 
animation in which a class collectively discusses the question, “What can be said about 
the angle bisectors of a quadrilateral?”  In that animation, Alpha
14
 states that he 
considered the case of a square, and found that in that case “the diagonals bisect each 
other”.  After a significant amount of discussion, Alpha re-shapes his claim as “In a 
square, the angle bisectors meet at a point, because they are the diagonals.”  Following 
the statement of this claim, a different student, Lambda, presents an argument that each 
diagonal of the square bisects both of the angles through which it passes.  It soon 
                                                
13
 This animation, and all others referenced in this chapter, may be viewed at the 
ThEMaT Researcher’s Hub.  Accounts may be requested at http://grip.umich.edu/themat. 
14
 Students in the ThEMaT animations are named after letters of the Greek 
alphabet. 
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becomes clear, however, that Lambda’s argument has been widely misunderstood by 
both his classmates, and (it appears) the teacher as well.  The animation ends with a sense 
of general confusion, as one student asks, “What are we doing?” 
In discussing this animation, one teacher made reference to the potential benefit 
of what she called “healthy confusion”: 
104 Lucille
15
 Well I was thinking that sometimes having a little bit of healthy confusion and 
debate actually serves a purpose, because if what’s going on is not particularly 
clear, then people think “Oh okay, we’re not sure if this right,” and everyone 
starts thinking about, “is it right, and if it is, how do we know it is, and if it’s 
not, why isn’t it?”  If you’re always saving them by giving them the answer —
eventually you have to do that because that’s our job — you kind of rob them of 
that reflection of what they know, and um...  Yeah, it’s hard to know when and 
when not to, but sometimes I think it’s almost better to allow the uncertainty to 
go for a little while because then more people start thinking about it than if you 
let the kid who always knows it fix it, or the teacher who always knows it fix it.  
And I think sometimes you start to see, oh there are way more possibilities of 
looking at it than you or I had thought about.  So I know it’s a hard call, as the 
bell rings at a certain time. 
Excerpt 1.  From ThEMaT081905, interval 6. 
 
Notice that Lucille at once endorses the potential benefits of “healthy confusion” 
as motivating student curiosity, and recognizes that the teacher can quash that curiosity 
by stepping in and resolving all questions.  At the same time, however, she signals that 
such confusion cannot be allowed to last indefinitely:  “Eventually you have to do that 
[give them the answer] because that’s our job” (emphasis added).  This characterization 
of the teacher’s responsibility to be the arbiter of truth stands in marked contrast to the 
approach of R.L. Moore.  Lucille’s ambivalence towards the idea of letting students be 
confused over extended periods of time was echoed and expanded on by other teachers in 
the interval immediately following: 
                                                
15
 All teacher and institution names in this chapter are pseudonyms. 
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110 Penelope I agree that a little healthy confusion is a necessary part of the classroom in 
order to get students into the process of discovery.  Because sometimes the 
teacher may not always be the one to say, “Hey that’s not exactly the correct 
path we’re going to go down.”  Some of your classmates may say, “Hey, you 
know, I don’t think so, I see it this way.”  So a little healthy confusion can spark 
a dialogue between the students, and I believe in seeing the teacher as a 
facilitator, just as someone to kind of say, “Hey this is where we’re going today 
and I want you to devise a plan for getting there.”  Let students be individual in 
their own thought processes in getting there. 
111 Greg I think the healthy confusion is really good, but I think there’s a fine line 
between letting it go too long also, because then the kids start confusing the 
kids who were starting to get it.  And then you have chaos.  So, I think healthy 
confusion is good, controlled and only to a certain extent though. 
112 Megan You know, the timing, too.  When she said that I thought, what a great phrase.  I 
think healthy confusion is very good if it occurs at the beginning of the period.  
[Laughter from group]  If it occurs in the last five minutes, it’s a very bad thing!  
[laughter]  I just, personally, I don’t like kids to leave thinking, “What just 
happened there?  Do we even know what we were doing there?  What a waste 
of time, I didn’t come to any conclusion.”  So the timing of healthy confusion I 
think is very important. 
Excerpt 2.  From ThEMaT081905, interval 7. 
 
Megan’s worry about ending the class with students confused is consistent with 
Lucille’s observation that “the bell rings at a certain time” (104).  Among the teachers in 
the study group, there appears to be an emergent consensus that, while confusion can play 
a productive role in motivating inquiry and “sparking dialogue”, such confusion must be 
resolved by the end of the class period. 
Once named by Lucille in the first study group meeting, the notion of “healthy 
confusion” was recalled periodically in subsequent study groups.   For example, in a 
meeting one month later, teachers viewed an animation titled “The Tangent Circle”.  In 
that animation, a teacher asks her class to draw a circle tangent to two given lines at two 
specified points in a pre-printed diagram.  As posed, the problem is impossible because 
the given points are not equidistant from the intersection of the two lines; when one 
student argues that the points should be moved, her proposal is ridiculed by her 
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classmates, who regard it as an illegitimate change of the problem.  In their subsequent 
discussion of this episode, teachers described various ways of restructuring the task so as 
to reduce the frustration they perceived among the students in the animation and to 
channel it in a more “healthy” direction: 
 
636 Denise I mean, so if you know that your students were starting to get frustrated, and I 
know my students, I can tell when they’re starting to get frustrated, and if I 
can’t tell they’re sure enough gonna let me know, I need to start going in a 
different direction, and maybe it’s time to stop exploration and give them 
more directives, because I don’t want them to shut down, because then they 
can’t learn anything.  Am I making sense? 
637  [participants make affirmative sounds] 
638 Moderator But then, do you use this frustration for them to, to get to a point that they 
wouldn’t? 
639 Denise Yeah, sometimes.  Sometimes, like I said, if it, the problem he said, you give 
them the one point, and then you give them the two points after that, like I 
think like most of my students that’d spark curiosity, that’s frustration, but it’s 
good frustration, like, [inaudible] 
640 Cynthia What did we say?  Healthy confusion. 
641  [laughter] 
642 Denise Yeah, healthy confusion. 
643 Researcher And, and is this one a case of constructive frustration, or is it not? 
644 Denise I, I don’t think so. 
645 Megan She thinks that’s confusion. 
646 Denise That’s just confusion, yeah. 
647 Researcher That’s just confusion, okay. 
648 Denise If she would have stopped there at some point and did something else, that 
might have been healthy confusion, healthy confusion. 
Excerpt 3.  From ITH092805, interval 26. 
 
For these teachers, the distinction between “healthy confusion” and “just 
confusion” hinges on timing and on the teacher’s responsibility to step in at the right 
moment.  According to Denise, the teacher ought to have sensed that the students were 
getting frustrated and seized the moment to “stop exploration and give them more 
directives”.  In failing to do so, the teacher allowed a potentially healthy confusion to 
degenerate into mere chaos. 
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In that same study group meeting, participants discussed the possibility of leaving 
questions unresolved over the course of multiple lessons: 
511 Moderator If you did that two or three classes in a row, do you think they would cha – 
who would break first? 
512 Karen Me. 
513  [laughter] 
514 Researcher But why? 
515 Karen Because they really don’t want to learn the stuff. 
S516 James [spells out] S-T-M-P. 
517 Researcher Because of the STMP
16
? 
Excerpt 4.  From ITH092805, interval 45. 
 
Karen and James are here seen to propose separate explanations for why leaving 
questions unresolved over extended periods of time is not a viable way of engaging 
students’ interests.  For Karen, the problem resides with the students themselves: she sees 
them as essentially uninterested in “the stuff” of the course.  Karen’s comments echo 
those made in an earlier focus group by Laura and Rick: 
127 Laura I guess one of the things, I’m sorry, one of the things that I um struggle with when 
it comes to proof is, we as math teachers, we’re curious.  I mean we’re sitting here, 
examining this quadrilateral, and trying to think of everything that we can possibly 
think of that might be true or can be proven to be true, but our students many times 
don’t have that same curiosity.  They, their mindset is.... 
128 Rick Just tell me. 
129 Laura Who cares.  Yeah, just tell me.  And that’s what I’m curious about, how do you 
develop that curiosity in your students, how do you get them to want. 
Excerpt 5.  From ABP-081704-1. 
 
Similar comments are found throughout the data corpus, as when for example 
Denise says of her students, “If I say it, they believe it.  They don’t question anything” 
(ITH092805, interval 17, turn 253).  At still other moments, teachers speak as if 
mathematical curiosity is an innate quality that is held by some students and not by 
others: 
                                                
16
 The STMP (State Test of Mathematical Proficiency) is a pseudonym for a 
standardized test taken by all students in the state. 
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576 Cynthia Some classes are more inquisitive, I think.  My first hour is very inquisitive, 
they ask questions, and they are like, Oh I wonder what would happen if, like 
that, but my fourth hour class.... I have to humor them a little bit, for them to 
pay attention.  I, serious, I... 
577 Denise But it’s the end of the, it’s closer to the end of the day. 
578 Cynthia Right, and they’re ready to leave, and so to keep their attention, I have to 
throw out “What do you call a dead parrot?  A polygon.”  You know, and they 
stay with me that way.  But first hour I don’t have to do that because they’re 
already with me no matter what, because I’ve got a lot of freshmen in there, 
they’re very talented, and the other kids just kind of go with, and just depends 
on the personality, like you said. 
579 Moderator So you provide different tasks to those kids? 
580 Cynthia No, I don’t give different tasks, I just approach things differently some times. 
581 Tina I, like my fourth hour, they have the Garfield effect I call it, you know 
Garfield the cat, he eats and he wants to sleep?  They come back from lunch 
[laughter] and I’m doing everything I can to keep them awake, and it’s the 
hardest time.  Seriously, they eat and they want to take a nap.  And then my 
sixth hour, like you said at the end of the day, they’re ready to bounce out the 
door, they, the last thing they want to talk about is geometry, and then my 
class in the morning, you know like you said they’re asking questions, they’re 
with ya, they’re... 
Excerpt 6.  From ITH092805, interval 34. 
 
Note here how the various speakers adduce different explanations for why some 
classes seem to be more curious and inquisitive than others.  Cynthia attributes these 
variations to intrinsic differences among students: 9
th
 grade students taking Geometry are 
more “talented” than are 10
th
 graders taking the same course.  Denise and Tina, in 
contrast, ascribe these differences to the time at which the class meets (right after lunch, 
at the end of the day, etc.)  But in all cases the teachers seem to regard the extent to which 
their students wonder about things as a fact of life, one that they must simply accept as it 
is; none of them speak of trying to cultivate curiosity or teach inquiry.  Laura’s question 
quoted above (“How do you get them to want?”) seems to be a rhetorical one, as neither 
she nor any of her colleagues offers an answer. 
In contrast to the view just described, which ascribes the lack of viability of 
leaving questions unresolved over the course of multiple lessons to intrinsic qualities of 
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students, James’s observation regarding the STMP exam (excerpt 4) points to the 
institutional realities of schooling (and in particular, the need to prepare students for 
standardized testing) as the reason why such a practice is unworkable.  It is not quite 
clear from the transcript of excerpt 4 whether we should understand James’s turn 516 as 
an alternative to Karen’s turn 515, or an expansion of it.  That is, he may be suggesting 
that one effect of standardized testing is to deaden or suppress students’ curiosity; on the 
other hand he may be pointing to standardized testing as a constraint on the teacher’s 
ability to leave questions unresolved over an extended period of time. 
Despite their aversion to the prospect of allowing doubt to survive beyond the 
boundaries of the class period, teachers were not entirely unsympathetic to the notion that 
such doubt can play a productive role in motivating student inquiry.  In one study group 
meeting (ESP101105), teachers were asked to respond to the following prompt: 
Suppose in a classroom students proposed the following three conjectures: 
1. When you join the midpoints of the neighboring sides of any quadrilateral, 
the result is a parallelogram. 
2. The parallelogram formed in this fashion has exactly half the area of the 
original quadrilateral... 
3. ...  and half the perimeter of the original quadrilateral. 
 
What would the teacher need to have done in order for these three conjectures to 
emerge? 
What would the teacher do next to engage the students in planning a proof, and 
proving these conjectures?
 17
 
 
                                                
17
 As an aside, I note that although the first two of these conjectures are true, the 
third is false.  This was not mentioned by the teachers in the study group, and the 
moderators did not bring it to their attention.  The fact that the teachers themselves gave 
no indication of wondering about the truth of these conjectures is obviously relevant for 
the present discussion. 
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In their discussion, teachers considered the possibility that students might use the 
measurement tools in dynamic geometry software (such as the Geometer’s Sketchpad) to 
discover the second and third properties. In this context one of the teachers cautioned that 
such software can be so forceful at persuading students of the truth of a proposition that it 
can have the effect of inhibiting their capacity to inquire further: 
 
53 Esther They might, they might think they’ve proved it because it worked on 
Sketchpad. And they might be less inclined to think they have some reason to 
prove something works because... 
54 Carl They don’t understand that Sketch-, that Sketchpad is not proof. 
55 Esther Yeah. 
56 Carl They don’t -- 
57 Esther -- Maybe when they do it by hand somebody’s works and somebody else’s 
doesn’t so now they’re not really sure if it’s right or not. So, can you give some 
other evidence about why something works? Whereas in Sketchpad they say 
well, it’s that, you know, this plus this is this, I mean, there it is. They don’t see 
that they need as much evidence, I think sometimes when they see -- 
58 Moderator -- Is that something that happens?  Where, um, because some students have 
found a relationship and other students have not that they feel the need to do a 
proof? 
59 Esther Well, I would like to think that... 
60 Melissa [Laughing]  Feel the need to prove! 
61  [General laughter] 
62 Moderator Or is it you? 
63 Esther Yeah, yeah.  I don’t know that they care, but sometimes they, I have some kids 
that would say well, why did this one work and why did this one not work, or is 
there some [rea--], does  it work sometimes and not other times, or did 
somebody do something wrong in the picture?  I mean I’ve had that happen, I 
don’t think -- 
64 Moderator -- And then that, that can serve then as a launch for the proof? 
65 Esther I wouldn’t say that it happens on a regular basis, but I’ve had that happen 
before. 
Excerpt 7.  From ESP101105, interval 6. 
 
The salience of this excerpt for us is located in Esther’s recognition that 
uncertainty (here engendered by the fact that some students’ “by hand” drawings “work” 
but others’ do not) can motivate students to look deeper into a problem.  Esther here 
describes the possibility that a student’s activity might be driven not by a teacher’s 
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instructions, but by a desire to understand a puzzling lack of consistency.  That, she says, 
is why using dynamic geometry software such as Sketchpad can undermine the 
imperative to produce proof:  it is precisely because the software removes uncertainty 
that students would see no need for a proof (53).  This recognition is tempered, however, 
by the laughter Melissa and her colleagues share at the notion that a student might “feel 
the need to prove” something (as if it the very notion were absurd), in response to which 
Esther hedges her earlier comment with the concessionary “I wouldn’t say that it happens 
on a regular basis”. 
 
Honesty and Deception 
It is one thing to tolerate doubt and uncertainty to remain over the course of 
several lessons; it is another thing else to actively court it by asking students to prove 
untrue claims, or by declining to intervene when students make errors of reasoning.  
When asked to consider scenarios in which a teacher was depicted making such a move, 
the teachers in the ThEMaT study groups were unanimous in their opposition.  This was 
particularly evident in the teachers’ responses to the ThEMaT animation “The 
Parallelogram”, a story in which the teacher makes extensive and repeated use of this 
teaching move. 
“The Parallelogram” begins with a teacher reminding his students that “When we 
studied triangles, we saw that the angle bisectors would always meet at a point,” and 
asking the question, “What happens with a parallelogram?”  After 8 minutes, Alpha 
volunteers to present his work.  Alpha draws a picture of a parallelogram with its 
diagonals (see Figure 3.1) and announces his intention to prove that the angle bisectors of 
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a parallelogram meet at a point.  In the animation, the teacher gives no indication that 
Alpha’s claim is incorrect (which it is), or that his diagram indicates some confusion 
between diagonals and angle bisectors.  Instead, he simply asks the class what the 
“Givens” would be for Alpha’s proof.  Theta, referring to Alpha’s diagram, states that 
AC  and BD  are angle bisectors.  The class begins constructing an argument using that as 
a premise — although it is somewhat unclear (from an observer’s perspective) what 
exactly they are trying to prove.  The class begins identifying congruent angles and 
segments, presumably for the purpose of eventually identifying some congruent triangles. 
 
 
Figure 3.1.  Alpha’s diagram. 
 
At one point in the animation Theta raises an objection:  “But how do you know 
that the angle bisectors are the diagonals?  I mean, don’t you have to prove that?”  To this 
Alpha responds, “No — that’s kind of my given, see?”  In response to this exchange the 
teacher comments, “So, Alpha, you really are using that the angle bisectors are the 
diagonals as a given.”   Alpha agrees, and the discussion resumes.  Eventually Theta 
notices that triangle ABC is isosceles, and consequently that the figure is a rhombus.  But 
to this Epsilon objects that “You would only have an isosceles triangle if you start from a 
rhombus, and that is a parallelogram.”   Alpha, puzzled, says that they seem to have 
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proved that their parallelogram is a rhombus, to which he adds, “This is crazy.”  Iota 
asks, “Are you then saying that all parallelograms are rhombi?”  The teacher responds, 
“Is that what you think we are saying, Iota?”  General confusion spreads throughout the 
class, until finally Xi and Epsilon identify Alpha’s initial assumption (that the diagonals 
are angle bisectors) as problematic and false for non-rhombic parallelograms.  Having 
reached this resolution, the teacher asks, “Epsilon, can you predict what the angle 
bisectors of such a parallelogram would look like?”  Here the animation ends. 
In the study group meeting (ESP110105) teachers reacted strongly to the teacher’s 
decision to allow incorrect statements to go uncorrected, and in particular to the way he 
encouraged students to pursue a line of inquiry that was founded on an incorrect 
presumption.  When the moderator asked participants to propose topics for discussion, 
Carl and Karen both raised this concern, echoed shortly after by James. 
 
368 Carl I think the whole concept of going with false information from the get-go.  
Assuming that diagonals are the same as the angle bisectors and going with it. 
369 Moderator Okay. Other things? 
370 Karen I’m just, you know, wondering if kids could stand the agony of it not working 
out as long as it went. 
371 Researcher Not working out? 
372 Karen Yeah, like there’s no resolution, it’s like, it’s like a plot that’s, you know, 
we’re just getting tangled and more and more confusion. 
  -------- 
386 James It really bothers me that the teacher doesn’t come in when they’re sitting there 
talking about the angle bisectors and the diagonals interchangeably, and 
doesn’t try and stop the discussion there and get that taken care of. 
387 Moderator Do you think – should the teacher do that like right away, as soon as it comes 
up? 
388 James Yeah, I mean, as soon as that’s put up there and they’re startin’ – well, at 
least, at the very least, when all of a sudden he’s got a given up there that it 
says it’s an angle bisector, and he says well that’s my given, that it’s an angle 
bisector and a diagonal.  I mean... 
  --------- 
397 Moderator So then your response to Karen’s question of how long should this go on is, it 
shouldn’t even start, basically.  As soon as the picture’s put up there- 
398 James I’m like Carl, they just spent 15 minutes, and now you’re at the dilemma of 
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do we go back, or do we just, you know, chuck the whole project and throw it 
out? 
  ---------- 
401 Moderator ... You’re saying that the teacher would not endure that? 
402 James I wouldn’t. 
403  [laughter] 
404 James I’ll let them make mistakes and find conflicts, but I mean that was just – I 
mean to actually come and say, that’s part of my given – I couldn’t handle it. 
[laughs] I’m sorry. 
Excerpt 8.  From ESP110105, interval 36. 
 
As the discussion of this episode continued into the subsequent interval, teachers 
were in general agreement that the teacher should not have allowed Alpha’s 
misconception to continue without correction, and went so far as to propose a method for 
preventing it from ever surfacing in the first place:  to exaggerate the proportions of the 
parallelogram so that “you weren’t gonna connect A and C and call it an angle bisector”  
(Carl, interval 37, turn 431).  Esther notes that prior to calling on Alpha, there were 
several minutes during which the teacher circulated around the room while students 
worked independently; based on this observation, Esther proposes that the teacher would 
have had the opportunity to call on a different student, one that had been observed to 
have a correct diagram, to point out the special nature of Alpha’s drawing.   If no such 
student could be found, then Lynne suggests “I would add my own drawing to the board 
and say, ‘This is weird.  This is the drawing I was thinking of....  What’s the difference 
here?  Talk to your partner for three minutes” (interval 39, turns 450, 452). 
In the face of the widespread agreement that Alpha’s mistaken assumption would 
have been better off avoided (or at least corrected immediately), teachers in the study 
group were hard-pressed to ascribe any intentionality to the animated teacher’s decision 
to call on Alpha.  Only one of the six teachers present, Karen, had any sympathy for the 
episode as time well-spent, a position to which Lucille responds with a lengthy caution: 
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555 Karen What if her objective... was to get them to start to talk about, to have a 
discussion about what was going on and discover that they had made a 
mistake, you know, like just have a discussion and discovery, you know, like, 
to start to get some sense of how you can backtrack and follow down the path 
and then back up and follow down another path.  And that there’s nothing 
wrong with it there.  They did the right thing. 
556 Moderator Umm... 
557 Researcher But, is it–I mean, what do the others think about that?  I mean, I know that 
you could do it, but sometimes, sometimes we hear well uh, there’s not 
enough time for that, and, you know, you always have to make compromises 
among all the things that you could do.  Which of those are worth doing, 
because your resources are limited.  Is this one that would be worth doing for 
the sake of uh, having an exploration? 
558 Lucille I think, [inaudible] you know, I think there’s, there’s a safety issue, like if you 
know that your class functions in a way where you can explore, and not be 
ridiculed for going down the wrong path, and if you felt confident that in the 
end wherever that end was, that clarity would come into play, then kids might 
be okay with this.  But for example, if you never do this, because you’re not 
comfortable with it as a teacher, and all of a sudden you do it, they’re gonna 
start to go, hey well wait a minute, because they’ve learned your style and 
your approach too.  And they might wonder well what’s going on here, don’t 
you really know? You know, so, um I don’t know, it does seem like a really 
good exercise in the development of thinking through why things do work.  
But I think you [gesturing to Esther] said at one of our meetings a while back, 
what about the one kid or the two kids that never really catch on and all this 
conversation’s going on, and after a while they may just tune out because they 
don’t really know what the discussion is about because they’re still just 
learning the basics, and so, then you’re having really good conversations with 
a small number of kids, and the other people we’re hoping are listening, and 
they might–maybe they are, but a good chance they’re  not, because they’re 
young, and high schoolers are like that. 
Excerpt 9.  ESP110105, interval 45. 
 
Within Lucille’s long turn 558 we can identify three separate sets of grounds on 
which to indict the decision to call forward a student with an incorrect idea.  First, one 
risks doing harm to students’ self-esteem: this is signaled by her use of emotionally 
charged language (“safety issue”, “not be ridiculed”).  Second, the teacher runs the risk of 
appearing ignorant or incompetent (“Don’t you really know?”).  Third, the teacher ends 
up teaching only to a small number of bright and attentive students, ignoring the majority 
of her class who “tune out” and “never really catch on”. 
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The first of these points — that teachers need to protect students from public error 
in order to preserve their emotional well-being — was raised in other study groups.  
When teachers first discussed the animation “The Tangent Circle” (in which the teacher 
gives students a problem that cannot be solved as posed) one teacher
18
 asked, “Do you 
think it’s like, that it’s bad in general to let kid, to sort of lead them in the wrong, to give 
them a problem that’s really not solvable?  Do you think it erodes your trust, or...?  
‘Cause I struggle with that a little bit you know.”  When the same question was posed to 
another study group one year later, participants had mixed feelings about the risks 
entailed, and identified the conditions under which such a move would be safe: 
 
519 Moderator ... In the past when we’ve shown this movie to – or these scenes to other 
groups of teachers um, we’ve had people comment that if you do this it can 
erode the trust that students have in their teachers – like it can actually sort of 
damage that relationship because they feel like you’re playing gotcha with 
them all the time because you’re always trying to trick them or something. 
Does anyone have any – share that feeling at all, that there’s sort of a risk of 
giving them problems like this? 
520 Catlynn I think you can’t do it all the time, yeah and I think you – it would erode them 
if they... 
521 Cadie But they also have to realize that mathematics is not always trusting, I mean 
you’re not going to be able to get to that answer. 
522 Jillian And what if they knew that up front, what if they knew like you know you 
build this trust with your class up early in the beginning and you give them a 
few easy ones and there’s humor so they can laugh about it and maybe for the 
low level, we were talking about some of the lower learners; maybe where it 
would be a game or a gimmick where it’s a gotcha problem, but it’s part of 
how we operate. And it’s not meant to be like me one-upping you, it’s just sort 
of how we can all do it. Or can you come up with a problem, your team for 
this team, that looks like it can be solved but it can’t? I mean maybe it’s 
something we just change the climate of how we teach so that it’s not – like I 
hate when teachers are always like oh I’m right and I got you. I don’t like that 
arrogance in the classroom, y’know, but I would like them to know, I don’t 
always know the answers and some mathematicians never know all the 
answers and that’s life, that’s why you’re here. 
                                                
18
 Megan in SG-ITH81905, interval 21, turn 388. 
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523 Melanie And it’ll depend on how you close it, it’s okay to figure out that it didn’t work, 
but eventually if you figure out what did work, I mean then you still have 
success and they don’t feel like something went wrong, I don’t think. 
Excerpt 10.  From ThEMaT-NEW-082206, interval 39. 
 
Particularly noteworthy here is the seeming contradiction between Catlynn, who 
says that such a move would be damaging if it happened “all the time”, and Jillian, who 
argues that such a move would be damaging unless it were made a normal and expected 
part of classroom culture.  But despite this apparent contradiction, Catlynn and Jillian in 
fact seem to be in agreement that such behavior is not normal.  Catlynn seems to be 
describing school as she knows it, while Jillian appears to be speaking of school as she 
wishes it could be, but not as it actually is: the frequent use of qualifying hedges (“if”, 
“maybe”) labels her speech as counterfactual. 
The second theme addressed in Lucille’s long turn in Excerpt 9 — that the teacher 
runs the risk of seeming ignorant or incompetent — does not seem to have been a 
recurring theme in the study group corpus; I have not found any other examples of 
teachers raising it as a warrant against the decision to allow an incorrect statement to go 
unchallenged.  On the other hand, the third theme (the risk of alienating or losing the 
“weaker” students in the class) was frequently cited in this connection.  One of the 
greatest perceived risks that teachers associated with “misleading” students is the 
likelihood that some students will come away from the class with incorrect beliefs.  This 
was expressed clearly in a subsequent study group, in which participants read aloud a 
script for a proposed sequel to “The Tangent Circle”.  In that script, the teacher draws a 
circle with two intersecting tangent lines, with a ray drawn from the two lines’ point of 
intersection to the center of the circle, and (what appears to be) a diameter passing 
through the two points of tangency and the center of the circle (Fig. 3.2).   
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Figure 3.2.  The teacher’s diagram. 
 
In the script students use this diagram to prove that the center of the circle lies on 
the bisector of the angle formed by the two intersecting tangents.  After the proof is 
completed, one of the students (Lambda) notices that the diagram is flawed:  the radii 
ought to be perpendicular to the tangent lines, and the two angles formed at C should not 
be right angles.  The teacher acknowledges that the diagram contains an error, but points 
out that the proof that was written did not rely on the error.  The script ends with the 
teacher asking the class, “So is the proof wrong, or is just the picture wrong?  Or are they 
both wrong?” 
In their discussion of this story, Glen argued against the teacher’s use of an 
incorrect diagram: 
1510 Glen I just hate to put a drawing up that’s misleading. 
1511 Denise Mm-hmm. 
1512 Glen Um, you know, again, you work so hard to get them to remember the correct 
ideas, and when you, as soon as I show ‘em a wrong one there’s going to be 
about 3 kids in the class that that’s gonna be the only one they remember, out of 
the whole day.  If I had a really, really excellent class, I could see using this type, 
where the vast majority of the kids could catch on to the error, discovering the 
error’s a great idea, but, but if you’ve got an average class where you’ve still got 
kids struggling with the basic concepts, you’re gonna confuse them all the more. 
Excerpt 11.  From ITH022206, interval 42. 
 
Although he acknowledges that encouraging doubt and confusion about the truth can 
have a motivational effect on outstanding students or in a “really, really excellent class”, 
Q
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as a teacher in a non-tracked classroom Glen feels an obligation to serve the needs of all 
his students, not only the ones he calls elsewhere “the bright ones”.  From one point of 
view, this position could be critiqued as condescending (in that it takes for granted that 
not all students have the intellectual capacity to handle challenging mathematics content) 
and essentialist (insofar as it regards intellectual capacity as something that the teacher 
must deal with, but has no power to change or stimulate).  At the same time we recognize 
in Glen’s comments another of the institutional constraints of schooling that the teacher 
must contend with, and that makes an elementary or secondary mathematics teacher a 
different kind of practitioner than a research mathematician, or even a mathematics 
teacher at the post-secondary level.  The latter need not be overly concerned with 
teaching all students to succeed, and to a certain extent this becomes even more true as 
we look closer and closer to research mathematicians’ practice.  To take one example, it 
is clear from Parker’s (2005) biography of R.L. Moore that, though Moore’s courses were 
well-known for “converting” non-mathematics majors, an even larger number of students 
dropped his classes in failure and discouragement.  Such an outcome is not desirable (or 
tolerable) for a secondary Geometry teacher.  The need to teach all students is, like 
standardized testing, a fact of life that teachers must contend with, and one to which they 
may appeal when justifying instructional decisions that may seem at odds with the 
mathematical sensibility. 
 
Summary 
In the previous chapter I argued that one of the dispositions most central to the 
sensibility of mathematicians is a view of the mathematician as one who wonders what is 
 
 108 
true, and as motivated by encounters with situations in which the truth is unclear.  The 
above excerpts from the study group and focus group data indicate some of the 
ambivalence teachers feel towards the idea that they can teach students to approach 
mathematics this way.  On the one hand, many teachers recognize (at least in the abstract) 
the potential benefits of “healthy confusion” in stimulating student inquiry.  This benefit, 
however, is bounded by a series of powerful constraints that teachers perceive on their 
freedom to encourage such “healthy confusion”.  First, teachers are extremely attuned to 
concerns of time:  healthy confusion must not last too long or it becomes “just 
confusion”, and on no account can it ever extend beyond the boundaries of a single 
lesson.  Teachers who permit such confusion to last too long or become too muddled run 
serious risks:  that they will accidentally reinforce misconceptions, which they will later 
have to “un-teach”; that their students will be unprepared for state-mandated standardized 
testing; that they will damage their relationship with students, eroding the trust that is an 
essential part of the teacher-student dynamic; that they will appear ignorant or ill-
prepared to their students; and that they will in any event only succeed in stimulating the 
interest of a small number of the best students, neglecting their obligation to the rest.  For 
all of these reasons there seems to be very little space in teachers’ practice for cultivating 
this aspect of a mathematical sensibility in students: to do so would require, as Jillian 
suggested (Excerpt 10, turn 522), a radical change in the climate of the classroom and of 
the institutional conditions to which it is subject. 
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Modifying the hypothesis or conclusion of an implication 
Beyond the characterization of mathematicians as individuals who wonder about 
the truth, one of the goals of the previous chapter was to identify particular dispositions 
(categories of perception and appreciation) that are typical of mathematicians.  That is to 
say, within the essentially limitless set of things that mathematicians could wonder about, 
what kinds of questions do mathematicians perceive as worth doing, and with what types 
of appraisal are those questions (and work on them) appraised?  In analyzing the 
mathematical narratives, I found that many of these dispositions are arranged in 
dialectical pairs.  One such pair was modify a hypothesis / modify a conclusion.  This pair 
of dispositions is deployed in various ways: as generalization, specialization, 
strengthening, investigating a converse and so forth.  What all of these have in common 
is a focus on mathematics as the study of conditional statements — or, as Peirce (1882) 
put it, a recognition of mathematics as “the science that draws necessary conclusions”.  In 
the pages below, I examine the extent to which these practices (of strengthening and 
weakening hypotheses and conclusions of conditional statements) figure into the 
ThEMaT study group teachers’ discourse about their classroom practice. 
 
Considering the converse of a proposition or question 
The teachers who participated in the ThEMaT study groups and the other GRIP 
focus groups spoke often of the important role conditional statements play in the intended 
curriculum of Geometry.  In particular, teachers speak of exercises in which students are 
asked to rewrite conditional statements in an explicit “if-then” form, to state the converse 
and contrapositive of those conditional statements, and to know that a statement and its 
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converse are logically independent (i.e. the truth value of one does not ensure the truth 
value of the other).  This surfaced, for example, in a study group meeting (ITH102605) in 
which participants read and performed a story about three pairs of students working on a 
proof of the theorem “In a circle, two congruent chords are equidistant from the center.”  
Notice that the “conditional” nature of this theorem is somewhat masked by its 
grammatical form: the “if” and “then” are not explicitly distinguished, and indeed it could 
be argued that the theorem is ambiguous
19
.  Teachers were in general agreement that it 
would be a useful exercise to ask students to parse the statement into if-then form, and to 
ask students to prove both the theorem and its converse: 
 
442 Tina Okay, what we were just saying, if you put that in if-then statement, you can 
do an if-then statement of the converse. So you can have groups of proving 
either way. So do we want to prove one specific way? Or I mean, [Moderator: 
Wonderful question] are we trying to prove equidistance from the center or are 
we trying to prove if they are equidistant, then they are congruent? 
443 Moderator Do you think anything works? Do you want both directions? Do you want 
specific one? 
444 Tina Would it matter to any of you? 
445 Moderator What did you, what would you want your students to prove? 
446 Cynthia I wouldn’t want them to think that it always works to prove it both ways. Ah, I 
mean, for other situations, not just, you know, not just this one. 
447 Moderator Not always  
448 Cynthia [inaudible] 
449 Tina But with our group, we’ve already done if-then statement and the converse as 
well [Cynthia: Right]. We know that sometime both are true [Cynthia: right], 
but sometime they’re not. 
450 Cynthia Right. 
451 Moderator So would you let, would you want them? 
452 Tina That was my question to the group. I mean, would you put it in if-then 
statement or would you, you, do see what I am saying, if you, would you put it 
in if-then statement before you did this with this group? This is my question to 
                                                
19
 In purely grammatical terms, the sentence has the same structure as “By a stream, two 
young children are napping.”  That is, the sentence asserts that that certain “things” 
(chords, children) with a specified property (being congruent, being young) also have 
another property (are equidistant from the center, are napping) — but any causal or 
implicative link must be inferred. 
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the rest of you. [Denise says something inaudible] Would you just throw that 
up and have them prove it? 
453 Moderator Would you talk about the converse as well? Or just one direction? 
454 Penelope I think I would do something more like two-column proof and have them set 
up for themselves. So, “Okay, what’s your given?” and then explain to me. I 
would have them probably go a little bit further, explain to me, “would this 
work in all cases in situations? What are some of the cases which this would 
work or which would not work?” 
455 Tina But my question is, would you set it up that you know that the chords are 
equal and you try to prove equidistance or would you prove that if they’re 
equidistant from the center and then the chords are equal? Or would you let 
them in their own little groups figure it out and then find out whether they...? 
456 Penelope I guess I let them do their own and then go back to the theorem and ask them, 
now did you prove what the theorem asks? 
457 Denise Oh, I see. 
458 Edwin It’s not very clear though (inaudible). 
459 Denise All I have is to set up, first, first I have to ask to write it in if-then because this 
is weird one. I know students will have trouble writing this. It will take more 
than two minutes to write if-then statement. But then once they did that I 
would have them prove it one way and then prove the reverse. 
460 Moderator So let them write if-then... 
461 Denise Yes. 
462 Moderator You let them write the if-then and then ask to do converse. 
463 Denise That’ll be good practice. 
Excerpt 12.  From ITH102605, interval 22. 
 
Tina’s question to the other teachers (442, and repeated in 452 and 455) concerns 
the locus of accountability for teasing apart the hypothesis and conclusion of a theorem 
that is stated in an unparsed form:  is this the teacher’s responsibility, or should it be 
devolved to students?  One possibility is that the teacher would translate the statement of 
the theorem into “if-then” form, identifying explicitly which property is assumed and 
which is to be proved.  The alternative is that the teacher would “just throw that up” 
(452), i.e. pose the statement in its unparsed form, and let the students work on it, 
knowing that different students would be likely to interpret it variously.    Although Tina 
does not voice a clear preference for one alternative over the other, her use of the word 
“just” in connection with the phrase “throw that up”, connoting an almost careless 
approach to teaching, suggests that she locates the responsibility for parsing the statement 
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with the teacher.  At the very least, the fact that she reacts so strongly to the statement as 
presented in the animation (in its unparsed form) marks this as a breach in the norms of 
instruction. 
With respect to the special role played by biconditional statements in Geometry, 
Cynthia’s comment (“I wouldn’t want them to think that it always works to prove it both 
ways”, 446) shows that she recognizes the distinction between a theorem and its 
converse, and moreover that she expects her students to learn this distinction.   Denise 
echoes this (459) and proposes that both directions of the theorem should be proved.  On 
the other hand, while teachers recognize this as a mathematically worthy topic, they seem 
to have mixed feelings about devoting full class time to both a theorem and its converse.  
Later in the same study group meeting, teachers were asked what they would do after a 
group of students had presented a proof of the theorem.  Despite broad agreement that it 
was worthwhile to explicitly state the converse, and verify its truth, teachers were in 
general agreement that proving the converse was not the most worthwhile way to spend 
the remaining class time: 
 
725 Tina I may have to show them that the converse is also true.  
726 Moderator So you would go, you would.  
727 Tina Yeah. 
728 Moderator Prove the one direction and then the converse. 
729 Tina I would show them this was an “if and only if”. Yeah. You can go, it’s 
biconditional, you could go either way first. 
730 Moderator And what do you do... so they prove, some group proved on the board one 
direction, and now what? You’d ask them to prove the other direction? 
731 Tina Could it be done the other way? If you knew, if you’re given, prove this [the 
converse. 
732 Moderator And then, what are you going to... 
733 Megan I probably wouldn’t let them work on that. 
734 Tina No, we’d [probably just do this as a] class 
735 Megan Yeah, I’d just say, you know 
736 Tina Could we do. 
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737 Megan  Could we prove this and then, somebody say. 
738 Moderator Could we prove this. 
739 Megan Who knows what the givens would be, and I’d write that up and then, okay, 
what are we trying to prove? And I’d write that. And then I’d ask questions 
and write it up, because you already spent a lot of time on this [Tina: mhm]. 
Sorry, time is a big deal for me on one theorem.  I want them to be able to 
start their work before they leave, I really, that’s sort of a big deal to me. 
[Tina: mhm] Everyday. I don’t want to talk right to the end of the period, I 
want to be able to start their work. Then do a few problems before they walk 
out of the room. I try and do this everyday. 
740 Moderator So when you said that’s, when you tell them to prove the converse or when 
you go, when you want to prove the converse yourself on the board, do you, I 
wasn’t sure whether you were saying – would you let them state what the 
converse is?  Would you just write the converse on the board?  
741 Megan No, I’ll have them say what the converse is, and I’d have them say what the 
given is have them say what the prove, I might even say “somebody come up 
to the board and draw a picture for this.”  So the people are doing the proof, 
but you are sort of moving it along instead of letting them work at their little 
table. ‘Cause you already did that, you know. Variety is the spice of 
[inaudible.]  [Giggles.] 
  --------------------- 
749 Researcher So why is that? Is that just a matter of -- 
750 Megan It’s a time management thing. Cause, like she said, I do think she is right, I 
would want them to do the converse ‘cause I keep talking about what a big 
deal that is, how powerful it is that they have a theorem that can go both 
ways, that that’s a really powerful thing. That there is not too many things in 
life that are like that, so-- 
Excerpt 13.  From ITH102605, interval 37. 
 
Megan’s observation (to which Tina concurs) that not as much class time would 
be devoted to the converse is interesting: it is as if doing so would amount to spending 
twice as much time on a single topic (“time is a big deal for me on one theorem”, 739; 
“you already did that”, 741).  What we see is that, despite the fact that Megan gives clear 
indication that she understands mathematically that a theorem and its converse are 
logically distinct (750), nevertheless from an instructional point of view she views them 
as the same thing.  She also points to time restrictions as an argument against giving a full 
treatment to the converse; if forced to choose between, on the one hand, proving both 
directions of the biconditional statement in full (a mathematically valuable activity), and 
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on the other hand giving students an opportunity to begin their homework before leaving 
class for the day (a pedagogically valuable activity), she chooses the latter. 
Although both Tina and Megan make reference to the logical independence of a 
theorem and its converse, at the same time it is not clear from the data how seriously we 
should take Megan’s characterization of a biconditional statement as “a really powerful 
thing” that is rare and important.  It certainly is true from a mathematical perspective; is it 
also true from a curricular point of view?  In a subsequent study group meeting Edwin 
remarks that in fact most of the theorems of Geometry are biconditional, and cites this as 
a possible reason why students expect theorems to work both ways: 
 
917 Edwin .... One of the things like I was saying, my book always does the one, and 
then always does the other like two days later, and I find they always find the 
first one is the important one, you know? And then because the book will say 
then here’s the converse, and they’ll do just that, they’ll assume, wow, the 
converse was true, we already, they’ll, I think, have already assumed that two 
days before, because they’re so used to so many of them are if-and-only-if, 
that if you switched the order then the other one would be the one that would 
be important to them..... 
  --------------------- 
940 Researcher What I, what is interesting in what you all are saying, is that apparently this 
work of, you know, what is the if part and what is the then part, working on 
that with the students seems to be a good use of time, right? Or, or isn’t it? 
941 Denise Of a biconditional statement? 
942 Researcher Yeah. 
943 Denise Not to me. Working on what’s the “if” and what’s the “then”…to me it 
doesn’t matter because we all know that it goes both ways.  So I say pick one, 
it doesn’t matter.  That’ll be the first part and then you pick the other part, it 
doesn’t matter, ‘cause they’re both equally important.  That way it’ll keep 
from making them think that one is more important than the other.  You know 
what I’m saying? 
Excerpt 14.  From ITH041906, interval 36. 
 
Edwin’s comment suggests that many students will mistakenly expect every 
theorem to be a biconditional, and to conflate a theorem with its converse.   If he is 
correct — if most of the theorems for which students are accountable are biconditional 
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— then one would not expect students to routinely pose the question “Is the converse 
true?”, as such a question would be purely rhetorical, the answer a foregone conclusion.  
And yet both the discipline and the curriculum make such a question important to ask.  
For this reason we might expect that teachers hold themselves always accountable for 
making sure the question is raised.  Denise (943) disclaims this accountability, apparently 
on the grounds that ultimately it does not matter which direction is called the “theorem” 
and which is called the “converse”, because the two are equally true and equally 
important.  On the other hand, there is evidence elsewhere that teachers do hold 
themselves accountable for making sure that the question of the converse is raised.  In 
one study group meeting, teachers collaboratively wrote a script for a story in which a 
class, having been taught the base angles theorem for isosceles triangles, undertakes a 
proof of the converse.  Teachers joked about the possibility that the question of the 
converse might be raised by a student: 
 
1272 Moderator ....  And so how would that go?  So who would talk first?  Anybod–Would, 
would the teacher start this off? 
1273 Karen You have the students say, “Mr. – whatever he is – is, is the converse of this 
theorem also true?” 
1274 Moderator Are you kidding or do you really mean that? [laughter] 
1275 Esther She’s kidding.  Unless it’s Alpha.  It could be Alpha saying that. [laughs]  
1276 Moderator Alpha could say that? 
1277 Esther Alpha’s the only one that would say that. 
  ----- 
1287 Moderator (Okay, so let me --) so how does the teacher start it off? The teacher would 
ask a question? 
1288 Megan I think the teacher would have – I agree with you [looking at Esther], I don’t 
think any kids (would say,) “Could we prove the converse now?”  Even the 
nerdy kids I have.  I think they would, you’d have to say, “Hey, do you think 
the converse of this is true?” 
Excerpt 15.  From ESP011006, interval 55. 
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Esther’s joking comment that only Alpha — a character from the animation, one 
who Esther characterizes as the sort of student who sometimes makes unexpected 
contributions
20
 — would raise the question of the converse, paired with Megan’s 
response that “even the nerdy kids” would be unlikely to do so, suggests that the 
unlikelihood of such an event is understood by the study group participants as a reflection 
on the students they teach.  That is, teachers would have to (note the modal verbs in 
1288) raise the question of the converse because the students would not do so.  Absent 
from this entire conversation is any consideration of the possibility that students might 
become habituated to raising this question, or that teachers might take upon themselves 
the responsibility for cultivating such a habit of mind. 
In the script that the teachers wrote, the students hit an obstacle in their proof and 
are unable to resolve the obstacle.  The moderator asked whether any students might take 
the failure of the proof as an indicator that the claim was not, in fact, true.  From the point 
of view of mathematical practice, this would be a not unreasonable inference; one of the 
main themes of Lakatos (1976), for example, is that an analysis of a failed proof can 
support the construction of a counterexample.  In scripting the continuation of the 
episode, however, teachers doubted this would happen; tellingly, Karen explained that 
this was unlikely to occur because “(I don’t) think that we give them very many places 
where the converse is actually false” (interval 61, turn 1617).   
                                                
20
 One interesting characteristic of the study group meetings is the extent to which 
the characters take on emergent qualities in the discourse of the teachers.  The name 
“Alpha” is a placeholder, used in different stories for students with distinct qualities, but 
the teachers gradually build up a composite notion of who Alpha “is”.  
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Taken together, the excerpts above create a mixed picture of how teachers relate 
to the mathematical practice of considering the converse of a mathematical proposition.  
On the one hand, teachers hold their students accountable for learning (at least abstractly) 
the difference between a theorem and its converse.  A perusal of textbooks bears out the 
claim that the curriculum ascribes a significant role to this distinction:  most geometry 
textbooks devote a significant portion of an early chapter to propositional logic, with an 
emphasis on if-then statements, converses, and contrapositives.  Students are expected to 
know that “if” and “only if” mean different things, and that “if and only if” is a somewhat 
special phenomenon. 
On the other hand, based on their statements in the study group, it appears that 
teachers do not expect their students to become habituated towards asking “Is the 
converse true?” when they encounter a new theorem.  This is partly because so many of 
the theorems in the Geometry curriculum are biconditional.   But nor do teachers 
customarily make it a practice to point out those cases in which the converse of a theorem 
is false.  When both a theorem and its converse are true, teachers in our study groups 
report that they typically spend less time on the converse than on the original theorem, 
treating it as an embellishment of the first result rather than a truly independent second 
result, and that consequently students regard the converse as a less significant piece of 
knowledge than the original theorem.  
 
Conditional thinking 
Above we saw that teachers hold themselves accountable for including in their 
directions to students that the theorem be parsed into if-then form; they do not seem to 
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expect that students would do so on their own.  More generally, teachers seem to be in 
agreement that writing mathematical propositions in if-then form is something students 
will only do when expressly directed to do so by their teachers.  In an early study group 
teachers viewed “Chords and Distances”, an animation in which a teacher distributes 
copies of a worksheet with two diagrams of circles and some segments drawn in (Fig. 
3.3), and asks them to “conjecture some theorems” about the diagrams.   
 
 
Figure 3.3.  The diagrams in the “Chords and Distances” animation. 
 
When asked what students would be likely to do in response to that prompt, many 
study group participants replied that some students might be likely to make some 
assumptions about the diagram, but that the better students in the class would know that 
they would not be justified in doing so, because without any “givens” a student is “dead 
in the water” (Tina, ITH092805, interval 7, turn 31).  Moreover the teachers said that the 
students would regard both their (unjustified) assumptions, and their (proposed) 
conclusions, as factual descriptions of the diagram, rather than as conditionally related 
possibilities.  If teachers wanted their students to make strategic hypotheses and consider 
what might be true when those hypotheses hold, the instructions would have to be 
explicit on that point: 
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56 Tina I think have them write it as an if-then statement. I mean assume something, 
you know, assume something was true what could you prove from that?  And, 
if you even, if you just gave them this and said okay, you have to write an if-
then statement, assuming something is true what could you prove?  What would 
you assume is true in this, what would you prove? [Denise: I agree] Then they 
would// 
57 Denise //If I [had given this to] my students and said write some conditional 
statements, then they would -- 
58 Tina Right. 
59 Denise I agree. 
60 Moderator So you’re saying that if you just wrote the “If something then something”, they 
would be able to... 
61 Denise They would come up with a whole bunch of stuff.  Might not make sense, but 
they would come up with a whole bunch of stuff. 
62 Megan You know what?  Don’t you think that// 
63 Res. 1 So the key issue would be to tell them that you want an if-then statement. 
64 Tina Right.  But I think, you would have you tell them they could assume something 
is true.  Because with my kids I drill it, our books play tricks on them, and like 
make something look like a 90 degree and it’s not, and they want them to think 
that it is but it’s really not, so it drills in their head that even if you were given 
this, you can’t assume that these two segments are equal or anything’s 
perpendicular until somebody tells you it is. So if you just gave a sheet of paper 
to them, they would go, we don’t know anything because the only thing we 
know is that’s a radii.  And those two are chords, and, you know, they would be 
pretty much dead in the water until you told them they could assume something 
was true. 
65 Res. 1 If you told them, if you gave them some information, what would be the 
probability that they would come up with an if-then statement? 
66 Tina What do you mean, like, give them that they were perpendicular? 
67 Res. 1 Well, perpendicular and the chords are equal. 
68 Tina Then I think they would come up with conclusions to it, because that would be 
their if part, if this is true then...  I don’t think they’d write it as an if-then 
statement, but they would write their conclusion, what they would come up 
with. 
69 Cooney Just write the conclusion. 
70 Tina Right. (3 sec pause) I don’t think they’d put it as an if-then. 
71 Res. 2 But in the situation that is given there, because no information is there, you 
don’t think they would conjecture that anything is true about this, that figure. 
72 Tina Not unless I tell them they could.  Mine are pretty well disciplined. 
Excerpt 16.  From ITH092805, interval 8. 
 
In interval 8, Tina seems to be making several related points (to which the other 
teachers concur, elsewhere in the transcript).  First, students are taught throughout the 
year not to make assumptions about the objects represented in diagrams without some 
explicit sanction to do so (“givens”); students do not choose their own givens, and 
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without givens they are “dead in the water”.  If the nature of a task is such that students 
are expected to make assumptions and see what conclusions follow from those 
assumptions, they need to be given explicit instructions to do so, and those instructions 
must contain a reference to “if-then” form or “conditional statements” in order to signal 
to students what they are to do.  Even when students do have givens to work with, and are 
asked to make conjectures, the conjectures are most likely to be expressed as factual 
statements (“just write their conclusion”, 68), rather than as a conditional relationship.  
All of this together adds up to an argument that teachers do not expect their students to 
think conditionally or counterfactually about geometric objects represented in diagrams; 
they take as shared the notion that students are supposed to describe or prove what is true 
about certain objects, rather than what could be true if certain conditions were met. 
These findings are consistent with earlier research on students’ interactions with 
diagrams (Herbst 2004) and on the role of the diagrammatic register (Weiss & Herbst 
2007) in mediating students’ understanding of geometric objects.  Those studies have 
argued that the conventions of the diagrammatic register are such that a diagram is taken 
to be a more-or-less accurate representation of a particular geometric object.  According 
to these conventions, not everything true of the diagrammatic representation can be 
ascribed to the object represented; in particular, measurements made on the diagram are 
to be regarded with suspicion.  Still, to the extent that the diagram is understood to 
represent an actual object, any claim that can be made about the object’s metric 
properties are either true or false.  For example, any given quadrilateral either is a 
rectangle, or it is not; and although one may not know which is the case, students 
nevertheless know that it is surely one or the other.  If there are enough givens to entitle 
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the conclusion that it is a rectangle, then this may be asserted, and otherwise one must 
refrain from making any such assertions.  This way of speaking of diagrammatic objects 
militates against making claims that are contingent on unverifiable possibilities, such as 
“If this were a rectangle, then…” 
All of the above, however, is predicated on the assumption that students encounter 
a particular diagram as a representation of a particular object, rather than a generic 
representative of an abstractly-defined class of objects.  Weiss & Herbst (2007) show that 
the latter is not unheard of in the Geometry classroom, but that its role tends to be 
restricted to the instructional situation of “installing theorems” (Herbst, Nachlieli & 
Chazan, submitted; Herbst & Miyakawa, 2008; Miyakawa & Herbst 2007a, 2007b).  In 
this context, a diagram is typically accompanied by a verbal formulation of the abstract 
properties that the diagram supposedly represents; this verbal formulation marks the 
diagram as a generic object only, rather than a particular object.  In the episode under 
discussion in the previous excerpt, no such markers of genericity were present in the task 
as posed by the teacher to the student.  For this reason it is not surprising that study group 
participants were in broad agreement that students would be unlikely to make any claims 
about the diagram in a form that labels its properties as contingent possibilities, rather 
than actualities — unlikely, that is, unless they were to be explicitly directed to do so by 
the teacher. 
 
Generalization and Specialization 
In Chapter 2, I indicated how modifications to the conclusion and hypothesis of a 
(settled) conditional statement can produce generalizations and specializations.  I 
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illustrated this by showing how the proposition “If ABCD is a parallelogram, then its 
angle bisectors form a rectangle” can give rise to a range of new questions by iteratively 
generalizing and specializing.  That example was chosen, in part, because a number of 
the ThEMaT study group meetings and GRIP focus groups were focused on some 
variation of the “angle bisector problem:”   What can be said about the angle bisectors of 
a quadrilateral?  The animations “The Square,” “The Kite,” and “The Parallelogram” 
(discussed above) all deal with one or more aspects of this problem.  Each of those 
animations exemplifies how looking at a special case of a problem can help to explore a 
complex problem space.  In light of this, it is interesting to see how study group 
participants responded to that aspect of those animations. 
In the first study group meeting in which participants watched “The Square”, 
participant Glen noted that the teacher had posed the problem in a general form (“What 
can one say about the angle bisectors of a quadrilateral?”) and reacted negatively to 
Alpha’s investigation of the special case of a square: 
173 Glen I would have stopped at some point fairly early on and said you know, a square is 
not, you know we want to talk about a quadrilateral.  And this is a very specialized 
one, can we get back to the more general.  I really stress to my kids, if I tell them to 
draw a triangle, I don’t want them to draw an isosceles, because it may lead them to 
facts that look to be true but really aren’t necessarily true in our problem.  So I 
would have tried–I would have left his square on the board and tried to have gotten 
somebody else involved so we could have gone from just a plain old ugly 
quadrilateral and then eventually like you said worked down to the more specifics, 
the parallelogram, the rectangle, the square— 
175 Greg See I wouldn’t even have let him come up to the board, cause I knew he was 
square.  He said it right away.  I wouldn’t have had him come up, I would have 
said, well let’s save that idea for later, let’s deal with— 
176 Mara And you saw that they were open for 5 minutes, walking around the room, you 
already know— 
178 Glen So then you know, I can see both sides of our discussion here, you’re going to stop 
this before it even happens, I may have let it happen and then kind of you move, 
show them the relationship-- 
Excerpt 17.  From ThEMaT081905, interval 13. 
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It is not completely clear on what grounds Greg and Glen object to Alpha’s 
investigation of a special case.  In part it appears to be based on the authority of the 
teacher:  students are supposed to answer the question they are asked, not change it to a 
different one.  On the other hand it also appears to be a matter of cultivating good 
intellectual habits: if students are supposed to be considering a general object, but use 
representations that have unrecognized special qualities, they may be misled in mistaking 
phenomena that are only true in certain cases as being true in general. 
Glen’s and Greg’s critiques of Alpha seem to be based at least implicitly on the 
idea that Alpha’s investigation of the square was not a deliberate and purposeful way of 
making progress in an open and uncharted problem space
21
, but rather an accidental 
misinterpretation of the problem or a misguided attempt to make things easier for 
himself.  Elsewhere in the corpus, in connection with a story in which students study the 
concurrency of medians in a triangle, we find evidence that teachers can regard a move 
such as Alpha’s as both problematic and strategic: 
 
134 Greg I was surprised that more students didn’t realize that by choosing an 
equilateral triangle or an isosceles triangle that that was a problem.  I thought 
they would have picked up that right away. 
135 Cynthia Special case. 
136 Greg Right. 
137 Cynthia Right. 
138 Researcher Yeah actually one student says why is that a problem? 
139 Cynthia Yeah, maybe he was the only one though. 
140 Researcher So you think that students should know that that is problematic? 
                                                
21
 It is perhaps worth noting here that, notwithstanding Glen’s claim (173) that he would 
urge Alpha to “get back to the general”, at no point in any of our study group meetings 
that discussed the angle bisector problem did any participant mention any properties of 
the general case as being worth pursuing in class.  This was so even after we distributed 
to all participants a short document containing a more-or-less complete mathematical 
treatment of both the general case and a number of special cases. 
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141 Greg I was just surprised that it either took them so long to figure that as a problem 
out or even one set of why is that a problem?  I think even after you explained 
why it might have been a problem. 
142 Researcher Do the others share that sentiment, like the students should know that it’s 
problematic to choose an equilateral triangle? 
143 Denise I don’t know, because my students...every time I tell them that’s a special 
case, that’s not gonna work all the time, they still try to find the easy way out 
and pick these special cases that make the problem easier.  So I don’t know.  
And even why I say no that’s a problem, that’s a special case, I don’t care if I 
say it every day for 15 days, someone’s gonna say why is that a problem?  
Because they want an easy way out, they want–I mean–so I don’t know.  That 
didn’t surprise me at all. 
144 Researcher In here, like, just to play devil’s advocate, Megan had also said you will draw 
your own triangle.  So couldn’t they just say well this is my triangle?  Or you 
would, but you would still expect them to choose a general one right? 
145 Greg Well I would think that they would first try an equilateral or an isosceles, 
because that’s the easiest one to do.  And then after that works for that one, 
let’s see, can I do an obtuse or something else that-- 
146 Moderator So they’d realize they’re taking a special case, then they need to take a 
general case. 
147 Greg And I think a lot of them do that right away, take a special case first. 
148 Moderator Take special case first, but knowing that it’s just a special case...then they-- 
149 Greg I did.  I felt the equilateral triangle would probably be the easiest one to see.  
And then once you see that then maybe let’s try another one to see why did it 
work for that one. 
Excerpt 18.  From ITH011806, interval 10. 
 
This excerpt contains a complex set of evaluative stances regarding students who 
look at a special case when posed with a general question.  Greg characterizes such a 
move as problematic, presumably for the same reasons cited above.  Denise regards the 
move as an act of laziness (“they want an easy way out”, 143).  To this Greg responds 
that knowingly taking a special case to simplify a problem may be a very strategic move 
(149), provided that subsequently one returns to the general case.  That the move be 
purposeful (rather than accidental and unrecognized) is an important one. 
Denise’s contention that specialization is something lazy students do finds an 
interesting counterpoint in a brief discussion from another study group meeting.  In that 
session, participants considered “Conjectures about Quadrilaterals,” a story in which a 
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teacher had students investigate the quadrilateral formed by the midpoints of a rectangle, 
with the goal of discovering and proving that it is always a rhombus.  Kappa, however, 
considers a general quadrilateral, and discovers that the “midpoint quadrilateral” (i.e., its 
dual) is always a parallelogram.  Participants were quick to label Kappa as an advanced 
student: 
 
783 Researcher And, and you were saying, so, you were saying that going after Kappa’s idea 
is like teaching to the top of the class. 
784 Carl Mm-hmm. 
785 Researcher Because Kappa didn’t care to look at the more trivial cases, was that what you 
said?  Like // 
786 Carl // Cause Kappa’s moving to the general case. 
787 Researcher Mm-hmm.  And, so, I // 
788 Carl // And that I think is--  all by itself illustrates teaching to a different level.  Is 
saying we can make conjectures, we can, we can perhaps find proof  in 
specific cases and I think that  that’s something that everyone in my class 
should be able to do. Take a square and do it. I mean, what do you get? You 
get another square. And I feel like, everyone’s like, “Oh, okay, that’s fine”.  
You know, start with a rectangle, what do you get?  And I feel like that’s 
something I would expect them all to get in short order.  
789 Researcher But if the teacher follows Kappa’s idea the teacher is sort of ignoring that 
bigger segment of the population, you’re saying. 
790 Carl Mm-hmm. 
791 Researcher Are you saying that? 
792 Carl Yeah. 
793 Melissa I think so. 
794 Carl And pulling everyone up.  
795 Researcher Mm-hmm. 
796 Carl Perhaps. 
797 Melissa But maybe they’re not ready to go into another, you know, [Carl:  I mean, 
perhaps.]  you might lose them more, and they’re just like, “Oh god, there 
goes Kappa again.” 
798 Carl Mm-hmm. 
799 Melissa Uh-huh.  “I didn’t understand the first part and now you’re onto the (.) end.” 
Excerpt 19.  From ESP101105, interval 22. 
 
These preceding excerpts, taken together, give evidence that teachers perceive a 
correspondence between the dialectical pair of mathematical practices “generalize / 
specialize” and the classification of students as “strong / weak”.  That is:  Alpha, who 
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specialized when he was not supposed to, is a weak or lazy student (Excerpt 17); Kappa, 
who did not follow the teacher’s instructions and instead considered a more general case, 
is a strong student. 
When this finding is set alongside the previously-noted obligation to teach all 
students (not just “the top of the class”) we find an emergent argument for teaching to 
favor investigation of special cases (as more tractable for the majority of students) over a 
propensity towards generalization.  And in fact when considering how the angle bisector 
problem might be deployed in classrooms, teachers indicated a preference for organizing 
the task as one of looking at special cases.  We find, for example, the same idea 
expressed by two different teachers in sessions held more than a year apart: 
 
231 Peter I think if, if you had the software, you could have ten different quadrilaterals that 
you could have them, on each one of those, doing, do the angle bisectors and look 
and see what they got.... if you start with this, you get this, they weren’t always the 
same, you didn’t get the same thing at every singe shape. So then, if all the kids 
were working in pairs or whatever, then you could bring ‘em all back together and 
collaborate.  Every time we started with this, what did our angle bisectors 
produce? Every time we started with one of these, what did our angle bisectors 
produce?  
Excerpt 20.  From TWP020805. 
    
682 Tina Well and see I’ve done something similar to this, and what I did is I actually drew 
up different quadrilaterals, like I drew like four rectangles on a page. I drew four 
squares on a page. I drew four – you know. I made, I made up my own sheets and 
then I randomly ran off however many I needed for the class and shuffled ‘em, and 
then I handed out and said, “Okay, here you go. Everybody’s got a sheet. 
Everybody’s got a different shape. Draw the angle bisectors and come up with a 
conjecture you can make.” And then what I do is say, “Find somebody who has the 
same shapes as you and see if you came up with the same conjec–“ and you gotta 
get ‘em moving that way a little bit, a little brain break and everything. And then I 
have them sit down and talk together and then we kind of post up one of the sheets 
and say, “Okay, who had this sheet? What conjectures did you come up with?” And 
then that way you kinda address ‘em–and when you have fifty-five minutes it’s a 
great way to kinda get through all of them quicker.... 
Excerpt 21.  From TMW111506, interval 24. 
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 Although Peter and Tina differ significantly in the kinds of material resources 
they envision students using — Peter favoring dynamic geometry software, Tina 
describing the use of photocopied worksheets — the tasks they describe are similar 
insofar as they both call on students to discover the general case (so to speak) through an 
inventory of a number of special cases. 
In summary, what we find is that the dialectical opposition between generalization 
and specialization finds its expression in the classroom in the form of a tension that 
teachers must negotiate.  On the one hand, the participants in the study groups and focus 
groups say that students, when asked to draw general objects, tend to (unconsciously) 
draw special cases, and as a consequence will erroneously ascribe properties of the 
special case to the more general one.  For this reason teachers need to resist the students’ 
instinct to specialize, and remind the class to stay in the general.  Teachers also recognize 
that looking at more general examples can help to differentiate between distinct objects 
that happen to coincide for some special case (e.g., the diagonals and angle bisectors of a 
quadrilateral; the medians and altitudes of a triangle; etc.)  On the other hand they also 
perceive the general case as more difficult than the special cases, and not really suitable 
for the majority of students; this perception pushes them in the direction of providing 
scaffolding for students’ work, by asking them to look at specific special cases rather 
than consider problems in their full generality.   No one, not even the teacher, is held 
responsible for considering questions in as much generality as possible, for letting the 
question “Can this result be generalized?” take the inquiry as far as it can go. 
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Utility & Abstraction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, another dialectical pair of dispositions (categories of 
perception and appreciation) that appear to be part of the mathematical sensibility is 
Utility and Abstraction.  That is, at certain times and in certain contexts, mathematicians 
value questions that have applicability in a (not purely mathematical) domain (e.g. 
physics, biochemistry, economics), or take their inspiration from those domains; while at 
other times and in other contexts mathematicians may openly disparage “real-world 
relevance” as a criterion on which to judge the merits of a mathematical result and 
instead value mathematics precisely for its removal from such practical applications.  As 
with the other dialectical pairs I discuss, these two oppositional categories are not in 
practice mutually exclusive; from the theoretical considerations discussed in Chapter 2, 
we would expect that most mathematicians might hold some allegiance to both of these 
positions, with one or the other coming to the foreground at certain moments. 
In this section we investigate whether either or both these categories has salience 
for teachers of high school geometry:  that is, in commenting on (theirs and others’) 
practice, do teachers refer to the utilitarian or abstract qualities of things, and adduce 
those qualities as grounds on which to form an appraisal of a possible action.  The 
question is an important one, especially when one considers the history of the high school 
geometry curriculum in the United States.  As has been shown (González & Herbst 
2006), for much of the past century the presence of geometry in the high school 
curriculum has been warranted on at least two competing grounds.  On the one hand, 
from ancient times geometry has had its origins in the solving of practical problems (as 
attested by the etymology of the word “geometry” as “earth measurement”).   With 
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regards to the school geometry curriculum, as early as 1909 the Committee of Fifteen on 
the Geometry Syllabus began calling for an emphasis on application of geometry to “real 
world situations such as designing architectural elements, surveying, and sailing” 
(González & Herbst, p. 11).  
On the other hand, as González & Herbst (2006) also report, from the end of the 
19
th
 century onward geometry was also touted as valuable for its capacity to cultivate 
students’ ability to think logically.  In the 1893 Report from the Mathematics Conference 
of the Committee of Ten, “geometry, unlike algebra, was seen as an introduction to 
students of the ‘art of rigorous demonstration’.” (González & Herbst, p. 12, quoting 
Newcomb et al, 1893).  From this point of view the most important aspect of the 
geometry course was not its utility in real-world problem-solving but rather its structure 
as an axiomatic-deductive body of knowledge (p. 8).  This position can be taken as an 
expression of the abstractness value, and it too has found repeated expression throughout 
the last century, perhaps most notably in the “new math” reforms of the School 
Mathematics Study Group (Curtis, Daus & Walker, 1961). 
González & Herbst (2006) identify four modal arguments that characterized the 
discourse around the nature and purpose of the geometry course during the 20
th
 century:  
a formal argument (geometry teaches deductive reasoning), a utilitarian argument 
(geometry is essential knowledge in the workforce), a mathematical argument (geometry 
offers students the opportunity to experience the activity of mathematicians), and an 
intuitive argument (geometry provides a language for describing the world).  Each of 
these four arguments finds its expression in recent policy documents such as Principles 
and Standards for School Mathematics (NCTM 2000).  For the present purpose, the 
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significance of these four arguments rests in the fact that two of them are related to the 
disposition towards utility and the other two are related to abstraction.  As such they 
provide evidence that, at least as far as the intended curriculum is concerned, both of 
those dispositions have a presence in the high school geometry course. 
The study group and focus group data bears these observations out, although the 
picture is a complex one.  In the transcripts we often find teachers mimicking a 
stereotypical student asking “When are we ever going to use this in real life?” in a 
mocking tone.  At the final ThEMaT study group of the first year (ESP062806), Megan 
was quick to concede that much of the substance of the course she teaches will have no 
direct application in students’ lives:   “And I say to kids all the time, ‘I’m not – No one’s 
gonna ask you to prove triangles are congruent in your life.  I’m just going to admit that 
right now.  No one’s ever going to ask you to do that.’”  Rather, for Megan the value of 
the course is located in its ability to teach students to think and learn independently:  “I 
have faith in learning.  That’s really what I think I’m teaching.  Faith in learning, that you 
can learn anything and you don’t really need me, I’m just sort of showing you some tools 
but once I do that, you can just pick something you want to learn and you can learn it.” 
In a similar vein Megan frequently spoke of “proof” as something that students 
could apply to real-world “problems”.  In another session
22
 she illustrates this with an 
anecdote from her classroom: 
.... But we’ve been talking about how you can use proofs in real life.  Like 
I said to one girl, tell me something your mom wouldn’t let you do, and 
she says “Wear a bikini top to school.”  So I was like, okay, let’s go with 
that, so what would be your logical arguments against that?  And she said, 
                                                
22
 SG-ITH092805. 
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“Everyone at school’s wearing a bikini top.”  Which is, she was just using 
this as a far-out example, no one would wear a bikini top, but I said, this is 
perfect, that is not a logical argument, you’re giving something that is not 
a logical argument.  Can somebody else give one?  And this girl says, “I’m 
so hot at school I’m dehydrated and I can’t think straight”, something like 
that....  So [inaudible] more logical arguments, yeah, we’re trying to have 
fun with the whole, that this stuff is useful.  Building a logical argument, I 
said, What are the givens you know about your mother?  And she was 
talking about her mother, and I was saying, well you want to build your 
argument around your given things.  So yeah we’re still like into that, 
we’re just starting proofs.  (ESP092805, interval 26, turn 449) 
 
Megan is not alone in disavowing the value of “proving triangles congruent” as 
useless, while simultaneously valuing the role of proof in teaching students to build 
persuasive arguments.  In one typical exchange Karen and Carl agreed that geometry was 
useful not so much for the content of the mathematics, but rather for its capacity to teach 
students the need to provide support for claims: 
 
63 Karen I think that what they’re seeing – I mean I see proofs as like stories, where 
you’re bringing in the elements just as you need them and, you know, that they 
make a, they have a plot.  And so, and I think it’s very hard for them to see any 
use in doing that with angles.  I mean we really start to get the “when am I ever 
going to use this, you know why would I ever ever want to prove that two 
triangles are congruent?” And, um, and I’m trying to focus on that proof is a 
really important part of life.  And that, that as you get to the idea of the basic 
structure of proof, and how to set it up so that you’ve got your givens and you 
make some reasonable arguments, that that’s a helpful thing.  And, so I think 
it’s a way of connecting it into what they’re doing so that, so that they-so many 
people end up saying, I hear from people that are grown, well you know, I 
went through geometry, I don’t remember any of it, I didn’t learn anything, it 
was totally useless.  And it was sort of like trying to get them to see it as part of 
a how we think. 
64 Carl I remember when–do you remember when we put together that proof project 
like a million years ago?  Lucille and I, she had this proof project and the goal 
was, I think, was to sort of bring in these ideas of, everyday life proofs into the 
whole idea of doing like formal proofs.  And I guess what–I do use it, but I rely 
on it less because I feel like I’ve hit–I’ve missed more than I’ve hit when I 
tried to do this project.  And I think that my purpose is a pretty clear one, and 
that is to just show students how they do inductive and deductive thinking all 
day long, and they don’t pay attention to when they’re doing it.  Um, but I do 
think that having those examples of those different kinds of thinking, those 
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different styles of thinking in particular are really useful to them because I 
think that they recognize that I’m not just teaching them how to do formal 
proof, but I’m trying to teach them how to think in certain ways. Um, like 
Karen was saying, I think it is part of life and I do think kids often think of 
geometry sort of as less important perhaps, or less useful or whatever.  But 
what ends up happening is kids end up saying to each other, like you know 
that’s really one that you remember, that’s the one you actually you know walk 
away and you actually–that’s the math you’re going to be doing.  You’re not 
going to do algebra when you’re walking down the street, you’re not going to 
be doing, you know, calculus.  But you’re going to be remembering 
relationships and remembering different kinds of thinking. But I can’t say that 
I’ve come up with a successful lesson plan that has really hit home, kids say 
yeah I get that.  I think that it’s a little too abstract. 
65 Researcher So is the everyday logic helping them understand the geometric logic-- 
66 Carl The need for it. 
67 Researcher 
--or is the geometric  logic helping them understand the everyday logic? 
68 Karen I think it’s a totally kind of new idea for them.  I mean the English teachers yell 
at them all the time, put in evidence.  And I think they’re, and they watch all 
the law shows and you know, and they have a sense of what happens in the 
jury but I don’t think they have a sense for what evidence is, or how to support 
a statement.  And that’s a crucial idea, that they get this way of understanding 
that you just can’t make a statement without supporting it and what support 
actually looks like rather than you know just, “Well I think it’s true”. 
Excerpt 22.  From ESP110105, interval 8. 
 
Karen and Carl’s lengthy turns in the above excerpt are loaded with terms and 
phrases expressing a dichotomy between, on the one hand, the abstract content of 
geometric proofs, and on the other hand the utilitarian value of the art of proving.  Karen 
distinguishes between proving “that two triangles are congruent” (which students see no 
use for) and proof as a “really important part of life”.  Carl speaks of “formal proofs”, 
“algebra” and “calculus” as “the math you’re not going to do when you’re walking down 
the street”, in contrast with “everyday life proofs” which students use “all day long”. 
But overlapping and coextensive with this dichotomy is a parallel one, in which 
deductive and inductive reasoning are opposed to each other and aligned, respectively, 
with formal (=useless) and everyday proofs.  This is found explicitly in Carl’s turn 64, 
and implicitly in Karen’s turn 68, in which writing a mathematical proof is compared to 
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writing an essay for an English class and to an argument before a jury in a court of law — 
both forms of argument that rely at last in part on amassing evidence and on rhetoric, 
rather than solely on rigorous deduction from axioms.  Thus the participants’ 
commentary on the utilitarian value of learning to prove contains an unrecognized 
contradiction:  the value of learning deductive argument is that argumentation is valuable 
is many real-world contexts, but this is illustrated with examples of argumentation that 
are not purely deductive, calling into question the claim that deductive argument is really 
worth learning. 
The above excerpts locate the value of the geometry course in its capacity to teach 
“logical reasoning”, which is in turn warranted for its value in the “real world”.  On the 
one hand, teachers reject the “stuff” of geometry — its actual mathematics content — as 
not useful in the real world.  On the other hand the need to justify the course on real-
world grounds cannot be entirely neglected, if for no other reason than that students will 
continue to challenge the teacher with “Why do I need to know this?”  Consequently the 
formal argument is turned around and made into a utilitarian one. We see here a striking 
accommodation between the opposing poles of utility and abstraction. 
Teachers are not entirely insensitive to the value that the substance of geometry 
(its propositional content) has for real-world problem-solving contexts.  In a discussion 
from a second-year study group teachers discuss the role that mathematics plays in blue-
collar professions: 
 
847 Researcher Now you realize that some, some of those kids that, that – The people that 
come to your house and fix the, you know, that work on the pipes and do all 
the manual things are usually, have been the people that had difficulty with 
mathematics in school. But they have the capacity to reason geometrically at 
least in ways that, you know, are enviable, you know? 
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848 Melanie Mm-hmm. 
849 Researcher And, you know -- 
850 Cynthia And they don’t see the connection between the two. 
851 Researcher We don’t see the connection between the two! [group laughter] 
852 Megan No, they don’t -- 
853 Cynthia No, they don’t. They don’t see that, that like my cousin is a landlord he’s got 
like, you know, thirty-some units which is a, a, quite a bit. And he doesn’t see 
the math behind when he buys carpeting, paint and all that kind of stuff, of 
calculating how much he needs as being part of math and -- 
854 Researcher Right. 
855 Cynthia -- you know I tell him, “John, you’re much better than you think you are 
(because you’re using) every day a real-life math, and he doesn’t see that 
(connection to,) to what I teach or anything like that, and so it’s just kinda 
interesting how -- 
856 Megan (You’re using math every day.) (He’s in denial.) 
Excerpt 23.  From TMT101006, interval 26.  
 
Similar observations were made in other sessions by Greg and Karen 
(TMW032107, interval 34, turns 660-662), and by Robin (TWP050306, turn 404).  In all 
of these instances teachers point to the practical value of geometry for workers in skilled 
trades (carpenters, plumbers, electricians, auto mechanics).  At the same time they lament 
the fact that the usefulness of geometry goes generally unrecognized in our society, to 
such a degree that even those who use geometry routinely see little connection between 
what they learned in school and the mathematics they use in practice.  This may speak to 
a sentiment among the study and focus group participants that the utility disposition is 
generally undervalued by a curriculum that places greater emphasis on abstraction.  But 
at the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, the teachers themselves give virtually no 
evidence throughout the entire corpus of data that they themselves do anything in their 
practice to redress this perceived imbalance.  On the contrary, whenever teachers discuss 
engaging their students in projects that would engage their students in real-world 
applications of  geometry, invariably the activity is characterized as a fun change-of-pace 
from the normal classroom routine, one that is done to boost morale but for which there is 
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little student accountability.  For example, at the beginning of one study group meeting 
(ITH121505, interval 0), while waiting for other teachers to arrive, Tina discussed an 
annual activity in which her students design and build a putt-putt golf course.  One could 
certainly regard the project of designing, building, and testing a putt-putt golf course as a 
learning experience, in at least two senses:  a student could deepen his or her 
understanding of certain geometric content, and also gain a better appreciation for the 
utility of geometry in real life.  But throughout her recount, Tina describes the activity as 
fun (“we had a blast”, turn 195) rather than “educational” or “useful”.  Cynthia, who 
listens attentively to Tina’s description of the activity and who asks her questions about 
the logistics of the event, concurs that “it’d be fun to do” but likewise says nothing about 
the project’s educational value.  Moreover, in her description of the annual event Tina 
states that it is customarily scheduled just before a vacation (“the day before 
Thanksgiving”, turn 193, or “at Christmas”, turn 203), further creating the sense that such 
events are an enjoyable diversion away from the normal activity of the classroom, rather 
than a central element of what is to be taught.  As teachers describe such activities, they 
signal with their language choices at their goal is not for students to learn any specific 
mathematics, or even to gain an appreciation of the utility of geometry in real-world 
contexts, but simply for students to have “a blast”. 
In summary, we find that the twin dispositions of utility and abstraction have 
salience for the teacher — that is, teachers speak both of the usefulness of geometry, and 
of its disconnect from reality — but (as with the other dialectical pairs described above) 
that salience manifests in the teachers’ practical rationality as a source of tension.  
Teachers feel obliged to point out the utilitarian nature of geometry, with its connection 
 
 136 
to real-world problem-solving, but neither they nor their students (nor former students 
who become users of geometry in the context of skilled trades) take that connection very 
seriously.  On the other hand teachers seem somewhat embarrassed and apologetic about 
the abstract nature of the content, rejecting the content of proof as useless (“Nobody’s 
ever going to ask you to prove two triangles congruent”) while simultaneously justifying 
the teaching of proof by an appeal to real-world situations in which argument-building is 
important.  This latter appeal deconstructs itself, in that the real-world contexts proffered 
are quite different in nature from the kind of arguments (logical deduction from 
assumption to conclusions) that typify proofs in geometry. 
 
Surprise and Confirmation 
The third dialectical pair discussed in Chapter 2 was surprise / confirmation.  
There it was shown that mathematicians place a high value both on results that run 
contrary to their expectations, and on results that confirm long-standing but unproven 
suspicions.  This pair of dispositions is, obviously, closely related to the general theme of 
mathematicians as wonderers who work in areas of doubt and uncertainty; and, insofar as 
we have already seen that the high school geometry classroom provides only limited 
exposure for students to such areas (see earlier in the chapter), we might expect to find 
little recognition of these dispositions in the corpus of study and focus groups. 
And, in fact, a search of the data found very few instances in which teachers said 
anything that seems directly related to these two dispositions.  In part this may be 
explained by the central and particular role that visual intuition plays in high school 
geometry:  The theorems taught in geometry are never really surprising, because they are 
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statements of facts that are visually obvious.  On the other hand the fact that the truth is 
never in serious doubt means that confirmatory results are not particularly important, 
either. 
In one lengthy but very revealing conversation, teachers expressly acknowledged 
that exploration, and in particular the work of finding counterexamples to a conjecture, 
tends to disappear from their classrooms at roughly the same time that proof begins to 
take a prominent role.  The following discussion excerpts are taken from two adjacent 
intervals in study group meeting ESP091305, in which teachers viewed “The Kite”, an 
animation that shows students engaged in the question of whether the angle bisectors of a 
kite meet at a point (and, if so, where that point is located).  In that context Carl noted 
that conjecturing and proof are allocated disjoint times within the school year: 
 
459 Carl ..... And sometimes I feel like we talk about conjecturing and counter-
examples at one point in the semester and then we’re like okay, we’re not 
gonna talk about this anymore, now we’re talking about proof.  That there’s 
some sort of stopping place in there, I don’t know if you guys do that too, but 
I, I think there’s some conjecturing that goes on at some point but then it’s 
like, okay, let’s just really prove this [stuff].  I don’t know if there’s enough 
ambiguity left.   You know, I don’t know if, I think maybe I’m not being 
clear.  Sometimes I just feel like everything we do is provable after a certain 
point in the semester, and we don’t spend enough time looking at problems 
where things aren’t provable, I don’t think. 
460 Karen Well we don’t spend very much time making conjectures because we have so 
many proofs to do. 
461 Carl Right, right.  Maybe that’s what // 
462 Karen // There’s less time exploring, and then at the end we’re stopping the proofs 
altogether // 
463 Esther // Yeah, we more or less tell the kids to show that this works.  We don’t do as 
much of asking them what they think works and whether or not they can 
verify it or prove it or explain it.  We more tell them, this works, explain why, 
more.  We don’t, we don’t do enough I don’t think of. 
464 Researcher So why is that, that we don’t do that? 
465 Esther Um... 
466 Carl Is the question that [the moderator] asked at the top of the hour foreign in 
your classroom at, like, the point it would be appropriate?  Like, we can’t start 
talking about kites until like December or January, right?  Would you ever 
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ask a question like that in December or January?  Like, I’m, it looks so 
foreign to me.  Like it’s a great question.  I wish I had time for it and 
everything.  But, like, I don’t feel like I ever would ask a question like that.  
Explore, figure out, and then maybe we’ll prove something. 
467 Lynne Well, think of how much knowledge that they have to have already, when 
we’re talking about // 
468 Carl // This is what I’m saying. 
469 Lynne // Side-side-side, so we have to have all the triangles congruence facts // 
470 Karen // We sure can’t do it like next week or anything // 
471 Carl // No. 
472  [3 sec pause] 
473 Karen Well, but, you know // 
474 Esther // It does take them to have a pretty strong basis before they do. // 
475 Karen // But I, I was like, I liked that question.  And I was thinking // 
476 Carl // Me too. // 
Excerpt 24.  From ESP091305, interval 51. 
 
Within this first excerpt teachers affirm that conjecturing (as an activity) gives 
way to proof when the latter enters the curriculum late in the first semester.  
Consequently there is no natural time for a teacher to pose a question like that considered 
by the students in the animation “The Kite.”  In considering why this is so, teachers offer 
a variety of explanations for this state of affairs.  Karen locates this as a result of the 
crowded curriculum:  once students become accountable for learning proof (late in the 
first semester), “we have so many proofs to do” (460) that there is no time left for 
conjecturing.  Lynne and Esther approach the problem from the other side:  the reason 
why a problem like this could not be taken on in the early part of the year (when 
investigating conjectures is still a common activity) is that students do not yet have the 
prerequisite knowledge for such a task (467, 469, 474). 
In something of a rebuttal to this, the following interval begins with a long turn in 
which Karen considers whether the problem could indeed be explored early in the year, 
and situates it within the unit on angle bisectors: 
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479 Karen No, but we could it.  We could do explorations.  In the same, you know, like, 
put it in as part of teaching angle bisectors.  I think it would make more sense.  
I think we have, well, what I feel is, I just have way too much content, too 
many things to cover and not enough time to do it.  And then the other part is, 
I know students who seem to be trained to be stubbornly stupid.  You ask 
them a question and they sit there [pause] and wait.  And if they can out-wait 
me, then I’ll tell them the answer.  So I’m continuing on the training, you 
know another year of being stubbornly stupid, and eventually the teacher will 
tell you the answer and so all you have to do is wait and someone will tell you 
the answer.  And it just seems like they’re trained for it, that they’re getting 
better and better training.  To wait. 
  ------------ 
483 Carl I feel like I’m driven by, the clock is ticking. 
484 Lynne But I think you kind of change your mindset too.  Your mindset switches to 
something different and your motivations are forming coherent arguments and 
things like that, so you’re not thinking, “I need to have my students make 
conjectures anymore.”  [Carl:  And explore...]    But, I think it’s a great time 
when you’re working with the shapes to talk about, okay, see if you can 
figure out their properties, what properties do you think are properties of the 
square? 
  ------------ 
491 James What I, I think what Carl’s saying is not so much the conjecturing because 
you can kind of introduce some of the proofs by getting, by trying to elicit 
some conjectures about it, but the counter-example.  Where all of a sudden 
now, you know, to be able to just say, okay, I can think of a counter-example 
and, you know, now I don’t have to do the proof.  It would be nice to, if 
you’re going along, if you’re doing some proof [Carl:  Yeah, it is //] to be able 
to have something // 
492 Carl // Yeah, it isn’t that we don’t conjecture, James’s right on, it’s not like we’re 
not conjecturing in December, it’s that we’re not conjecturing falsely in 
December.  Maybe that’s what I’m saying. 
493 James Yeah. 
494 Moderator All of the conjectures were right. 
495 Carl All of our conjectures are right.  Now we’ve just gotta write it down // 
496 James // But even the // 
497 Researcher // That’s quite a coincidence, isn’t it? 
498  [Laughter] 
499 Carl Yeah, it sure is! 
Excerpt 25.  From ESP091305, interval 52. 
 
As in the previous excerpt, teachers offer a variety of explanations for the 
disconnect between conjecturing and proving.  Karen (479) attributes it both to the 
overcrowding of the curriculum (“I just have way too much content”), echoing her 
comment from the previous interval, but also to her students’ poor intellectual habits:  
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they are “stubbornly stupid”, unwilling to expend effort on a challenging problem, and 
able to outwait the teacher who must (because of the dictates of time and coverage) 
eventually capitulate and “tell them the answer”.  Carl agrees that time compels the 
teacher to eventually resolve all questions (483).  Lynne affirms that conjecturing and 
proving belong to different times of the year, and that once the former has been 
completed, it is no longer an important part of a teacher’s planning. 
Carl’s amused recognition (to which James and Karen concur) that in December 
“all of our conjectures are right,” together with the observation that students feel little 
need to prove theorems because they are obvious, and Lynne’s description of students’ 
conjecturing the characteristics of special quadrilaterals (all of which are unsurprising 
and supported by visual intuition), combine to create a portrait of geometry as a subject in 
which nothing is ever surprising, and thus one in which neither confirmatory results nor 
unexpected counterexamples have much value — the former because they are trivial and 
ubiquitous, the latter because they are nonexistent.  Thus it appears that neither “surprise” 
nor “confirmation” form part of the practical rationality of geometry teachers. 
Now it is not at all the case that everything true in geometry is visually obvious; 
there are surprising results in Euclidean geometry.  Napoleon’s Theorem, for example, 
states that if one begins with any triangle, constructs three equilateral triangles on its 
sides, and joins the centers of those triangles, then the resulting triangle will always be 
equilateral — a fact that many people find unexpected when they first encounter it.  
Pappus’s theorem about the segments joining six points chosen on two arbitrary lines (see 
chapter 2) is equally surprising.  For a more recent example, Morley’s Trisection 
Theorem — which asserts that the angle trisectors of an arbitrary triangle meet at the 
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vertices of an equilateral triangle (see Fig 3.4) — is striking not only for its content but 
also for the fact that it was not discovered until 1899, more than 2000 years after Euclid 
(Oakley & Baker, 1978).  More examples could be provided ad lib.  From another 
perspective, there are a number of famous negative results of Euclidean geometry that 
could be opportunities for students to encounter surprise:  for example, the impossibility 
of squaring a circle or trisecting an angle with only compass and straightedge. 
 
 
Fig. 3.4.  Morley’s Trisection Theorem. 
 
Any of these phenomena could in principle be made an opportunity for students to 
encounter the values of surprise or confirmation.  And yet, while some of them may be 
found in older textbooks, for the most part they are absent from the conventional 
geometry curriculum.  They are certainly absent from the study group data — at no point 
in the corpus do teachers raise these or any other similar results as topics of conversation. 
I raise these examples not because I wish to argue that any or all of them ought to 
be included in the prescribed geometry curriculum, but simply to illustrate my claim that 
there are surprising facts in Euclidean geometry; the fact that these and others like them 
are generally absent from the curriculum is thus evidence that the twin dispositions of 
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surprise and confirmation play little role in the subject as it is conventionally taught.  The 
study group data presented and discussed above suggests some reasons why these 
categories are mostly invisible to teachers.  One possibility is to point to those 
institutional forces (textbook publishers, state and federal standards, school boards and 
department heads) that shape the curriculum.  Teachers do not generally have ultimate 
authority to decide what to teach: they are bound by their professional obligations to 
follow curricula that are authored by others, and the time constraints under which they 
labor tend to crowd out any material that is not mandatory.  (In this connection, see 
Karen’s references to the overcrowded curriculum, as well as James’s references to the 
STMP exam, earlier in this chapter.)  Another possibility is to count this as a result of 
limits in teacher knowledge:  obviously teachers will not teach content that they do not 
know themselves, and as none of the phenomena raised above are standard elements of a 
“geometry for teachers” course there is no reason to expect teachers to know this 
material.  A third possibility is to observe that each of the mathematical phenomena cited 
above has a proof whose difficulty far exceeds that of the typical geometry theorem; in 
some cases the proof requires advanced methods from areas of mathematics that are 
entirely outside geometry.  One can hardly expect such a proof to find a place in a high 
school geometry course.  To some extent this might be mitigated in the future if dynamic 
geometry software succeeds in finding a role in the classroom:  such software makes it 
possible for students to “confirm” surprising results, even ones as complicated as those 
above, without actually undertaking a proof.  But even if this were to happen, the fact that 
the DGS provides instant feedback means that there will still be no long-standing but 
unproven beliefs to be either confirmed or disconfirmed.   
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Theory-building & Problem-solving 
The final dialectical pair of categories of mathematical appreciation described in 
Chapter 2 was theory-building / problem-solving.  Recall that theory-building places a 
high premium on the logical interconnections among the elements of a theory:  which 
may be taken as postulates, which are logically equivalent to one another, and so forth.  
From this perspective, a re-organization of an existing body of knowledge (e.g. providing 
a new definition for an existing class of objects and showing that the previously-accepted 
definition is a provable consequence of the new one) would be regarded as a significant 
accomplishment.  In contrast, Gowers (2000) describes combinatorics and related fields 
as areas of mathematics that are organized not by the interconnections among theorems, 
but rather by the presence of heuristics that can be applied to a broad range of context:  in 
such fields, problem-solving takes the place of theory-building as an organizing principle. 
I begin my analysis with the conjecture that the high school geometry class is by 
default organized around the work and value of problem-solving, rather than theory-
building.  Students learn to use algebra (and later, trigonometry) to find the measures of 
unknown segments and angles, and to calculate areas and volumes.  Proof, as it exists in 
the high school course, is largely an opportunity not to develop the elements of a theory 
but rather to put in practice various proof-methods that students are accountable for 
learning (side-side-side, angle-side-angle, etc.; segment and angle addition arguments; 
and so forth), and so demonstrate that they have learned “how to prove” (Herbst, 2002).  
In this section I investigate the extent to which the study and focus group archive presents 
evidence that teachers place any value on the complementary value of theory-building. 
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The topic first appears in a discussion from an early study group meeting in which 
Megan raises the question of whether certain principles of triangle congruence that are 
designated as “Postulates” in her textbook might more appropriately be labeled as 
“Theorems”, or indeed not included at all on the grounds that they add nothing to the 
theory.  She recounts an episode in which she taught her students “Hypotenuse-Leg” (a 
method of proving two right triangles congruent by establishing that they have congruent 
hypotenuses and a pair of corresponding congruent legs). 
 
119 Megan .... But we had this picture up for Hypotenuse-Leg today, the two triangles.  
And I said let’s talk about, ‘cause it’s a postulate in my book.  So I said, well 
let’s talk about this as a postulate.  And some kids wanted to argue that it 
shouldn’t be a postulate.  It should be a theorem.  And their idea was that 
postulates, we just believe those, and this they thought we could build a logical 
argument and they said, if we know two sides of a right triangle, we really 
know the third, because of the Pythagorean theorem.  And they were rubbing 
into me, I have this book in my room, 300 ways to prove the Pythagorean 
theorem, they said see, we can prove that 300 ways!  So then they said, so this 
shouldn’t be a postulate.  Once we have two sides and a right angle, we could 
argue that we really know the third side so the two triangles are equal by side-
side-side or side-angle-side.  Which is a pretty valid argument.  One of the kids 
said no, you can’t check every set of numbers.  And another kid then went up to 
the board and put letters on them, he had a B here and a C here, and said instead 
of calling this A like you would for a right angle, it’s the square root of C-
squared minus B-squared.  Which he’s right.  And so is this one.  This is a 
great, you know, it was a great little thing that came out.  And then how do you 
tell kids how you pick the postulates?  You know, who picks that? Should it be 
a postulate or a theorem?  It’s a theorem in your book.  Then why did they 
make it postulate? 
120 Cynthia Because your book company hasn’t proven it yet and ours has. 
121  [Laughter] 
122 Edwin Yeah, right. 
123 Megan Okay, thank you very much. 
124 Penelope They won’t buy us new books. 
125 Megan Because I said, you’re right, you know, and this is an interesting thing, because 
some books have side-side-side as a postulate, have just a few of them as 
postulates and all of the rest theorems, some just decided those are all 
postulates.  [Cynthia:  Right.]  It’s a really -- 
126 Tina See that’s what I was saying, when I taught out of the two different geometry 
books, that was a headache. 
127 Cynthia Yeah. 
128 Megan Oh, that’s true, ‘cause you had all that (inaudible). 
 
 145 
129 Tina (Because it was,) you know the same thing, it was postulate here, it was a 
theorem there and I would stand in front of the kids and be so confused I 
wouldn’t know what I was talking about. 
130 Megan No, part of me is happy that they’re thinking about the difference between a 
postulate and a theorem.  [Tina:  Right.]  You know, that’s a pretty valuable 
thing.  But then, you know, how do I say, well why did the book pick that?  
You know I actually said I agree with you, this is pretty dumb. [laughs] 
131 Tina Well, I need to tell them that it’s just what the authors picked.  That’s the way 
they chose to do it.  It is a theorem, it is a theorem in our book. 
132 Denise I tell you my students, postulates, theorems, who cares?  Use them to prove a 
proof.  [laughs]  They know you can use them all as reasons in a proof.  And 
they’re like ok. 
133 Megan Well did you, did your book have, this book also, in this section, it has three 
little minor theorems: Leg-Leg, Hypotenuse-Angle and okay...  we were 
making fun of the names, “Ha!”  We were singing like.  I said they were not 
useful at all.  I said I’m only telling you these because -- 
134 Tina It’s right angle. 
135 Megan You’re right, it’s “ra,” leg-leg and “ha.” 
136 Tina It just takes all three of them, it just takes the other one, the right angle out. 
137 Megan But why do they have those?  They’re so repetitive.  I told the kids, this is a 
waste of time, it’s the same as side-angle-side.  So we wrote them all up, 
because they will show up in the answers.  That’s the problem.  If you don’t do 
them, kids doing their homework looks in the answers, it says “L-L” they’re 
like what is that?! 
138 Tina See our book has taken those out. 
139 Megan That’s good.  See I never saw it any other book.  The book I previously taught 
in didn’t have it. 
Excerpt 26.  From ITH111605, interval 10. 
 
There is much in this excerpt that is relevant for the present discussion.  First, we 
note that Megan (and her students) are sensitive to the fact that the theory, as presented in 
the textbook, is less economical than it could be:  the identification of “hypotenuse-leg” 
as a postulate rather than a theorem, and the superfluous inclusion of “leg-leg” (which is 
really nothing more than “side-angle-side” in the case of a right triangle) are particularly 
questionable.  The fact that students in Megan’s class not only produced a more-or-less 
complete proof of “hypotenuse-leg”, recognized that that proof was based on the 
Pythagorean Theorem, and argued on that basis that “hypotenuse-leg” ought to be 
classified as a theorem, rather than a postulate, seems like a clear instance of theory-
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building as classroom activity.  And Megan indicates that she values it as such:  not only 
did she allow what appears to be a significant amount of class time to be devoted to this 
discussion, she explicitly labels that activity as “a pretty valuable thing” (130). 
But Megan’s appreciation of the value of this discussion is tempered (“part of me 
is happy”, 130, emphasis added).  As much as she values that her students are engaged in 
a discussion over whether a given proposition ought to be classified as theorem or 
postulate, she is unsure how to respond to students: she appears to be genuinely mystified 
as to the grounds on which some propositions are deemed to be postulates while others 
are theorems.  Significantly, though, Megan consistently refers to this as a decision to be 
made by a group of unspecified and somewhat mysterious others, referred to variously as 
“they” (120, 137) and “the book” (125, 130, 133).  The possibility that the class might be 
entitled (or even expected) to take these decisions on themselves is both novel and 
problematic for her. 
Megan’s comments are echoed by the other teachers in the conversation.  For 
Tina, the important thing is for the teacher to conform to the will of the textbook 
publisher:  different texts use different sets of postulates, those choices are essentially 
arbitrary (“it’s just what the authors picked”) rather than based on any grounds or values, 
and the teacher must simply adapt to the text.  Finally, we note Denise’s position rejects 
the entire topic as unworthy of consideration.  For Denise, it simply makes no difference 
whether a particular property is labeled theorem or postulate.  Both are equally important 
insofar as students must learn to use them in a proof; but the designation of one of them 
as postulate and the other as theorem is of no significance.  Denise thus embodies the 
problem-solving disposition in its purest form, with utter disregard for the theory-
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building disposition.  In contrast, Megan seems to clearly recognize the importance of the 
theory-building perspective, and seems noticeably proud that her students have begun to 
exhibit the same disposition, but is unsure of how to validate her students’ contributions 
in the face of the officially sanctioned curriculum.  Tina represents a middle ground:  she 
recognizes that the organization of a theory matters (i.e. it is something visible that she 
can talk about) but she has surrendered any agency on the matter. 
Later in the same study group meeting Megan and Denise added to their earlier 
comments: 
 
157 Megan ...  But when we go over them and you talk about this is a postulate, so we can’t 
prove it, and that’s what bugs people about this one, is that I’m presenting it as a 
postulate, it says in the book it is, but they’re saying wait, I can build a pretty 
good argument for that one, you know? 
158 Denise A lot of the postulates though you can prove, they’re just something that you 
don’t have to prove, it’s just taken as true.  A lot of postulates I found you can 
prove.  That’s why in some books they are theorems, because you can prove them 
and yet, you know what I’m saying? 
159 Res. 1 So you mean, postulate means we don’t have to prove it? 
160 Megan It’s a commandment of math, that’s what I say.  [laughs] 
161 Res. 2 So -- 
162 Denise -- a theorem or something, but a postulate you use to prove theorems.  Did I say 
that all right? 
163  [Laughter] 
164 Denise Okay, yeah postulate is used to prove theorems.  But I mean -- 
165 Megan Most of them you can’t.  Like the ones, “two lines intersect in at most one point”.  
Now those are like building block postulates and you just sort of look at it and 
say, we believe that, you know?  But like I said, this one, they could build a pretty 
good argument for it.  So, that’s why [inaudible].   
166 Tina I’d be impressed if my kids came up and argued that fact, that it’s a theorem not a 
postulate. 
167 Denise My kids wouldn’t even try.  Even if they thought of it they wouldn’t let me know. 
168 Megan That’s true, cause a few kids in every period, and one of them will bring 
something up, you can see them rolling their eyes, like here we go.  
169 Res. 2 So you would just be happy that it happens but you wouldn’t feel that you have to 
make that happen. 
170 Denise You mean that them making the distinction between postulate? 
171 Res. 2 Yeah. 
172 Denise Oh, yeah I mean when we studied postulates, when I first introduced that word 
postulate to them, I want you to know what that is, and I want you to know what 
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theorem is and I want you to know the difference.  But you use them all to prove 
theorems.  You use the theorems to prove other theorems, you use postulates to 
prove theorems.  I mean you need to know that these can be reasons and you can 
use these as reasons in a proof, along with definitions and corollaries. 
Excerpt 27.   From ITH111605, interval 12. 
 
The difference between Megan’s position and Denise’s position becomes clearer 
in this excerpt.  For Megan, a postulate is something that cannot be proven because it is 
too fundamental (the “building blocks”, 165); she makes use of words denoting the 
possibility or impossibility of proving the statements (“can’t”,  “can”, “could”; 157,165).  
(Note also, however, the opposition present in turns 157 and 165 between “prove” and 
“build an argument”.  A postulate is something that cannot be proven; what students have 
done with respect to “hypotenuse-leg” is build a convincing argument, which seems to 
mean not quite the same thing.)  In contrast, Denise uses words denoting the necessity, 
rather than the possibility, or proving a statement (“have to prove”, 158):  for her, a 
postulate is something that one does not have to prove because it has been labeled as such 
by an arbitrary choice of some authority.  Note that Denise’s characterization of 
postulates lacks any indicators of agency on the teacher’s part. 
If Denise’s position can be critiqued as somewhat unmathematical, in part one can 
point to a century of geometry curricula in her defense.  Although mathematicians 
working at the foundations of geometry have a long tradition of exploring the 
independence and interdependence of various axiomatic formulations of the subject (see 
in this connection the discussion of R.L. Moore’s work in the previous chapter), 
Geometry curricula have largely avoided the matter altogether.  Virtually every Geometry 
curriculum written for school use in the last century has included redundant axioms for 
ease of presentation and clarity.  For example, one common practice has been to include 
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“ruler and protractor axioms” into the curriculum.  These axioms build the metric 
properties of the plane in to the theory from the beginning, and render most of the other 
axioms unnecessary.  On the other hand, most textbooks do not discard the traditional 
axiomatic system, perhaps because doing so would have produced a course that was not 
recognizably the same as the one that had been taught for the previous half-century.  The 
result is a theory that is overloaded with redundant postulates that are rarely used and 
even more rarely considered critically.  Our study group teachers often seemed not even 
sure what were the postulates of their textbook: 
827 Mitch I think the book I’m using now has a compass postulate.  I think it calls it a 
compass postulate, that when the, when the pointer and the pencil are 
separated and you mark it-- 
828 Megan Compass postulate.   
829 Esther I’ve never heard of that! 
830 Mitch --and you move it over, you’ve given the same distance. 
831 Megan Well you have a ruler postulate, our book has that.  And I actually made fun of 
that. 
832 Mitch Yeah, it’s (connected--) 
833 Megan (Because) it’s very lengthy and long and I say to kids, what does this actually 
say?  
834 Mitch It says you can construct a ruler. 
835 Megan  And you can usually get one kid to say, you can make a ruler and measure 
things?  I’m like, Yes!  That’s what it says.  Do we really need this as a 
postulate?  But that’s, compass postulate would be just like that. 
836 Mitch Well I think–yeah, or you like put the compass on the ruler...I don’t remember 
how it’s stated in my-- 
837 Megan You can use both together! 
838 Mitch --it might even be the ruler postulate, but if we think of it as putting the 
compass on the ruler, and then we have equal lengths. 
839 Megan That’s hilarious. 
840 James Because they didn’t-- 
841 Moderator In our book they had the ruler postulate and the protractor postulate. 
842 Megan Oh yeah, that’s protractor–that’s right, I forgot about that. 
843 Moderator But we didn’t have a compass postulate. 
844 Mitch Well, my–in fact my memory might not be quite right but what we were doing 
is putting it on the ruler.  So I guess that’s using a new tool-- 
845 Megan That’s terrible. 
846 Mitch --a new tool to make distance. 
Excerpt 28.  From ESP020706, interval 18. 
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From a mathematical point of view it is hard to understand how one could 
possibly teach any proof-based mathematics course without knowing exactly what 
axioms underlie the theory.  This is all the more surprising in the case of Geometry, 
which for centuries has drawn attention to questions of the independence and 
completeness of its axioms.  That experienced teachers of Geometry express clear 
uncertainty about the axioms of the course they teach is indicative of the low value they 
place on holding students (and themselves) accountable for the theory-building 
disposition. 
Despite this there are natural places within the Geometry curriculum where one 
might expect that opportunities for cultivating the theory-building disposition might be 
situated.  For example, consider the four propositions stated and illustrated in Figure 3.5, 
below.  These propositions state various properties of particular pairs of angles formed by 
intersecting a pair of parallel lines with a transversal.  All four of these properties are 
common elements of typical high school Geometry curricula — in fact, in most textbooks 
these four properties occur within a few pages of one another.  It seems safe to say that 
each of the properties asserted in Table 1 are all taken as objects of the didactical contract 
that binds Geometry teachers and students together: students are expected to know each 
of those four properties, and teachers hold their students accountable for that knowledge. 
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1. If a pair of parallel lines is intersected by a 
transversal, then the corresponding angles are 
congruent. 
 
 
2. If a pair of parallel lines is intersected by a 
transversal, then the alternate interior angles are 
congruent. 
 
3. If a pair of parallel lines is intersected by a 
transversal, then the consecutive interior angles are 
supplementary. 
 
4. If a pair of parallel lines is intersected by a 
transversal, then the alternate exterior angles are 
congruent. 
 
Fig. 3.5.  Some equivalent statements about parallel lines. 
 
And yet what is important from the theory-building point of view is not that the 
four properties in Fig. 3.5 are true, but rather that they are all equivalent to one another.  
In the first place, they are “true” only relative to some set of postulates, not in any 
absolute sense: in non-Euclidean geometries they are all false, and in fact they are all also 
equivalent to the Euclidean parallel postulate.  The conventional high school geometry 
curriculum obscures this by taking one of these properties as a postulate, in addition to 
the Euclidean parallel postulate.  But beyond noting that the designation of one of these 
sum = 180°
 
 152 
four properties as a “postulate” is unnecessary, it is also important to note that the 
selection of one of them to be so designated is arbitrary.  That is to say, if any of the four 
properties were taken as a postulate, then the remaining properties could all be proven as 
easy consequences.  Moreover there are subtle interrelationships between these postulates 
and other consequences of (and conditions that imply) Euclid’s parallel postulate, such as 
those presented in Fig. 3.6.  The network of implications among those properties is 
complex; some (but not all) of them are equivalent, some (but not all) of them can be 
proved from the other axioms of geometry (and thus hold in geometries other than 
Euclid’s). 
 
1. Parallel lines are coplanar lines that never intersect. 
2. Parallel lines are always the same distance apart. 
3. If a line segment intersects a pair of lines forming two interior angles on the same 
side that sum to less than 180°, then the pair of lines intersect on that same side. 
4. Given any line, and a point not on the line, there exists at least one line that 
passes through the given point and is parallel to the given line. 
5. Given any line, and a point not on the line, there exists not more than one line that 
passes through the given point and is parallel to the given line. 
6. If a pair of parallel lines is intersected by a transversal, then the four angle-pair 
properties indicated in Table 2 hold. 
7. If a pair of lines is intersected by a third line such that any one of the four angle-
pair properties indicated in Table 2 hold, then the pair of lines is parallel. 
8. The sum of the three angles in any triangle is 180°. 
9. Parallel lines have the same slope. 
Figure 3.6.  A collection of interrelated properties. 
 
But these interrelationships are not typically part of what students are held 
accountable for studying.  Indeed none of the contemporary high school geometry 
textbooks I have reviewed (Larson, Boswell & Stiff, 2001; Jurgensen, Brown, & 
Jurgensen 1990; Schultz, Hollowell, Ellis  & Kennedy, 2001) suggest that the 
organization of the theory could be other than the form in which it is presented.  Even 
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Lang & Murrow (1980) and Moise & Downs (1991), which use far more sophisticated 
and parsimonious organizations of the theory, present the theory of parallel lines as a fait 
accompli — the work of organizing the theory is carried entirely by the authors; students 
need not concern themselves with it.  Serra (1997) is a notable exception: In a note to the 
reader Serra (p. 727) states explicitly that the designation of one of the properties in 
Figure 3.5 as a postulate is purely arbitrary, and he encourages students to explore 
alternative restructurings of the theory.  Also in Serra’s textbook we find explicit 
attention to the network of interrelationships among the properties of Figure 3.6 (pp. 745, 
759).  However, as Serra defers all discussion of postulates, theorems, and proof until the 
last 60 pages of an 800-page book, it is unclear to what extent students are actually held 
accountable for this content in classrooms that make use of that text.  In any event, it 
remains true that in none of the other works are students expected to investigate these 
matters; in all other cases the textbook authors do that work themselves, giving no hint 
that the theory could be structured differently. Questions about the organization of the 
theory are simply not part and parcel of what the geometry curriculum is about. 
One ThEMaT animation was designed specifically to probe how teachers respond 
to a story in which theory-building plays a prominent role with respect to the theory of 
parallel lines.  In “Postulates and Parallel Lines”, a teacher introduces a new postulate 
(“If two parallel lines are cut by a transversal then corresponding angles are congruent”) 
and proves two theorems (“If two lines are parallel then alternate interior angles are 
congruent” and “If two parallel lines are cut by a transversal then same-side interior 
angles are supplementary”).  Following the proofs, the teacher briefly remarks that the 
three propositions could have been done in a different order, with one of the theorems 
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taken as a postulate and the postulate proven as a theorem.  In addition to the story as just 
described, three alternate endings were also represented as separate animations. In the 
first alternate ending, the teacher undertakes to do precisely what she had previously only 
described as a possibility:  she erases the board, announces that she is starting over, and 
shows how the same three propositions could have been organized into a theory 
differently by taking the first theorem as a postulate, and proving the original postulate as 
a theorem.  The animation depicts the lesson running smoothly.  In the second alternate 
ending, the teacher follows the same course of action as in the first alternate ending, but 
things do not go so well:  students seem confused and angry by the “starting over” move, 
ripping out the pages from their notebooks and crumpling them on their desk.  In the final 
alternate ending, the teacher states briefly that the theory could be organized in a different 
order, and invites students to write up the details for extra credit. 
Two study group meetings were devoted, almost in their entirety, to a discussion 
of this story and its alternatives.  Both meetings followed the same agenda:  a prompt 
asked participants to discuss how they teach their students the difference between a 
theorem and its converse.  After some discussion of this, the main version of “Postulates 
and Parallel Lines” was screened and discussed.  Participants were asked to comment 
particularly on the ending, in which the teacher states that the theory could have been 
developed in a different order.  Later in the session, each of the three alternate endings 
was viewed and discussed in turn. 
These two meetings were the only ThEMaT study group sessions that were 
structured around an animation that was specifically designed to elicit teachers’ responses 
to a representation of the Theory Building disposition, and the animation proved 
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successful at doing so:  Of the 119 intervals in the two meetings, 41 (just over a third) 
included some significant discussion of the status of propositions (as “postulate” or 
“theorem”), and of the possibility of restructuring an existing theory into a different 
configuration of postulates, theorems, and definitions.  Because of the large volume of 
the data it is not possible to report here all of the relevant commentary that teachers 
offered; I will present only selected excerpts. 
Participants in both study group meetings were quick to identify the animated 
teacher’s intention (“I guess her point was that any one of those could’ve been a 
postulate”; Raina, TMT030607, interval 15, turn 318).  They also were in broad 
agreement that the teacher was less than successful in achieving that goal.  They differed, 
however, in their assessment of whether the goal was a worthwhile one, and it is this 
disagreement to which I now turn. 
Almost immediately after completing the viewing of the first version of the story, 
Jillian opined that “It was a terrible idea.  Absolutely terrible idea.” (TMT030607, 
interval 15, turn 322).  When asked to expand on her strong criticism, Jillian explained 
that the problem had to do with a mismatch of (what she perceived to be) the teacher’s 
goal with the timing of the story:  a lesson on the properties of the angles formed by 
parallel lines would fall “so early in the year”, and “at this point in the year it’s absolutely 
terrible” because students would be completely unable to understand the teacher’s point 
(324, 326).  She conceded that the “lesson” (by which she seems to mean the learning 
goal) could be a valuable one, but concluded with “I would never do it with my kids” 
(328). 
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Immediately after Jillian offered this strongly-worded opinion, Lucille offered her 
own experience as a counter-argument:  “I have done it…  I don’t see anything negative 
to it…  It didn’t bother me that she said any one of these could’ve been, um, postulates” 
(330, 335, 343).  To justify her appraisal, Lucille cited something she said she had 
learned from participating in previous study group meetings:  “that every textbook is a 
little bit different” (339), with a different presentation of definitions, postulates, and 
theorems, and that some students may encounter these different presentations — for 
example, in online resources, or in the textbooks of friends who attend other schools 
(339, 365).  On hearing this explanation, Jillian immediately reversed her previous 
opposition to the story, fully endorsing the teacher’s goal but continuing to criticize the 
execution of the goal (“It was so bland”, 360, 366). 
Other teachers offered different reasons why a lesson like that depicted in the 
animation would be unnecessary, undesirable, or unlikely to succeed.  One common 
opinion voiced by many of the teachers in both study group meetings was that, 
fundamentally, the difference between a postulate and a theorem is of no consequence.  
Articulating this view, Greg said “I really don’t, personally I don’t care if they think it’s a 
postulate or a theorem” (TMW032107, 419), echoing Denise’s comments above from a 
different session (see Excerpt 27).  The same sentiment was expressed later in the same 
meeting by Tina and Cadie (863-865), and in the other study group meeting by Lucille:  
“When they’re proving I don’t really care whether they say postulate or theorem. That 
they’re all like kind of equal in status” (TMT030607, 562).  None of the teachers 
participating in either study group meeting voiced an opposing viewpoint, despite the fact 
that in both meetings the moderator attempted to garner some sympathy for the position 
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that the status of a proposition as postulate or theorem is an important thing for students 
to learn.  Instead, teachers repeatedly endorsed the view that what matters is for students 
to learn how to use the various properties of parallel lines in order to do proofs and other 
exercises.  That is, they value the properties of parallel lines for the role they play in a 
diverse range of problem contexts — a perspective consonant with the problem-solving 
disposition, as articulated by Gowers (2000). 
There was also a broad consensus among most of the teachers that factors beyond 
their control make it extremely unlikely that they would devote class time to a proof that 
two conditional statements, one dubbed a postulate and the other a theorem,  are in fact 
equivalent.  Teachers cited time constraints (TMW032107, 648, 978), an overcrowded 
curriculum (TMT030607, 861, 887-893), and students’ intellectual immaturity 
(TMT030607, 328, 863, 874).  On this latter point, one strand of arguments in particular 
seems noteworthy.  Melanie, in TMT030607, interval 16, raised the concern that “in 
these upcoming years all students are going to be doing this type of proof and, I mean, 
my special ed kids – I’m really concerned with how much they’re even going to even 
understand” (398).  From an outsider’s perspective, it may seem quite extreme for a 
teacher to indict a proposed course of action on the grounds that it would be too difficult 
for special education students
23
.  But Melanie’s concern was echoed much later in the 
same meeting by both Lucille (“Well, when we talk about some of the concerns of 
students with special needs … y’know it’s, it’s an interesting thing because what they’re 
                                                
23
 The teachers seem to take for granted that Special Education students are less 
intellectually capable than others, a position that oversimplifies the wide range of 
conditions that Special Education students may have.  As the goal here is to report 
teachers’ perceptions of what is and is not viable in the classroom, I defer to their own 
use of the term. 
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expecting us to do is raise the level or the rigor of what’s going on and yet they’re asking 
us to do it with everybody”, 675) and Jillian (“You’re gonna tell the special ed kids that 
[the postulate could be a theorem, if you took something else as a postulate] though right? 
You’re not, I don’t think. I just think that’s not going to make any sense”, 780).  These 
three teachers call our attention to the way that institutional factors — such as, for 
example, a completely de-tracked curriculum in which special education students are 
mainstreamed into the same Geometry course as advanced students (398) — can be 
experienced by teachers as constraints on what kinds of teaching moves are viable in their 
classroom. 
When teachers were asked to respond to the particular pedagogical strategy of 
erasing the board and “starting over” (as shown in the first two alternate endings), there 
was a broad consensus that students would be confused (TMT030607, interval 24) and 
even angered by such a move (TMT030607, interval 33).  Instead they proposed various 
other ways the teacher could have conducted the lesson (TMT030607 interval 24, 
TMW032107 interval 60).  The teacher might use one half of the board for the initial 
development of the theory, and use the other side for the “alternate” development; the 
teacher might distinguish the two possibilities using different colors, or surround it with a 
“cloud” marking it as a brainstorming exercise or thought experiment only.  They 
suggested using phrases like “alternate universe” and “through the looking glass” to label 
the second development of the theory as a distinct possibility.  Throughout all of these 
proposals, teachers consistently use modal verbs denoting possibility and subjunctive 
constructions (“we could have done it this way”, “if we had done it differently”).  All of 
these strategies convey the notion that the theory could have been developed differently, 
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while at the same time preserving the initial development in the official record of the 
class’s work (the board, students’ notebooks).  In contrast, the “erase and start over” 
move depicted in the animations was characterized as signaling to students an actual 
restart:  what is erased is not only the literal board, but also the students’ collective 
memory of the lesson to that point (González, 2009).  Participants reacted negatively to 
this, stressing that what the teacher needs to communicate is that she is “just taking a 
different perspective” (TMT030607, interval 47, 951), rather than starting over. 
Underlying all of this discussion, and surfacing explicitly throughout it, was the 
question:  What makes some statements a “postulate” and others a “theorem”?  In the 
animation, the teacher says that a postulate is “so obvious that we just take it for granted,” 
and, later, that “postulates are just things we assume to be true.” In the study group 
meeting, Raina objected to the characterization of postulates as “something so obvious 
that we just take it for granted”; she asked, “What makes the first statement more obvious 
than any of the other ones that they would consequently prove?” (TMT030607 interval 
15, 318).  Later in the same session, Jillian and Cynthia reacted to the animated teacher’s 
phrase “just things we assume to be true” on the grounds that “It seems so arbitrary” and 
“It sounds like they’re not important” (interval 40).  But participants’ own speech 
revealed a wide variety of ways of speaking about postulates.  They used various 
metaphors, such as the foundation of a house (TMT030607, interval 24, 565) and the 
(arbitrary but inflexible) rules of a game (TMW032107, interval 24, 473).  As noted 
above, study group participants were in widespread agreement that students should not be 
held accountable for knowing which statements are postulates and which are theorems; 
despite this, teachers still held some fidelity to the notion that not everything should be 
 
 160 
taken as a postulate, that “we kind of like to keep the postulates at a minimum and do the 
bulk of our work deductively” (Jillian, 842).  Teachers acknowledged that the curriculum 
they teach takes as postulates many more statements than is really necessary (“Most of 
the postulates in our books… [are] just theorems that are beyond the scope of this 
course”, 859), a state of affairs they describe as being “lazy” (TMT030607, interval 33, 
748) in order to make things “easier” (TMT030607, interval 23, 515). 
In their discussion, participants reveal a basic tension they experience with respect 
to theory-building.  On the one hand, they appreciate the value of producing many 
theorems from a small number of postulates, and want their students to appreciate this as 
well (TMT030607, interval 40, 842; TMW032107, interval 24, 565).  On the other hand, 
they do not hold themselves responsible for using only a minimal set of independent 
assumptions (“That’s what college is for”; TMT030607 interval 25, 571).  Instead, they 
defer to the authority of the textbook and its authors, who determine what may, and what 
may not, be taken as true without proof. 
It may be that individual teachers’ knowledge of mathematics may influence how 
they perceive the role of postulates and theorems in mathematics.  In some cases teachers 
made arguments that suggest a serious misunderstanding of this role.  Karen, for 
example, distinguished between “axioms” (which she understands to refer to statements 
that cannot be proven) and “postulates” — which she understands to refer to statements 
that are “one level up” in the hierarchy, statements that can be proven, but for which the 
proofs are difficult and hence omitted for ease of presentation (TMW032107, intervals 24 
and 33).  In a more extreme case, Denise endorsed the notion that a postulate is an 
obvious truth, and used this to argue that none of the properties of parallel lines should be 
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called postulates, on the grounds that (unlike other postulates, such as the fact that two 
points define a single line) none of the properties of parallel lines are obvious 
(TMW032107, interval 24, 456-458) — a view that calls to mind the long history of 
attempts to find a proof for Euclid’s parallel postulate, motivated in large part by the 
sense that it alone among the postulates was not truly “self-evident” and hence ought to 
be provable (Greenberg 1980).   
In contrast, both study group meetings contained at least one moment in which a 
participant made a connection to larger questions of theory in geometry and other 
branches of mathematics.  Raina reported that she normally includes, as part of her 
teaching the parallel postulate, a discussion of the many (failed) efforts over the century 
to prove it, and how those efforts typically include an assumption that is later recognized 
as equivalent to the parallel postulate itself — for example, “you can take the… triangle 
angle sum being 180, is logically equivalent to the parallel postulate” (TMT030607, 
interval 16, turn 372).  Like the teacher depicted in the main branch of the animation, 
Raina does not pursue a proof of this equivalence when teaching; she merely informs her 
students that such a proof is possible.  None of the other teachers present in that study 
group meeting respond directly to Raina’s report.  In the other study group meeting, 
Karen cited Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem to justify why it is acceptable for 
Geometry curricula to include many redundant postulates that are amenable to proof:  
“We did this whole race to prove all of mathematics, and we wanted to limit our 
postulates… but that sort of went out the door with Gödel anyway” (TMW032107, 
interval 34, turn 636).  Again the other teachers present seem to have little to say in 
response to this connection; one of them, Madison, says only “I don’t remember that”. 
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These two episodes provide some evidence to suggest that advanced mathematical 
knowledge, and in particular knowledge of the history and philosophy of mathematics, 
may play a role in supporting teachers’ ability to speak in terms of the theory-building 
disposition.  But even if this is so, it is also noteworthy that neither Karen nor Raina, or 
indeed any of the teachers who voice some appreciation of the values of mathematical 
economy, speak of holding students accountable for studying the equivalence of different 
formulations of an axiom, or for investigating the independence of proposed axioms. 
Although they give indications that they recognize these as mathematically valuable 
activities, they offer no evidence that they carve out a role for these activities in 
instruction. 
Thus we see that, even when teachers give evidence that they place some value on 
the theory-building disposition when they consider it from the perspective of 
mathematicians, they consistently alienate themselves from that disposition when 
considering it from the perspective of teachers of mathematics.  This illustrates well the 
sense in which practical rationality — the collection of categories of perception and 
appreciation with which practitioners view and appraise the world — is a characteristic 
not of the individual practitioner, but rather the practice as a whole.  The value that 
practitioners attach to theory-building is that it may be important for mathematicians (and 
they may include themselves in that group), but it is not important for high school 
teachers and their students.  Time constraints, the intellectual limitations of their students, 
and the obligation to conform to the authority of the curriculum all are cited as reasons 
why teachers reject the idea that they might make theory-building a central classroom 
activity as portrayed in “Postulates and Parallel Lines”. 
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Discussion 
In this chapter I have examined a large corpus of conversations among 
experienced high school geometry teachers gathered in monthly study groups to find 
evidence of how they relate to some of the various dispositions that were proposed, in the 
previous chapter, as characteristic of mathematicians’ professional vision.  I now 
summarize my findings and discuss their significance in the light of the larger questions 
of this dissertation. 
In Chapter 2, I showed that mathematicians describe themselves as problem-
posers who actively seek areas of doubt and uncertainty in which to explore.   
Mathematicians use various generative moves — modifying hypothesis and conclusion, 
generalizing, specializing — in order to generate new questions and hypotheses.  They 
bring various frames to bear in appraising the value of questions and results:  they may be 
appreciated for their applicability to contexts outside of mathematics, or for their abstract 
qualities; for confirming or disconfirming a result long believed true; for revealing 
relationships among the elements of a theory, or for providing a set of heuristics that can 
be applied in a wide range of problem-solving contexts. 
In this chapter I have turned to a corpus of records from a collection of study 
group and focus group meetings of experienced geometry teachers, and looked for 
evidence of the way these practitioners relate to the dispositions of mathematicians.  In 
these study groups, practitioners considered various teaching scenarios in the form of 
animations and other representations of teaching — representations designed to elicit 
their own practical rationality.  The results are revealing.  Although many teachers in the 
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study group meetings were quick to acknowledge the potentially generative role that 
doubt and uncertainty can play in motivating student inquiry, they were consistently 
vocal in their criticism of teaching stories in which a teacher pursues such doubt and 
uncertainty.  In voicing this criticism, teachers pointed to the conditions of their work: 
these include time constraints, the need to cover the curriculum and prepare students for 
mandatory standardized testing, student absenteeism and attentiveness, the heterogeneous 
qualities of their classroom, and students’ intellectual immaturity.  They also spoke of the 
nature of their professional obligations to their students:  ultimately, teachers perceive 
their role as obliging them to, eventually, resolve all questions and clarify what the truth 
is.  A teacher who fails to do so is guilty of violating the tacit didactical contract, and 
risks jeopardizing both their relationship with their students and their status as authorities. 
Because students know that teachers will eventually step in and clear up all mysteries, the 
potential of doubt and uncertainty to motivate student inquiry is undermined and 
neutralized. 
Many of the excerpts I have cited and discussed in this chapter suggest that, 
unlike mathematicians, geometry teachers do not view mathematics largely as the study 
of relationships among contingent possibilities (what could be true, what would be true 
under certain conditions); rather, they regard it as the study of the factual properties of 
diagrams, which represent objects that are acknowledged to be idealizations but 
nevertheless are regarded as “real” in some sense (a kind of tacit and unexamined 
Platonism).  For this reason, many of the generative moves that underlie mathematical 
inquiry are found only rarely in classroom practice:  students are not expected to seek a 
conclusion that might come from strengthening or weakening a particular hypothesis, or 
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to seek a hypothesis that might be sufficient for a particular conclusion.  Because 
diagrams by their nature collapse a conditional statement into a simultaneous presentation 
of concomitant facts, even the disposition towards considering whether the converse of a 
proposition is true — a disposition that has an avowed place in the structure of the 
geometry curriculum — gets little play in actual practice.  And because “proof” is 
allotted a designated time within the curriculum, and is viewed by teachers as a thing to 
learn rather than as a tool to know with, conjecturing and proving are experienced in 
classrooms as distinct and disjoint activities. 
With respect to the pair of dispositions Utility and Abstraction, the data testifies to 
a fundamental paradox in how teachers speak of the value of the course they teach.  
Teachers speak of the abstract quality of what they teach in almost apologetic tones (this 
sentiment finds its expression in the frequent refrain, “In real life, nobody’s ever going to 
ask you to prove two triangles are congruent”); implicitly, they seem to agree that the 
course must be justified in terms of its real-world utility, which they locate in the value of 
proof itself (rather than on the content of what is proved), citing countless examples of 
contexts in which argumentation is a useful life skill.  This is consistent with the 
observation just made above, that proof is perceived as a thing to learn, rather than a tool 
to know with.  The fact that the examples offered to justify the “real-world” utility of 
proof are all illustrations of argumentation that are not purely deductive undermines this 
argument, but this goes unrecognized by teachers.  Notwithstanding this, teachers 
acknowledge that the content of geometry does have “real world” utility, particularly for 
architects, engineers, and workers in the skilled trades, but this utility plays only a 
marginal role in their classrooms. 
 
 166 
As was noted above, teachers consistently cite factors beyond their control as 
reasons why the potentially generative functions of doubt and uncertainty are seen to 
pose greater risks than benefits.  A consequence of this perspective is that little to no 
space exists within the Geometry classroom for the mathematical dispositions of Surprise 
and Confirmation: teachers feel obliged to ensure that all questions are resolved by the 
end of every class period, an obligation that is incompatible with the practice of allowing 
open problems and conjectures to exist over extended time periods.  In arguing that there 
are no surprises in high school Geometry, I do not mean to suggest that every result in 
Geometry is immediately obvious (although many are); rather the claim is that a 
particular pedagogical practice — allowing the emergence of conjectures (some true, 
some false) that remain unresolved for days, weeks, or months, eventually to be either 
confirmed with a proof or disconfirmed with a counterexample — might conceivably be 
endorsed by teachers who appreciate the value of surprising or confirmatory results, but 
is instead universally rejected as inappropriate for the high school setting. 
In the final section of this chapter I discussed a number of study group 
conversations in which teachers spoke about issues related to the disposition pair Theory-
Building / Problem-Solving.  I showed that teachers were, by and large, uninterested in 
the organizational structure of Geometry.  Many teachers expressed uncertainty over 
which statements are designated as postulates, which as theorems, and which as 
definitions in the curricula they teach.  They were aware that different textbooks may 
structure the theory differently, but they regarded that choice as an essentially arbitrary 
decision of the authors, and indicated that they did not regard an investigation of the 
different possibilities as appropriate material for classroom work.  More than one teacher 
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told the study group that they expressly tell their students not to worry whether a 
statement is a postulate or a theorem; all that matters, they teach, is that students know 
how to use the statement for the purpose of problem-solving (here “doing a proof” is 
included as a special kind of problem).  Some teachers were aware that many of the 
statements designated as “postulates” in the curriculum are, in fact, provable 
consequences of other postulates, but they attach little significance to this, and as a matter 
of course do not engage their students in discussions of the independence of postulates.  
As in the other cases, teachers cite time constraints, an increasingly overcrowded 
curriculum, and their students’ lack of intellectual sophistication as reasons why 
classroom theory-building is inappropriate. 
Across all of the excerpts cited and discussed in this chapter, there are two 
noteworthy themes that warrant further elaboration.  The first is that in many of the 
conversations in the study group meetings there was at least one teacher who was able to 
temporarily step outside, so to speak, the perspective of the practice, and view matters 
from a point of view more akin to that of the mathematical sensibility.  But even these 
teachers, when asked to comment on how they might deal with an imaginary classroom 
scenario, voiced the same opinions as their colleagues.  This is significant, in that it 
confirms the notion that practical rationality is not a characteristic of the individual 
practitioner but rather a collective phenomenon, a characteristic of the practice.  An 
individual teacher may, at times, look through different sets of lenses, but when they put 
on their “teacher goggles” (so to speak) they perceive and value differently than they do 
when they wear “mathematician goggles”. 
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The second significant theme that runs across all of the examples in this chapter is 
the remarkable lack of agency that teachers exhibit when they discuss their practice.  On 
questions of mathematical value, the teachers in this study consistently subordinate their 
own desires to the authority of the textbook, to the (perceived) deficiencies of their 
students, to the clock and the calendar and the many other institutional factors over which 
they have no control.  The study group participants’ responses tend to come in the form 
“We cannot do X because Y”, or “We have to do X because Y”, where Y is some 
institutional reality (and, in particular, not one of the dispositions that comprise the 
mathematical sensibility).  One might imagine teachers arguing in favor of a particular 
course of action despite the institutional factors that militate against it, on the grounds 
that it is mathematically appropriate to do so — but I have been unable to find examples 
of this in the corpus of study group meetings. 
This last observation serves to motivate the next two chapters.  In them, I turn to a 
collection of documents produced over a three-year period by a teacher who, it will be 
shown, consistently created assessment items in which students were held accountable for 
elements of the mathematical sensibility.  The analysis of these assessment items, 
considered individually and over time, provides another, complementary vantage point 
for the questions that were posed in Chapter 1:  Can the geometry course be used to 
cultivate, in students, the dispositions that are characteristic of the mathematical 
sensibility?  What factors oppose such a use?  And, finally, how does that intended use 
adapt over time to those opposing forces? 
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Chapter 4 
Looking for the mathematical sensibility in a corpus of examination questions 
 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters of this dissertation I analyzed a collection of 
mathematical narratives to identify a number of key dispositions that appear to be 
characteristic of the “mathematical sensibility” — the practical rationality that typifies 
the professional vision of a mathematician (Goodwin, 1994).  Following that analysis, I 
turned to a corpus of data from a series of study group meetings among experienced 
geometry teachers to see what role, if any, those dispositions play in their own practical 
rationality: that is, to see whether those same dispositions have a customary place in the 
teaching of high school geometry.  In this chapter, I turn to analyze a corpus of geometry 
examination questions that was constructed by a teacher24 in a small, private high school 
in an affluent, suburban Midwestern community in three school years between 2001 and 
2005.  My initial motivation for undertaking this analysis was to provide an “existence 
proof” — to document that geometry instruction can be taught in such a way that 
students are held accountable for learning the elements of the mathematical sensibility.  
                                                
24
 It is probably a good idea to reveal here that the anonymous teacher referred to in this 
chapter is actually the author of the dissertation.  However, throughout this work I use the 
device of referring to "the teacher" in the third person, in part to help preserve the 
traditional distinction between subject and object.  For more on the challenges and 
affordances of self-study, see below, p. 193-199. 
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But beyond merely establishing that such a role for the mathematical sensibility is 
possible, I intend to examine how such a role can be carved out, and in particular to 
identify the constraints that threaten the viability of such a role in the ecology of the 
classroom.   
Before elaborating fully on the theoretical perspectives and methods for this 
study, I begin with two motivating examples.  An informal examination of these 
examples will bring into focus what I mean by one of my main claims in this chapter:  
that an assessment item can exemplify, or instantiate, one or more of the mathematical 
dispositions.    The examples will also serve as an opportunity to introduce one of my key 
theoretical resources in this and the following chapter, namely the construct of the 
implied teacher.  For the first example, consider the item in Figure 4.1: 
 
 
In class I claimed that any quadrilateral has exactly twice as much area as its dual 
(remember, the dual is the figure formed by joining midpoints of adjacent edges).  Prove 
this in the special case where the original figure is an isosceles trapezoid. 
 
Figure 4.1.  An assessment item. 
 
Notice that, as written, this item includes more than just the statement of the task 
(which could easily have been reduced to “Prove that an isosceles trapezoid has twice the 
area of its dual”).  It also includes an introductory sentence that serves as a motivation for 
the task:  specifically, this task exists in order to confirm, at least partially, a claim that 
had been previously made but (it appears) was never proven in class.  Thus the item 
includes alongside the task a kind of commentary on the task.  This commentary 
communicates several things, simultaneously, to the student: 
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• that previously-made claims ought to be supported by a proof 
• that the student need not remember the definition of the word “dual” 
(because it is provided in parentheses) 
• that doing a proof in a special case can be worthwhile, even though it falls 
short of proving the general case 
The commentary thus calls the student’s attention to two important mathematical 
dispositions:  Confirmation and Specialization.  In addition to this, the item’s text 
includes (via the use of the phrase “in class I claimed”) a memory of a prior classroom 
experience that is taken as shared; an explicit reference to the item’s author, i.e. the 
teacher; and a characterization of that as a certain kind of individual — one who makes 
claims, and comes back to them later to seek confirmation.  Less explicitly, the very 
existence of the commentary indicates something about the teacher’s expectations of the 
student: namely, that a student in the midst of taking a test may be expected to care about 
more than just “what am I supposed to do now”. 
The theory of systemic functional linguistics (SFL) (Halliday 1994; Martin & 
Rose, 2003) provides a language for discussing the way this (short) text operates.  SFL 
identifies three distinct “metafunctions” of language:  the ideational (what is being talked 
about), interpersonal (the interaction of “speaker(s)” and “audience”), and textual (the 
mode and organization of a text).  From the point of view of the ideational metafunction, 
this is a text about the areas of certain quadrilaterals.  From the point of view of the 
textual metafunction, this item makes a connection to a prior “text” (where here I use the 
word somewhat loosely to include prior classroom interactions that may not have been 
recorded in written form).  But from the perspective of the interpersonal metafunction, 
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this assessment item is a text about who the teacher is, and who the teacher expects the 
student to be.  Seen from this perspective, it is as if the teacher is trying to say to the 
student that this problem needs to be done, in part, because of who the teacher and 
student are, and because of the relationship between them as enacted through ongoing 
interaction:  in short, it says that “you” (the student) and “I” (the teacher) have unfinished 
business to take care of. 
This self-insertion of the teacher into the assessment item, and its narrative 
quality, personalizes and temporalizes the question in a way that seems odd from the 
customary perspective that depicts mathematics as timeless and depersonalized 
(Brousseau, 1997, chapter 1).  But perhaps this should not come as a surprise.  Students 
do not, after all, do mathematics problems solely for the purpose of learning 
mathematics; they also do so because of a didactical contract that joins teacher and 
student in a network of explicit and implicit mutual obligations.  Whenever a student 
does (or refuses to do) an assigned task, that action indicates compliance with (or 
rejection of) the roles that are institutionally mandated for the student and teacher. 
This brief discussion serves to introduce two of the main themes of this chapter:  
that an assessment item can (through commentary and word choice) signal the 
importance of one or more of the mathematical dispositions; and that an item (through the 
textual and interpersonal metafunctions) can imply a specific teacher-role and student-
role.  I return to both of these points later in this chapter. 
For my second motivating example, consider the problem in Figure 4.2.  In this 
problem, students are presented with a diagram of what appears to be two parallel lines 
crossed by a transversal.  Four of the angles formed by those lines are labeled with 
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algebraic expressions in two variables, and the student is asked to determine whether or 
not the lines are actually parallel.  Note first how differently this problem uses language 
in contrast to the previous example.  Unlike the example in Fig. 4.1, this second problem 
contains no commentary, no personalization of the teacher, no reference to past 
experience.  The interpersonal metafunction here appears to construct an entirely 
different relationship between teacher and student, one in which the teacher’s 
individuality is elided altogether.  Nor does the text contain any words that seem to 
clearly mark any of the mathematical dispositions of the previous chapter. 
 
 
In the diagram below, are the lines parallel?  Why or why not? 
 
 
Figure 4.2.  The Possibly Parallel Lines problem. 
 
But it would be incorrect to conclude that this item says nothing about the 
mathematical dispositions, or about the roles of the teacher and student.  As I will now 
show, that information can also be found through an analysis of the possible solution 
strategies that a student might pursue.  This problem admits at least two solution 
strategies, either of which in principle would have been available to a typical student in a 
(x+2y)(x-y)+3x+y
3x+34
9x+2
70-8y
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Geometry class.  One strategy, which I call the direct approach, is conceptually very 
straightforward but entangles the reader in some rather thorny algebraic manipulations.  
In this approach, the student notices that the two angles at the top of the diagram 
constitute a linear pair, and hence that 
9x + 2( ) + 3x + 34( ) = 180  
which, after some modest algebra, yields x = 12 ; and hence the two angles in question 
are 110° and 70°, respectively.  So far there the problem is fairly commonplace and not 
very interesting.  Continuing in this fashion, one next turns to the lower pair of angles.  
Following the same reasoning (and making the substitution x = 12 ) one obtains 
70 ! 8y( ) + 12 + 2y( ) 12 ! y( ) + 3 "12 + y = 180  
But whereas the reasoning that produces this second equation is the same as that 
behind the previous one, the algebra needed to carry this equation forward to a solution is 
much more difficult.  If students are diligent and careful, eventually they would arrive at 
the quadratic equation 
2y
2
! 5y ! 70 = 0  
which has the two (irrational) solutions  
y =
5 ± 3 65
4
. 
After all of this, one determines the measures of the lower pair of angles to be 
60 + 6 65( ) ° and 120 ! 6 65( ) °.  Finally one reaches the conclusion that the 
corresponding angles in the diagram are not congruent, and hence the two lines are not 
parallel. 
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So much for the direct approach, which is conceptually very straightforward but 
requires a great deal of algebraic facility (and entails a not insignificant risk of error).  
The second strategy, the indirect approach, is far simpler from a procedural standpoint, 
but conceptually subtler.  In this approach, one begins as in the direct approach by using 
the top pair of angles to find x = 12 and then determining the upper angles to be 110° and 
70°.  At this point, however, rather than continue onwards to determine the value of y and 
the measures of the lower pair of angles, and hence determining whether the lines are 
parallel, one instead makes a strategic hypothesis:  suppose that the lines are parallel.  If 
so, then the lower left-hand angle must also be 110°; and from the equation  
70 ! 8y = 110  
we quickly discover that y = !5 .  Next, we substitute the (known) values for x and y into 
the expression for the angle on the lower right, obtaining 12 !10( ) 12 + 5( ) + 3 "12 ! 5 , 
which is easily evaluated to be 65°.  We reach the conclusion that if the half-lines on the 
left side of the transversal are parallel, then the half-lines on the right side are not; or, 
equivalently, that the only way to make the left-hand pair of corresponding angles be 
congruent is to put a kink in the bottom “line”. 
In summary, the indirect approach almost entirely circumvents the need for the 
difficult algebraic manipulations required for the direct approach.  Instead, the student 
makes a strategic hypothesis, deduces consequences from that hypothesis, and ultimately 
rejects the hypothesis on the grounds that it leads to a contradiction.   In other words, the 
indirect approach calls for the student to engage in a kind of reasoning that corresponds 
to the method of indirect proof; it also captures well one of the heuristics a 
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mathematician might use in attempting to discover whether something is true or not 
(Polya, 1957). 
In terms of the mathematical dispositions of the previous chapter, note that the 
moment at which the strategic hypothesis is made could be characterized as a deployment 
of the move “consider the converse”:  Rather than seek the correct values of x and y to 
determine whether corresponding angles are congruent, instead one assumes a desired 
conclusion (that the two left-hand angles are congruent) and seeks conditions under 
which that conclusion would hold.  In addition, the problem places students in a 
mathematical context in which the truth of the matter is ambiguous: it is not clear until 
one has finished the problem whether the lines are parallel or not.  Precisely because of 
this, the indirect approach described above is a risky one: if one were to follow the steps 
outlined above but not reach any contradiction, one would not be entitled to reach any 
conclusion whatsoever, and would need to start over with some other strategy. 
The problem thus places the student in a situation of ignorance somewhat 
analogous to that of the research mathematician, who genuinely may not know ahead of 
time whether the theorem he is attempting to prove is true or false, or whether the 
particular problem-solving strategy he pursues will bear fruit or lead to a dead-end.  The 
“direct approach” solution navigates through the problem-space in a more conservative 
fashion:  the student executing this approach makes no unfounded assumptions and thus 
takes no “risks”.  The cost of this conservatism, however, is a high level of procedural 
difficulty and a pronounced risk of error.  Seen from thus perspective, the “Possibly 
Parallel Lines” problem can be understood as holding students accountable for being able 
to deploy the mathematical dispositions of making strategic assumptions, considering the 
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converse problem, and seeking the conditions under which a conclusion holds as 
heuristics for navigating through uncertainty. 
The second motivating example was intended to illustrate the fact that geometry 
problems at a relatively accessible level can nevertheless become opportunities for 
students to call upon rather sophisticated forms of reasoning.  Of course, the fact that the 
opportunity exists does not mean that students will exercise it; there is, after all, always 
the direct approach.  But the direct approach is costly, and students who pursue it face a 
kind of tax on their work. 
Looking back across the two motivating examples, we see that an assessment item 
can represent an instance of a mathematical disposition in more than one way.  On the 
one hand the item can explicitly mark a disposition as salient, either through word choices 
or through commentary; alternatively an item can implicitly mark a disposition as 
valuable, in the case where there is a “favored” solution in which such disposition is 
deployed.  This distinction aligns with an important distinction from Chapter 2.  Recall 
that practical rationality consists of both categories of perception and categories of 
appreciation, and recall also that I have included the mathematicians’ “generative moves” 
among the categories of perception, in that they constitute labels for what a 
mathematician sees as actions that may be performed at a particular moment.  The 
categories of appreciation, on the other hand, are labels that describe how a particular 
piece of mathematical work (including both problems and solutions) may be valued.  In 
the two examples, we see that categories of appreciation are instantiated through word 
choice and commentary; these tell the student not only what he or she is to do, but why it 
is important or worthwhile that it be done.   On the other hand, categories of perception 
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(the generative moves) may be located in the analysis of the possible solutions of a 
problem. 
 
Theoretical perspectives 
The intentional fallacy and the “implied teacher” 
In the discussion of the previous examples I made some informal comments about 
the teacher and his apparent intentions as revealed through text, and before proceeding it 
is important to address directly the role that such questions play in my analysis below.  It 
is always risky to make claims about a teacher’s intentions on the basis of what is 
observed to have happened, and in any event this study is not meant to be an analysis of 
an individual teacher, but rather of teaching as evidenced by a collection of artifacts.  
And yet the artifacts themselves are provocative, and it is somewhat natural to speak of 
them in terms of intention.  For this reason, I begin my discussion of theoretical 
frameworks with a perhaps unusual turn to a discussion of some developments in 20
th
 
century literary criticism. 
Prior to the mid-20
th
 century, a standard element of literary criticism was an 
inquiry after the intention of the author, who was held to have primacy in determining the 
meaning of a text.  Wimsatt & Beardsley (1946/1999) dub this the “intentional fallacy”, 
and offer as an example of the fallacy Goethe’s three questions for critics:  “What did the 
author set out to do?  Was his plan reasonable and sensible, and how far did he succeed in 
carrying it out?” (p. 483).  The intentional fallacy was named, and rejected, by the 
founders of the so-called “New Criticism,” who argued that the only meaning that 
matters, or that is even accessible to the critic, is that which can be found in the text, 
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rather than in the mind of the author:  “One must ask how a critic expects to get an 
answer to the question about intention.  How is he to find out what the poet tried to do?  
If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the poem itself shows what he was trying to do” 
(Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946/1999, p. 481).  From this point of view, while information 
about the author’s life may be illuminating, this properly belongs to the realm of literary 
biography, rather than literary criticism. 
But despite the rejection of the intentional fallacy, literary critics have still found 
it useful to introduce various surrogate notions to take the place of the author.  In his 
1961 work The Rhetoric of Fiction, the literary critic Wayne Booth introduced the notion 
of the implied author of a text.  The implied author is a theoretical construct, distinct 
from both the actual author of a text and the narrator. When a reader encounters a text, 
that text is likely to suggest to the reader certain characteristics or qualities of its author, 
and thus an impression of the author is formed in the mind of the reader.  This impression 
may correspond only approximately, or not at all, to the actual author who put pen to 
paper and constructed the text; and certainly it may be that the author implied by a text to 
one reader may be somewhat different from the author implied by the same text to a 
second reader.  Still, despite the somewhat conjectural nature of the implied author, as a 
theoretical construct literary critics have found it a natural and useful way to discuss 
matters of intent without the need to make claims about an actual biographical 
individual— when, in any event, such claims may be difficult or impossible to 
substantiate. 
Booth describes the implied author as “the picture the reader gets of [the author’s] 
presence”.  Booth observes that 
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It is a curious fact that we have no terms either for this created 
“second self” or for our relationship with him.  None of our terms for 
various aspects of the narrator is quite accurate.  “Persona,” “mask,” and 
“narrator” are sometimes used, but they more commonly refer to the 
speaker in the work who is after all only one of the elements created by 
the implied author and who may be separated from him by large ironies.  
“Narrator” is usually taken to mean the “I” of a work, but the “I” is seldom 
if ever identical with the implied image of the artist.... 
It is only by distinguishing between the author and his implied 
image that we can avoid pointless and unverifiable talk about such 
qualities as “sincerity” or “seriousness” in the author....  we have only the 
work as evidence for the only kind of sincerity that concerns us: Is the 
implied author in harmony with himself — that is, are his other choices in 
harmony with his explicit narrative character?  If a narrator who by every 
trustworthy sign is presented to us as a reliable spokesman for the author 
professes to believe in values which are never realized in the structure as a 
whole, we can then talk of an insincere work.  A great work establishes the 
“sincerity” of its implied author, regardless of how grossly the man who 
created that author may belie in his other forms of conduct the values 
embodied in his work.  (pp. 73-75) 
 
By putting forth the construct of the implied author, Booth brackets as irrelevant 
any consideration of the biography of the actual author, while simultaneously enabling 
discussion of “intent” without the need for presumptuous and unverifiable claims about 
an actual person’s state of mind.  The implied author is of course himself a fiction, one 
co-created by the critic who recognizes traces in a text of what is presumed to be the 
text’s creator.  It goes without saying that different readers of the same text may 
encounter different implied authors there; however, insofar as the implied author has no 
qualities other than those that can be inferred on the basis of textual evidence, it is to be 
expected that any two implied authors of a common text will at least have much in 
common.  
Booth goes on to identify the implied author’s opposite number, namely the mock 
reader.  Any text, Booth argues, presumes a certain kind of reader; it is this reader whom 
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the implied author has in mind when creating the text.  Booth quotes Walter Gibson in 
saying that “a book we reject as bad is often simply a book in whose ‘mock reader we 
discover a person we refuse to become, a mask we refuse to put on, a role we will not 
play” (p. 138): 
We may exhort ourselves to read tolerantly, we may quote 
Coleridge on the willing suspension of disbelief until we think ourselves 
totally suspended in a relativistic universe, and still we will find many 
books which postulate readers we refuse to become, books that depend on 
“beliefs” or “attitudes” — the term we choose is unimportant here — 
which we cannot adopt even hypothetically as our own. 
 
A perspective similar to Booth’s is found in the work of the semiotician Umberto 
Eco.  In The Role of the Reader (1979), Eco renounces “the use of the term /author/ if not 
as a mere metaphor for «textual strategy»” (p. 11).  That is to say, for Eco the only 
“author” that can be spoken of with any definiteness is the author who we can identify 
through the traces he leaves in the text, the methods he employs for creating meaning.  
Elsewhere Eco (1994, p. 50) distinguishes between the intentio operis and the intentio 
auctoris (respectively, the intent of the work and the intent of the author).  The actual, 
biological individual who constructed the text ceases to be relevant the moment the text 
leaves his hands and enters those of the reader:  the intentio operis, the textual strategy, is 
Eco’s analogue for Booth’s implied author.  Corresponding to Booth’s mock reader is 
Eco’s own notion of the Model Reader.  The Model Reader is a model of the possible 
reader, one presumed by the author in construction of a text.  Notice, though, that in 
saying that the Model Reader is “presumed by the author”, it is important to keep in mind 
that by “author” is meant only a textual strategy, not an actual flesh-and-blood person.  
Thus both Eco’s “author as textual strategy” and “Model Reader” are, like Booth’s 
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“implied author” and “mock reader”, purely hypothetical constructs, descriptions of a 
presumptive author and reader that may differ substantially from the actual author and 
readers of a given work.  These constructs provide a metaphor-rich language for 
discussing the strategies employed by a text in terms of intention, without requiring (or 
even tolerating) any claims about the author’s real desires. 
Booth describes the experience of rejecting a book as bad as the result of a 
mismatch between the book’s mock reader and its actual reader; Eco takes this point in a 
more radical direction, arguing that a successful text will transform the actual reader (in 
Eco’s parlance, the empirical reader) into the model reader.  Eco illustrates this claim 
with an example from Sir Walter Scott’s novel Waverley: 
The author of Waverley opens his story by clearly calling for a 
very specialized kind of reader, nourished on a whole chapter of 
intertextual encyclopedia....  But at the same time [the text] creates the 
competence of its Model Reader.  After having read this passage, whoever 
approaches Waverley (even one century later and even — if the book has 
been translated into another language — from the point of view of a 
different intertextual competence) is asked to assume that certain epithets 
are meaning «chivalry» and that there is a whole tradition of chivalric 
romances displaying certain deprecatory stylistic and narrative properties. 
Thus it seems that a well-organized text on the one hand 
presupposes a model of competence coming, so to speak, from outside the 
text, but on the other hand works to build up, by merely textual means, 
such a competence.  (pp 7-8). 
 
In the analysis of a corpus of mathematics assessment items, or indeed any 
artifacts of teaching, I propose that it is valuable to speak of analogues of the implied 
author and mock reader — two constructs I will refer to as the implied teacher and the 
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implied student
25
.  The implied teacher is the observer’s answer to the question, “What is 
the intention of this teaching?”  The implied student is the answer to the question, “What 
is a student held accountable for being capable of doing here?”  In asking and answering 
these questions we must scrupulously avoid making claims about the actual teacher and 
students (following Eco, I will henceforth refer to these as the empirical teacher and 
empirical students); to do so would be to fall victim to the intentional fallacy (Wimsatt & 
Beardsley, 1946/1999)
26
. 
In particular, Eco’s perspective on texts — in which the function of a text is to 
transform the empirical reader into its Model Reader, by creating in the empirical reader 
the competencies needed to understand the author’s message — takes on a particular 
salience in the case of written instructional materials.  That is to say, the purpose of such 
materials is explicitly to build in each and every empirical student the capacities of the 
implied student.  In the present context, it amounts to the claim that assessment items 
constitute an opportunity to learn. 
 
Assessments in mathematics education 
In the preceding pages, I have suggested that the constructs of the implied teacher 
and implied student may be useful for describing a collection of assessment items and 
what they may say about teaching.  Such constructs can make possible a description of 
                                                
25
 I use "implied student" rather than "mock student" or "model student" because 
the latter two have unintended connotations. 
26
 In this connection, it is worth noting that teacher educators who make use of 
videocases have in some cases noted that preservice and inservice teachers may be 
reluctant to make judgments about a teaching episode on the grounds that it is impossible 
to evaluate such an episode without knowing the teacher’s intentions — a version of the 
intentional fallacy. 
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the didactical contract, in terms of what the teacher does (and does not) hold his students 
(and himself) accountable for.  But it must also be stressed that while the same 
perspective could fruitfully be brought to bear on a study of other teacher-authored 
documents —homework assignments, in-class worksheets, unit review guides — the 
texts in question for the present study are none of those:  they are, specifically, 
assessment items, and as such constitute a particular genre of instructional text.  Just as 
literary genres (e.g. Western, Detective, Science Fiction, Romance) are defined by certain 
normative expectations (conventions), so too are assessments characterized by certain 
conventional features.  I turn now to a review of the literature on the functions of 
assessment in mathematics education. 
There is an extensive and deep literature on assessment in mathematics education.  
Kulm (1990) notes that assessment is a tool with multiple instructional uses, including 
diagnosis, monitoring, and evaluation of student learning, and that “in recent years... the 
evaluation and comparison of achievement between groups of students, school districts, 
states, and nations have become the central focus of assessment” (pp. 1-2).  In addition to 
these functions Kulm lists as primary purposes of assessment “feedback for the student” 
and “communication of standards and expectations” (p. 4).  Kulm’s focus is on the twin 
questions of what should be assessed, and how it can be assessed.  A crucial component 
of Kulm’s analysis is his contention that not all forms of assessment are equally well-
suited for assessing different kinds of knowledge.  While the traditional in-class written 
examination may suffice very well for measuring students’ computational and procedural 
fluency, alternative forms of assessment — including oral presentations, group project 
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work, open-ended take-home assignments, and student portfolios — may be better able to 
provide insight into students’ higher-order thinking and problem-solving skills. 
Niss (1993) frames the purposes of assessment as: (1) provision of information (to 
the student, to the teacher, to the system), (2) the establishing of bases for decisions or 
actions (filtering and selecting individuals for various functions, licensing, ordering, etc.), 
and (3) the shaping of social reality (disciplining students, teachers and institutions; 
subordination to power, authority, and ideology; etc.).  In addition to the purpose of 
assessment, Niss describes an assessment as a metaphorical “vector” whose components 
include the subject (who is assessed), object (the content and ability being assessed), 
items (the kinds of output), occasions, procedures and circumstances, judging and 
recording, and the reporting of outcomes.  With respect to the second of these, Niss notes 
that “In an increasing but limited number of cases, objects of assessment include... 
heuristics and methods of proof... [and] problem solving” but that “we rarely encounter... 
exploration and hypothesis generation as objects of assessment (p. 15).” Niss also 
distinguishes between continuous assessment and discrete assessment: the former are 
generally of the “formative” type (in that they provide feedback to the teacher at the same 
time that the teacher is engaged in instruction) while the latter are typically of the 
“summative” variety. 
The authors of the various chapters in the volume edited by Lesh & Lamon (1992) 
echo Kulm’s concern that the form of assessment be well-suited for the content that is to 
be assessed.  In that volume, the editors (Lesh & Lamon, 1992, p. 6) stress that “the 
authors are not simply concerned about developing new modes of assessment.  They are 
primarily concerned about changing the substance of what is being measured.”  Goldin 
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(1992), for example, discusses five versions of the same question (see Fig. 4.3 below), 
and shows how seemingly minor variations in phrasing can result in assessments of very 
different kinds of knowledge.  To be specific, Goldin’s “Problem 3” assesses the extent to 
which a student is familiar with the notion of “average” or “mean”, as well as his or her 
understanding of the properties “commutative” and “associative” as applied to binary 
operations, and finally the student’s ability to transfer that knowledge to an unfamiliar 
context in which the truth is in doubt.  Problem 3a removes the dependence on prior 
acquaintance with the mean by including an explanation, but at the same time “it requires 
more than the transfer of the concepts of commutativity and associativity to a new 
domain.  It requires, and assesses, the student’s ability to construct the new domain from 
the given verbal description of a new operation.” (p. 79, emphasis added). 
Problem 3.  Let the symbol @ stand for the average or mean of two numbers.  For example, 
we shall write 6@8=7, because 7 is the mean of the pair 6 and 8.  Is the operation @ 
commutative?  Is it associative?  Explain why or why not. 
Problem 3a.  Let the symbol @ stand for the average or mean of two numbers.  This is 
found by adding them and dividing their sum by 2.  For example, 6@8=7, because 6+8 is 14, and 
14 divided by 2 is 7.  Is the operation @ commutative?  Is it associative?  Explain why or why 
not. 
Problem 3b.  The operation of addition (+) is commutative because when two numbers are 
added, their sum is the same in either order.  For example, 6+8=14 and 8+6=14.  Addition is also 
associative, because when three numbers are added it does not matter which pair is added first.  
For example, (6+8)+2=14+2=16, while 6+(8+2)=6+10=16. 
Now let the symbol @ stand for the average or mean of two numbers.  This is found by 
adding them and dividing their sum by 2.  For example, 6@8=7, because 6+8 is 14, and 14 
divided by 2 is 7. 
Is the operation @ commutative?  Is it associative?  Explain why or why not. 
Problem 3c.  Let the symbol @ stand for the average or mean of two numbers.  For 
example, we shall write 6@8=7, because 7 is the mean of the pair 6 and 8.  Give an example 
(using two numbers) which illustrate the commutative property of the operation @.  Give an 
example (using three numbers) to show that @ is not associative. 
Problem 3d. Let the symbol @ stand for the average or mean of two numbers.  This is found 
by adding them and dividing their sum by 2.  For example, 6@8=7, because 6+8 is 14, and 14 
divided by 2 is 7.  
Draw a number line and, using two numbers as an example, show the meaning of @ with a 
diagram on the number line.  Then explain what your picture suggests about whether @ is or is 
not commutative. 
Fig. 4.3.  Four variations on an assessment item.  After Goldin (1992). 
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Similarly, Problem 3b removes the dependence on prior acquaintance with the 
commutative and associative properties; Problem 3c restores the need for prior 
knowledge, but both removes the uncertainty inherent in the original Problem 3 and 
replaces the call for an explanation with a more modest call for an exemplification; and 
Problem 3d calls for a particular kind of pictorial representation that may or may not have 
been part of a student’s response to the other four variations. 
In Chapter 5, I perform a similarly fine-grained analysis on a number of exam 
questions from the corpus of data under examination.  In particular I will show how 
certain exam questions that were repeated on tests in each of the three years of the data 
sample underwent subtle changes in phrasing and emphasis that amounted to changes in 
what was at stake for students. 
Much of the literature on assessment is concerned, quite properly, with what we 
might call the retrospective function of assessments.  That is to say, the purpose of 
assessment is understood as being the measurement (or other characterization) of what 
has happened up to the present:  what a student has learned, what he remembers of what 
he has learned, and what he can do with what he remembers of what he has learned.  But 
as the example from Goldin suggests, assessment items can have a secondary, 
prospective function as well.  The student who finds Problem 3b on an assessment is 
likely encountering the commutative and associative properties for the first time (at least, 
the problem does not hold them accountable for having seen or understood it previously); 
but it may not be for the last time.  On the contrary, the introduction of these concepts on 
the assessment may set the stage for work that will be done in subsequent days or weeks.  
In this way examination questions can foreshadow material from the coming chapter; 
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they can introduce new vocabulary and definitions that will be used in subsequent 
classroom work.  From this point of view, assessment items do not only measure what 
has been learned; they also constitute an opportunity to learn new material (Bell, 
Burkhardt, & Swan 1992a, 1992b; de Lange 1992; Chazan & Yerushalmy 1992). 
 
Reconstructing practice from assessment items 
As has been noted above, the literature generally regards assessment items as 
instruments used to discover information about students.  From this point of view the 
value of an assessment item is only realized when students are actually assessed, and the 
informational value of the assessment resides within the students’ responses to it.  In this 
chapter, however, I take a quite different position with regard to the analysis of 
assessment items: I look to these items for the purpose of a post facto reconstruction of 
classroom instruction itself.   That is, in the absence of other data sources (e.g. field 
records of instruction) that may contribute to our understanding of what and how a 
particular teacher taught, I contend that a corpus of examination questions can provide 
some insight into the classroom practice of the teacher by answering the question, “What 
did the teacher hold his or her students accountable for learning?”  In other words, I use 
the assessment items not to make measurements on or describe the knowledge of 
students, but to reflect back on the teaching practice, as evidenced by the textual 
strategies — the implied teacher of the assessment. 
This perspective rests on some assumptions about teaching that derive from an 
understanding of the didactical contract (Brousseau, 1997).  Because education is both 
institutionalized and compulsory, students and teachers hold certain (tacit) expectations 
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of one another.  One of those expectations is that teachers prepare students for 
assessments by ensuring that there is some close correspondence between what is taught 
and what is assessed.  When a teacher asks, on an exam, a question that students 
(individually or in the aggregate) are not capable of answering, the contract is breached:  
either the students have failed to live up to their responsibilities, or the teacher has failed 
to live up to his.  In either case we can expect that an institution would respond, and that 
either the teacher or the student would be expected to make changes going forward. 
For this reason a corpus of exam questions, taken from a single teacher, can be 
taken as evidence of what the teacher intended to teach, or (more precisely) as a proxy for 
what students were intended to learn.  What students actually learned, of course, is an 
entirely different matter, and to study that one would need access not only to the 
questions asked, but also to the responses students generated.  Moreover, even this would 
not tell us the whole story.  Students do not take examinations in isolation; on the 
contrary, teachers often interact with their students during exams, responding to 
questions, clarifying instructions, giving feedback and in some cases offering hints to 
those who are struggling.  In this manner a students’ experience of working on an 
examination question may include scaffolding not present in the written text of an item.  
It may even be that challenging examination questions undergo a degradation analogous 
to that documented by studies of mathematical tasks in classrooms.  Such studies have 
shown that curricula intended to engage students in high-level reasoning tend to be 
deployed in ways that reduce the conceptual demands to the level of merely procedural 
proficiency (Stein, Smith, Henningsen & Silver, 2000). 
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Despite this, there is value in looking closely at curricular tasks in their own right, 
disconnected from the work students do and the interaction between teacher and students 
in the deployment of the tasks.  Earlier studies of curricular tasks have largely focused on 
textbook exercises rather than an exam questions, but some of the same considerations 
certainly apply here.  Mesa (2004) writes that textbooks are an expression of the intended 
curriculum; the same is true of examinations, which embody what students are supposed 
to have learned from each curricular unit, and what the teacher believes he or she actually 
taught.  Mesa describes the study of textbooks as a hypothetical exercise: 
What would students learn if their mathematics classes were to 
cover all the textbook sections in the order given? What would students 
learn if they had to solve all the exercises in the textbook? Would they 
learn the particular mathematical notions that are presented in the 
textbook? Would that learning work well in their future work in 
mathematics? (Mesa, p. 256; italics in original) 
 
The analogous questions about examinations (e.g., What would students have had 
to learn in order to answer this question successfully?  What new mathematics would a 
student learn if they were to answer this question?) invites us to investigate the tasks in 
much the same way that Simon (1975) explores the problem space of the Tower of Hanoi 
problem.  In that analysis, Simon performs an a priori analysis of a problem and 
describes multiple strategies that might be brought to bear on its solution.  Each strategy 
is in turn analyzed for the kinds of demands it makes on one’s visual perception and 
short-term memory.  In this way his analysis shows that different individuals may have 
equal success in solving the Tower of Hanoi problem, and yet learn very different things 
from the experience.  My analysis above of the Possibly Parallel Lines problem (Fig. 4.2) 
is in this same spirit:  it shows that a student might solve the problem by persistently 
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applying algebra techniques to a somewhat complex problem, or alternatively might 
reduce the algebraic complexity by deploying some of the mathematical dispositions.  
The implied teacher and implied student can be regarded as the product of carrying out 
the hypothetical exercise described in the passage quoted above.  As such they amount to 
a retrospective characterization of the intended curriculum— they describe what was 
supposed to have been taught and learned. 
Beyond the value that lies in examining individual assessment items to see what 
they tell us about the intention behind them, there is additional evidence in the corpus that 
allows us to draw some inferences regarding the alignment between what was intended to 
be taught (as indicated by the questions) and what was actually taught and learned (as 
would be indicated by students’ responses).  This evidence exists because the corpus 
under examination contains not a single assessment or even a single year’s worth of 
assessments, but a multi-year corpus of examination questions written by a single teacher, 
in which many questions are repeated in successive years.  For this reason we may take 
the position that the teacher, in giving and scoring assessments, receives feedback from 
his class that could inform his behavior in subsequent years.  For example, if the teacher 
were to discover through grading exams that there was a mismatch between what he 
thought had been taught and what students actually learned, it is likely that the implicated 
question would disappear from, or undergo modification in, subsequent years’ 
examinations — or alternatively that the teacher will take greater pains in subsequent 
years to prepare students better to answer the question.  On the other hand if an 
assessment item “succeeds” (i.e. if it produces roughly the kind of response the teacher 
was hoping for) then it is likely to reappear in subsequent years with little or no 
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modification.  For this reason in the next chapter I will look not only at individual items 
on single assessments, but at the history of each assessment item, for evidence of how 
viable it proved to be in the ecology of the classroom.   A question that continues to 
appear on exams in multiple years may legitimately be taken as a reflection of the 
teaching that preceded it.  On the other hand a question that drops out of the corpus after 
one year, or recurs with modifications, may be taken as evidence of some kind of 
mismatch between what the teacher hoped for and what was actually achieved. 
To make this more concrete, suppose a teacher were to include Goldin’s Problem 
3 (Figure 4.3) on an exam in one year, and in the following year were to use the variation 
Problem 3a instead.  The thrust of my argument here is that such a change in the problem 
would testify to more than would a consideration of the individual variations as separate 
items.  It would be reasonable to infer, on the basis of such a change, that the teacher’s 
assumptions in the first year (e.g. that students already were familiar with the notion of 
average) proved not to be true, so that in the second year the teacher found it prudent to 
provide additional scaffolding for those students who needed it.  At the same time the fact 
that the teacher provided the scaffolding in 3a, but not the scaffolding in 3b, suggests that 
either the teacher consistently intended to hold students accountable for knowing the 
algebraic notions of “commutativity” and “associativity” and was therefore unwilling to 
provide definitions for these concepts, or alternatively that the results of the first year’s 
exam showed that students were generally capable of demonstrating knowledge of these 
properties and therefore the teacher did not find it necessary to provide additional 
scaffolding. 
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Coherence and adaptation in the assessment items corpus 
More generally, one can look at the evolution of a single assessment item across 
multiple years, and — by noticing what changes and what does not — draw some 
reasonable inferences about the kinds of feedback that a teacher experienced in the use of 
the task.  I return to this theme in Chapter 5, in which I discuss adaptation in the corpus 
across multiple timescales. 
All of the foregoing discussion relies in part on the presumption that it makes 
sense to regard a corpus of assessment items as a text.  The legitimacy of this 
presumption could itself be challenged.  From one point of view, such a corpus resembles 
a novel or biography far less than it does, say, a recipe book, or the classified 
advertisements in a local newspaper.  That is, assessment items are typically short (on the 
order of at most a few sentences) and independent of one another.  The questions in most 
exams can be done in any order, and the content covered on one exam may have little in 
common with that covered on another.  One would not expect to find much of an implied 
author in a heterogeneous collection of independent, disconnected paragraphs; on what 
grounds is it legitimate to approach the corpus of assessment items in the way have I 
described? 
To answer this question I turn again to the linguistic theory of systemic functional 
linguistics, or SFL (Halliday 1994; Martin & Rose 2003), and in particular to the theory 
of cohesion (Halliday & Hasan 1976; Hasan 1984).  Recall that SFL identifies three 
distinct “metafunctions” of language:  the ideational (what is being talked about), 
interpersonal (the interaction of “speaker(s)” and “audience”), and textual (the mode and 
organization of a text).  The key notion of SFL is that any text can be analyzed for how it 
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uses language in the service of these three metafunctions.  Cohesion, meanwhile, refers to 
the use of lexical and grammatical relationships to produce a coherent text, that is, to hold 
a text together and give it meaning.  Cohesion is, so to speak, the means by which the end 
of coherence is achieved.  Thompson and Zhou (2001) note that most studies of cohesion 
focus exclusively on the use of language to signal logical connections among 
propositional content, and thus stress the ideational and textual functions of cohesion.  
However, they point out, cohesion can function along the interpersonal axis as well: 
Halliday (1994: 338) mentions that certain types of cohesive resources 
involve interpersonal rather than ideational meaning, but he does not 
explore the implications.  In general, the important concept of evaluative 
coherence — the way in which, for example, writers work to convey a 
consistent personal evaluation of the topic they are dealing with ‘ has 
received little attention, and there has also been little investigation of the 
corresponding role of the evaluative lexis in creating cohesion (though see 
Hunston 1989, 1994).  What we wish to do… is to explore one of the ways 
in which explicit evaluation in a text functions to create texture and 
structure.  (p. 123) 
 
In particular Thompson and Zhou study the use of disjuncts to create an evaluative 
stance.  Evaluation is regarded as part of the interpersonal metafunction, in that it 
conveys the author’s opinions about what is written.  But, they argue, disjuncts also 
function as cohesive signals, tying a text together.  The continuity of an author’s 
evaluative stances is one of the elements of a text’s coherence. 
More generally, cohesion can serve the purposes of any or all of the three 
metafunctions:  that is, cohesion can exist at the ideational level (e.g. repeated references 
to the same thematic content), the interpersonal level (e.g. repeating a phrase that 
characterizes the relationship between the author or reader, or the author and the text), or 
the textual level (e.g. comments such as “As we saw in the last chapter...”).  Indeed the 
 
 195 
recognition of something as “a text” (rather than as a disconnected collection of words) 
rests on cohesion along all three metafunctions.  When such cohesion is lacking, the 
“text” will lack coherence.  A page of classified advertisements from a newspaper has 
some ideational coherence (in that many of the advertisements are for the same or similar 
products) but essentially no textual coherence (in that typically no advertisement refers to 
other advertisements on the same page, even indirectly) or interpersonal coherence (in 
that there is no consistent authorial “voice” that ties advertisements together).  This is not 
to say that all three metafunctions are not present in the individual ads — certainly 
advertisements may position the buyer and seller in a mutual relationship — but only that 
there is no cohesion that can create coherence across the entire page.  For this reason it 
would be unnatural to speak of the page as a whole as a single “text” with a (single) 
implied author — although it may make perfect sense to speak of each individual 
advertisement as a text with its own implied author. 
Thus one way of justifying my treatment of this corpus of exams as a “text” is to 
identify cohesion within it:  that is, to locate questions in which the author makes explicit 
self-reference, and questions that refer back to other questions on the same exam, or to 
previous exams, either by revisiting thematic content or by making explicit reference to 
past experience.  One of the tasks to be undertaken in the subsequent analysis, then, is to 
document that such cohesion exists in the corpus under examination. 
 
The problem of self-interpretation 
The framework described above — in which “author” and “reader” are taken to 
mean “implied / model author” and “mock / model reader”, with an explicit disavowal of 
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any claim about the empirical author and reader — is complicated when the empirical 
reader of a text — the one forming the interpretations — happens to coincide with the 
empirical author of the text.  In this case, we must contend with some difficult questions:  
Is the (actual) author of a text capable of judging the meaning of a text?  Or is there a 
kind of conflict of interest that precludes an author from an unbiased reading of “his” 
own text? 
On the other hand, one might approach the situation from the opposite end:  Does 
the empirical author stand in a privileged position when it comes to interpreting the 
meaning of that text?  The author, after all, can claim, in a way that no others can, to 
know what was meant by a particular phrase, or why a certain character was given a 
specific name, and so forth.  Other readers must content themselves to make do with the 
“traces” of the author left behind in the text, but the author himself has the inside story, 
so to speak.  Does the author’s own interpretation of his text have any particular 
preeminence? 
Eco deals directly with this question in “Between author and text” (1992).  
Writing from both the perspective of a philosopher of language and semiotics, and from 
the vantage point of an author of novels (most notably The Name of the Rose and 
Foucault’s Pendulum), Eco addresses the question, “Can we still be concerned with the 
empirical author of a text?”  Eco enumerates more than a dozen instances in which 
readers of his own novels have “discovered” references and allusions that, as author, he 
“knew” were not intended.  He discounts some of these “findings” as unconvincing and 
false.  Nevertheless in other cases he concedes that the text he produced supports the 
contention that its “Model Author” (i.e., an explicit textual strategy) intended something 
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that, as empirical author, he knows was not designed.  In the end he concludes that “there 
are... cases in which the empirical author has the right to react as a Model Reader” (p. 
79), but reaffirms that even in this instance the empirical author possesses no privileged 
position from which to interpret: “I have introduced the empirical author in this game 
only in order to stress his irrelevance and to reassert the rights of the text” (p. 84).   
Eco’s discussion of the interpretative difficulties that accompany the situation of 
an empirical author who acts as a Model Reader gains particular significance for us in the 
context of the teacher-researcher tradition.  The teacher-researcher is both an observer of 
and a participant in the activity under investigation, a position that suggests the 
possibility of gaining valuable insight into teacher’s decision-making that would be 
otherwise unavailable to researchers, while simultaneously raising questions about 
subjectivity, bias, and conflict of interest.  Of course, all research is subjective to a 
degree; but the complexity of disentangling oneself from the phenomena under 
investigation is much greater when one stands squarely in the middle of it.  In a survey 
article on teacher research, Cochran-Smith & Lytle (1990) discuss the benefits that such 
research affords, as well as the risks that are inherent to it.  In particular, Cochran-Smith 
& Lytle argue that teacher research should be regarded as something fundamentally 
distinct from traditional research on teaching: 
Regarding teacher research as a mere imitation of university research is 
not useful and ultimately condescending.  It is more useful to consider 
teacher research as its own genre, not entirely different from other types of 
systematic inquiry into teaching, yet with some quite distinctive features.  
But it is also important to recognize the value of teacher research for both 
the school-based teaching community and the university-based research 
community.  (p. 4) 
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It is interesting to note that Cochran-Smith & Lytle do not directly address the 
problems of subjectivity, bias, and conflict of interest.  In a subsequent review article a 
decade later (Cochran-Smith & Lytle 1999), the same authors elaborate further on the 
distinctions between teacher research and other research on teaching.  They note that 
some scholars have critiqued teacher research on grounds that Cochran-Smith & Lytle 
refer to as methods critiques.  These methods critiques deal directly with the questions of 
bias and subjectivity.  In this respect they cite Huberman (1996), who argues that 
understanding events when one is a participant in them is excruciatingly 
difficult if not impossible, thus challenging the possibility of the teacher 
functioning as a researcher in his or her own school or classroom setting....  
Huberman argues that the fact that teachers may have intimate insider 
information about teaching does not negate the need for research methods 
that are ‘minimally reliable’ in order to safeguard against ‘delusion and 
distortion’.  (Cochran-Smith & Lytle, p. 20) 
 
In contrast to Huberman’s concern for documentation and reliable research 
methods, Cochran-Smith & Lytle also cite Berthoff (1987), who proposed a view of the 
teacher as what she called “RE-searcher”, who “did not need more ‘findings’... but more 
dialogue with other teachers that would generate theories grounded in practice”.  
(Cochran-Smith & Lytle 1999, p. 15).  From this perspective, the teacher has access to a 
unique “data set” – namely, his or her own first-hand experiences – which is no less 
valuable than the more objectivized “data” that research normally privileges. 
These theoretical concerns find their echoes in the writing of individual teacher-
researchers.  Wilson (1995), reflecting on her own experiences as a teacher-researcher, 
concludes, “I think learning to do research made me a better teacher.”  And yet, echoing 
the “methods critiques”, Wilson does acknowledge that “the limitation and problems of 
such research deserve critical attention,” adding (in a footnote) in particular the need to 
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ask the questions:  “What are our blind spots, places where our defensive selves make it 
impossible for us to ‘see’ clearly?” (pp. 20-21). 
Ball (2000) discusses teacher research through an analysis of four case studies:  
her own work, and the work of Magdalene Lampert, Ruth Heaton, and Martin Simon.  
Ball argues that such inquiry, which she refers to as “working on the inside” and as “first-
person research”, has struggled to find its place within the larger spectrum of education 
research.  As Ball says in the opening sentence of her essay, such research presents both 
unique benefits and serious pitfalls.  Although Ball does not focus her attention explicitly 
on the problems of bias and subjectivity in such first-person research, her analysis 
suggests that one question that must be asked is, “Can a teacher-researcher accurately 
represent him- or herself after the fact?”  It is difficult enough — perhaps not even fully 
possible — for any researcher to disengage his or her personal feelings and opinions 
when observing teaching; how much more so is it difficult for the teacher-researcher to 
remain objective when holding the mirror up to his or her own practice?  
Perhaps in response to this tension, teacher-researches have used various 
mechanisms to create distance between their “research selves” and their “teacher selves”.  
Ball recalls how in her own dissertation (Ball 1988), she described a teaching episode 
from her classroom, in which she described herself throughout as “the teacher” without 
ever identifying the lesson as her own experience: 
The description of the lesson continues for almost four pages, with 
detailed account of the discussion, the teacher’s moves, and the children’s 
work.  The section ends with a commentary on the mathematics lesson, 
but nowhere do I reveal that I am using my own practice as a source for 
understanding the nature of teaching, that I am “the teacher”.  (p. 372) 
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Such third-person masking is a strategy for coping with the conflicts that are 
intrinsic to the dual role of the teacher-researcher.  Ball is not alone in her use of third-
person masking; to take another example, Steffe (2004) includes a detailed analysis of a 
teaching experiment, in which “the teacher” is referred to throughout in the third person; 
a reader might read the entire paper and never come to the realization that “the teacher” 
is, in fact, Steffe, the author. 
A fascinating variation on this strategy is employed by Heaton (1994).  As Ball 
describes Heaton’s own dissertation research, “Heaton invented a methodological 
strategy that afforded her separation from herself by using different voices to represent 
different points on her trajectory:  Ruth 1, the self that was doing the teaching at the time; 
Ruth 2, the self that was reflecting on that teaching at the time; and Ruth 3, the self that 
made sense 3 years later of the teaching she did during that year.”   This artifice, the 
trifurcation of the self into multiple personae, helps to signal the various roles that a 
single individual may play.  It would be overreaching to claim that this tactic, or other 
uses of the third-person masking strategy, actually solves the problems of bias and 
subjectivity; rather it attempts to ameliorate those problems by flagging them and making 
them explicit. 
My introduction of the construct “implied teacher” can be regarded as another 
instance of third-person masking.  In my view, however, the implied teacher (and his 
opposite number, the implied student) are not “masks” for the empirical teacher and 
student; they are entirely independent constructs with a (hypothetical) life entirely their 
own.  As I seek to describe the intentions and values of the implied teacher, it is 
important for me to stress that no claims of my own intentions or values as empirical 
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teacher have a role in this analysis.  With the distance of time (some of this teaching 
occurred seven years before the writing of this analysis), in the absence of a journal or 
lesson plans, and with no access to students’ work, it would be impossible to make 
credible claims about what I actually intended or what students actually learned.  The 
most that can be claimed is that the documents themselves imply a certain kind of 
teacher, who in turn anticipated a certain kind of student.  It is to these documents that I 
now turn. 
 
Data sources and methods 
The remainder of this chapter, and the next, are devoted to an analysis of a corpus 
of examination questions that was constructed by a teacher of Honors Geometry in a 
small, private high school in an affluent, suburban Midwestern community in three 
school years between 2001 and 2005.  The corpus of questions is, as will be shown, 
unusual in a number of respects.  In part because of the small size and young age of the 
institution at the time (the school began operations with only 52 students in the year 
2000), and in part because in each year there was only a single Honors Geometry class, 
the teacher was given nearly complete freedom to develop his curriculum as he saw fit, 
without regard to any external mandates — although there was a preselected textbook 
(Larson, Boswell, & Stiff, 2001). This freedom is significant, in light of the fact that the 
teachers in the ThEMaT study groups (see Chapter 3) frequently cited institutional 
constraints as reasons why it is not viable for them to hold students accountable for 
learning the mathematical dispositions:  it suggests that in this class the possibility, at 
least, may have existed to cultivate in students the elements of a mathematical sensibility. 
 
 202 
 
The corpus at many timescales 
Instruction is a complex phenomenon that can be examined over many different 
timescales (Lemke 2000):  the task, the lesson, the unit, the year, and so on.  Each 
timescale brings different information to light and allows asking different questions.  In 
the present study, I analyze the corpus of assessment tasks at four different scales: 
(i) The scale of the individual item, as it might be encountered by a single 
student, one at a time.  How does the individual item represent an opportunity 
to learn elements of the mathematical rationality? 
(ii) The scale of an entire assessment.  Students do not encounter assessment 
items singly, but in the form of quizzes, tests, or projects that typically bundle 
many questions together.  Each such bundle is located at a particular point in 
the trajectory of the school year, and there are certain descriptive features that 
are associated to the assessment as a whole:  How many questions did it have?  
How much time did students have to work on it?  What resources (notes, 
calculators, etc.), if any, did students have access to?  A description of the 
corpus at this level will allow us to see if there are any long-term changes in 
the basic accountability structure of assessments in the corpus. 
(iii) The scale of the single year.  Within each year, there may be certain items that 
refer explicitly back to problems on earlier assessments, or hint at problems 
that may appear on future ones.  Such “item chains” create textual cohesion 
(Halliday & Hasan 1976) across the year.  Cohesion of this sort helps justify 
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the stance that a full year’s set of examinations constitutes a single “text” with 
a coherent implied teacher and implied student. 
(iv) The scale of the full corpus.  Many questions from the first year of the corpus 
reoccur with little or no change in the second and third years, while others 
undergo modifications or drop out entirely.  Thinking of the history of a single 
item as it evolves from year to year helps to foreground the way in which the 
teacher’s initial intentions were shaped and redirected by experience.  From 
this perspective, the appropriate unit of analysis is not the individual item or 
the item thread, but rather an equivalence class of variant versions of a single 
question across the three-year corpus; I will refer to this as an item class.  
Cohesion across item classes realize the coherence of the implied teacher: the 
repetition of items (with or without alterations) serves to enable the 
identification of two tests in different years as nevertheless “the same” in 
some sense.  (This cohesion is not visible to the implied student, because a 
successful student would not return to take the exams again in subsequent 
years).  Examining item classes also provides some (admittedly indirect) 
evidence for how well the enacted curriculum aligned with the teacher’s 
intentions in a given year, in that changes within a class can be regarded as 
adaptations, and questions that are stable across multiple years can be 
regarded as “successful” from the point of view of the teacher. 
These different grainsizes are represented schematically in Fig. 4.4, which 
represents the corpus at different scales.  In Fig. 4.4, the dark horizontal regions represent 
the three years of the corpus; within each year, the white rounded rectangles represent 
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assessments, and the small dark circles represent individual assessment items.  The dark 
horizontal arrows linking each assessment to the next signifies the evolution of the corpus 
as it is experienced by the implied teacher (for whom each new assessment constitutes an 
opportunity to deploy lessons learned in the previous); the thin jagged lines linking items 
within a single year represent ideational cohesion from the perspective of the student in a 
single given year; and the vertical lines represent item classes. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4.  The corpus at many timescales. 
 
One fairly coarse-grained way of representing the corpus is with a table, as in Fig. 
4.5.  This view of the data tells us nothing about the content of the individual questions, 
but does give some sense of the size and arrangement of the corpus, and certain large-
scale patterns are already evident.  Reading across the rows, we can note that the number 
of questions per exam consistently declined over the three-year history of the archive.  
Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment
Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment
Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment
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Additionally, the scope of the material covered drops from year to year.  Moreover, the 
use of take-home problems as part of an examination — introduced in Year 2 solely for 
the midterm and final exam — becomes, in Year 3, part of the normal characteristics for 
an exam.  Most strikingly, the use of regular chapter exams seems to have disintegrated 
entirely by the middle of Year 3.  These phenomena will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
 
 Number of items 
 Y1 (01-02) Y2 (03-04) Y3 (04-05)
(i) 
Chapter 1 22 17 14 
Chapter 2 18 17 17 
Chapter 3 17 14 12 
Chapter 4 12
 
8 8 
(iii) 
Chapter 5 
(ii) 
11 12 
(iii) 
Midterm 31 10 
(iii) 
9 
(iii) 
Chapter 6 15 11 
 
Chapter 7 
(ii) (ii) (iv) 
Chapter 8 15 10 
(ii) 
Chapter 9 11 
(ii)
 
(ii) 
Chapter 10 18 
(ii) (ii) 
Chapter 11 7 
(iv) (iv)
 
Chapter 12 
(ii) (iv)
 
(iv)
 
Final exam 27 18 
(iii) 
21 
(iii) 
 
Figure 4.5.  An overview of the corpus. 
Notes.  
(i) 
The exams for chapters 1, 2 and 3 in Year 3 each came in two versions(designated A and B) that 
differed only superficially (e.g. different sequences of problems, different numbers and equations, etc.).  To 
avoid double-counting these items, only the Version A items were analyzed.  
(ii)
No exam given; material 
from this chapter was included on a subsequent exam.  
(iii)  
Included a significant take-home component.  
(iv) 
 
Material not covered in this year. 
 
Individual Items 
A relational database containing the text and relevant images for each assessment 
item, along with metadata locating the item in the overall corpus, was created using 
Filemaker Pro database software.  In transforming the corpus into a database, it was 
 
 206 
necessary to give some consideration to the question of what constitutes an individual 
item.  As is customary on assessments, each examination question is prefaced with a 
number indicating its sequence in the test; thus we speak of Question #1, Question #2, 
etc.  This enumeration creates a default division of the corpus into individual items.   
However, a difficulty emerges when we consider questions with multiple parts.  Should 
such a question be entered as a single item, or should each of its constituent parts be 
entered as a separate item? 
As an operational decision, I used the following criterion:  If the separate parts of 
a question were independent of one another (i.e. if they could be done in any order and 
with any possible combination of correct and incorrect responses), then each part was 
entered into the database as a separate item.  On the other hand, if any of the parts of a 
question required the result of an earlier part, then all parts of the question were coded as 
a single unit.  This criterion is illustrated by the two multi-part problems in Fig. 4.6.  In 
the multi-part problem of Fig. 4.6a, parts (a) and (b) are entirely independent of one 
another.  In contrast, Fig. 4.6b shows a multi-part problem in which there is dependence:  
specifically, parts (b) and (c) cannot be answered without first solving part (a), and any 
errors made in a solution to part (a) would propagate through the solution to the rest of 
the problem.   In one case, four questions from the Year 1 midterm exam (specifically 
#26-29), although numbered as separate items on the assessment itself, were nevertheless 
entered into the database as a single item because the latter questions could not be solved 
without the result of earlier ones.  (Significantly, this same set of questions reappeared on 
subsequent years’ midterm exams, reformatted as a single, multi-part question.) 
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A center pivot irrigation system uses a 
fixed water supply to water a circular 
region of a field.  The radius of the 
watering system is 560 feet long. 
 
(a)  If some workers walked around the 
circumference of the watered region, how 
far would they have to walk?  Round to the 
nearest foot. 
 
(b) Find the area of the region watered.  
Round to the nearest square foot. 
Triangle ABC has vertices at A(0,0), B(3,4), 
and C(5,0). 
 
(a)  Find AB, AC, and BC. 
 
(b)  What is the perimeter of triangle ABC? 
 
(c)  What is the area of triangle ABC? 
 
(a)  A multi-part question coded as two 
independent items. 
(b)  A multi-part question coded as a single 
item. 
Figure 4.6.  Examples of multi-part questions in the assessment items corpus.  
 
Based on this criterion above the corpus consists of 405 individual items, with 
193 items in Year 1, 112 items in Year 2, and  96 items in Year 3.  In the Findings section 
below, selected individual items will be presented with an accompanying analysis of how 
they might be solved, and how those solutions inform the question of what students were 
held accountable for.  Such an analysis is in the spirit of Simon’s (1975) analysis of the 
Tower of Hanoi problem, or Goldin’s (1992) analysis of the way variations of a single 
question can hold students accountable for different knowledge (see the discussion of 
Table 1 earlier in this chapter).  The size of the corpus, however, makes it impractical to 
analyze every item in this fashion; an analysis of the corpus requires the aggregation of 
items into classes, and the development of some systematic method of coding the classes. 
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Item Classes and Codes 
Within the database, each item from Year 2 and Year 3 was identified as either 
new or a repetition (or adaptation) of a problem from a previous year. This led to the 
partitioning of the 405 items into 239 distinct item classes, each of which is an 
equivalence class of problems from different years. (To be clear, problems that repeated 
within a single year  — for example, a question on a midterm exam that nearly replicates 
a question from a previous chapter exam — were not identified as part of the same item 
class.)  The determination that two items belong to the same item class was made by 
identifying re-used words and phrases, the overt goal of the problem (i.e. what students 
were supposed to do or produce), as well as textual cues such as the placement of the 
item relative to the assessment as a whole.  Item classes will function as the principal unit 
of analysis in Chapter 5, which documents adaptation in the corpus over time.  In the 
present chapter, however, I examine the corpus at the level of the individual item, in 
order to quantify the extent to which the various mathematical dispositions can be found 
in the assessments.  For this purpose, it is necessary to develop and deploy a set of codes 
for the assessment items. 
Researchers have employed various classification schemes for coding tasks.  For 
example, Caldwell & Goldin (1987) classified word problems according to two 
independent axes (abstract/concrete and hypothetical/factual), thus identifying each word 
problem as belonging to one of four categories.  Stigler et al (1986), also working in the 
context of word problems, used the framework of Carpenter & Moser (1982, 1984) to 
classify textbook problems into 20 categories according to the natural methods by which 
they could be solved.  More recently, Li (2000) compared the kinds of problems U.S. and 
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Chinese textbooks include in lessons on adding and subtracting signed integers.  Li 
analyzes these tasks along three independent axes:  mathematical features (does the 
solution require single or multiple computations?), contextual features (is the problem 
purely mathematical, or does it contain illustrative content?) and performance 
requirements (what type of response is called for, what is the cognitive requirement?).  
Mesa (2004), in a study of functions, draws on the construct of conception developed by 
Balacheff and Gaudin (2002) to code each task in her sample with a quadruplet 
P,R,L,!( ) , where P is a set of problems, R is a set of operators, L is a representation 
system, and ! is a control structure.  This results in an extremely subtle and sophisticated 
coding protocol that allows for a careful mapping of the concept space in a large corpus. 
For this study, in order to describe the role these items play in creating an 
opportunity to learn the mathematical rationality, the items were coded with a set of 16 
descriptors based on the mathematical dispositions identified in previous chapters.  A list 
of these descriptors is found in Fig. 4.7.  The first 12 descriptors correspond directly to 
dialectical pairs of dispositions that were described in Chapter 2.  The four additional 
descriptors were employed to try to identify items that constitute an opportunity for 
students to experience an encounter with the unknown — to wonder about what is true, 
rather than to prove or disprove claims that are already identified as such.  For example, 
items that were coded for Existence focus on the issue of whether a certain kind of object, 
or an object with a certain combination of properties, could exist. Converse was used to 
identify those items which foregrounded the question of whether the converse of a 
property was true.  FindHyp4Con (an abbreviation for “find hypotheses for a 
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conclusion”) and FindCon4Hyp (“find conclusions for hypotheses”) described items that 
foreground the conditional relationships among contingent possibilities. 
Generalize Specialize 
Utility Abstraction 
Surprise Confirmation 
TheoryBldg ProblemSolving 
Simplicity Complexity 
Formalism Platonism 
Existence  
Converse  
FindHyp4Con Find Con4Hyp 
  
Fig. 4.7.  Descriptors used to code assessment items. 
 
In general, items were coded after specific descriptors if there was evidence in the 
text or diagram that the disposition was of some salience.  Before describing the codes in 
more detail, it is helpful to anticipate how, exactly, such salience can manifest.  Recalling 
the two motivating examples from the beginning of this chapter, I observe that there are 
at least two ways in which a disposition might be salient for a student working on a 
particular task:  the disposition might be explicitly marked in the wording of a problem or 
in accompanying commentary, or it might be implicit in the work that students are 
expected to do to solve a problem.  Consider the two problems shown in Fig. 4.8.  The 
first of these (4.8a) calls explicitly for an investigation of whether a particular property, 
proved for one set of hypotheses, generalizes to a larger class of hypotheses: the word 
“generalize” is a marker of the salience of the disposition Generalization for this 
problem.  This problem not only holds students accountable for being able to generalize; 
as a speech act (Searle, 1975), it also signals to students that generalization is something 
important, something one should care about.  The second problem (4.8b) likewise calls 
for a generalization, but in a very different manner.  No explicit marker signals the value 
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of generality or calls students’ attention to the fact that they are engaged in an act of 
generalization.  And in fact it is possible that a student might actually attempt to solve the 
problem in 8b directly, by drawing a 22-sided polygon and attempting to draw and count 
all of its diagonals.  However, as with the Possible Parallel Lines problem (Fig. 4.2), the 
unwieldiness of such a solution, and the likelihood of error, imposes a penalty on those 
students who avoid generalization, while the relative simplicity of a generalization-based 
solution strategy rewards those who have learned to deploy this key mathematical 
disposition. 
 
In class we proved that the sum of the 
interior angles of any convex polygon is 
 
180 n ! 2( ).  Does this generalize to non-
convex polygons?  Give an argument for, 
or against, your answer. 
In this question, we will investigate how 
many diagonals a polygon has. 
• Draw diagrams of polygons with 3, 4, 
5, and 6 sides, and fill in the following 
table. 
N (# of sides) d (# of diags) 
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
 
• How many diagonals does a 22-sided 
polygon have? 
 
8a 
 
8b 
Figure 4.8.  Two tasks that call for generalization. 
 
In order to code the assessment items, I adapt notions taken from Doyle (1988) and 
Herbst (2006).  Doyle (1988) defines an academic task  in terms of four components:  (1) 
a product to be generated by students, (2) operations students may use to produce the 
product, (3) resources supplied by the teacher, and (4) a weight that indicates the relative 
significance of the task in the accountability system of the class.  To these four 
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components, Herbst (2006) adds  two important perspectives.  First, Herbst attends to the 
temporal nature of student work — to the way in which a problem does not only specifies 
operations and resources but also, implicitly, the unfolding of those operations over time.  
Within this observation in mind, Herbst distinguishes between the “problem” (the 
specification of a goal and the provision of resources by the teacher) and the “task” (the 
universe of potential solution paths, modeled as the execution of a sequence of operations 
over time).  Second, Herbst introduces the notion of instructional situation, a conceptual 
frame that participants “use to know who has to do what and when, so that whatever they 
do can be used to claim the fulfillment of their contractual obligations” (p. 316).   In the 
Geometry class, for example, “Doing proofs” is one instructional situation, and 
“Installing theorems” is another (Herbst & Brach, 2006; Herbst & Miyakawa, 2008).  A 
single problem may, in two different instructional situations, call for entirely different 
kinds of student work.  Thus understanding the meaning potential of a task requires not 
only an examination of Doyle’s four components, but also an anticipation of how the task 
might be deployed over time, and how that deployment is mediated by the instructional 
situation in which the task is located. 
My discussion above suggests the significance of another (potential) component of a 
task, as exemplified by the commentary embedded within Figure 4.8(a).  This 
commentary, explicitly marking one or more mathematical dispositions, provides a kind 
of framing distinct from the instructional situation Herbst considers:  that is, it provides a 
conceptual frame for telling the student why a task is worth doing relative to a set of 
values that are not necessarily instantiated by obligations in the didactical contract.  
That is, a student attempting to solve the problem in Figure 4.8(a) will probably not be 
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helped in that work by the knowledge that the problem can be framed as a 
“generalization”; nor does labeling the problem as such tell the student much about what 
he or she is accountable for doing (that information is found elsewhere in the statement of 
the task).  But framing the problem as a “generalization” tells the student why, from a 
mathematical point of view, the problem is worth doing. 
Thus every problem in the exam items corpus can be described in terms of the 
following five components:  
• The goal to be produced (e.g., the result of a calculation to be performed, a proof 
to be written, a yes / no question to be answered) 
• The resources provided to the student in and through the text.  These include 
diagrams, hints, scaffolding (e.g. breaking a complex problem down into distinct 
parts to be answered in sequence), etc. 
• Framing of the problem.  This is an articulation of the importance of the problem, 
or why the problem is worth doing.  This can be found in the form of 
commentary, as in the example of Figure 4.8a, but also through the use of words 
or phrases that are not strictly necessary for stating the goal, as in the example of 
Figure 4.1 at the beginning of this chapter. 
• Stakes of the problem.  How many “points” does a successful solution to the 
problem earn the student?  Problems worth more points have higher stakes than a 
problem worth fewer points.  The designation of some problems as “Extra Credit” 
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also marks them as lower stakes, in that not all students are expected or required 
to complete those.
27
 
• The solution space of the problem.  For each problem, I considered different sets 
of operations that a student might perform to reach a correct solution, as well as 
operations that might lead to solutions that are incorrect but plausible-seeming. 
 
I examined the framing and the resources for each item for words or phrases that 
could mark one or more of the categories of appreciation; additionally I considered the 
solution space of the problem to see whether an application of one or more of the 
generative moves (categories of perception) would be particularly useful in solving it.  
(Other aspects of the item, such as other resources and the stakes, will be used in Chapter 
5 in my study of item evolution over the three-year corpus.)  Based on these 
considerations I applied descriptors both to tasks that mark a disposition explicitly, as 
well as those for which there is a preferred solution method that makes use of one or 
more of those dispositions. 
Coding the 405 items in the corpus requires some clearly articulated criteria for 
when to employ each of the 16 descriptors.  First, the descriptors are independent and 
non-mutually exclusive; any individual item can be coded after any combination of 
descriptors, or after none of them.  A single item can also be coded with both members of 
                                                
27
 Note that “Stakes” emcompasses but is somewhat more general than Doyle’s 
notion of “Weight”.  A 10-point “mandatory” problem and a 10-point “extra credit” 
problem on the same test have the same weight — a student who does the former but not 
the latter earns the same grade as a student who does the latter but not the former — but 
nevertheless the stakes are different; students are “supposed to know” how to solve the 
mandatory problem, whereas they are not “supposed to know” how to solve the extra 
credit problem. 
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a single dialectical pair of dispositions.  I describe next the criteria used for each of the 
descriptors. 
As illustrated above,  the descriptor Generalize was applied to any item that 
signals the mathematical value of generalizing results or questions.  This signaling can be 
explicit in the wording of the problem (e.g. marked by the word “generalize” or phrases 
such as “in general”), or implicit in one of the likely methods of solution (e.g., a problem 
that can be solved using multiple methods, but for which the approaches that avoid 
generalization carry some penalty in the form of additional difficulty or likelihood of 
error).  Note that neither the proof of a generalization, nor an explicit statement of the 
generalization in some general form, need be present (cf. Fig. 4.8b).  The same criteria 
were used for the descriptor Specialize. 
In the case of the second dialectical pair (Utility / Abstraction), any problem that 
placed mathematical knowledge in a purportedly “real-world” context (however 
contrived) was coded with Utility, because the use of such a context implies that the 
teacher sees value in the role that geometry can play in solving real-world problems, or 
perhaps that the teacher anticipates his students to see such value — in other words that 
Utility is an appropriate category with which to appraise the mathematical content of a 
question.  On the other hand, the mere absence of such a real-world context does not, in 
itself, warrant the use of the keyword Abstraction:  this latter was only used when the 
problem calls attention directly to something that is impossible (or seems impossible) to 
experience directly in the “real world” — for example, references to the idealized “zero 
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thickness” of lines, or to processes or objects that go on “forever”, or to geometry in more 
than three dimensions, or to non-Euclidean geometry, etc
28
. 
The dispositions of Surprise and Confirmation, as described in the previous 
chapters, are ways of framing results that either confirm or disconfirm previously-held 
beliefs.  For this reason, these codes were only used when the text of a problem made 
explicit reference to conjectures and/or claims made at a moment that is prior to, and 
disjoint from, the moment at which the claim or conjecture is definitively settled.  This 
could be done in a retrospective fashion (“In class I claimed that….   Now let’s do a 
proof of it.”) or in a prospective fashion (“Make a conjecture about….  In the next 
chapter, we will see if this conjecture is true.”)  Questions of this nature signal to students 
the value of revisiting previously-held but unconfirmed beliefs to determine 
unequivocally whether or not they are true. 
The Theory-Building descriptor was used for items that call attention to the status 
of, and relationships among, the elements of a theory.  For example, problems that call 
for students to use, or avoid, a particular theorem in order to prove another theorem 
signal that not only the postulates and theorems themselves, but also their independence, 
dependence, and equivalence, is something important to care about.  The descriptor 
ProblemSolving was used for problems that call attention explicitly to a particular 
method
29
; for example, “What would you need to know in order to prove these triangles 
                                                
28
 It is true that non-Euclidean and higher-dimensional geometries have enormous 
real-world utility, and in principle could be appraised as such; but for a student who does 
not know of those applications, it is likely that such contexts appear to be interesting (if at 
all) precisely because of their seeming removal from the real world. 
29
 In Chapter 3, I claimed that problem-solving is a default (unmarked) disposition 
for the Geometry course, and in fact if every problem that called for the use of some 
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congruent by SAS?”, or “Use the distance formula to show that the two segments are 
congruent.”  Likewise, the codes for Simplicity and Complexity were applied to items that 
explicitly labeled a piece of mathematics as simple (e.g. with an instruction like 
“Simplify your answer as much as possible”) or as complex (as might be conveyed 
through a reference to “the complicated diagram below”). 
With respect to the pair of descriptors Formalism and Platonism, the former code 
was applied to any task that could be solved by ignoring all or part of the semantic 
content of the problem, and focusing instead on its syntactic structure.  This might occur, 
for example, when a problem uses words or phrases for which there is no shared meaning 
— nonsense words, or terminology that students are not expected to understand — but 
which can be treated as “placeholders” and manipulated in a purely formal sense.  It also 
can occur when the problem can be solved by relying solely on notational conventions 
and ignoring other sources of meaning (such as diagrams and/or numerical 
measurements).   In contrast, the code for Platonism would be applied only in cases 
where some reference is made to a “real object” that exists independently of its 
representations.  Such a reference must be explicit; otherwise any task that is 
accompanied by a diagram and a statement about the properties of the object represented 
would be coded for Platonism, and this would drown out the phenomenon we are 
attempting to document.  As in the case of the other dispositions, the question here is 
whether the assessment items constitute an opportunity for the teacher to communicate to 
                                                
problem-solving method had been identified as such, it is likely that the entire corpus 
would have been coded with this descriptor.  For the purposes of the present chapter, I 
coded only those items that make explicit reference to a problem-solving method. 
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students a Platonist view of mathematics, or to hold students accountable for learning to 
view mathematics in such a way. 
The criteria for applying the final four codes — Existence, Converse, 
FindHyp4Con and FindCon4Hyp — are relatively straightforward.  Existence was used 
to mark those problems that ask a question of the form “Does ___ exist?” or “Can there 
be a ____?”.  Converse was used for any problem that foregrounded the difference 
between a conditional statement and its converse (such foregrounding does not 
necessarily require the use of the word “converse”). FindCon4Hyp and FindHyp4Con 
were used whenever a set of properties was specified, and students were asked to find 
either necessary or sufficient conditions for the given properties. 
In order to determine reliability, a subset of 40 items (10% of the total corpus) 
was coded independently by a colleague using the same guidelines detailed above.  For 
each of the dispositions, the number of disagreements was tallied, and an inter-rater 
reliability calculated as (number of agreement) / 40.  Figure 4.9 summarizes the results. 
Disposition Inter-rater reliability 
Generalize 85.0% 
Specialize 77.5% 
Utility 85.0% 
Abstraction 100.0% 
Surprise 100.0% 
Confirmation 100.0% 
TheoryBldg 92.5% 
ProblemSolving 95.0% 
Complexity 97.5% 
Simplicity 95.0% 
Formalism 90.0% 
Platonism 100.0% 
FindCon4Hyp 37.5% 
FindHyp4Con 97.5% 
Converse 100.0% 
Existence 92.5% 
  
Figure 4.9.  Reliability of coding per disposition. 
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The extremely low reliability of FindCon4Hyp appears to have been the result of 
providing the colleague with an overly-broad description of that code; in 24 of those 25 
disagreements regarding FindCon4Hyp, the colleague had marked the code and I did not.  
For that reason the results reported in the next section are, if anything, an underestimate 
of the presence of the dispositions in the data.  The overall inter-rater reliability across all 
codes was found to be 90.5%. 
 
Findings 
Statistical profile of items 
Because each item could be coded after more than one descriptor, or none at all, a 
first question to ask of the data is to what extent the codes were applicable at all.  How 
many items received codes?  How many received more than one code?  Figure 4.10  
summarizes the data by showing, for various values of n, the number of item classes that 
received n codes.  It is perhaps worth noticing that slightly more than 61% of all items 
were not coded after any of the descriptors at all; of the 405 items in the data, only 155 
were coded after one or more of the descriptors.    On the other hand, a total of 265 codes 
were assigned throughout the corpus, a “density” of roughly 2 codes for every 3 item 
classes.  If we restrict our attention only to those items that received codes, we find an 
average of 1.71 codes per item; and if we restrict our attention still further by discarding 
as outliers the four items with more than 5 codes each, we still find an average of 1.54 
codes per item. 
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N Items receiving n codes % items receiving n codes (of N=405 total) 
0 250 61.7% 
"1 155 38.3% 
1 82 20.2% 
2 61 15.1% 
3 4 1.0% 
4 3 0.7% 
5 1 0.2% 
7 2 0.5% 
9 2 0.5% 
Figure 4.10  Number of codes assigned to items. 
 
Overall the impression given here is of a collection of assessment items that 
accords a substantial role to the dispositions coded for.  In order to gain a sense of 
whether or not this role is unusually large, it is necessary to seek comparative data from 
an analogous corpus of assessment items.  For this purpose, I applied the same coding 
protocols to the “Chapter Tests” printed at the end of each chapter in the textbook by 
Larson, Boswell & Stiff (2000).  This book, which was the assigned text in all three years 
of the Honors Geometry course from which the assessments item corpus was drawn, 
represents a normative set of expectations for students in the course; the degree to which 
the assessment items corpus departs from that normative set of expectations is what needs 
to be measured.  And indeed the difference is pronounced:  of the 229 items contained in 
the 12 chapter tests in that text, only 38 were coded with one of the descriptors (about 
16.5%, less than half the density in the assessment items corpus), and no items were 
coded with more than one descriptor.  For additional corroboration, we can look back to 
the analysis done in Chapter 3, in which it was shown that geometry teachers gathered in 
study groups reported that they generally do not hold their students accountable for work 
that could exemplify many of the dispositions.  Figure 4.10 suggests that, in this respect, 
the teaching implied by the assessment items differs substantially from what is normal in 
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the teaching of Geometry, as evidenced by the textbook and as revealed in the records of 
those study groups. 
Figure 4.11 breaks the data down by descriptor and shows the number of items 
identified with each.  As can be seen, two of the codes most frequently assigned to items 
are Formalism and Theory Building, while the dialectical partners of these (Problem-
Solving and Platonism) are among the least commonly assigned codes.  For comparison, 
Figure 4.11 also shows the comparable data from the coding of the chapter tests in the 
textbook. 
Descriptor 
# of items in corpus 
(N = 405) 
# of items in textbook 
(N = 229) 
   
Generalize 19 (4.7%) 1 (0.3%) 
Specialize 13 (3.2%) 0 
Utility 19 (4.7%) 27 (6.7%) 
Abstraction 5 (1.2%) 0 
Surprise 5 (1.2%) 0 
Confirmation 10 (2.5%) 0 
Theory-Building 28 (6.9%) 1 (0.3%) 
Problem-Solving 5 (1.2%) 0 
Simplicity 2 (0.5%) 0 
Complexity 4 (1.0%) 0 
Formalism 33 (8.2%) 0 
Platonism 0 0 
Existence 33 (8.2%)
 
0 
Converse 24 (5.9%) 4 (1.0%) 
FindHyp4Con 13 (3.2%) 0 
FindCon4Hyp 52 (12.8%) 5 (1.2%) 
   
Figure 4.11.  Number of items coded with each descriptor. 
 
On the basis of these results a few observations can be made.  First, it is clear that 
the assessment items in the corpus make use of different textual strategies than do the 
comparable items from the textbook chapter tests; that is, they presume a different set of 
competencies from the student, and imply a different set of intentions on the part of the 
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teacher.  In particular it is clear that the items in the corpus allocate a significant role for 
the mathematical dispositions.  On the other hand it must be noted that not all of the 
dispositions are equally well-represented here:  the relative rarity of items coded for 
Simplicity and Complexity is noteworthy.  In the next several pages I turn to a more 
detailed discussion of some of the codes.  For each of the codes discussed, I will provide 
examples of items from the corpus that were coded with the descriptor. 
 
Generalize and Specialize 
25 items were coded as exhibiting the dispositions of generalization, 
specialization, or both.  Figure 4.12 shows two items from such classes.  The item in 
Figure 4.12a calls for students to prove a property that is true of all triangles —  a 
relationship among the orthocenter, circumcenter and centroid — in a special case for 
which the proof is particularly easy.  In this sense it resembles the first motivating 
example from the beginning of this chapter, in which a general claim that had been 
previously made in class is to be proven in a special case. 
Figure 4.12b contains two items that were coded independently in the database 
because they could have been solved in either order.  The student, however, would have 
encountered these two items on an exam in the form of a single, two-part problem, and 
the default for such a student would have been to solve them in sequence.  Thus the 
implied student would have found the value of each angle in an equiangular 
dodecahedron, and then generalized the result to find a formula expressed in terms of the 
parameter n. 
 
[Year 3, Unit 5 exam, #1] [Year 3, Ch. 3 exam, #9a] 
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Draw a right triangle.  Where, exactly, is the 
orthocenter?  Where, exactly, is the 
circumcenter?  Prove that, in the special case of 
a right triangle, the orthocenter, circumcenter, 
and centroid are collinear, with the distance 
from the orthocenter to the centroid exactly 
twice the distance from the centroid to the 
circumcenter. 
A dodecagon is a 12-sided figure. In an 
equiangular dodecagon, what is the measure of 
each angle? 
 
[Year 3, Ch.  Exam, #9b] 
Find a formula for the measure of each angle in 
an equiangular n-sided polygon. 
 
(a) An item from Year 1, coded for 
Specialize. 
(b) Two items from Year 3; the second was 
coded for Generalize. 
 
Figure 4.12.  Problems coded for (a) Specialize and (b) Generalize. 
 
 
The first of these two tasks holds the student accountable for knowing how to find the 
sum of the angles in any polygon:  such an implied student would find the indicated sum, 
and divide the result by 12. The fact that the second item reads “Find a formula...” 
implies that students are not expected his students to recall such a formula but to derive 
one.  This second item was coded with the descriptor Generalize because in order to 
solve it, a student would repeat the calculations performed on the earlier item, operating 
on n in the same way that he had previously operated on 12.  Notice that while the 
question in Figure 4.12a refers explicitly to specialization, the second item in Figure 
4.12b only implicitly calls for a generalization. 
One might ask whether the items in Figure 4.12 were “typical” of the items in the 
corpus.  In this connection it is worth noting that both of the items in Figure 4.12 
appeared for the first time in Year 3.  Thus all three of the items might be considered 
“singletons”, i.e. items that belong to classes with no other members.  On the other hand, 
the item in Figure 4.13 (below) appeared on an exam in Year 1 and re-appeared, with no 
modifications, in Year 2.  In this item, students are expected to recognize that a method 
for constructing a parallelogram actually results in a rectangle; the presence of the phrase 
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“special parallelogram” signals that a special case is under consideration.  Note that this 
problem does not call for students to perform a specialization, but merely to recognize 
one. 
 
Consider the following method for constructing a parallelogram: 
 
What kind of “special parallelogram” results?  Prove your answer. 
Figure 4.13.  A problem coded for Specialize. 
 
Utility and Abstraction 
The corpus contained 24 items that were coded after one or both of the pair of 
dispositions Utility and Abstraction.  As was briefly stated above, items were coded for 
Utility if they contained any kind of real-world context, no matter how contrived or 
artificial, on the grounds that the presence of such a context at all constituted an implicit 
endorsement of the value of utilitarian mathematics.  (Recall that the word “utility” is 
here restricted to refer to the usefulness of mathematics in non-mathematical contexts.)  
Figure 4.14 shows three items from classes that were coded for Utility.  Note the 
variation among them: the first item takes its context from physics, the second from 
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architecture, and the third from a fanciful blend of cartography and super-hero 
criminology
30
.   
When light enters glass, the light 
bends.  When it leaves glass, it 
bends again.  If both sides of a 
pane of glass are parallel, light 
will leave the pane at the same 
angle at which it entered.  (See 
diagram)  Prove that the path of 
the exiting light is parallel to the 
path of the entering light. 
 
The outer wall of Fort 
Jefferson, which was 
originally constructed in the 
mid-1800s, is in the shape of 
a hexagon with an area of 
about 466,170 square feet.  
The length of one side is 
about 477 feet.  The inner 
courtyard is a similar 
hexagon with an area of 
about 446,400 square feet. 
 
(a) What is the ratio of the 
areas of the small hexagon 
to the large hexagon? 
 
(b) What is the scale factor 
of the small hexagon to the 
large hexagon? 
 
(c) How long is a side of the 
inner courtyard? 
When I was a kid I used 
to watch “The 
Superfriends” – kind of a 
dumbed-down version of 
the Justice League.  Here’s 
a typical Superfriends 
scenario:  While the 
heroes are meeting in the 
Hall of Justice, suddenly 
the Troubalert computer 
sounds an alarm:  the 
Legion of Doom has just 
robbed three banks in 
Metropolis! 
 
Batman assumes that the 
Legion of Doom’s secret 
hideout is probably 
equidistant from the three 
crime scenes.  Explain 
how, using only a bat-
compass, bat-
straightedge, and a map, 
they can use the 
techniques of geometry to 
pinpoint the Legion of 
Doom. 
A b c 
Figure 4.14.  Three problems coded for Utility. 
 
In addition to the variation in contexts, each of these three problems holds 
students accountable for learning different kinds of knowledge.  The item in Figure 4.14a 
holds students accountable for knowing how to use properties of one pair of parallel lines 
to prove that another pair of lines is also parallel.  The item in Figure 4.14b holds 
students accountable for understanding the notion of scale factor, and for knowing that 
                                                
30
 It could very well be argued that the context of the item in Fig.14b is no less contrived 
than that of the item in Fig. 14c.  Under what conceivable circumstances would one know 
the area of two hexagonal regions without knowing the lengths of the sides? 
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the ratio of the areas of two similar polygons is the square of their scale factor.  The item 
in Figure 4.14c holds students accountable for knowing that the circumcenter of a triangle 
is equidistant from its three vertices, and that it can be constructed as the intersection of 
the bisectors of any two of the angles in the triangle.  The three items share very little, 
apart from a tacit endorsement of the principle that mathematics can be useful in the “real 
world”. 
The fact that only 19 of the 405 items were coded for Utility makes it clear that 
the default, in this corpus, is for tasks to be presented without a real-world context.  But 
the absence of such a context does not, in and of itself, mean that an item should be coded 
for Abstraction.  The goal of the coding was not to identify problems that are abstract, but 
rather to identify problems that call attention to abstraction as a value.  There were very 
few (only 5) item classes that seemed to do this.  One of them is reproduced in Fig. 4.15.  
It will be immediately noticed that that item is long:  it filled an entire page in its original 
context, and contains more than 300 words of text, nearly twice as many as the three 
items in Fig. 4.14 combined.  Moreover the text contains several markers of the value of 
“abstraction”:  the phrase “in higher-level mathematics”, the reference to “higher 
dimensions”, and the explicit statement that four-dimensional simplices cannot be drawn 
all point to the notion that the notion of simplex is an abstract one, disconnected from the 
world of direct experience. 
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Fig. 4.15.  A problem coded for Abstraction. 
 
One might look at the problem in Fig. 4.15 as an impressive introduction of 
sophisticated mathematical content into the secondary Geometry course — it goes well 
beyond the normal curriculum and beyond the 3
rd
 dimension.  On the other hand, an 
analysis of the task from a student’s perspective leads to a somewhat more reserved 
assessment.  In order to complete the first three rows of the table, the implied student 
need only: 
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• be able to understand the “definitions” (really, examples) of simplices 
• be able to draw a picture of a segment, a triangle, and a tetrahedron 
• be able to count to 6 
With these minimal skills alone, a student could fill in the first three rows, as 
shown below in Fig. 4.16.  In order to complete the table, a student must then (as the 
problem says) use inductive reasoning to make a prediction based on the pattern in the 
first three rows.  There are a number of things a student might do at this point.  The 
pattern in the first column seems evident, and a student might reasonably (and correctly) 
be expected to fill in a “5” for the first cell in the last row of the table (an example of the 
“Generalize” disposition).  A slightly more subtle pattern runs down the diagonals of the 
pattern: a student who sees them might be expected to guess that a “5” goes in the 
second-to-last cell in the bottom row, followed by a “1”.  
 
        
  How many How many How many How many How many  
  0-simplices 1-simplices 2-simplices 3-simplices 4-simplices  
  does it 
contain? 
Does it 
contain? 
Does it 
contain? 
Does it 
contain? 
Does it 
contain? 
 
 1-simplex 2 1     
 2-simplex 3 3 1    
 3-simplex 4 6 4 1   
 4-simplex       
        
Fig. 4.16.  The first three rows of the table from Figure 4.14. 
 
 
But after this, it is unclear what else a student should do.  If the student is familiar 
with Pascal’s Triangle, he or she might be expected to recognize a variation of it here; 
absent such a familiarity, there really is very little a student could be expected to do to fill 
in the remaining two cells correctly.  It is even more difficult to imagine how a student 
might answer part (b) of the item, which calls for a general conjecture about the number 
of k-simplices contained in an n-simplex.  To answer this a student would need to know 
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something about binomial coefficients, or (at the very least) have a familiarity with 
Pascal’s Triangle.  And yet nowhere else on this, or any other exam in the corpus, is there 
any indication that the teacher has taught that content and expects students to know it.  It 
will probably not have escaped the reader’s notice that the whole task is explicitly 
designated an extra credit problem, and thus (almost by definition) cannot be taken as an 
indicator of what the teacher held students accountable for.  Thus while the first few parts 
of the item are more or less trivial (requiring little more on the part of the student than 
visual perception, counting, and pattern recognition), the latter parts of the item appear to 
be aimed at the exceptional students who may have learned some mathematics in an 
outside-of-class experience, for example on a Mathcounts
®
 or other “Mathlete”-type 
activity
31
.  Such students might or might not recall a previously-encountered formula or 
table, but in the event that they do, they are not expected here to do anything with it other 
than recognize and reproduce it.  In summary, despite the fact that this problem appears 
on its surface to introduce students to high-level content, on closer examination it is seen 
to be a marginal example that makes only superficial demands on students’ knowledge.  
It embodies the value of Abstraction — but little else. 
 
Surprise and Confirmation 
Only 5 item classes in the corpus were coded after Confirmation, one of which 
was also coded for Surprise.  It will be remembered that Confirmation, in Chapter 2, was 
used to refer to a positive appraisal of a mathematical result on the grounds that it 
                                                
31
 Mathcounts
®
 is a nation-wide competitive mathematics enrichment program for 
middle-school students (http://mathcounts.org). 
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confirmed something that had long been suspected true, but not yet proven; Surprise was 
used to value results that did the opposite, by disconfirming something that was expected 
to be true.  Both of these dispositions require, as a prerequisite, that open questions be 
allowed to exist for a significant period of time:  if every question is resolved either 
affirmatively or negatively almost immediately when it is raised, there can be neither 
surprises nor confirmation.  In Chapter 3 it was shown that Geometry teachers in the 
ThEMaT Study Group were almost uniformly opposed to leaving questions unresolved 
for extended periods of time, suggesting that Surprise and Confirmation have little place 
in their customary practice; the scarcity of examples in the corpus of assessment items 
suggests that the teacher here is not dissimilar in that respect. 
One of the 5 item classes coded for Confirmation was already discussed above: it 
is the question about the area of the dual of an isosceles trapezoid (see Fig. 4.1 at the 
beginning of this chapter).  Note that that item specifically references the fact that the 
property had been claimed as true but not yet proven, and suggests that to produce a 
proof (at least of the special case) would amount to paying off a kind of debt.  Another 
item coded for Confirmation, also a “singleton” from Year 1, is in Fig. 4.17.  In its length 
and its tone, it is somewhat reminiscent of the simplices problem (Fig. 4.15).   
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Figure 4.17.  An item coded for Confirmation. 
 
I will return to this example later, in my discussion of Problem Solving.  For the present, 
the item in Fig. 4.17 is significant principally for part (g), which asks students to confirm 
(in a special case) a formula that was presented as true, but not proved, in class — much 
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like the problem in Fig. 4.1.  Rather than asking for a proof that something is generally 
true, this item merely asks for confirmation that a particular value, calculated via one 
method, is consistent with a general formula.  Despite this difference, both of these 
problems imply teaching in which it is important that claims not be taken solely on faith 
— and yet also in which confirmation of such claims may be delayed until a later date.  
Very few items in the corpus (only 5) were coded for Surprise, and in fact those 
five items really consist of three item classes:  one item that appeared in Year 1 and again 
(without modifications) in Year 2, one item that appeared in Year 3 only, and one item 
that was the take-home problem from the final exam of both Years 1 and 2.  This take-
home problem is a true outlier in the corpus, both in terms of the number of dispositions 
embedded within it (it was coded with 9 of the 16 available descriptors) and in terms of 
the way in which it violates many of the conventions of assessment.  A fuller account of 
this exercise is given in the next chapter. 
 
Theory Building and Problem Solving 
As Fig. 4.11 shows, 33 items were coded with the descriptor Theory Building, 
making it one of the most commonly-applied codes.  In general an item received this 
descriptor if it made reference to the relationship between two or more theorems, 
postulates, or definitions.  Three examples of such items can be found in Fig. 4.18.  The 
first example (Fig. 4.18a) asks for students to show that any one of the properties of 
parallel lines may be used to prove all of the other properties — in other words to show 
that the designation of one of those properties as a “postulate” and the others as 
“theorems” is an arbitrary matter of convention.  Note that this is very close to the 
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content of the ThEMaT animated classroom scenario “Postulates and Parallel Lines”, 
summarized in the previous chapter.  It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that the members 
of the ThEMaT study group were nearly unanimous in their agreement that they do not 
typically hold students accountable for proving the equivalence of the properties of 
parallel lines; nor do they make questions of the organization of those properties into a 
theory part of the classroom discourse.  In the context of that discussion it is particularly 
interesting that the author of the exams corpus holds students accountable for precisely 
the same content that the study group teachers rejected. 
 
Using any one of Postulate 15 
and Thm. 3.4-3.6, prove any 
other one.  (e.g., you could use 
Corresponding Angles to 
prove Alternate Interior, or 
vice versa.)   You may wish to 
refer to the diagram below.  
Make sure you state what 
you’re trying to prove! 
 
The proof of the Polygon 
Interior Angles Theorem 
is based on the … 
 
(a)  Alternate Interior 
Angles Theorem 
(b)  Triangle Sum 
Theorem 
(c)   Midpoint Theorem 
(d)  Definition of a 
regular polygon 
Consider the following 
conjecture (this is a 
variation on the Angle 
Bisector Theorem):  “Let 
AOB  by any angle, with 
points A and B equidistant 
from the vertex.  If P is 
any point on the angle 
bisector of  AOB, then P is 
equidistant from A and 
B.” 
 
(a) Draw a sketch 
illustrating this 
conjecture. 
(b) How is this different 
from the “usual” angle 
bisector theorem?  
Explain. 
(c) Is the conjecture true?  
Convince me with 
either a proof or a 
counterexample. 
A b c 
Figure 4.18.  Three problems coded with the descriptor Theory Building. 
 
 The second example of TheoryBldg (Fig. 4.18b) similarly focuses squarely on the 
issue of the relationship between two theorems: the student is expected to know which 
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theorem (or property) was instrumental in proving a second theorem.  Note, though, that 
in this exercise the student is expected merely to identify the relevant theorem from a list 
of candidates; the student is not expected to produce a proof, only to remember the idea 
of it.  The third example (Fig. 4.18c) is significant for the present discussion primarily 
because of the second part of the question, which asks for the student to articulate the 
distinction between two nearly-identical statements, one of which is an established 
theorem while the other is only a conjecture. 
In contrast to the large number of items coded after Theory Building, it is 
noteworthy that only five items were coded for Problem Solving.  As was mentioned 
above, items only received this code if they made explicit reference to a particular  
method of solution.  One such item is the “centroid” problem discussed above (Fig. 4.18).  
Note that this problem takes nearly half of a page to describe a method for locating the 
centroid of a region by breaking it into simpler parts and calculating a weighted average.  
From the emphasis the text lays on the generality of the method, it does appear that the 
teacher is hoping that the students will do more than just solve the problem correctly:  he 
intends for his students to learn some general principles about a particular method of 
problem-solving. 
Another item in the corpus that was coded after Problem Solving was a problem 
that called for a proof that the medians in a triangle are concurrent.  This item (Figure 
4.19) was coded for Problem Solving because the instructions in part (a) stress the need 
for the student to make intelligent strategic choices about such matters as where to put the 
axes and what scale to use. 
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We have proven already that the three medians of a triangle are concurrent.  In this problem, you 
will re-prove the result another way, using a coordinate proof. 
 
a. Draw a triangle in a coordinate system.  Make choices about where to put the origins and 
axes, and choose a scale.  Label the three vertices of your triangle with coordinates. 
b. Find the coordinates of each of the three midpoints of the triangle. 
c. Find the equation of the median from A to the midpoint of  BC. 
d. Find the equation of the median from B to the midpoint of  AC. 
e. Find the equation of the median from C to the midpoint of  AB. 
f. Choose any two of the equations you found in (c)-(e) and solve them. 
g. Now take your solution from (f) and plug it into the unused equation from (c)-(e) to verify 
that it is a solution of all three equations. 
Figure 4.19.  An item coded after Problem Solving. 
 
Formalism and Platonism 
The descriptor Formalism was assigned to 33 items in the corpus, making it one 
of the most common codes. Items were assigned this code if they appeared to give a 
privileged role to reasoning that is based on purely formal properties.  For example, the 
items in Figure 4.20a and 20b both call on students to draw conclusions based solely on 
notational conventions (neither item was accompanied by a diagram).  In 20b, for 
example, a student would be expected to know that the angles and segments in congruent 
triangles correspond to one another according to their position within the notation for the 
triangles.  Thus, even though !ABC  and !CAB  designate the same triangle, the 
assertion that !ABC " !CAB  implies that all three angles are congruent to one another, 
as are all three sides — in other words that the triangle is equilateral.  Because this 
conclusion follows purely from the formal properties of the notation, the item expresses 
the value of Formalism. 
The third example (Fig. 4.20c) differs somewhat.  The significant point about this 
item is that a student could not realistically be expected to know the meaning of the 
theorems referred to — and in fact a footnote printed on the examination explicitly stated 
that students need not worry about understanding the content of the Riemann Conjecture 
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of the Prime Number Theorem.  In order to answer the question accurately, a student 
would need to deliberately ignore the semantics of the problem and focus instead on its 
syntactic properties.  The conclusion follows by pure logic from its premises, even if one 
is entirely ignorant of its meaning; and in fact the student must suppress any attention to 
the meaning of the premises in order to solve the problem.  Put another way, “the 
Riemann Conjecture”, “Prime Number Theorem” and “grows logarithmically...” are mere 
placeholders; recalling Hilbert’s famous joke about the undefined terms in Geometry, 
they may as well be “tables”, “chairs”, and “beer mugs”. 
 
What is the 
intersection of 
 AB
! "!!
 and  BA
! ""
?  
What is their 
union? 
As you know, when 
writing a triangle 
congruence 
statement, the order 
of the letters 
matters.  Suppose 
for three points A, 
B, and C is happens 
to be true that 
!ABC " !CAB .  
What can you 
conclude about 
!ABC  in this case?  
Be as detailed as 
possible. 
The mathematician Riemann proved the 
following theorem (called the Prime 
Number Theorem) in the 19
th
 century: 
 
“If the Riemann Conjecture is true, then 
the number of prime numbers below N 
grows logarithmically with N.”  
 
Suppose a student, working diligently 
and in secret for months, manages to 
prove the Riemann Conjecture to be true.   
 
(a)  Putting this amazing discovery 
together with the Prime Number 
Theorem, what can our student 
conclude? 
(b)  Which logical law (Syllogism or 
Detachment) did you use in 
answering (a)? 
a b c 
Figure 4.20.  Three items coded for Formalism. 
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As was noted earlier, no items in the corpus were coded for Platonism.  This may 
be because the bar was set too high in the coding process:  an item would have been 
coded for Platonism only if it contained some indication that the “thing” under discussion 
possessed some kind of reality that transcended its formal properties.  No such items 
were found; however, this could be taken as an indication that Platonism is in fact the 
default mode for items in the corpus.  Most items in the corpus include a diagram, and 
refer to the diagram as if it were a picture of a real thing; the “reality” of the figure is 
taken for granted, not made explicit. 
 
Existence and Converse 
In Chapter 1, I briefly mentioned the prominent role given to questions of 
existence in the corpus of assessment items, and illustrated that role with a list of 
examples.  Figure 4.11 bears out the claim that such questions play a significant role in 
the corpus; 33 items were coded for Existence, making it one of the most frequently-
assigned codes over the corpus.  Some of those items are shown in Figure 4.21. 
 It will be recalled that the reason for including a code for Existence — which, 
after all, was not a member of one of the six dialectical pairs described in the previous 
two chapters as comprising part of the mathematical sensibility — was to attempt to 
identify those items that place the student in a condition of genuine uncertainty as to what 
is true (the “encounter with the unknown”).  In this connection it is worth noting that, 
while all of the items in Figure 4.21 ask some variation of the question “Does ____ 
exist?”, four of them, (a, c, f, and g) should be answered “No”.  And yet there is little in 
the wording of the items that gives away the fact that the object indicated is impossible; 
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note in particular that items (a) and (b) are phrased using nearly identical wording, as are 
(c) and (d), despite the fact in each of those pairs one of the items describes objects that 
do exist and one describes items that do not. What emerges from these textual strategies 
is an intentio operis of posing questions of existence in a manner sufficiently neutral so 
as not to render the answers to those questions obvious, and an implied student who is 
expected to be capable of navigating in a conceptual domain in which the objects under 
consideration may or may not be possible. 
 
(a) If an angle is bisected into two pieces, can either of the pieces ever be obtuse?  
Justify your answer. 
(b) Is it possible, using only a straightedge and a compass, to construct a 45° angle?  
Describe how in words, and demonstrate below. 
(c) If two lines intersect, can they be non-coplanar?  If you answered ‘yes’, what are 
lines like this called?  (If you answer ‘No’ to the first part, then no further 
explanation is necessary.) 
(d) If two lines are co-planar, can they be non-intersecting?  If so, what are lines like 
this called?  (If you answer ‘No’, then no further explanation is necessary.) 
(e) Can a triangle be both isosceles and obtuse?  If so, draw an example and indicate 
the measure of the three angles.  If not, explain why. 
(f) Is it possible for a regular polygon to have every angle equal to 155°?  If so, how 
many sides must it have?  If not, why not? 
(g) We proved that, in any triangle, there is a point that is equidistant from all three 
sides of the triangle, and that you can construct such a point by bisecting all three 
angles and seeing where they cross.  But we never addressed the “uniqueness 
problem”:  Is it possible that there might be a different point that is not on the 
intersection of the three angle bisectors, but nevertheless is still equidistant from 
all three sides of the triangle?   Decide whether you think this is possible or not.  
If you think it is, give me an example.  If you think it is not, give me a proof. 
Figure 4.21.  Seven items coded for Existence. 
 
Another code used to locate items that place students in an encounter with the 
unknown was Converse.  This code was applied to items that call attention to the fact that 
the truth of a statement and its converse are logically independent of one another (so that 
a resolution of the truth status of one of those propositions does not necessarily help 
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resolve the truth status of the other).  24 item classes were coded with Converse, making 
this one of the more common themes in the items corpus.  Three of them are reproduced 
in Figure 4.22.  The first of those examples makes use of a parenthetical “warning” to call 
the student’s attention explicitly to a consideration of the meaning of “if an only if”
32
.  
The second example offers the student a choice of proving either a theorem or its 
converse — implying, among other things, that a student is accountable for knowing the 
difference between the two.  The third example in that table is more subtle: the proposed 
implication is true in one logical direction (i.e., a rhombus does have perpendicular 
diagonals) but not in the other (a quadrilateral with perpendicular diagonals need not be a 
rhombus).  
When a ray of light reflects off of a mirror, 
the angle of incidence is always equal to 
the angle of reflection.  In the figure at 
right, an incoming light ray r reflects off of 
two mirrors M1 and M2.  Show that the 
outgoing light ray s is parallel to r if and 
only if the two mirrors are parallel to each 
other.  [Before you start working on this 
problem, make sure you understand what 
“if and only if” means.] 
 
 
State and prove either 
the Angle Bisector 
Theorem or its 
converse. 
True or False:  “A 
quadrilateral is a 
rhombus if and only if its 
diagonals are 
perpendicular.”  If true, 
give a proof; if false, 
give a counterexample, 
and correct the statement. 
(a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 4.22.  Three items coded for Converse 
                                                
32
 The reader may have noticed that the item in Table 22a is reminiscent of the 
“refracting light” problem reproduced earlier as Table 14a.  In fact, these two problems 
are members of a single item class.  I will discuss the evolution of this item class in the 
next chapter. 
 
 240 
 
Thus in order to answer the question correctly a student must understand that the two 
directions are independent of one another, be able to identify which implication is true, 
and replace a (false) biconditional statement with a true conditional one. 
The most frequently-assigned code, as Figure 4.11 shows, was FindCon4Hyp.  
This code was used to designate item classes in which a student was expected to find a 
conclusion that could be deduced from specified hypotheses.  As with Existence and 
Converse, the purpose of this code was to identify those problems that cast students into a 
context in which the truth or falsity of the statements at play is not evident.  Many of 
those problems have already been described above.  For example, the items in Figure 
4.21b (introduced to exemplify the Formalism code), and Figure 4.14 (introduced to 
exemplify Specialize) were also coded with FindCon4Hyp.  Figure 4.23 contains some 
additional examples.  The first of these, 4.23a, is similar in spirit to the problem in Fig. 
4.13.  The multi-part item in 4.23b covers fairly elementary material (it was taken from a 
Chapter 1 exam) and yet we can already see emphasis being placed on the 
interrelationship of contingent possibilities (note also that in the second of those parts, 
there is no conclusion that can be drawn from the given information).  The multi-part 
item in Fig. 4.23c calls for the student to make a conclusion from given hypotheses, and 
then to reconsider whether the conclusion would still hold under a weakened set of 
hypotheses — a nearly pure illustration of the generative moves I described in Chapter 2. 
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AC  and BD  
intersect each 
other at N.  
AN ! BN  and 
CN ! DN , but 
AC  and BD  do 
not bisect each 
other.  Draw AC  
and BD  and 
ABCD.  What 
special type of 
quadrilateral is 
ABCD?  Prove 
your answer. 
In questions (a)-(d)    below, answer 
the question if possible; if there is not 
enough information in the question, 
write “not enough information” 
 
(a)  Suppose S is a set of points that 
are non-collinear.  What is the 
minimum number of points in S? 
 
(b) Suppose T is a set of points that 
are collinear.  What is the maximum 
number of points in T? 
 
(c) Suppose R is a set of points that 
are non-coplanar.  What is the 
minimum number of points in R? 
 
(d) Suppose P  is a set of collinear 
points, L is a second set of collinear 
points, and suppose further that P and 
L have one point in common.  Now 
suppose R is a third set containing all 
of the points from both P and L.  Can 
you say anything about R (e.g., is it 
collinear, coplanar, neither)? 
Consider the following 
theorem: 
For coplanar lines m, n, and 
r,  if  m ! r  and n ! r , then 
…………… 
 
(a)  What should be the 
conclusion of this theorem?   
(b)   Prove the theorem.  
You might find it helpful to 
draw a diagram. 
(c)   Do you believe the 
theorem would be still true 
if we deleted the word 
“coplanar”?  Would the 
proof you wrote in (b) still 
work?  (Note, these are two 
different questions.)  Why 
or why not? 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.23.  Examples of items coded with FindCon4Hyp. 
 
The large number of items coded after Existence, Converse, and FindCon4Hyp 
indicates a set of textual strategies that testify to an intention to force students to confront 
situations of doubt and uncertainty.  The “Possible Parallel Lines” problem, introduced as 
the second motivating example at the beginning of this chapter, further exemplified this:  
the two distinct strategies described earlier for solving the problem (the “direct” and 
“indirect” approaches) correspond to different ways of approaching such encounters with 
the unknown. 
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Discussion 
Throughout this chapter I have argued that a corpus of examination items can, in 
some cases, be regarded as a single “text”, and as such is amenable to description in 
terms of its “implied” or “model” author and “mock” or “model” reader — or, as I have 
termed them here, the implied teacher and implied student.  It should be recalled that 
these implied personages are hypothetical constructs, entities whose characteristics we 
infer from what Eco called “textual strategies”.  The value of these constructs is that it 
provides us with a language for speaking of the intention of instructional texts (that is, the 
intentio operis) that is disconnected from claims about the intention of the actual teacher 
(intentio auctoris).  Whether or not the implied teacher and implied student bear any 
close similarity to their “empirical” counterparts is a question that could in principle be 
explored through the use of interviews.  However, for the purpose of the present analysis 
I have adopted the stance of the “new criticism” literary school (Ransom, 1941; Wimsatt 
& Beardsley, 1946/1999), in which the intentions of the actual author are regarded as 
irrelevant and, in any event, generally unknowable. 
This stance rests, however, on an important assumption:  namely, that a corpus of 
short examination items exhibits sufficient coherence (thematic and otherwise) to warrant 
regarding it as a single text.  There is, to be sure, some coherence that derives purely from 
the institution — all items are used for a course called “Honors Geometry” in a single 
school.  But this is akin to regarding an anthology of poems as having coherence simply 
on the grounds that they are published between a single set of covers; one would not 
necessarily expect to find a consistent set of textual strategies (a single authorial “voice”) 
under such circumstances.  To warrant such an expectation, one would need to document 
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the use of cohesion as a textual strategy to create coherence within the ideational, 
interpersonal and textual metafunctions as well. 
As a first step towards establishing this cohesion, I have introduced the notion of 
item classes (sets of items that repeat in subsequent years of the corpus).  The existence 
of these item classes entitles me to speak of “a course taught over three years”, rather 
than regard it as three different courses.  In the next chapter I document the evolution of 
items within those classes, and illustrate how that evolution can be used to gain insight 
into the teacher’s need to adapt his means of assessment to the ecological constraints of 
his classroom.  I also document in detail the existence of item chains that give coherence 
to a one-year “slice” of the corpus (as might be encountered by a student). 
Beyond the mere claim that the corpus can be regarded as a text, I have shown 
that the text can be usefully described by coding item classes after the mathematical 
dispositions that I identified and discussed in preceding chapters, and that certain of those 
dispositions are more represented within the corpus than are others.  In particular, it is 
worth noting the prominent role that Theory Building, Formalism, Existence, and 
Converse seem to play in this corpus, especially when we consider the lack of 
commitment to these dispositions that was found earlier in my analysis of the study group 
records (Chapter 3), and the near-total absence of the dispositions in the chapter tests 
from the textbook.  In fact, this contrast is part of what gives the corpus coherence, and 
helps to generate a picture of teaching practice which, idiosyncratically, attempts to teach 
students what it is to “be like” a mathematician. 
 
 
244 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Coherence and adaptation in the assessment items corpus 
 
 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I examined a corpus of examination items written and 
used by a geometry teacher over a 3-year period, and showed that those items allocate a 
significant role to the mathematical dispositions — the elements of the mathematical 
sensibility that was documented in Chapter 2.  In this chapter, I examine that same corpus 
of items from a different perspective and for different aims:  rather than look at individual 
items (or even item classes), I look at the way the items in the corpus are structured over 
time.  In particular, I look at the corpus over multiple distinct time-scales, with the goal of 
documenting distinct phenomena.  These scales, which were introduced in Chapter 4, and 
are represented schematically in Fig. 5.1, will now be elaborated on: 
• The time-scale of the single year allows us to read the corpus as it might 
be encountered by a hypothetical student, with the goal of finding 
evidence of cohesion within that corpus.  Finding such cohesion provides 
an empirical warrant for the theoretical position staked out in the last 
chapter: namely, that the corpus can legitimately be regarded as a single 
text (rather than a large anthology of independent, smaller texts), which in 
turn entitles us to inquire after the text’s “model author” and “model 
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reader” (which I have referred to previously as the “implied teacher” and 
“implied student”).  This cohesion is represented in Fig. 5.1 by the thin 
horizontal lines that link items together within a single year. 
• In contrast, the time-scale of the three-year corpus allows us to track the 
evolution of items from year to year.  We will see that as certain items 
drop out of the corpus, others enter it to take their place; simultaneously 
other items remain present but undergo change form year to year.  I will 
argue below that these changes in the corpus attest to a process of 
adaptation, as the (implied) teacher must negotiate new norms of 
assessment to correspond to his expanded instructional goals.  These 
chains are represented in Fig. 5.1 as the vertical lines that link 
corresponding items in subsequent years. 
• A third manner in which the corpus can be analyzed is at the scale of the 
sequence of whole assessments.  From the teacher’s point of view, each 
assessment is a sequel to the previous one, and it is not unreasonable to 
expect that changes in the structural features of assessments (length, 
duration, etc.) might occur in response to events on the ground.  Much of 
this chapter will be devoted to narrating the evolution of the assessment 
corpus at this scale, represented in Fig. 5.1 by the dark horizontal and 
diagonal lines linking each assessment to the next. 
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Figure 5.1.  The corpus at many timescales 
 
Cohesion with a single year:  Item threads in Y2 
One of the goals of this chapter is to understand the extent to which cohesion in 
the corpus allows us to regard it as a single text, with a coherent implied teacher and 
student.  Such cohesion additionally may allow for the deployment of multiple 
dispositions around a single content area, over an extended time frame on the order of the 
school year — for example, a diagram representing a particular geometric configuration 
may be re-used throughout the year, each time for a different purpose and calling for the 
deployment of different dispositions.  Seen from this perspective the unit of analysis is 
not the individual item, but rather strings or chains of items that create cohesion.  
Something somewhat analogous (albeit on a smaller scale) is found in Nathan & Long 
(2002), which analyzed the organization of categories of problem-solving activities in 
textbooks.  In Nathan & Long’s methodology, individual exercises were first coded as 
Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment
Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment
Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment
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either S (symbolic) or V (verbal).  The unit of analysis, however, was not the individual 
exercise, but rather sections of exercises.  Each section was thus coded as either SS 
(symbol-to-symbol), SV (symbol-to-verbal), VS (verbal-to-symbol), or VV (verbal-to-
verbal), according to the way in which the section was organized as a whole.  For the 
present discussion, I am interested not in the scale of the section or even the chapter, but 
rather the entire year; still, the notion of tracking the development of content over time is 
central to the attention given here to cohesion in the corpus. 
To operationalize this form of cohesion, I identify items that either look backward 
to previous problems or anticipate future interrelations can be manifested explicitly:  for 
example, one question on a chapter exam from the second semester in Year 2 posed a 
proof exercise very similar to one that had appeared on a previous midterm exam, but 
included the statement “You may use any theorem in Chapters 1-5...  This is much easier 
than the problem on the midterm.”  In other cases the interrelationship between items 
might be less obvious, but could be inferred from the re-use of a diagram, or the posing 
of several problems that build on one another.  The result of such an identification is an 
item thread. 
Recall that the linguistic theory of systemic functional linguistics, or SFL 
(Halliday 1994; Martin & Rose 2003), identifies three distinct “metafunctions” of 
language:  the ideational (how language represents what is being talked about), 
interpersonal (how language creates positions and relationships between “speaker(s)” 
and “audience”), and textual (how language accounts for the mode and organization of a 
text).  The key notion of SFL is that any text can be analyzed for how it uses language in 
the service of these three metafunctions.  Cohesion, meanwhile, refers to the use of 
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lexical and grammatical relationships to maintain coherence in a text and give it meaning 
(Halliday & Hasan 1976; Hasan 1984).  As discussed in Chapter 4, such coherence can 
be created out of and through any or all of the three metafunctions.  That is, cohesion can 
operate not only at the ideational level (e.g. repeated references to the same thematic 
content) and at the textual level (e.g. comments such as “As we saw in the last 
chapter...”), but also the interpersonal level, as in Thompson & Zhou’s (2001) analysis of 
the role of evaluative statements as cohesive signals. 
All three forms of coherence exist in the examinations corpus.  To clarify, I am 
here concerned principally with coherence across and within a single year; this coherence 
helps to create a single text from the perspective of the implied student, who of course 
does not have access to examinations from previous years.  There is also coherence, from 
the teacher’s perspective, across multiple years; this coherence is manifested in part by 
changes in the structural features of examinations over time, as I will show later.  For the 
present, I restrict my attention to the exams in the second year of the corpus. 
 
Interpersonal cohesion 
 Scattered throughout the data from Y2, there a number of items that make explicit 
reference to the teacher and/or student as individuals.  By this I mean more than just the 
presence of a first or second-person pronoun, as in “What can we say about...?” or “Show 
your work”.  Stock phrases such as this are part of the normal discourse of teachers and 
students; they serve in part to establish and reinforce customary power relationships 
among teachers and students (Pimm 1987; Rowland 1992).  I am interested here in the 
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presence of items that testify to some shared experience on the part of teacher and 
students, or that create an impression of the teacher and of the implied student. 
 Such content was heavily present in the second exam of Y2.  This exam, which 
covered Chapter 2 of the course textbook (Larson, Boswell & Stiff 2000), focused on 
propositional logic, including the laws of syllogism, detachment (modus ponens), and 
contrapositives.  At the top of the first page, in a block of text offset from the remainder 
of the text by a solid border, appeared a set of general instructions to the student, 
including the following comment: 
This may be the first test you’ve ever taken that has footnotes on it (it’s 
certainly the first one I’ve ever written).  The footnotes are there to 
provide you with some additional context for the examples on the test, if 
you’re interested, and in one case to give you a hint; but if you find that 
the footnotes just confuse you, feel free to ignore them. 
 
 I note the presence of seven personal pronouns (six 2
nd
-person, one 1
st
-person) in 
this short passage.  And indeed the presence of the footnotes, as elements that stand 
outside of the actual question-and-answer portion of the exam, is one of the more curious 
elements of this exam.  As we will see, the teacher
33
 uses the footnotes to engage in a 
kind of running commentary on the items — a commentary that is less about authority or 
assessment, and more about intellectual curiosity.  This dialogue runs parallel to, and 
independently of, the main text (as indicated by its spatial separation from the main body 
of the page). 
                                                
33
 Recall that all claims about the “teacher” in this chapter are meant to refer to 
the “implied teacher”, i.e. the intentio operis as revealed through a set of textual 
strategies. 
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 One question on the exam, and its corresponding footnote, are reproduced in Fig. 
5.2.  This question is one of several in which students are asked to identify the 
hypothesis, conclusion, converse, inverse, and contrapositive of a particular conditional 
statement.  What makes this particular statement noteworthy is its allusion to 
mathematics far outside the scope of a high school Geometry course, and the footnote 
indicating to students what they are, and are not, required to worry about in answering the 
question: 
The Riemann Conjecture1 :  If z is a solution of the equation ! (z) = 0, then 
Re z( ) =
1
2
. 
Hypothesis: __________________________________________________  
Conclusion: _________________________________________________  
Converse: ___________________________________________________  
Inverse: _____________________________________________________  
Contrapositive: ______________________________________________  
1
 The symbol !  is the Greek letter zeta, and represents a function called (naturally enough) “the 
Riemann zeta function”.  It’s probably a good idea to just leave it at that.  Don’t worry about 
copying the Greek letter beautifully; just make a C with a squiggle on the top and another on the 
bottom. 
Fig. 5.2.  A question (with its footnote) from the Y2, Chapter 2 exam. 
 
 What is even more striking about this example is the way the commentary 
continue onto the next page of the exam (Fig. 5.3) 
The next couple of questions are also about the Riemann Conjecture, but don’t worry — you 
don’t need to have gotten the previous questions right to answer the next ones. 
 
The mathematician Riemann proved the following theorem (called the Prime Number Theorem) 
in the 19
th
 century: 
 
“If the Riemann Conjecture is true, then the number of prime numbers below N 
grows logarithmically with N.”
3 
 
Figure 5.3.  (continued on next page) 
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7.  (6 points)  Suppose a «name of school omitted» student, working diligently and in secret 
for months, manages to prove the Riemann Conjecture to be true.   
 
(a)  Putting this amazing discovery together with the Prime Number Theorem, what can our 
student conclude? 
(b) Which logical law (Syllogism or Detachment) did you use in answering (a)? 
 
8.   (9 points)  Now suppose that your Geometry teacher has managed to prove the following 
statement, henceforth to be known as “Weiss’s Theorem”:  “If the number of primes 
numbers below N grows logarithmically with N, then the Artin-Stafford Conjecture is 
true.”
4 
 
(a) Is it legitimate to conclude that “If the Artin-Stafford Conjecture is true, then the 
Riemann Conjecture is true”?  If so, what logical law (Syllogism or Detachment) justifies 
this? 
(b) Is it legitimate to conclude that “If the Riemann Conjecture is true, then the Artin-
Stafford Conjecture is true”?  If so, what logical law (Syllogism or Detachment) justifies 
this? 
(c) Is it legitimate to conclude that “The Riemann Conjecture is true if and only if the Artin-
Stafford Conjecture is true”?   If so, what logical law (Syllogism or Detachment) justifies 
this? 
3 
The question here is, how many primes are there below any given number N?  For example, there are 4 
prime numbers below 10, 8 prime numbers below 20, 10 prime numbers below 30, 12 prime numbers 
below 40, etc.  As you look ever higher, the primes become more and more scarce, so the rate at which the 
number of primes grows is slowing down.  Logarithmically is a technical word that describes how fast the 
number of primes grows.  You’ll learn about logarithms in Algebra 2 (next year). 
 
4
 Oh, how I wish it were that simple. 
Fig. 5.3.  More questions and footnotes from the Y2, Ch 2 exam. 
 
The discourse in this passage is complex.  The opening sentence addresses the 
student directly and reassuringly (“You don’t need to have gotten the previous questions 
right”).  The statement of the Prime Number Theorem is accompanied by a footnote that 
explains in capsule form the substance of the theorem, while simultaneously drawing a 
connection between the rather abstract mathematics of the PNT and the knowledge that 
students will encounter in their subsequent mathematics courses.  Note again the presence 
and role of personal pronouns and the direct address to the reader here; it is as if the 
implied student is on the stage along with the mathematical content being assessed.  This 
 
 252 
is further reinforced by the hypothetical situations presented in problems 7 and 8, which 
place (respectively) an imaginary student in the school, and the teacher-author himself, as 
characters in a historical-mathematical drama — as does the attempt at self-deprecating 
humor in footnote 4. 
The examples above are not alone; among the 116 items in the Y2 portion of the 
corpus, I have identified 11 instances in which the teacher makes use of language in 
service of the interpersonal metafunction.  Most of these instances, like the ones we have 
seen, take the form of paratextual comments:  footnotes, asides, and other commentary 
not directly necessary for the student to know what he or she is to do.  The cumulative 
effect of these language choices is to create an impression of the teacher, or rather the 
image of the teacher that one encounters through the text (cf. Booth’s “second self”, cited 
on p. 180 above), and of the student that the teacher addresses.  The constancy of these 
impressions over time is one of the sources of cohesion in the corpus:  that is, a reader 
sense that the several assessments and dozens of items contained within it are all the 
product of a single persona. 
In this context it is worth noting that the assessment items included within the 
textbook (Larson et al 2000) — the “Chapter Exams” printed at the end of each chapter 
— avoid the use of personal pronouns and other forms of address nearly entirely.  Across 
the entire 229-item corpus, not a single item was found that creates any sense of an 
author or a reader; consistently, the elided second-person imperative (“Prove that...”, 
“Solve for the variable...”) and passive voice (“Which theorem can be used...”) are used 
to depersonalize the text.  This is hardly surprising, of course; the authors of a textbook 
are many steps further removed from the eventual student-reader than is the teacher who 
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constructs his own exam items for use with students in his own class.  The language 
choices of the textbook serve the interpersonal metafunction in their own way: they 
create an impression of an impersonal author, one above and removed from the lives of 
the students. 
The significance of the findings above lies in the fact that the teacher who 
authored this corpus of assessments could have emulated the impersonal, textbook style, 
but did not do so.  It is in part through this departure from the usual norms of discourse, 
the customary way in which the interpersonal metafunction is deployed in written 
assessment items, that this collection of assessment items functions as a source of textual 
cohesion, creating a coherent and stable sense of an implied teacher. 
 
Ideational and textual cohesion 
In addition to establishing and reinforcing a relationship between teacher and 
student, the items in the examinations corpus also establish and reinforce an ongoing 
relationship with particular content areas.  This is of course something one would likely 
expect in any collection of math exams:  to the extent that mathematics is a cumulative 
subject, material from any point in the year is likely to be invoked at subsequent 
moments.  And to the extent that Geometry is about a certain category of “things” 
(points, lines, planes, angles, etc.) and the relationships among them (incidence, 
congruence, parallelism, etc.), one expects those things and relationships to reappear 
throughout the course of the year.   All of the above stands as examples of ideational 
cohesion, and as such it is neither very surprising nor very interesting to find it 
throughout the corpus.  What is both surprising and interesting is the presence of certain 
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recurring themes or motifs that are not “necessary”, insofar as one could easily imagine a 
corpus that omits them without shortchanging the curriculum. 
One motif of this sort in the Y2 assessment items is located in a collection of five 
problems that I refer to as the “duals thread”.  Each of these five problems asks students 
to consider one or more properties of a figure that is formed by joining together the 
midpoints of adjacent sides of a polygon.  The first problem in the duals thread appeared 
on the exam for Chapter 4 (Fig. 5.4a).  In this problem, the student is asked to prove 
(using a “coordinates proof”) that any two of the triangles formed by joining together the 
midpoints of a triangle are congruent.  
Subsequently, two related problems (the “fractals” problem and the “antwalk” 
problem) appeared on the Midterm exam.  These two problems are interesting in their 
own right for a variety of reasons, and I discuss them both in detail below (see pp. 287-
292).  For the present it suffices to reproduce the diagrams that accompanied those 
exercises (Fig. 5.4b, 5.4c).  The reader will note at once the similarity of these to the 
diagram in Fig. 5.4a. 
The next assessment, the Chapter 5 Exam, included yet another problem that 
made use of essentially the same diagram, and called for another proof of essentially the 
same property as did the previous items in the thread (Fig. 5.4d).  The principal 
difference between the problems in Fig. 5.4a and Fig. 5.4d are the operations and 
resources available to students.  The problem in Fig. 5.4d comes after Chapter 5, which 
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introduces a particular theorem (the “midsegment theorem”
34
) that makes the problem 
fairly simple — a theorem that was not available to students when taking the earlier 
assessments; hence the parenthetical comments that follow the statement of the task. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
Fig. 5.4.  Four problems from the Y2 “duals thread”. 
                                                
34
 The midsegment theorem states that the segment formed by joining the 
midpoints of two adjacent sides of a triangle is parallel to, and half the length of, the third 
side of the triangle. 
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The duals thread reappears for a fifth and last time on the Final Exam, where it 
forms the ideational backbone of a take-home research project: students are charged with 
investigating the properties of duals of polygons.  As with the problems on the Midterm 
exam, I will give a full treatment of the Y2 Final Exam in the pages below.  Here it is just 
worth mentioning that the instructions on that Final Exam make explicit reference to the 
fact that students are expected to be able to say something about the dual of a triangle, 
and frame the larger research project as an extension and generalization of that. 
 The existence of the duals thread is significant partly because it does not exist in 
the textbook items corpus.  That is not to say that the textbook does not contain problems 
like those in Fig. 5.4; on the contrary, it does.  But all of them are located in the exam for 
Chapter 5 — that is, the chapter in which the midsegment theorem, that theorem that was 
marked as instrumental in Fig. 5.4d, was introduced.  The exam items corpus is different 
not for the mere presence of this content, but for its repetition throughout the course of 
the year.  The theme is introduced first on the Chapter 4 Exam, before its “proper place” 
(as defined by the textbook), where it is difficult to prove.  It reappears (in somewhat 
masked form) in two questions on the midterm.  It appears again on the Chapter 5 Exam 
(its “normal” location).  The student is then reminded of it at the end of the year, and 
asked to review and extend what has been learned.  This is what is meant by my claim 
that the corpus of assessment items is marked by a degree of ideational cohesion that ties 
it together, transforming it from a collection of independent texts to a single, extended 
work. 
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 The examples above also illustrate the way the textual metafunction of language 
is employed to produce coherence.  The textual metafunction is that use of language that 
calls explicit attention to the organization of a text:  phrases like “as we saw in the 
previous chapter”,  “as I will show below”, and “the examples above” all illustrate the 
textual metafunction.  In this connection notice that the problem in Fig. 5.4d makes 
explicit reference to an earlier member of the duals thread (“this is much easier than the 
problem on the midterm”).  Examples of this sort are rare in the assessment items corpus, 
but they do exist; additional examples will be described below.  Usages like this show 
that the implied teacher expects the implied students to have a shared memory of 
problems from a prior exam.  That is, the exams (and the items on them) do not stand 
alone: the discourse within them establishes each question as an installments in an 
ongoing, continuous interaction among teacher, student, and content. 
 
Adaptation in the corpus 
Fundamental to the analysis in this chapter is a perspective on learning and 
knowing that proceeds from a practice-based point of view.  Following Piaget (1975) and 
von Glasersfeld (1995), I take the position that individuals learn by adapting to feedback 
provided by the environment in response to their actions.  Taking this perspective as a 
starting point, Brousseau (1997) has added the critical notion of the milieu in which 
learning takes place.  Brousseau uses the word “milieu” in a technical sense, to refer to 
the system counterpart of the learner:  the learner acts on and in the milieu, and the milieu 
in turn provides feedback to the learner. 
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In the current context, I wish to argue that changes in the corpus over time attest 
to adaptation in the above sense on the part of the teacher.  That is to say, I take as a 
starting point the presumption that, as a teacher interacts with students, administrators, 
other teachers, parents, and the artifacts of teaching (written homework assignments and 
tests, lesson plans, report cards), there is the possibility for the teacher to learn in 
response to the feedback received from the educational milieu.  A lesson plan that does 
not come off how the teacher envisioned it may be modified the next time it is used; a 
homework assignment that takes too long to grade may lead to shorter assignments, or 
more cursory grading, in the future; complaints from students, parents and/or 
administrators about too many failing students may lead to gradual (and even 
unrecognized) grade inflation.  Of course from an outsider’s perspective, many of these 
changes might, to the extent that they take a teacher further away from some ideal of 
what practice ought to be like, be viewed as maladaptive.  But insofar as they serve the 
teacher’s interest by modifying his existing practices to better accommodating feedback 
from the milieu, I regard them here as a form of learning. 
At any given point in the course of a learning trajectory, there exist certain 
systems of interactions between the learner (here, the teacher) and the milieu.  Balacheff 
(see Balacheff & Gaudin 2002) refers to those systems of practices as conceptions, where 
this term is understood to refer not to unobservable cognitive operations but rather to 
those interactions that can be observed.  In Balacheff’s cK¢ model, a conception is 
characterized by a set of problems that the conception handles, operators and 
representations that the learner employs to deal with those problems, and controls that 
are used to evaluate whether the task has been correctly solved, and if not what should be 
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done next.  In the current context, consider “Writing an exam to assess students’ 
learning” as a problem that a teacher must solve periodically.  Some of the operations a 
teacher might use in the process of solving this task are:  selecting questions from a 
textbook or a question bank provided by the textbook publisher; amending those 
questions in both non-substantive ways (e.g. changing the equations slightly in a problem 
that uses algebra) and substantive ways (adding or removing parts of a multi-part 
problem, providing more or less scaffolding, etc.); reusing questions that were discussed 
in class; or creating new questions from scratch.  Among the choices a teacher has 
available as representations of the problem are:  the number of items on the test, the 
number of pages, the amount of white space between items, the amount of time students 
have to work on the assessment, the presence or absence of diagrams, and so forth.  
Finally, as controls the teacher has various ways of determining whether a test is “going 
well”, both during and after the fact:  Are students asking for clarification?  Do too many 
students finish the test early, or run out of time without completing it?  Are there too 
many failing students, which could indicate that the test was harder than appropriate?  Or 
too many students with perfect grades, which could indicate the opposite?  All of these 
provide some measure of feedback to the teacher that can, at least in principle, result in 
changes on the next assessment. 
 
Evolution within item classes 
The preceding discussion reveals another reason why it is important to document 
the existence of cohesion within the corpus: it is only in the context of a cohesive body of 
assessments that changes over time can be interpreted as evidence of teacher learning, i.e. 
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of adaptation in response to feedback from a milieu
35
.  That is to say:  if a collection of 
exam items were to be examined and found to lack significant cohesion, then variations 
in that collection would not be significant.  It is only the existence of a more-or-less 
stable background that makes changes meaningful. 
In this section I turn to an analysis of how individual items evolved over the 
three-year corpus.  In particular, I examine the item classes in the corpus (represented 
schematically in Fig. 5.1 by the vertical lines linking corresponding items in different 
years) and track the different kinds of changes evident in those item classes.  (Recall that 
an item was said to belong to the same item class as an item from a previous year if it was 
a repetition or an obvious adaptation of the earlier item.)  Before turning to the data, some 
preliminary considerations are in order. 
What kind of changes might one expect to find in an item class, and what might 
such changes testify to?  First, there is the possibility that an item might disappear 
entirely from one year to the next — that is, that an item present in the corpus in Year n 
might not reappear in the Year (n + 1).   Such a disappearance may or may not be 
associated with an overall reduction in the number of problems present from year to year.  
If the total number of problems present on each exam or within each year does not drop, 
then the disappearance of any single particular question implies that it was replaced with 
another question.  A comparison of the dropped questions in one year to the new 
questions introduced in the next might then suggest why the change took place:  perhaps 
the new problems are shorter, easier, etc.  This might then testify to a lowering of 
                                                
35
 To be clear, “learning” here is not intended to refer to something that is 
necessarily positive according to some theory of what good teaching is like, but only to 
adaptation.  Bad habits are learned just as much as good ones are. 
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expectations on the teacher’s part.  On the other hand if the new problems appear more 
difficult or complex than the ones they replace, we might infer that the teacher is raising 
expectations of his students.  If, alternatively, a number of problems were to disappear 
without being replaced by new ones in subsequent years, this could be taken as a 
reflection not of the individual items but of the test as a whole:  perhaps the teacher came 
to recognize that it had too many questions, that students could not finish it in the allotted 
time, etc.  Of course even in this question we would still be entitled to ask, Why eliminate 
these questions rather than others?  And again there are a number of possibilities that 
could be suggested by comparing the questions that disappear with those that survive:  
perhaps the problems eliminated were too difficult, or not difficult enough, or sufficiently 
similar to the surviving problems that their disappearance could be understood as the 
elimination of redundancy. 
But disappearance is only one of many things that could happen to a problem over 
time.  Another possibility is that a problem might survive, but in modified form.  These 
modifications correspond to the categories that I used in the previous chapter to model 
items: 
• Changes in the goal to be produced can take the form of changes in wording (e.g. 
“show that” becomes “prove that”), or in multi-part problems gaining or losing 
parts (i.e. an increase or decrease in the number of distinct goals); 
• Changes in the resources provided to the student in and through the text include 
the addition or elimination of scaffolding (hints, a diagram, breaking a complex 
problem down into multiple parts, etc.); 
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• Changes in the stakes of a problem could take the form of a reclassification of a 
required item as an extra credit item, or vice versa. 
Moreover the coding of items after mathematical dispositions provides another 
means of describing changes in an item class.  For example, if the version of the item 
used in Y1 was coded after three dispositions, but the version of the item used in the 
following year was coded after only one, then we can say that there has been a decrease 
in the number of mathematical dispositions represented in the item.  Similarly a problem 
can experience an increase in the number of dispositions represented in it. 
 In any given problem, it may impossible to explain why a change in one of the 
above ways might have occurred.  But if the aggregation of all item classes in the corpus 
displays consistent patterns of change (e.g. if the problems consistently gain additional 
scaffolding, exhibit reductions in the number of dispositions, and become shorter) then 
we would be justified in ascribing those changes to the presence of some form of 
feedback on the teacher. 
In fact all of the above kinds of changes are present in the corpus.  Fig. 5.5 
summarizes the kinds of changes that items underwent over the three-year period of the 
corpus.  (Items can undergo more than one kind of change.)  Notice, first, the large 
number of problems introduced in Y1 that were eventually dropped: fewer than half 
survived one year, and less than 30% of survived to Y3. The decrease in the number of 
items over time is part of a more complex trend towards shorter tests in Y1 and Y2; this 
trend will be discussed in more detail below, when I narrate the changes in the structure 
of examinations over time. 
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If we restrict our attention only to those items that repeat for at least one year, and 
focus on the nature of the changes those items underwent, we find that among the 82 
problems that were introduced in Y1 and survived for at least another year,  more than 
1/3 experienced some form of rewording. 
Changes to items introduced in Y1 
Number of items 
(total N = 193) Percent
 
Drop out after Y1 101 n/a 
Drop out after Y2 35 42.7% 
Rewording/clarification 29 35.6% 
Scaffolding reduced 2 2.4% 
Scaffolding added 7 8.5% 
Problem lengthened 8 9.8% 
Problem shortened 5 6.1% 
Dispositions increased 3 3.7% 
Dispositions decreased 3 3.7% 
Stakes increased 0 0 
Stakes decreased 2 2.4% 
   
Figure 5.5.  Evolution in the item classes from Y1 to Y2. 
Note.  Percentages are calculated relative to the 82 problems that survived into Y2. 
 
In addition there were 17 changes that could be regarded as a lowering of the teacher’s 
expectations (increased scaffolding, a reduction in the number of tasks or dispositions, or 
a repackaging of a problem as lower-stakes, e.g. extra credit).  Interestingly, though, 
these are nearly balanced by 13 changes that could be viewed as an increase in the 
teacher’s expectations:  decreased scaffolding, an increase in the number of tasks or 
dispositions, or a repackaging of a problem as higher-stakes.  Moreover, while it is 
conceivable that a single problem might evolve simultaneously in opposite directions — 
for example, having the stakes raised, but with additional scaffolding provided — there 
were no problems that underwent change of this sort from Y1 to Y2.  Overall there is a 
slight trend towards making the problems clearer, simpler, and lower-stakes. 
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If we shift focus to the problems that survive from Y2 to Y3, we see that the 
situation is somewhat more stable (Fig. 5.6).  The surviving items from Y1 still 
experience a high attrition rate (42%) in the passage from Y2 to Y3, but among those 57 
that survive into the third year there are relatively few modifications.  The 24 new 
problems introduced in Y2 fared even better than the 101 problems they replaced: of the 
newer group, just over 70% were re-used in Y3, most with no modification. 
 
Changes to items after Y2 Number of items Percent 
Items repeated from Y1 82  
Dropout after Y2 35  
Rewording/clarification 10 15.6% 
Scaffolding added 4 6.3% 
Scaffolding reduced 0 0% 
Problem lengthened 3 4.7% 
Problem shortened 1 1.6% 
Dispositions increased 2 3.1% 
Dispositions decreased 0 0% 
Stakes increased 0 0% 
Stakes decreased 2 3.1% 
   
Items introduced in Y2 24  
Dropout after Y2 7  
Rewording/clarification 7 10.9% 
Scaffolding added 3 4.7% 
Scaffolding reduced 0 0% 
Problem lengthened 0 0% 
Problem shortened 0 0% 
Dispositions increased 0 0% 
Dispositions decreased 0 0% 
Stakes increased 1 1.6% 
Stakes decreased 0 0% 
   
Figure 5.6.  Evolution in the item classes from Y2 to Y3. 
Note.  Percentages are calculated relative to the 64 items that survive into Y3. 
 
What does all this mean?  If we understand the high rate of attrition and 
modification of the problems introduced in Y1 as evidence of some indication of a 
mismatch between what the teacher originally set out to accomplish, and what actually 
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transpired — i.e. as reflecting some sort of negative feedback on the teacher — then the 
relatively low rate of modification of those problems that remained in the corpus after Y2 
stands as an indicator that those items were well-adapted to the milieu.  Additionally the 
fact that a larger proportion of the items introduced in Y2 survived into Y3 with little or 
no change stands as an indication of teacher learning:  that is, the teacher’s item-writing 
skills have adapted, in some fashion, to produce items that are more viable in the 
classroom. 
What is the nature of this learning?  To answer this question, I now provide 
selected examples of the various kinds of item evolution in the corpus, and discuss what 
they may say about the interaction of the teacher with the milieu of teaching. 
 
Examples of item evolution 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 both show that many items survived from one year to the next 
with modifications in wording.  Figure 5.7 illustrates this phenomenon with three pairs of 
items that exhibit such changes.  Although the changes in wording are minor in each pair, 
the details of the changes are highly suggestive.  Consider the change from 5.7a to 5.7b:  
The addition of the sentence “if there is more than one answer, give both” not only 
signals to students that they ought to be on the lookout for more than one possibility; it 
also leads us to consider the possibility that the first problem might have “failed” by 
eliciting only a single answer from too many students.  If this were so, then the rewording 
can be understood as evidence that the teacher learned to become more explicit with his 
expectations. 
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Or consider the change from Fig. 5.7c to Fig. 5.7d.  Why might a teacher change 
“Give an example” to “Make up your own example”?  Perhaps with the original version 
of the problem, a significant fraction of the class provided examples that had been 
previously discussed in class.  Certainly a student might have thought such a response 
was appropriate.  If so, then the teacher’s decision to change the problem might have 
been motivated by a desire to test whether students understood the principle behind those 
examples, rather than simply their ability to recall the example. 
On a number line, point S has coordinate 1.  
If ST = 5, then what could be the 
coordinate of point T? 
On a number line, point S has coordinate 1.  
If ST = 5, then what could be the 
coordinate of point T?  If there is more than 
one answer, give both. 
(a) (b) 
Give an example of a sentence which is 
false, but has a true converse.  (If this is not 
possible, explain why.) 
Make up your own example of a sentence 
which is false, but has a true converse.  (If 
this is not possible, explain why.) 
(c) (d) 
Are the points A(4, 5), B(-3, 3), C(-6, -13) 
and D(6, -2) the vertices of a kite?  Explain 
your answer 
Are the points A(4, 5), B(-3, 3), C(-6, -13) 
and D(6, -2) the vertices of a kite?  Justify 
your answer. 
(e) (f) 
Figure 5.7.  Items that underwent rewording from one year to the next.   
 
On the other hand it is hard to know what to make of the change from Fig. 5.7e to 
Fig. 5.7f.  These two items differ only in a single word — “explain” is replaced with 
“justify” — but it is not completely clear what, if anything, that change signifies.  If the 
teacher had changed the word “explain” to the word “prove”, or even a phrase such as 
“write a paragraph proof”, then the teacher’s intentions would be more transparent.  We 
might speculate that “justify” had a shared meaning within the discourse of the 
classroom, one that was more specific than “explain”.  But the evidence in Fig. 5.7 is not 
really sufficient to support such a conclusion. 
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There is one case of a problem that underwent successive rewording in each year 
of the corpus.  That problem (Fig. 5.8) asks students to derive some consequences about a 
triangle from a hypothesis stated in the form of a congruence.  Recall that the final 
version (Fig. 5.8c) was used in Chapter 4 (Fig. 4.20, p. 232) to illustrate the code 
Formalism.  It is also worth noting that a proof of the base angles theorem along similar 
lines was denounced by a teacher in the ThEMaT Study Group as “stupid” (ITH121505, 
interval 59).  Here we see the problem evolve in a very consistent manner:  More text is 
added to the statement of the task to both motivate the problem and to clarify what is 
expected.  One can almost see the teacher struggling to find a way to make this problem 
viable, despite what (it seems) must have been strong feedback to the contrary. 
 
What does !ABC # !BCA 
tell you? 
If !ABC # !BCA, what 
can you conclude about the 
triangle?  Justify your 
answer. 
As you know, when writing 
a triangle congruence 
statement, the order of the 
letters matters.  Suppose for 
three points A, B, and C it 
happens to be true that 
!ABC # !CAB. What can 
you conclude about !ABC 
in this case?  Be as detailed 
as possible. 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 5.8.  Three versions of the same item in successive years. 
 
Intriguingly, another problem in the Y1 corpus — one quite similar to that in Fig. 
5.8a — failed to adapt in this fashion, and dropped out of the corpus after one year.  That 
problem (Fig. 5.9) seems intended to target approximately the same mathematical ideas 
(i.e., that the notational convention for similarity and congruence indicate 
correspondences between the constituent parts of the geometric objects).  Consider the 
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possible solutions that a student might produce:  Students who have understood the 
formalist point — that the correspondence between congruent parts is indicated by the 
notational convention — will ignore the diagram, and read off from the statement of the 
congruent pentagons that 
 
AB ! RQ , 
 
BC !QP , !C " !P , etc.  On the other hand a 
student who has failed to learn that point is likely to be guided by the visual 
correspondence between the two pentagons in the diagram, in which A appears to match 
up with P, E with T, and so forth, leading to incorrect conclusions such as 
 
AB ! PQ , 
 
BC !QR , !C " !R , etc. In terms of what students are asked to do, then, this problem 
“means” that a student is supposed to know to follow the notational correspondence and 
ignore (even actively suppress information coming from) the diagrams. 
 
In the diagram below, ABCDE # RQPTS.  List all the angle and segment congruences 
that you can based on this information. 
 
Figure 5.9.  A problem that dropped out after Y1. 
 
The problem (in its various incarnations) of Fig. 5.8 can be described in the same 
way.  But in addition, that problem could be regarded as standing for:  an (implicit) 
statement of the theorem that “equilateral” and “equiangular” are one and the same 
property for triangles, an (also implicit) connection between the formal properties of an 
object and the symmetries of its diagram, and (more explicitly) the notion that a single 
figure can be regarded as more than one formal object.  Nothing analogous to these can 
A B
C
D
E
P Q
R
S
T
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be said to be present in the problem of Fig. 5.9.  In this light we can perhaps understand 
why the teacher kept trying to find a way to make the triangle version of the problem 
“work”, but was willing to give up after only one try with the pentagon problem:  only 
the former problem had a sufficiently high mathematical value to justify an ongoing 
attempt to make it viable in the face of what (we can only presume) must have been 
consistent negative feedback. 
Figs. 5.5 and 5.6 also show that a (smaller) set of problems underwent changes in 
the number of parts students were required to complete, and/or the number of dispositions 
after which they were coded.  Fig. 5.10 shows two illustrations of this.  The item in Fig. 
5.10a (from Y1) was reduced both in number of parts (the “formal logic” portion was 
eliminated) and in dispositions (the version in Fig. 5.10a was coded for Formalism, the 
version in Fig. 5.10b was not).  In contrast, the item in Fig. 5.10c experienced an increase 
in both length and dispositions:  the version in Fig. 5.10d (from Y2) calls for a proof of a 
biconditional statement, and includes a diagram that shows a condition opposite to those 
which students are to prove equivalent, stressing the contingent nature of the hypothesis 
and the conclusion, and the link between them.  I note in passing that the refracting light 
item (Fig. 5.10c) was cited in the previous chapter as an illustration of the Utility code, 
and the double-reflection item (Fig. 5.10d) was cited in that same chapter as an 
illustration of Converse. 
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Below are several examples of “logical” reasoning.  Some 
of the examples use legitimate (i.e. valid) logic, and some 
of the examples use incorrect logic.  For each example, 
circle the symbolic expression that best represents the kind 
of logic used.  Then indicate whether it is valid or not; and 
if it is, why? 
 
Given:  If you want to sing the blues, you’ve got to pay 
your dues. 
Given:  You don’t want to sing the blues. 
Conclude:  You don’t want to pay your dues. 
 
(a) Given 
 
a! b and given ~ b, conclude ~ a. 
(b) Given 
 
a! b and given a, conclude b. 
(c) Given 
 
a! b and given ~ a, conclude ~ b. 
(d) Given 
 
a! b and given 
 
b! c , conclude 
 
~ c!~ b . 
 
Is it valid logic?  
If you answered “yes”, what logical rule(s) does this use? 
Below are several examples of “logical” 
reasoning.  Some of the examples use legitimate 
(i.e. valid) logic, and some of the examples use 
incorrect logic.  For each example, indicate 
whether the reasoning is valid or not; and if it is, 
why? 
 
Given:  If you want to sing the blues, you’ve got 
to pay your dues. 
Given:  You don’t want to sing the blues. 
Conclude:  You don’t have to pay your dues. 
 
Is it valid logic?  
If you answered “yes”, what logical rule(s) does 
this use? 
(a) (b) 
When light enters glass, the light bends.  When it leaves 
glass, it bends again.  If both sides of a pane of glass are 
parallel, light will leave the pane at the same angle at 
which it entered.  (See diagram)  Prove that the path of the 
exiting light is parallel to the path of the entering light. 
 
 
When a ray of light reflects off of a mirror, the 
angle of incidence is always equal to the angle of 
reflection.  In the figure at right, an incoming 
light ray r reflects off of two mirrors M1 and M2.  
Show that the outgoing light ray s is parallel to r 
if and only if the two mirrors are parallel to each 
other.  [Before you start working on this problem, 
make sure you understand what “if and only if” 
means.] 
 
 
 
 
(c) (d) 
Figure 5.10.  Items that gained or lost parts or dispositions over time. 
 
Summary of item class analysis. 
In the preceding pages I have shown, on the basis of the data (Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 
5.6) and illustrated with specific examples, that an analysis of change within item classes 
r
s
M1
M2
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over the three-year period of the corpus reveals evidence of some kind of adaptation on 
the part of the teacher.  While it is impossible to make any definitive claims as to what 
the teacher adapts to, there does seem to be a clear trend towards increased scaffolding 
and more explanatory text over time, which suggests that students’ performance was 
other than what the teacher was hoping for — for example that grades were too poor, or 
were distributed too unevenly across the class, or too many students had difficulty 
finishing the class in the allotted time, or too many students needed to ask clarifying 
questions during the exam.  On the other hand there does not seem to be a corresponding 
trend towards shorter problems, or fewer mathematical dispositions in those problems 
that survive.  On the contrary there are some indications to suggest that the teacher may 
have provided additional scaffolding or explanation to precisely those items that were 
longer and most representative of the mathematical sensibility, perhaps in an effort to 
keep them viable despite some negative feedback from the milieu. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will step away from the scale of the individual 
items, the item classes, and the item threads, and look at the structure of each assessment 
taken as a whole.  We will see that we find largely the same phenomenon at this larger 
grain size:  although there is a long-term trend toward fewer and shorter assessments, 
there are indications that the teacher resists the pressure toward reducing the complexity 
of the assessments, instead providing additional resources to the students to compensate 
for whatever negative feedback may be present. 
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A narrative of examinations 
In this section I describe the corpus at the scale of the examinations, each taken as 
a single unit.  At this scale, the features that emerge are descriptive not of individual 
questions, but rather of the whole assessment:  how many questions appear on it, how 
many points the entire exam is worth, how much time is allowed to students to complete 
the exam, how much time elapses between assessments, what material resources (e.g. 
calculator, note card, etc.) students were allowed to make use of, and so on.  When 
examined from this perspective, the corpus looks like a single sequence of units, with the 
first unit in Year 2 a direct successor to the last in Year 1, and so on:  that is, we are 
following the dark horizontal and diagonal arrows in Figure 5.1.  The fundamental 
question of interests here is, What changes and what remains constant across this 
sequence of assessments? 
This question is significant for two distinct reasons.  The first reason has to do 
with the stance I have adopted with respect to the “implied teacher” of the corpus.  The 
contention that this corpus implies a single teacher (rather than a multiplicity of implied 
teachers, one for each assessment) rests on the premise that the corpus can fruitfully be 
regarded as a single extended text; and this in turn relies on the presumption that there 
may exist cohesion across the corpus.  That is, if the basic structure of examinations 
remains more or less steady from one exam to the next, this consistency enables us to 
infer a consistent authorial presence behind the corpus. 
The second reason to care about this question is, in a sense, complementary to the 
first:  if consistency across the corpus supports the inference of an implied teacher, then 
change across the timeline of the corpus can provide evidence of adaptation on the part 
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of that implied teacher.  To take a simple example:  if the number of questions on each 
exam were to steadily decline over the first half of the corpus, and thereafter remain 
stable, it would be entirely reasonable to infer that the teacher is responding to some kind 
of feedback from the instructional milieu:  perhaps too many students are unable to 
complete the exams in the time allotted, or the average grade in the class is too low, or 
the exams take too long to grade, etc.  In terms of the conceptions of teaching discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the decline in the number of questions would then be evidence of a 
process of the teacher’s adaptation to an instructional “problem”, while the eventual 
stabilization would be understood as the emergence of an instructionally viable 
“solution” to that problem. 
 
The first year of the corpus:  Negotiating the measurement of achievement 
As can be seen from Figure 5.11 (below), the eleven exams in Year 1 
corresponded to Chapters 1-11 of the textbook in an essentially one-to-one fashion:  
although there were some exceptions, such as the absence of an exam dedicated 
exclusively to Chapter 5 (the content of which was included in the Midterm Exam) and a 
combined exam for Chapters 7-8, the assessment schedule in the classroom conformed to 
the default chronology of the chapter divisions in the textbook.  Note that the exams were 
spaced roughly at 3-4 week intervals. 
Certain features of the exams in this portion of the corpus deserve special 
mention.  First, four of the first five examinations lacked any explicit designation of the 
“point values” for individual items or for the assessment as a whole; for those 
assessments, the data in Figure 5.11 are taken from the teacher’s hand-written grading 
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guide, where those were available. Note also that the total number of points possible on 
those early exams does not conform to the common practice of normalizing assessments 
to a 100-point scale.  In contrast, after the midterm exam, all items on every assessment 
are accompanied by an explicit designation of how many points they are worth; at the 
same time, although the 100-point scale never becomes quite universal, it seems to 
emerge in the second half of the year as a default. 
Assessment Date # of items
a 
Points Possible 
Chapter 1 Exam 9/25/2001 17 (22) n/a
b 
Chapter 2 Exam 11/01/2001 18 (18) 89 
Chapter 3 Exam 11/20/2001 17 (17) 92
b 
Chapter 4 Exam 12/13/2001 12 (12) 57
b 
Midterm Exam (inc. Ch. 5) 1/23/2002 29 (31) 135
b 
Chapter 6 Exam 2/21/2002 15 (15) 100 
Chapter 7-8 Exam 3/21/2002 15 (15) 85 
Chapter 9 Exam 4/24/2002 8 (11) 101 
Chapter 10 Exam 5/14/2002 8 (18) 100 
Chapter 11 Exam 5/30/2002 7 (7) 85 
Final Exam 6/13/2002 27 (27) 27 
Notes. 
 a 
The first number reported is the number of items as designated on the exam itself; 
the second number is the number of items as entered into the corpus database.  
b 
Point values 
were not printed on the exam questions given to students, but were found on the teacher’s 
grading guide (not extant for Chapter 1). 
Figure 5.11.  Assessments in Year 1. 
 
What can one say about the (implied) teacher, and his adaptation to the teaching 
milieu, based on these few observations?  In the first place, it must be said that the values 
of questions on an exam do not “just happen” to total 100 points; when such a 
phenomenon occurs, it indicates a deliberate effort on the part of the teacher.  Why do 
teachers make such an effort?  Several possibilities come to mind. Recall that Kulm 
(1990) includes feedback to students and communication of expectations as two of the 
functions of assessment.  Examinations with point values that sum to 100 serve both of 
these functions:   On the one hand, a standard 100 point scale makes it possible (for the 
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teacher, but also for the student, parents, administrators, etc.) to easily compare a 
students’ grades across assessments and tell at a glance whether he or she is improving, 
struggling, etc.  Moreover, the 100 point scale creates a default correspondence with 
letter grades:  90-100 = A, 80-90 = B, and so on.  In referring to these 10-point letter 
bands as the “default”, I do not mean not to say that the 10-point letter bands are 
universal, but merely that they are common, and that they (like the 100-point scale) create 
a natural way to interpret a students’ performance on a test as a measure of achievement. 
 Thus the 100 point scale serves the teacher’s interest in tracking students’ ability, 
and also provides the student (and parents, administrators, etc.) with clear and 
immediately understandable feedback on his or her performance.  Furthermore, the 
inclusion of point values on the exam itself communicates the relative weight of different 
questions; such information discloses to the time-pressed student the costs and benefits of 
abandoning a difficult problem to work on a more tractable one, enabling the student to 
perform a kind of “triage” during the exam. 
The absence of a 100-point scale and of designated point values on the exam, 
then, suggests a teacher who is somewhat insensitive to the communicative functions of 
assessment, perhaps a teacher more focused more on the content of the individual 
questions themselves that on letting the student know what is and is not most important to 
do on the test.  The teacher we see in the first half of Year 1 appears unaware of, or at 
least unconcerned with, the need to let students know ahead of time how important 
questions are relative to one another, or what their score “means” in terms of a standard 
A-F letter scale.  That this state of affairs changes following the Midterm Exam may be 
taken as indicating some “learning” on the part of the teacher — that is, a response to 
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some feedback from the milieu.  The timing of this change may or may not be 
coincidental, but at the very least it strongly suggests that the need to mark students’  
semester grades on their report cards, and the attendant communications with parents and 
administrators concerning student progress, may have contributed to this “learning”. 
Another clear trend visible in Fig. 5.11 is the gradual reduction in the number of 
problems per assessment.  With the exception of the Midterm and Final Exam (for which 
students had extra time available), students encountered an average of 16 problems on 
each exam in the first semester, but only an average of 10.6 problems on each exam in 
the second semester.  There are many ways this phenomenon might be interpreted.  On 
the one hand, it could be understood as indicating a lowering of the teacher’s 
expectations of his students — possibly in response to poor student performance in the 
first semester.  But there are other possibilities: for example, it is conceivable that the 
assessments in the second semester might be fewer in number but also richer in content, 
which would indicate an increase in the teacher’s deliberateness in selecting and 
authoring items. 
To gain greater understanding of the meaning of this reduction, I examined each 
assessment to see how many of its items received one or more code for one of the 
mathematical dispositions (see previous chapter).  Figure 5.12 tabulates the number and 
“density” of dispositions that are present in each assessment.  It will be immediately 
noticed that both of these drop precipitously in the second half of the year:  the four 
assessments prior to the midterm had an aggregated disposition density of 0.67, compared 
with only 0.27 after the midterm.  This, taken together with the overall decline in the 
number of items, suggests that the decline in the number of assessment items can be 
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substantially accounted for by the reduction in the number of items that attend to one or 
more of the mathematical dispositions. 
Assessment # of items
a 
Dispositions
b 
Disposition density 
Chapter 1 Exam 17 (22) 9 (10) 0.45 
Chapter 2 Exam 18 (18) 7 (9) 0.50 
Chapter 3 Exam 17 (17) 7 (13) 0.76 
Chapter 4 Exam 12 (12) 7 (14) 1.17 
Midterm Exam (inc. Ch. 5) 29 (31) 12 (13) 0.42 
Chapter 6 Exam 15 (15) 7 (12) 0.80 
Chapter 7-8 Exam 15 (15) 5 (7) 0.47 
Chapter 9 Exam 8 (11) 1 (2) 0.18 
Chapter 10 Exam 8 (18) 0 (0) 0.00 
Chapter 11 Exam 7 (7) 2 (2) 0.29 
Final Exam 27 (27) 2 (2) 0.07 
Notes. 
 a 
The first number reported is the number of items as designated on the exam itself; the second 
number is the number of items as entered into the corpus database.  
b 
The first number reported is the 
number of items that were coded for at least one disposition; the second number is the total number of 
dispositions coded for in the assessment.  
c
 The disposition density is the ratio of the (total) number of 
dispositions on the assessment to the number of items as entered into the database. 
Figure 5.12.  The declining role of the dispositions in Year 1. 
 
It is tempting to regard this reduction as evidence for some kind of adaptation to 
the milieu of teaching — that is, to infer that the teacher experienced some kind of 
negative feedback in the first semester, and responded to that feedback by severely 
reducing his expectations of students vis-à-vis the dispositions.  But there are other 
possibilities that should be considered; for example, it may be that the mathematical 
content of the latter chapters of the textbook (polygons, circles, and solids) is not as well-
suited for “disposition questions” as is the content of the earlier chapters (parallelism, 
triangles, and quadrilaterals).
36
  Or it may be that some other set of expectations emerges 
                                                
36
 In this connection it is worth noting that the teachers in the ThEMaT study 
groups (see Chapter 3) were in general agreement that the latter half of the year contains 
fewer proofs than does the first half.  While “doing proofs” and “learning the 
mathematical dispositions” are certainly not synonymous, there is undoubtedly some 
close correspondence between the two.  On the other hand, the reduced prominence of 
proof in the second half of the year is not an intrinsic property of the mathematical 
content, but rather an instructional phenomenon that has yet to be fully explained.  
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in the second semester and crowds out the mathematical dispositions.  In order to fully 
understand the phenomenon, we would need to look for trends across the 3-year corpus.  
If such an examination were to show a consistent reduction in the presence of the 
dispositions from one year to the next, we would be more justified in ascribing this 
decline to adaptation.  As we will see below, the full story is more complex than that. 
 
Renegotiating norms of assessment:  Year 2 
Following a one-year gap (during which the teacher taught other courses), the 
teacher returned to teaching geometry.  Figure 5.13 summarizes the assessment 
instruments used in this second year of the corpus.  Some trends are worth noting here.   
 
Assessment Date # of items
a 
Points Possible 
Chapter 1 Exam 9/16/2003 14 (17) 100 
Chapter 2 Exam 10/21/2003 13 (17) 90
b 
Chapter 3 Exam 11/14/2003 14 (14) 100 
Chapter 4 Exam 12/18/2003 8 (8) 100 
Midterm Exam 1/9/2004 10 (10) 100 
Chapter 5 Exam 2/26/3005 7 (11) 83
c 
Chapter 6 Exam 4/1/2004 11 (11) 88
d 
Chapter 7-8 Exam 5/6/2004 10 (10) 80 
Final 6/3/2004 18 (18) 34
e 
Notes.  
a
 The first number reported is the number of items as designated on the exam 
itself; the second number is the number of items as entered into the corpus database.  
b
 
Includes one question worth 5 points “extra credit”. 
c 
Includes 5 points for completing 
top portion of page 1, and one question worth 5 points “extra credit”.  
d
 Includes one 
question worth 8 points “extra credit”.  
e
 Includes 17 questions worth 1 point each, and 
one take-home problem worth the remaining 50%. 
Figure 5.13.  Assessments in Year 2 
 
One noteworthy trend visible in Figure 5.13 concerns the amount of time between 
exams.  Whereas the exams in Year 1 were spaced roughly 3-4 weeks apart, the exams in 
Year 2 are spaced 4-5 weeks apart.  This additional time spent on each chapter has a 
 
 279 
cumulative effect: by the middle of May in Year 2, the class is nearly two full chapters 
“behind schedule” (if we take the Year 1 exams as defining a normative timeline of the 
year), ground that is never fully recovered:  note the complete absence of assessments 
focused on Chapters 9, 10, and 11 in Year 2. 
A second trend concerns the default 100-point scale, discussed earlier.  In light of 
the discussion above, it is surprising to note that the teacher in Year 2 appears to be 
following a trajectory that is precisely the reverse of that which was visible in Year 1:  
although four of the first five exams conform to the “100 points possible” standard, after 
the midterm exam the standard is completely abandoned.  This requires explanation. 
Indeed the midterm exam marks a significant transition moment, not only in Year 
2 but across the entire 3-year corpus.  The abandonment of the 100-point scale is not the 
only significant change that occurs here:  the Year 2 midterm exam also stands as the first 
assessment in the corpus to consist in part or entirely of a take-home problem set.  To be 
precise, the midterm exam consisted of 10 questions, each worth 10 points, to be 
completed outside of scheduled class meetings.  Students were given one week to 
complete the problems, were given specific instructions regarding the resources they 
were permitted to make use of, and were asked to sign an honor statement.  The first page 
of the midterm exam, containing these instructions, is reproduced in Fig. 5.14. 
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Figure 5.14.  The first page of the take home midterm exam (Year 2). 
 
The content of the midterm exam will be described below in detail, when I 
describe the emergence of open-ended problems as a phenomenon of the corpus.  For the 
moment our attention is on the attributes of the individual exams (rather than the 
attributes of the items on the exam), and the ways in which those attributes change over 
time.  From this point of view there are several salient points to be observed.  The first is 
that the decision to use a take-home problem set in place of a traditional, in-school 
midterm exam poses significant risks for the teacher, in that it makes it impossible for a 
teacher to monitor students as they work and ensure that the work they submit is actually 
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their own.  That is to say, the risk of cheating becomes a significant problem for the 
teacher.  The fact that the teacher’s instructions to the students (Fig. 5.14) spell out 
explicitly that students may not seek the assistance of others (students, teachers, parents, 
or tutors) indicates that the teacher was fully aware of this risk.  In this context the honor 
statement can be understood as an attempt to articulate why a student should not cheat:  
not because a student is likely to get caught, but because it would be dishonorable to do 
so.  In effect the teacher is telling students, “I know you could cheat, but I trust that you 
will not do so.”  The student tempted to seek unauthorized help is being told that to do so 
might gain them a higher grade, but only at the cost of their own integrity.  Further, the 
teacher’s offer to provide help and assistance can be understood as an attempt to forestall 
any illicit student activity: it says that a student who needs help can seek it directly from 
the teacher, and thus has no need to make use of unsanctioned resources. 
What was the result of this “experiment” on the teacher’s part?  To answer that 
question we can look forward into the remainder of the corpus.  Although the remainder 
of the chapter assessments for the year were traditional, in-school examinations, the Final 
Exam at the end of Year 2 consisted of two parts: an in-school portion (consisting of 17 
multiple-choice questions) and a take-home portion (consisting of a single, open-ended 
problem, referred to as a “research project”), each worth 50% of the exam grade.  I will 
describe the content of the open-ended problem in detail below; here I once again restrict 
my attention to the form of the exam.  In the present discussion the teacher’s instructions 
to the students (Fig. 5.15) are noteworthy in part because of the wide range the teacher 
indicates in what will be expected:  anywhere from 2 to 15 pages worth of typed, 
illustrated text.  Notice also that the teacher gives no indication of how the exam will be 
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graded, and indeed we will see later that the very openness of the problem would make 
the creation of a rubric very problematic.  All of this suggests that the take-home portion 
of the final will necessarily be graded using somewhat subjective (or at least tacit) 
criteria.  Balancing this is an almost obsessive degree of precision in the policy for 
projects turned in late.  This policy — and the complementary “early bird bonus” 
incentive for students to turn in their work early— might be interpreted as a preemptive 
attempt to manage the challenge of grading all of those research projects, some of which 
might be expected to run as long as 15 pages, in time to mark final report cards.  
The fact that the teacher chose to once again include a significant take-home 
component in the assessment provides indirect evidence that the midterm experiment had 
been, from the teacher’s perspective, a success worth repeating.  (Note the reappearance 
of the honor statement.)  On the other hand, the balancing of this take-home portion with 
a more traditional, in-class multiple choice exam could be interpreted variously.  One 
possibility is that the teacher felt a need to balance the somewhat subjective nature of the 
take-home portion with a clear-cut, objective measure of students’ attainment.  
Conducting the multiple-choice portion of the exam in class (rather than making it part of 
the take-home exam) could be viewed as a means for the teacher to regain some of the 
control that is lost when students do their work out of the teacher’s watchful eye.  And it 
should not go unmentioned that a multiple choice exam can be graded quickly, a perhaps 
welcome counterpoint to the time-consuming nature of grading research papers. 
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Figure 5.15.  A portion of the instructions for the Year 2 final exam. 
 
Looking further ahead, this model of assessment (take-home portion + in-class 
portion) reappears in the third year of the corpus.  We will see below that once again the 
teacher used a take-home Midterm.  But even more significantly, in Year 3 every 
assessment after the Midterm contained a take-home component.  In this sense we can 
say that the use of take-home assessments, which was first implemented in the Midterm 
Exam of Year 2, eventually stabilized as a normal part of assessment in the corpus. 
Take-home exams both entitle and oblige students to make decisions about how 
much time they will devote to the work, in a way that in-class exams typically would not 
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be expected to.  But in fact one of the most interesting changes in Y2 concerns the timing 
and duration of in-school assessments.  The Chapter 2 exam contains a new element at 
the top of the first page:  a pair of checkboxes, just below the assessment title and above 
the blank line for students’ names, with which students were to indicate whether they 
were done with the exam or needed additional time (see Figure 5.16). This new feature 
occurs, without modification, at the top of the first page of every subsequent assessment 
(except the Final) in the remainder of the year. 
 
Figure 5.16.  The top portion of the Year 2, Chapter 2 exam. 
 
Although this “extra time” checkbox survives the year, it undergoes an interesting 
modification at the beginning of Year 3.  In Exam 1 of the first year, students once again 
are given the option of checking a box to request extra time — but this time, an explicit 
cost is attached to exercising that option (Fig. 5.17): students are informed that taking 
extra time will lower their total exam grade by the equivalent of 5%.  It also informs 
students that they may, after the exam is graded, choose to retake the exam, at the cost of 
a 10% reduction in their total possible score. 
There are 80 points possible on this test + 8 points available extra credit. 
 
If you do not finish the test in the time available, you may “purchase” extra time at a cost 
of 4 points (and you forfeit the right to do the extra credit).  Please check one of the two 
boxes below when you turn the test in. 
 
! Don’t grade yet, I want extra time. ! Grade it now, I’m done. 
 
After the test is graded, you can decide to do a retake at a cost of 8 points (plus you 
forfeit the right to do the extra credit.)  You don’t need to decide now. 
Figure 5.17.  The top portion of the Year 3, Chapter 1 exam. 
 
 285 
 
The emergence and evolution of the “extra time” checkbox illustrates the way in 
which an examination of documents can shed light on the teacher’s interaction with the 
instructional milieu.  What inferences can we draw from this phenomenon?  It certainly 
seems natural to interpret these changes as attesting to an adaptation on the teacher’s 
part; that is, to propose that the teacher was responding to an instructional problem.  The 
precise nature of that problem cannot be identified with certainty, but one possibility that 
seems plausible is that perhaps in the first half of the year a substantial fraction of the 
students were having difficulty completing the exams within the allotted timeframes.  If 
so, the result would be poor grades for those students.  This in turn could lead to negative 
feedback on the teacher, who might have to justify his assessment procedures to students, 
parents, and administrators.  Providing extra time to any student who requests it would 
“solve” that “problem” for the teacher.  Requiring students to explicitly indicate whether 
or not they are finished helps to forestall the possibility of a student asking for extra time 
after his or her exam has already been graded.  It also shifts the locus of responsibility for 
determining when an exam is over from the teacher (as is customary) to the student. 
On the other hand, giving all students the right to extend the duration of the exam 
at will could open a Pandora’s Box of new problems for the teacher:  If a teacher grades 
and returns exams to those students who have indicated that they are finished, there is the 
risk of correct solutions “leaking” to students who are not yet done, and this could 
potentially compromise the meaningfulness of the results.  On the other hand if the 
teacher does not return the exams until every student has finished, the communicative 
function of the assessment (giving meaningful feedback to students and other 
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stakeholders on their performance) is undermined (feedback given to students long after 
they complete their work may come too late to be useful).  Moreover it is easy to imagine 
the logistical difficulties of scheduling additional time (after school, at lunch, during 
study hall, etc.) for students to work on their exams.  And the open-ended timeframe for 
completing the exam competes with the decidedly non-negotiable schedule of semesters 
and quarters, parent-teacher conferences and report card marking. 
These considerations suggest that if the “extra time” option signals an attempt to 
solve a teaching problem, the introduction of a “cost” for exercising that option signals a 
kind of second-order correction: it creates a disincentive for students who might 
otherwise check the box in order to increase their score by a small increment.  A student 
who is far from ready to have his exam graded might sensibly decide that the potential 
gain exceeds the 5% cost of admission, but a student who anticipates getting a score in 
the high 80% or low 90% range has much less to gain and would therefore probably be 
less likely to exercise the option. 
Similar considerations apply to the 10% “purchase price” for retaking an exam.  
Prior to Year 3, Exam 1, there is no evidence in the documents to tell us whether students 
were, or were not, allowed to retake exams.  One might imagine that students were 
allowed to request retakes on an ad hoc basis, but that the number of such requests 
eventually became too large for the teacher to manage without instituting some form of 
disincentive.  Alternatively one might imagine that students were not previously allowed 
to retake exams, and that the institution of a retake policy in Year 3 constitutes a further 
development of the “extra time” policy.  Regardless of which is the case, it seems clear 
that the institution of the retake policy serves dual functions:  it provides a regularized 
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way of handling students’ requests for retakes, while simultaneously creating a 
disincentive to discourage frivolous requests and to keep the volume of such requests at a 
manageable level. 
We thus see that the structure of examination in Year 2 undergoes changes in the 
use of time and other resources, by both teacher and students, in three distinct ways:  
more time is devoted to the content of each chapter; and more autonomy is devolved to 
individual students in determining how much time to spend on their exam; and a 
substantial portion of the assessments are transformed into open-book, open-note take-
home problem sets.  We also see that the examination structure takes away from students 
a resource that had previously been introduced, namely the 100-point scale which, as I 
argued above, plays a supporting role in providing feedback to students on the relative 
weight of different problems and on their performance in the class over time. 
I wish to propose that these changes are not entirely unrelated to one another, but 
rather that the new resources provided may in some sense enable the elimination of the 
100-point scale.  That is to say:  by spending more time on each chapter, the teacher may 
be making it possible for some students to learn the material more thoroughly; by 
allowing for extended time, the teacher may be making it possible for some students to 
earn higher grades; by assigning students to work on take-home problems, the teacher 
shifts emphasis away from rapid and accurate recall of facts and procedures, and allows 
students to consult with textbooks, notes, and the teacher himself.  The gain students 
derive from these additional resources may be sufficient to compensate for the cost of 
using a nonstandard point scale. 
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Admittedly this is speculative.  Without looking at student work or at grades, we 
have no way of knowing whether the introduction of these novel features had any effect 
on student achievement.  On the other hand, let us approach the problem from the other 
side.  Suppose that a significant proportion of students were having difficulty completing 
their exams in the time allotted.  Certainly this would lead to some negative feedback on 
the teacher.  What other kind of adaptation to this feedback might one expect, other than 
the creation of a mechanism by which students requesting additional time? 
One possibility is that a teacher might reduce the number of questions on each 
exam.   And indeed this does appear to have happened:  a comparison of the Chapter 4, 
Chapter 6, and Chapter 7-8 exams in Years 1 and 2 (note that there was no Chapter 5 
exam in Year 1) shows that exams in the second year contain nearly 1/3 fewer questions. 
A second possibility, compatible with the first, is that a teacher would change the content 
of the questions on the exams, to make them easier to complete in the limited time.  This 
could happen in several ways:  one or more difficult questions might disappear, possibly 
replaced by easier ones; or a question could survive but with some scaffolding, such as an 
explicit hint; or a multiple-part problem could reappear with fewer parts to it. 
In fact a closer examination of the changes from Year 1 to Year 2 shows that all 
of these occurred (Fig. 5.18).  In total, 19 of the 42 items on the three Y1 exams 
disappear entirely (with only 4 new items appearing on Y2 exams to replace them); 10 
survive unchanged; and 12 survive with some modifications.  This latter group was 
discussed in the previous section, in which it was shown that, in general, the trend was 
towards increased scaffolding and more explanatory text. 
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Assessment # items (Y1) # items (Y2) Changes 
Chapter 04 12 8 3 items dropped 
1 item moved to Y2 Ch. 2 exam 
8 items survive (5 unchanged, 3 
modified) 
Chapter 06 15 11 8 items dropped 
7 items survive (4 unchanged, 3 
modified) 
1 new item 
3 items moved from Y1 Ch 11 exam 
Chapter 07-08 15 10 8 items dropped 
7 items survive (1 unchanged, 6 
modified) 
3 new items 
Figure 5.18.  Changes from Year 2 to Year 3 
 
Two measures that are relevant here are the number and density of the 
mathematical dispositions that are present (in the sense discussed in the previous chapter) 
in the assessment items.  It will be recalled that the data shows a sharp decline in both of 
these measures over the course of Year 1 (Fig. 5.12), and that the reduction in length of 
the assessments over the course of that year can be largely accounted for by the 
elimination of items that attend to one or more of the mathematical dispositions.  In light 
of the foregoing discussion, it is appropriate to see whether this trend continued in Year 
2.  Fig. 5.19 contains the details. 
A comparison of Fig. 5.12 to Fig. 5.19 paints a somewhat mixed picture (Fig. 
5.20).   There is a consistent decrease in both the number of items and the number of 
dispositions on 5 of the 6 exams that are directly comparable between the two years.  For 
the most part it appears that the reduction in the number of items is accounted for by 
reducing the number of items that contain evidence of the dispositions.  The Chapter 2 
exam is a notable exception in that the number of items drops only slightly but the 
number of dispositions increases slightly. 
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Assessment # of items
a 
Dispositions
b 
Disposition density
c 
Chapter 1 Exam 14 (17) 8 (10) 0.59 
Chapter 2 Exam 13 (17) 9 (16) 0.94 
Chapter 3 Exam 14 (14) 4 (8) 0.57 
Chapter 4 Exam 8 (8) 4 (8) 1.00 
Midterm Exam 10 (10) 6 (17) 1.70 
Chapter 5 Exam 7 (11) 10 (11) 1.00 
Chapter 6 Exam 11 (11) 3 (5) 0.45 
Chapter 7-8 Exam 10 (10) 5 (8) 0.80 
Final 18 (18) 4 (12) 0.67 
Notes. 
 a 
The first number reported is the number of items as designated on the exam itself; the second 
number is the number of items as entered into the corpus database.  
b 
The first number reported is the 
number of items that were coded for at least one disposition; the second number is the total number of 
dispositions coded for in the assessment.  
c
 The disposition density is the ratio of the (total) number of 
dispositions on the assessment to the number of items as entered into the database. 
Figure 5.19.  The dispositions in Year 2. 
 
Based on all of the foregoing, a clear picture emerges of teaching in which, over 
time, students’ accountability decreases (as measured both by the number of items on 
assessments, and the number of assessment items that contain evidence of one or more 
dispositions), while simultaneously the amount of classroom time devoted to covering 
each chapter increases (at the expense of coverage of the curriculum), and students gain 
the option to take additional time to complete exams. 
 
Assessment Items 
Y1, Y2  chg 
Items with Dispositions 
Y1, Y2  chg 
Chapter 1 22, 17  -5 9, 8  -1 
Chapter 2 18, 17  -1 7, 9  +2 
Chapter 3 17, 14  -3 7, 4  -3 
Chapter 4 12, 8  -4 7, 4  -3 
Chapter 6 15, 11  -4 7, 3  -4 
Chapter 7-8 15, 10  -5 5, 5  0 
Fig. 5.20.  A comparison of Year 1 to Year 2. 
Note:  Y2 assessments with take-home components are omitted, as are 
assessments that do not have analogues in both years. 
 
But this is only part of the story.  So far very little has been said about the content 
of the take-home Midterm and Final Exam.  As we will see below, these take-home 
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assessments are remarkable for the prominent role they reserve for problems that contain 
the mathematical dispositions.  The analysis of those assessments suggests, contrary to 
the above, that the teacher’s expectations of his students vis-à-vis the mathematical 
dispositions are not lessening, but rather are migrating from the in-school exams to the 
take-home exams.  I now turn to a more full description and discussion of this 
phenomenon. 
 
The take-home Midterm and Final (Year 2) 
The Midterm exam in Year 2 consisted of 10 problems.  Of those problems, 
exactly half were coded after one or more of the mathematical dispositions; in total, 16 
dispositions were assigned to those five problems.  Fig. 5.21 shows the details.   
Question # Dispositions present 
1 Generalize, Abstraction 
2 Utility 
3 Existence, Converse, Generalize, Specialize 
4 n/a 
5 Formalism, FindCon4Hyp 
6 n/a 
7 Utility 
8 n/a 
9 n/a 
10 FindHyp4Con, FindCon4Hyp, Existence, Converse, Generalize, 
Specialize, Complexity 
Figure 5.21.  Coding the problems in Y2’s Midterm Exam for the dispositions 
 
It is immediately obvious that the density of dispositions in the Midterm exam was 
significantly higher than on any of the in-class exams in Y1 or Y2.  Across the whole 
exam, the density of dispositions in the exam was 1.7; if we restrict our attention only to 
the six problems that had at least one disposition, there were an average of 2.83 
dispositions per problem.  Even if we disregard the clear outlier (Problem 10, with 7 
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dispositions) the remaining five problems have an average of 2.0 dispositions per 
problem.   It is also worth noting the alternating pattern evident in Fig. 5.21:  it appears as 
though the teacher has attempted to balance the disposition-rich problems with more 
“normal” ones. 
At this point is seems appropriate to look into the content of some of the 
questions.  Figure 5.22 contains two of the disposition-rich problems from the exam.  The 
first of these, Question 1 (Fig. 5.22a), has several distinctive features.  Most immediately 
obvious is the quantity of text present in the problem; on the original exam, Question 1 
filled an entire page.  Second, there is an introductory paragraph in which new 
mathematical content is presented: it seems from the text that students are not expected to 
have previously encountered the Cantor set or Sierpinski gasket, or indeed the notion of a 
fractal at all.  In this respect the problem resembles the “simplices” problem described in 
the previous chapter (Fig. 4.15).  Note, however, how different this problem is from that 
prior example are in terms of what they call on students to do.  Previously it was seen that  
in order to solve the “simplices” problem a student needed to be able to draw a few 
pictures, count to 6, and make some predictions based on pattern recognition (some of 
which would only have been plausible for a student who had some prior exposure to 
Pascal’s Triangle).  In contrast, the “fractals” problem requires students to: 
a. recognize that each of the small segments in any given stage in the 
construction of the Cantor set is one-third the length of the segments in 
the prior stage 
b. recognize also that there are twice as many segments in each 
successive stage 
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c. integrate those two facts into the recognition that the total length of 
each stage is 2/3 that of the previous stage 
d. represent this symbolically using exponential notation, as (2/3)
n
 
e. extrapolate forwards until the value is less than 0.001 
f. and adapt all of the preceding to the analogous case of the Sierpinski 
gasket. 
It should be pointed out that the various parts of the “fractals” problem are not 
really open-ended, in that the solutions are fully specified by the data in the problem, and 
there is really only one correct solution for each part.  Despite this the problem is rich in 
mathematical dispositions:  it situates the examples of cases of an abstract concept 
(“fractal”), calls on students to generalize a pattern of numbers, and presents visually 
complex diagrams (the fifth stage in the construction of the Sierpinski gasket, for 
example, contains too much detail at too small a scale for a student to easily “read” it).  
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 (a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 5.22.  Two questions from the Y2 Midterm Exam. 
 
The second disposition-rich problem (Fig. 5.22b) is quite different:  it contains 
much less text, and deals with geometric objects (quadrilaterals, kites, angle bisectors) 
that a student would be expected to have seen before.  Like the “fractals” problem, the 
“kite” problem begins by presenting the student with some new mathematics:  namely the 
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fact that the angle bisectors of a kite meet at a point.  The problem explicitly identifies 
this as a true statement; at the bottom of the page (not reproduced in Fig. 5.22), a footnote 
on the word “true” comments to students “You can just take my word for it, although the 
proof is not that hard”, from which it may be inferred that students are not expected to 
have prior knowledge of this fact.  The first three parts of this multi-part problem call for 
little more than an understanding of the words “converse”, “inverse”, and 
“contrapositive”.  To answer the fourth part, a student could make use of the fact that any 
statement and its contrapositive are logically equivalent — something they would have 
been expected to learn when studying Chapter 2 of the textbook — and hence, even in the 
absence of a proof, the contrapositive must be true (since the original statement was 
sanctioned as true).  Finally, the fifth part of the problem presents the student with a 
(false) generalization, and calls for the student to disprove it by showing that a 
counterexample exists — which a student might do by, e.g. drawing a rectangle with its 
angle bisectors, or any other non-rhombus parallelogram.  For this last part, many 
different solutions could be judged equally correct. 
The most interesting problem from the Y2 Midterm is, as might be expected, the 
outlier of the set — Problem 10, which alone was coded for 7 dispositions.  This problem 
is reproduced in its entirety in Fig. 5.23 below. Once again the sheer quantity of the text 
is immediately noticeable, as is the way in which it addresses the reader directly (“...what 
you have to do...”, “If you give up one or more of these assumptions....”).   
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Figure 5.23.  The tenth and final problem from the Y2 Midterm. 
 
The “antwalk” problem in Fig. 5.23 is almost identical to a problem that was used 
in Herbst & Brach (2006, p. 84) as a probe for exploring what share of work students 
accept responsibility for when doing proofs.  In that study it was shown that in any 
situation in which a proof is called for, students expect to be told explicitly what “givens” 
they are to use, and what they are to prove.  Both the “givens” and the “prove” are 
normally fixed parameters of the problem, specified by the teacher or a teacher’s 
surrogate (e.g. textbook); students’ share of the labor is to create a chain of logical 
reasoning that leads from the former to the latter.  In light of that prior research the 
problem in Fig. 5.23 appears exceptionally unusual:  it openly subverts those normative 
expectations, flouting the under-specified nature of the problem (“Here’s the tricky thing: 
There is not enough information in the problem...”) and calling for the students to provide 
both a set of assumptions and a set of conclusions that follow from those assumptions.  
 
 297 
Moreover it also asks students to vary those assumptions and explore how the 
conclusions change in response.  It asks for students to try to find counterexamples, to 
consider the converse, to weaken hypotheses — in short it calls on students to perform 
essentially all of the generative moves that were enumerated in Chapter 2 as comprising 
part of mathematicians’ categories of perception. 
What kind of response could a teacher expect from such a task?  And how might 
those responses influence future the decisions the teacher might make when writing 
future exams?  Certainly, a question like the “antwalk” problem seems like a significant 
departure from the norm.  If students’ performance on the task were to fail to live up to 
the teacher’s expectations, we might expect to find no further experiments of this sort.  
But in fact the opposite is true:  when we turn to the Final Exam from Y2, we find that 
the abnormal features of this problem reappear in an even more magnified form. 
The take-home portion of the Y2 Final consisted of a single problem, the 
instructions for which were covered three full pages on the original exam.  These 
instructions are reproduced in their entirety below (Fig. 5.24): 
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Honors Geometry Final Exam 
Part 1 (Take-Home Portion) 
 
This portion of the Final Exam is worth half of the entire final (so, 10% of 
the semester grade). 
Information on Part 2 of the Final is at the end of this document. 
 
Begin with any polygon.  If you join the midpoint of each side to the midpoint of the two adjacent 
sides, the result will be another polygon, called the dual of 
the original polygon. 
 
For example, the figures at right show the dual of triangle 
XYZ, the dual of quadrilateral ABCD, and the dual of 
hexagon PQRSTU.  (Each dual is shown shaded in gray.) 
 
Your task is to conduct original mathematical research in the 
subject of duals of polygons.  What are their properties?  
What are the relationships between the original figure (called 
the “predual”) and its dual? 
 
“Research” does not mean “look it up in a book or on the Internet” (I doubt you’ll be able to 
find anything anyway).  Instead, “research” means: 
 
1. To pose interesting questions 
2. To investigate your questions, by drawing lots of pictures, making measurements, 
and looking for patterns 
3. To formulate conjectures, and present evidence to support your conjectures 
4. When possible, to answer your questions, and prove (or disprove) your conjectures (at 
which point they stop being conjectures, and become theorems). 
 
Please note that you don’t have to answer all of the questions you raise; nor do you have to prove 
all of the conjectures you propose.  Some questions might be just too hard.  I want to know about 
the questions you couldn’t answer, as well as the ones you could.  (Of course, I expect that you’ll 
be able to answer some of your questions – I’ll be very disappointed if you can’t produce any 
theorems.) 
 
To get you started, and to illustrate what I mean, here are some examples of the kinds of 
questions you might be able to answer. 
 
Question 1.  What can you say about the dual of a triangle? 
Question 2.  What can you say about the dual of a quadrilateral? 
Question 3.  Under what circumstances will the dual of a quadrilateral be a square? 
 
Question 1 is easy to answer (and I expect you to answer it in the course of your research). 
 
Question 2 is not so easy to answer.  Part of the answer is: 
 Theorem.  For any quadrilateral, the dual will be a parallelogram. 
 Proof.  You can find this on page 364 (Example 2) in the textbook. 
There’s much more that could be asked about duals of quadrilaterals, however. 
 
 
Figure 5.24 (continues on next 2 pages) 
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Question 3 is very hard to answer.  Here’s a conjecture: 
 Conjecture.  The dual of a quadrilateral will be a square if, and only if, the predual is also 
a square. 
 Is this conjecture true?  Maybe yes and maybe no.  You ought to investigate it and try to 
find out. 
 
Besides these three questions, here are some words and phrases that might spark some ideas in 
your mind. Not everything on this list is necessarily going to be useful to everyone, but you 
might get some interesting questions by pondering this list. 
 
Lengths • angles • bisectors • concurrency • parallel • perpendicular • 
congruence • similarity • triangles • isosceles • equilateral • incenter 
circumcenter • median • orthocenter • circumscribed circle • inscribed circle • 
midsegment • special quadrilaterals • convex • nonconvex • equiangular 
polygons • equilateral polygons • area • perimeter • symmetry • 
transformations • proportions • regular polygons • circles • chords • secants • 
tangents • polyhedra • Platonic solids • duals of duals 
 
 
What do you turn in? 
This assignment is different from what you are probably accustomed to, because you have to 
generate the questions -- not just answer them. 
 
The process of doing research is often messy – diagrams get scribbled in the margins of 
notebooks, on the backs of envelopes, etc.  And the ideas can come at odd times – while you’re in 
the shower, sitting in history class, watching TV.  Sometimes you even get ideas in your sleep! 
 
I don’t expect (or want) you to turn in every single scrap of paper that you wrote on in the course 
of doing this research.  Instead, I want you to take your results, and write up a research report.  
Your research report should tell me what you did in an organized and coherent fashion.  You 
should include descriptions of your investigations, questions you asked (both the ones you were, 
and were not, able to answer), conjectures you considered (even if you subsequently found out 
they were wrong), theorems you proved – anything. 
 
I assume that your research report will be typed, illustrated with lots of diagrams, and proofread 
for grammar and spelling.  I anticipate most of you will produce reports that will be in the 
neighborhood of 5 pages long (double-spaced) – I can’t imagine doing this well in fewer than 2 
full pages, but some of you might end up writing 10-15 pages or more. 
 
I hope to take the best research reports and combine them to produce something that we can 
submit for publication in journals of teaching mathematics.  With hard work and some 
imagination, you may end with your work in print in a nationwide publication! 
 
Honor Statement 
The first page of your research report must contain the following honor statement, written in 
your own handwriting and signed: 
 
HONOR STATEMENT:  I attest that I completed this exam 
without any assistance from any other student, teacher, parent, 
or tutor. 
 
___________________________________ (signature) 
 
 
Figure 5.24 (continued) 
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Research reports that do not contain the honor statement will not be accepted. 
 
Due Date: 
This portion of the final exam is due Monday, June 7th, no later than 12:00 noon.  Papers turned 
in late will face a 0.4% reduction in your grade for every hour it is late.  So, for example, papers 
turned in Tuesday at 1:00 PM (25 hours late) will lose 10%.  (If you email it to me Monday 
evening, I will look at the time the paper was sent, not the time it was received.) 
 
I will be glad to receive your work early.  Turn your work in on or before Friday, June 4th at noon, 
and you will receive a 5% “early bird” bonus on your work. 
 
Lastly, the other portion of your final exam – the in-school portion – will be held at the normal 
time during exam week. 
 
Figure 5.24.  The take-home portion of the Y2 Final Exam 
 
There is so much to say about this open-ended problem that it is difficult to know 
where to begin.  First, note that the text repeatedly stresses the novelty of the task, and the 
originality of the work that students are expected to do:  words and phrases such as 
“original mathematical research” are scattered throughout it.  The instructions make 
explicit that students are expected to pose their own questions, to investigate them, to 
make conjectures, and (if possible) to either prove or refute those conjectures.  They also 
make clear that students are expected to organize their work in a coherent report — that 
is, not to produce a miscellany of disconnected findings but rather to build a rudimentary 
theory of duals.  And the instructions openly acknowledge that it can be valuable to ask a 
good question, even if no answer is forthcoming.  (In this connection it is worth noting 
that the twin dispositions of Surprise and Confirmation both depend on the possibility 
that a problem may exist without a clear resolution for an extended period of time, 
something that I have shown in Chapter 3 is uncommon in teachers’ practice.)  All of this 
is part of the specification of the goals and framing of the problem. 
At the same time, the openness of the work students are asked to do is bounded by 
the limiting of the conceptual domain:  this is to be a research project about duals, and 
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work that is not connected to that general theme in some way has no place in it.  For 
students who do not know where to begin, three “starter questions” are provided, and for 
those who or are stumped for what to do next, a long “list of words and phrases that 
might spark some ideas” is provided; however students are not obliged to make use of 
any or all of these words and phrases.  These (along with the definition, the figure, 
reference to a particular page in the textbook) are part of the resources provided by the 
teacher. 
The problem also specifies the sorts of operations students are expected to deploy 
in their work on the problem.  All of the “generative moves” discussed previously are 
explicitly present in these instructions.  Students are asked to find conclusions that follow 
from certain hypotheses, to find conditions under which certain conclusions follow, to 
inquire whether the converse of a statement is true, to generalize, and to specialize.  They 
are invited to look at concepts from the “list of words and phrases” and to inquire after 
connections between them.  For example, a student might read through that list and pose 
any of the following questions: 
a. Is the incenter of a triangle the circumcenter of its dual?  If not always, 
when does this happen? 
b. Is the centroid of a triangle also the centroid of its dual? 
c. Do nonconvex polygons have duals? 
d. Can a dual ever be nonconvex? 
e. If a polygon is symmetric, is its dual also symmetric?  What about the 
converse? 
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f. How is the area of a triangle / quadrilateral / general polygon related to 
the area of its dual?  What about the perimeter? 
g. Do circles have duals?  What would those be? 
h. Do solids have duals?  What would those be? 
Some of these questions can be given clear and unambiguous answers.  Others are 
more difficult, yielding only in special cases.  Some call for students to make new 
definitions.  Some of the questions are relatively easy to answer, while others are quite 
subtle and difficult.  Students are thus free to make this research project as challenging as 
they want it to be. 
The existence of the take-home portion of the Year 2 Midterm and Final Exam 
thus counters the impression that was produced by the earlier analysis of the Year 2 in-
school assessments.  While the in-school assessments show evidence of a decrease in the 
teacher’s expectations of his students (as measured by number of items per assessment 
and number of dispositions present in each exam), the out-of-school assessments show 
that those expectations are not disappearing, but are rather finding their expression in 
another form.  In summary, what we have here is the beginning of a bifurcation of the 
corpus into two distinct subcorpora:  a set of in-class assessments that more-or-less 
resembles a “normal” assessment, and a parallel set of out-of-school assessments that 
provide students with disposition-rich, open-ended problem contexts.  As we shall see 
below, in the third year of the corpus this trend continued, and the gap between the two 
subcorpora of assessments grew even wider. 
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Achieving a new equilibrium:  Year 3 
The assessments from the third year show a continuation of the trends that began 
to emerge in Year 2.  I have already discussed the manner in which the “I need extra time 
checkbox”, introduced in Y2, was modified at the beginning of Y3 by the introduction of 
both a “purchase price”, amounting to 5% of the total exam grade, and an explicit retake 
policy.  It was also mentioned previously that, beginning with the Midterm exam in Y3, 
every unit assessment consisted of both a take-home problem set and an in-class portion 
(designated as a “Quiz” on the documents).  The full details for the Y3 assessments can 
be seen in Fig. 5.25. 
Assessment Date # of items
a 
Points Possible 
Unit 1 Exam 9/27/2004 10 (14) 88
b
 
Unit 2 Exam 11/3/2004
c
 15 (17) 93
b 
Unit 3 Exam 12/2/2004 14 (15) 100 
Midterm 12/20/2004 9 (9) 100 
Unit 4 Take-Home Problems 1/24/2005 3 (4) 60
d 
Unit 4 In-School Quiz 1/24/2005 4 (4) n/a
d 
Unit 5 Take-Home Problems 3/4/2005 5 (5) 60 
Unit 5 In-School Quiz 3/4/2005 5 (7) 30 
Final Research Project 6/7/2005 1 (1) 40
 
Final Exam (In-School) 6/7/2005 20 (20) 40 
Notes.  
a
 The first number reported is the number of items as designated on the exam itself; the 
second number is the number of items as entered into the corpus database.  
b
Includes one 
question worth 8 points “extra credit”.   
c
Exam was spread over two consecutive class meetings 
(11/3 and 11/5).  
d
Point values not printed on exam; reconstructed from graded student work or 
grading guides, where extant. 
Figure 5.25.  Assessments in Year 3. 
 
One remarkable characteristic of the Y3 assessment data is the continuation of a 
trend noticed in Y2:  the spacing between assessments continues to grow, seemingly at 
the expense of coverage of the latter chapters.  We note that the spacing between the first 
four exams was on the order of four weeks, comparable to Y2; after the Midterm exam, 
however,  six full weeks elapse between the Unit 4 and Unit 5 assessments, and following 
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Unit 5, formal unit assessments appear to disappear entirely — notice the three-month 
gap between the Unit 5 assessment and the Final Exam. 
The absence of formal assessments for the subsequent chapters of the textbook 
does not necessarily mean that the content of those chapters was not covered.  On the 
contrary, the Y3 Final Exam includes a number of questions on precisely that content, 
and a Review Sheet distributed prior to the Final makes it clear that students were 
accountable for knowing that material.  Still, the absence of formal assessments appears 
in context as the ultimate extension of the trend that began in Y2. 
It is also noteworthy that, as in both previous years, the mid-year break appears to 
have been a time of transition.  Previously we saw (in Y1) that from the midterm exam 
onward, assessments began to conform to a 100-point scale, and became shorter in length 
and less focused on the mathematical dispositions; we also saw (in Y2) the disappearance 
of the 100-point scale and the first use of take-home problem sets.  Now we see that 
following the Y3 Midterm, both the Unit 4 and Unit 5 assessments were formally divided 
in two parts, one designated “Take-Home Problems” and the other designated a “Quiz”.  
The bifurcation described at the end of the previous section is now institutionalized: 
rather than one corpus of assessments, we can now recognize the existence of two distinct 
subcorpora. 
We find corroboration for this if we look at the two subcorpora through the lens 
of the mathematical dispositions (Fig. 5.26).  A comparison of Fig. 5.26 with Fig. 5.20 
(above) shows that the length of the first three exams remained relatively stable from 
Year 2 to Year 3, as did the number of items containing dispositions on each of those 
assessments.  Beginning with the midterm, however, there is a clear change: the number 
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and density of dispositions on the in-school assessments drops sharply, while the number 
and density of dispositions on the take-home assessments climbs dramatically. 
 
Assessment # of items
a 
Dispositions
b 
Disposition density
c 
Unit 1 Exam 10 (14) 6 (7) 0.50 
Unit 2 Exam 15 (17) 9 (16) 0.94 
Unit 3 Exam 14 (15) 5 (12) 0.80 
Midterm 9 (9) 6 (18) 2.00 
Unit 4 Take-Home Problems 3 (4) 2 (6) 1.50 
Unit 4 In-School Quiz 4 (4) 2 (3) 0.75 
Unit 5 Take-Home Problems 5 (5) 5 (8) 1.60 
Unit 5 In-School Quiz 5 (7) 5 (5) 0.71 
Final Research Project 1 (1) 1 (10) 10.00 
Final Exam In-School 20 (20) 2 (2) 0.10 
Notes. 
 a 
The first number reported is the number of items as designated on the exam itself; 
the second number is the number of items as entered into the corpus database.  
b 
The first 
number reported is the number of items that were coded for at least one disposition; the 
second number is the total number of dispositions coded for in the assessment.  
c
 The 
disposition density is the ratio of the (total) number of dispositions on the assessment to the 
number of items as entered into the database. 
Figure 5.26.  The role of the dispositions in Year 3. 
 
Earlier I argued that the gradual decline over time in the role allocated for the 
mathematical dispositions on in-school assessments can be taken as an adaptation on the 
part of the teacher, who (I theorize) is responding to some form of feedback from his 
milieu.  I noted that the midpoint of the year is a natural time to expect for such an 
adaptation:  the administrative need to record students’ grades on report cards, and the 
consequent communication with, parents, administrators, counselors, etc., all potentially 
serve as sources of feedback on the teacher.  At this point in the narrative it appears that 
the teacher has found a way to respond to that feedback and still preserve a role for the 
mathematical dispositions.  He has done this by creating two parallel forms of 
assessment, one of which (the in-school quizzes) conforms more closely to what one 
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might expect of a “normal” assessment, while the other (the take-home problems) carves 
out a niche for more mathematically authentic investigation. 
The difference between the two forms of assessment can best be seen through a 
direct comparison of the questions on the two Unit 4 assessments (Fig. 5.27).  The four 
questions in the left-hand column of Fig. 5.27 constituted the Unit 4 in-school quiz; the 
three questions in the right-hand column were the Unit 4 take-home problem set.  First, it 
should be noted that the problems from the in-school quiz are not trivial, nor are the 
mathematical dispositions entirely absent.  On the contrary, 3 out of 4 problems call 
explicitly for a proof; two of the problems (#1 and #2) call for the student to determine 
what conclusion follows as a consequence of the provided “givens”; and one of the 
questions (#2) is one of the exemplars of the Formalism code (see Figure 4.20b). 
 
1. In the diagram 
on the right, 
 
AB ! AD  
and 
 
ED ! BC .  
Write a true 
triangle 
congruence 
statement, and 
state what rule 
you used. 
 
1.  Line l is defined by the equation 
 y = 4x – 2.  
a. Find the equation of the line that is parallel to 
line l and passes through the point (4,9). 
b. Find the equation of the line that is 
perpendicular to line l and passes through 
(0,3). 
c. Find the coordinates of the point where the 
original line l crosses the line you found in 
(b). 
d. Find the distance between the point (0,3) and 
your answer from (c). 
2. As you know, when writing a triangle 
congruence statement, the order of the letters 
matters.  Suppose for three points A, B, and C 
it happens to be true that !ABC # !CAB.  
What can you conclude about !ABC in this 
case?  Be as detailed as possible. 
2.a. Prove that if P is a point on the perpendicular 
bisector of 
 
QR , then P is equidistant from Q 
and R (this means that PQ = PR). 
b. Conversely, prove that if then P is equidistant 
from Q and R, then P is on the perpendicular 
bisector of 
 
QR . 
 
Figure 5.27 (continues on next page). 
D
E
B
A C
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3. In the diagram at right, 
 
AB ||DE   and 
 
AB ! DE .   
Write a true congruence 
statement, and give a proof. 
4.  
5. In the diagram at right, you 
are given that 
 
BC ! DE , 
 
BC ||DE , and 
 
BE || AC .  
Using only this information 
(don’t make any other 
assumptions), prove 
!ABC # !BDE. 
 
3.  There are a number of properties of quadrilaterals that we have 
discovered almost accidentally in the course of the last few weeks.  
The purpose of Problem #3 (which is really a set of problems) is to use 
what you know about congruent triangles to organize and prove those 
properties in some logical fashion. 
 
Below is a list of ten conjectures about quadrilaterals.  Some of them 
are true, and some are false.  You are to do the following: 
(a) Figure out which are which 
(b) Provide clear counterexamples to the false ones 
(c) Provide proofs for the true ones 
Note that you can rearrange the conjectures in any order you want; 
once you’ve proven one, you can use it to help you prove the 
subsequent ones.   So part of the task here is to figure out what would 
be a “good” order to prove these in. 
 
The conjectures: 
• In a parallelogram, the two diagonals bisect each other. 
• If a quadrilateral’s two diagonals are congruent, then it is a 
parallelogram. 
• In a parallelogram, there are two pairs of congruent opposite sides. 
• If a quadrilateral has two pairs of congruent opposite angles, then 
it is a parallelogram. 
• In a parallelogram, there are two pairs of congruent opposite 
angles. 
• If a quadrilateral’s two diagonals bisect each other, then it is a 
parallelogram. 
• In a parallelogram, the two diagonals are also angle bisectors. 
• If a quadrilateral has two pairs of congruent opposite sides, then it 
is a parallelogram. 
• In a parallelogram, the two diagonals are congruent. 
• If a quadrilateral’s two diagonals are also both angle bisectors, 
then it is a parallelogram. 
 
You will probably need the following definitions: 
 
Definition.  A quadrilateral is a set of four line segments that intersect 
only at their endpoints, and in which each endpoint is shared by 
exactly two segments. 
 
Definition.  A parallelogram is a quadrilateral with two pairs of 
parallel sides.   
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.27.  The (a) in-school and (b) take-home assessments for Y3, Unit 4. 
 
Nor are the three take-home problems all paradigmatic examples of contexts for 
open-ended, mathematically authentic problem-solving.  On the contrary the first 
question is a fairly pedestrian (but still challenging) multi-part problem, the kind that 
might just as well be expected to appear on an in-class assessment — and indeed, the 
E
CB
D F
A
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exact same question had appeared in both Y1 and Y2 on the Chapter 3 exams.  On the 
other hand, the second and third problems on this assessment are quite unusual, and I turn 
now to an analysis of their content. 
The first thing that should be noted about Problem  2 is that the mathematical 
propositions the student is asked to prove have a normative role in the curriculum; in the 
textbook that students used for the course in question (Larson, Boswell, & Stiff, 2001),  
they are referred to as the “Perpendicular Bisector Theorem” and its converse, which 
appear in the first page of Section 5.1 of the textbook
37
.  It is thus particularly interesting 
that the teacher includes the proof here on the assessment for the previous chapter:  it 
indicates that the teacher is using the take-home problem set not only to assess what 
students have already learned, but also to introduce new material that will be relevant for 
future work (cf. my discussion in Chapter 4 of the prospective function of assessment). 
Another noteworthy feature of problem #2 on the take-home problem set is that 
no diagram is provided to students.  This is in sharp contrast to the three proof problems 
on the in-class quiz, all of which included complete diagrams.  Elsewhere (Weiss & 
Herbst, 2007) I have shown that in the secondary Geometry course, proof problems are  
customarily presented using a “diagrammatic register”, that theorems are customarily 
introduced using a blend of a the “conceptual” and “generic” registers, and that teachers 
                                                
37
 The rationale for including this theorem at the beginning of Chapter 5 (“Properties of 
Triangles”) appears to be that it is instrumental in proving that the three angle bisectors of any 
triangle are concurrent.  This fact appears (and is labeled a “theorem”) in section 5.2 of the text 
(p. 273); interestingly, however, the proof is buried deep in an appendix at the end of the textbook 
(p. 835).  The implication seems to be that the textbook’s authors feel obliged to ensure that a 
proof is provided, but do not expect students to see it, or for teachers to hold students accountable 
for understanding it.  In this connection, it is particularly interesting that one of the questions on 
the Y3 Chapter 5 Take-Home problem set (the “two parabolas” problem, not discussed in this 
dissertation) seems to have been designed precisely to test whether students understand the 
structure of that proof, and are capable of applying the reasoning to another context. 
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normally shield students from the responsibility to perform translations between those 
registers.  Problem #2 defies that custom:  it makes use exclusively of conceptual (verbal) 
tokens (e.g. “perpendicular bisector”, “equidistant”) and generic signs (P, Q, R, QR ); it is 
the student who must produce a diagram that represents this abstract situation.  Moreover 
the explicit separation of the biconditional proposition into two distinct conditional 
statements, and the explicit labeling of the second part as a converse, calls attention to the 
mathematical disposition of considering the converse of a proposition. 
By far the most provocative question on the take-home problem set is Problem 3.  
Many of the attributes that have previously been noted about take-home problem sets in 
the Y2 Midterm and Final are visible here, as well: 
Like the Antwalk problem on the Y2 Midterm, and the Duals research project on 
the Y2 Final, Problem 3 is extremely text-heavy.  Notice the framing of the problem:  the 
first paragraph serves not only to introduce the theme (properties of quadrilaterals) but 
also to establish a shared memory of prior mathematical work (“we have discovered 
almost accidentally in the course of the last few weeks”) and to motivate the task.  The 
goal is articulated as “to organize and prove those properties in some logical fashion”; 
that is, the student is here charged with responsibility not only for proving theorems, but 
for the organization of those theorems into a theory.  This is reinforced by the explicit 
comments that “you can rearrange the conjectures” and “part of the task here is to figure 
out what would be a ‘good’ order to prove these in”.  This is the mathematical disposition 
of Theory Building, embodied in a task for students. 
Notice as well the prominent role of personal pronouns in this problem:  “we” 
(the class) have discovered these properties, “you” (the student) are going to organize and 
 
 310 
prove (or disprove) them.  In fact “you” appears six times in the text of this problem.  
This is an instance of the more general phenomenon noted above, in my discussion of 
how personal pronouns are one of the key resources the implied author employs to create 
coherence in the corpus.  Here we see that the pronouns establish the roles and demarcate 
the zones of accountability for the author and reader of the text: “you” are responsible for 
deciding what is true, providing proofs and counterexamples, and organizing the theory.  
On the other hand “you” are not (yet) responsible for knowing or producing definitions 
for the words “quadrilateral” or “parallelogram” (they are provided because “you will 
probably need” them). 
Other noteworthy features of this problem include the fact that it avoids entirely 
both the diagrammatic register and the generic register, instead remaining entirely within 
the conceptual register (Weiss & Herbst, 2007).  This includes the use of conditional 
statements in unparsed form (cf. p. 47).  Students are thus responsible for extracting the 
hypothesis and conclusion from the statements, for instantiating the abstract properties 
into generic representatives, and for producing a diagram that illustrates the properties of 
the generic objects — all of this prior to the actual determination of which properties are 
true and which are false.  And neither the parsing, nor the determination of which 
propositions are true, is trivial:  for each proposition in the list, the converse also appears 
in the list (but the pairs are camouflaged both by the sort order and by variations in 
grammar); moreover among these “converse pairs” are examples in which both are true, 
as well as examples in which both are false, and one pair in which only one is true
38
. 
                                                
38
 Specifically, the seventh tenth property is false, but its converse, the tenth property, is 
true: if each diagonals of a quadrilateral bisects both of the angles at its endpoints, then the 
quadrilateral must be a rhombus, and hence a parallelogram.  It should be noted that the wording 
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A final feature of this problem is that, like Problem 2 on the same problem set, it 
holds the student accountable for proving and organizing content that, from the point of 
view of the textbook’s own chronology, is premature:  the various families of 
quadrilaterals are not even supposed to be defined until Chapter 6, which is when the 
properties of special quadrilaterals are normally lodged.  This is thus another illustration 
of the prospective, rather than retrospective, function of assessments.  In fact comparing 
the content of the textbook’s Chapter 6 to the propositions listed in Problem 3, we can see 
that there is one true proposition among the latter that is not included in the textbook 
(namely, the tenth property in the list).   
All of this provides us with another point of view on the phenomenon of 
diminishing coverage, noted above in connection with Year 3.  While it is true that the 
Y3 corpus does not include an assessment devoted explicitly to Chapter 6, the properties 
of quadrilaterals, this absence does not mean that the content was not covered.  On the 
contrary, the appearance of this question two chapters “early” partly explains why no 
assessment for Chapter 6 exists: as the teacher’s adherence to the curriculum as defined 
by the textbook’s table of content gradually erodes, assessments corresponding to 
individual chapters become impractical (in this connection note also the teacher’s change 
in nomenclature, from “Chapter N” in Y1 and Y2 to “Unit N” in Y3). 
Consider also the difficulty of assigning a grade to students’ solutions to Problem 
3.  In particular, the fact that the problem makes students accountable for creating a 
logical organization of the theory (on the grounds that any proposition, once proved, 
might be useful in proving subsequent propositions) implies that the teacher should take 
                                                
of the tenth property is sufficiently imprecise that a serious argument could be put forth that it is 
false.  Even the translation between registers is nontrivial in this problem. 
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that organization into account when deciding how many points to assign to a solution.  
But on what objective basis can a teacher decide that one such organization is better than 
another — and how can a numerical value be attached to that difference?  Certainly there 
is much in Problem 3 that can be assessed objectively — the truth or falsity of each 
proposition, the suitability of any given proof or counterexample — but the problem calls 
for more than that.  An organization of the theory cannot be evaluated as purely right or 
wrong, but rather as elegant or inelegant, efficient or inefficient, aesthetic or clumsy — 
categories of value that do not translate well into numerical scores.  It is difficult to 
imagine any grading rubric for this problem that does not have a subjective component to 
it. 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the claim that I have made above — that the 
bifurcation of the corpus into two distinct assessment subcorpora (take-home and in-
class) serves to create a mechanism by which the teacher can continue to hold students 
accountable for the mathematical dispositions — and even increase those expectations of 
students — while also preserving a role for more normal assessments.  The four problems 
on the in-class problem set are not trivial, but they are relatively short (both in terms of 
the amount of text and time it takes to specify them, and the amount of text and time it 
takes to solve them), have well-defined, unique solutions (in contrast to the open-ended 
nature of the take-home problems), can be graded using more or less objective criteria, 
play a purely retrospective function, and are to be done under the teacher’s direct 
supervision.  The problems on the take-home set, in contrast, call for the student to take 
part in a wide range of mathematical activities (conjecturing, proving, disproving, 
translating between registers, theory building), include a mix of open-ended and fully-
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specified problems, and allow for some degree of creativity on the student’s part — but 
call for a more extended timeframe, and require a measure of trust on the teacher’s part. 
If the above analysis is correct — if the bifurcation of the corpus serves to carve 
out to distinct spheres of assessment, one more “normal” and the other more “authentic” 
— then one might expect that the “extra time” checkbox would no longer be necessary on 
the in-school quizzes.  That is, if the function of the take-home assessments is in part to 
create a way to hold students accountable for mathematical work that is more demanding 
of time and other resources than an in-school assessment allows, the emergence of those 
assessments would seem to obviate the necessity for allowing students additional time on 
their in-school assessments, which by design were intended to be not as time-consuming.  
And in fact this is precisely what happens in the corpus:  neither the Unit 4 nor Unit 5 
assessments in Y3 (the assessment after the midterm, the very two that were formally 
divided into two components) includes the by now familiar “extra time” checkbox.  It no 
longer appears, presumably because the teacher no longer considered it necessary. 
 
Discussion 
Looking back over the entire 3-year corpus, we see a continuous process of 
teacher learning, i.e. adaptation to some kind of feedback.  Although we have no direct 
evidence of the nature of this feedback, I have speculated above on some of its sources, 
and I review here the way in which such feedback might have led to some of the changes 
described above. 
• Students’ grades constitute a measure not only of their own work; indirectly they 
serve as a commentary on the teacher’s competence.  If grades are too low, a 
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teacher risks appearing ineffective, overly strict, or unreasonable in his 
expectations; if grades are too high, a teacher risks the perception of having low 
standards.  This is not to suggest that a teacher is primarily concerned with what 
others think; the above applies to a teacher’s self-evaluation, as well.  If a teacher 
sees that none of the students in his class were able to earn above 70% on a test, it 
is entirely reasonable to conclude “I must have made the test too hard”, and to 
consciously write an easier test next time. Alternatively, he might preserve the 
difficulty of the exams, but allow students who fail an exam to retake it.  On the 
other hand, a teacher might conclude that he needs to spend more time teaching 
the students the content, so that they will be better prepared for the next test.   
• Students’ ability to complete an assessment in the allotted time provides a second, 
complementary source of feedback to the teacher.   If a teacher comes to the 
realization that the tests he is writing cannot easily be completed within the 
customary time (which is not quite the same as saying that they are too hard), a 
teacher might do any of the following: 
o plan to devote two class periods for each future exam 
o make the exams shorter 
o allow students to choose whether they need additional time 
o repackage some of the more time-consuming problems as take-home 
problem sets 
• But all of the above options entail further complications.  Spending more time 
teaching students the content of each chapter means sacrificing the latter chapters.  
Devoting two class periods to each exam cuts into the amount of time available 
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for teaching, further compromising the coverage of the curriculum as defined by 
the textbook.  Allowing students to choose whether they need additional time or 
retake a test creates logistical challenges around grading and returning exams to 
students, marking report cards, etc.  And migrating time-consuming problems into 
take-home assessments removes the student from the teacher’s observation, 
opening up the possibility of cheating. 
 
The assessments corpus provides indirect evidence of the above cycles of 
feedback and adaptation.  Some of the structural features of the assessments — the honor 
statements attached to take-home problems, the “purchase price” for extra time and 
retakes — can be understood as second-order corrections, adaptations to the feedback 
produced in response to adaptations to feedback. 
The trends I have noted in the number and density of mathematical dispositions 
across the corpus provide an independent corroboration of this evidence.   Initially (up 
through the middle of Y2) both measures gradually but consistently decrease.  Following 
the introduction of the take-home midterm in Y2, we see the number and density of 
dispositions continue to decrease on in-school assessments, but this is balanced by a 
strong role for the dispositions in the out of school assessments.  All of the above paints a 
clear and strong picture of teacher learning, or (we might say) of instructional problem-
solving.  In terms of the model of conception described at the beginning of this chapter, 
we could say that the teacher has learned to solve a particular task (“Produce an 
assessment for students that includes a significant role for the mathematical 
dispositions”) by means of novel representations and operations (take-home problem sets 
 
 316 
containing a mix of retrospective and prospective items, using a blend of registers, etc.) 
with controls (can students complete the work in the allotted time, is there still some 
measure of supervision of students at work) to determine whether an assessment stands as 
a good “solution” to the task. 
The above considerations lead to a somewhat mixed set of conclusions.  On the 
one hand, the continued existence of a role for the mathematical dispositions in the 
assessments corpus seems to provide evidence that it is, indeed, possible for a high school 
Geometry course to hold students accountable for learning the mathematical sensibility.  
On the other hand, the adaptations described in this chapter, and the various sorts of 
feedback that I have argued might help explain those adaptations, strongly suggest that 
for a teacher to take on the responsibility for cultivating the mathematical sensibility in 
students takes more than just knowledge and the desire to do so:  it also requires a 
commitment of time that competes with the default timeline of the curriculum, and calls 
for the development of novel forms of assessment — forms that compete with the (also 
significant) imperative for standardized, uniform testing.  I take up these matters in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
 
Looking back 
In this final chapter, I look back over the work done in Chapters 1-5.  I review 
some of the key theoretical and methodological contributions of this dissertation, and 
discuss how they help shed light on the questions introduced in Chapter 1.  I also attempt 
to develop a synthesis of the findings reported above, and propose some directions for 
further research. 
In Chapter 1, I stated the main research question as: What is the capacity for the 
high school Geometry course to serve as an opportunity for students to learn the elements 
of a “mathematical sensibility”?  The relevance of this question stems from the (not 
uncommon) position that the mathematics classroom can and should be conceptualized as 
more than just a delivery system for content knowledge; it also can function as an 
environment in which to cultivate in students some of the values and habits of mind of 
mathematicians.  But this perspective frequently treats the notion of “mathematical 
sensibility” as a rather nebulous construct.  In order to sharpen the question and to 
transform the intuitive notion of “mathematical sensibility” into something researchable, 
I undertook in Chapter 2 to produce a more detailed articulation of the elements of the 
mathematical sensibility. 
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I began my analysis by borrowing, from the sociology of Bourdieu (1998), the 
notion of practical rationality: the network of dispositions — shared categories of 
perception and appreciation — that characterize a practice.  Throughout the remainder of 
the dissertation, I have taken “practical rationality of mathematicians” as a formal 
analogue of the informal notion of “mathematical sensibility”.  I also narrowed the scope 
of the question by examining in particular that portion of the mathematical sensibility that 
is concerned with appraising the value of mathematical results, i.e. implications of the 
form “if P, then Q”.  This portion of the mathematical sensibility includes within it the 
posing of problems, which may be regarded as partial anticipations of future results (e.g. 
“Does P imply Q?”, “Which P implies Q?”, etc.).  This restriction of the conceptual 
domain excludes other important aspects of mathematical practice, such as problem-
solving, proof, and conviction (both the process of becoming convinced of the truth of an 
assertion, and the process of convincing others).  It excludes other important 
mathematical practices such as symbolization and translation across semiotic registers.  
Further research is necessary to articulate the mathematical sensibility as it applies to 
these other zones of mathematical practice. 
My method for discovering the dispositions that comprise this restricted portion 
of the mathematical sensibility was rooted in the notion that practitioners’ knowledge is 
usually tacit, and encoded in the form of narratives.  Thus, I turned to a collection of 
narratives of mathematicians and their practice to find two kinds of dispositions: 
(a) examples of the generative moves that mathematicians may use to move from 
one problem or result to the posing of a second problem; 
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(b) examples of the categories of value that mathematicians may use to describe 
the salient characteristics of a result or problem. 
This analysis yielded a network of disposition that were organized in dialectical 
pairs, consistent with what philosophers of mathematics have suggested regarding the 
role of dialectic in providing a motive force within mathematics.  These dispositions are 
reproduced below (Figure 6.1).  These eight dialectical pairs played multiple roles in this 
dissertation: they were, on the one hand, the findings of the analysis in Chapter 2; at the 
same time they functioned as theoretical and methodological resources in the empirical 
studies of Chapter 3-5. 
 
 
Categories of perception (generative moves): 
 (strengthen/weaken) hypothesis  (strengthen/weaken) conclusion 
 generalize   specialize 
 consider converse   consider converse 
 
Categories of appreciation 
 utility   abstraction 
 surprise   confirmation 
 theory-building  problem-solving 
 simplicity   complexity 
 formalism   Platonism 
 
Figure 6.1.  The mathematical sensibility. 
 
In the first of these empirical studies (Chapter 3) I analyzed a collection of 
conversations among groups of experienced teachers gathered in study groups around 
representations of teaching.  This study made use of many of the same theoretical and 
methodological considerations of the analysis of narratives in Chapter 2, but in a different 
configuration.  In Chapter 3, narratives of practice functioned not as a source of data, but 
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rather as a collection of probes into the practical rationality of teachers; the dispositions 
comprising the mathematical sensibility found in the previous chapter were then 
deployed as an instrument for retrieving and aggregating relevant intervals from the large 
data corpus produced by Project ThEMaT.  My analysis of these intervals showed that 
experienced teachers of high school Geometry generally disclaim responsibility for 
incorporating the various mathematical dispositions into their practice.  To be sure, some 
of those dispositions have a greater affinity to teachers’ practice than do others.  In 
particular the data shows that teachers tend to view Geometry as being organized by 
various problem-solving methods, rather than by connections among the elements of the 
theory; that they apologize for the abstraction of the course, while paying (what appears 
to be) lip service to its utilitarian value; and that they reject mathematical formalism 
while endorsing a kind of tacit Platonism.  Teachers reported that, because they feel 
obliged not to leave questions unresolved at the end of a lesson, their practice provides 
little or no opportunity for appraising results as either surprising or confirmatory.  As for 
the generative moves, I found little evidence that teachers in the study groups regard 
problem-posing as something that they are supposed to teach, or that their students are 
supposed to learn: rather there is a clear division of labor in which posing problems is the 
responsibility of the teacher, and solving problems as posed is the responsibility of 
students.  Teachers acknowledged that there may be benefits in creating contexts in 
which a student would be genuinely unsure of what is true (“healthy confusion”) and that 
this uncertainty could help to promote a problem-posing orientation among students, but 
they also argued that those benefits are outweighed by the costs of alienating students, or 
of being perceived by students as dishonest or ignorant. 
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When teachers were asked to consider teaching scenarios that foregrounded one 
or more of those dispositions that are not commonly represented in practice, teachers 
pointed to a range of institutional factors as warrants for why those scenarios would not 
be viable.  These institutional factors include:  time constraints, an over-crowded 
curriculum, student mobility and inattentiveness, the need to prepare students for 
standardized exams, and a heterogeneous student body. 
In Chapter 4, I turned to a collection of assessment items written and used by a 
teacher in Honors Geometry classes over a three-year period.  In this chapter, I borrowed 
from literary criticism the important notions of “implied author” and “implied reader”. 
These two constructs are anthropomorphisms, the former for the textual strategies 
deployed in a written document, the latter for the capacities that a text both presumes of 
and helps to create in its reader.  I adapted these into the constructs of implied teacher 
and implied student. It is the implied teacher (not the empirical teacher) that students 
encounter and must adapt to when taking an exam, and it is the implied student (not the 
empirical student) that tells us what an assessment item holds students accountable for 
learning.  Thus it is these two hypothetical figures, not their real-world counterparts, that 
are the parties bound together by the didactical contract. 
I analyzed the individual assessment items by repurposing the dispositions of the 
mathematical sensibility as codes, and showed that those dispositions are accorded a 
significant role within the corpus.  I illustrated this role with examples of items coded for 
each of the dispositions.  While not all dispositions were as well-represented in the 
corpus, as a group they were found in more than 38% of all items, and there were an 
average of roughly 2 dispositions for every 3 items in the corpus.  In contrast an 
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examination of an analogous corpus of assessment items taken from the textbook used in 
the course found that the dispositions were found in about 16.5% of all items, that only 
five of the dispositions were represented at all, and that no items were coded with more 
than one disposition. 
In Chapter 5, I examined the assessment items at multiple timescales for evidence 
of both coherence and adaptation across the three-year corpus.  I showed that the items 
make use of all three metafunctions of language (ideational, textual, and interpersonal) to 
create a coherent background.  Against this coherent background, changes in both the 
norms of assessment and in the formulation of individual items can be understood as a 
kind of teacher “learning” (i.e., adaptation).  I documented the bifurcation of the 
assessment items corpus into two distinct subcorpora, one consisting of take-home 
problem sets and one consisting of more normal in-school quizzes.  I argued that this 
adaptation can be understood as an accommodation between, on the one hand, the 
intention of the implied teacher to hold students accountable for learning the elements of 
a mathematical sensibility — an intention represented through the use of explicit textual 
strategies — and on the other hand some negative feedback on the teacher from the 
milieu of teaching.  I turn now to a discussion of this negative feedback, and work 
towards a synthesis of the findings from Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. 
 
What makes teaching the mathematical sensibility difficult? 
It is important to recognize that there are some striking correspondences between 
the findings of Chapter 3 and those of Chapter 5.  In particular, many of the warrants that 
were pointed to by the ThEMaT study group teachers for why they do not hold students 
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accountable for learning the mathematical sensibility have analogues in the analysis of 
the assessment items corpus. 
For example, teachers in the ThEMaT study groups frequently cited the 
heterogeneous nature of the students they teach as a constraint.  They argued that if they 
had classes composed exclusively of bright students they could carve out a role for the 
mathematical sensibility — but since their classes include both honors students and 
special education students, such a role would not be workable.  In this connection, it is 
perhaps not insignificant that the corpus of examination questions analyzed in Chapters 
4-5 come from an Honors Geometry course.  I point this out not to reify or endorse the 
teachers’ claim, but rather to raise what seems to be a pertinent question:  To what extent 
does the designation of a course as “honors” enable a teacher to pursue goals that would 
otherwise be too risky?  Note that a student who struggles in an Honors course may be 
urged to transfer into a different, non-Honors section, an option that does not exist for a 
student already in a section not designated as “honors”.  What would have happened if 
the author of these items would have tried to use them in a non-Honors course?  What 
kind of adaptation would have been generated in response to the feedback from that 
different milieu of teaching? 
A second institutional constraint to which the ThEMaT teachers referred was their 
obligation to the intended curriculum, as represented by the textbook.  As a general rule 
teachers do not choose their textbooks; textbooks are chosen for them, either by a 
department chair or by district-level selection committees.  Moreover nearly all of the 
teachers in the study groups worked in schools where there was more than one section of 
Geometry, often with more than one teacher, and this produces a need (or at least a 
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perceived need) for consistency across all sections.  In marked contrast, the author of the 
assessment items taught in a small private school, in which there was only one section of 
the course, and was entirely free of district or state level mandates.  This unusually high 
degree of autonomy almost certainly was a crucial affordance for the teacher.  Again I 
raise this point not to endorse the study group teachers’ point of view, but rather to flag 
an important, and still unanswered, question:  Could assessments like the ones studied in 
Chapters 4-5, and the teaching that they imply, be viable in a more ordinary school 
context?  That experiment has yet to be conducted. 
A third issue that the ThEMaT study group teachers raised contrasts the limited 
number of contact hours available to them, with the amount of time it would take to 
create opportunities for students to practice and learn the mathematical dispositions.  
Teachers argued that there simply is not enough time in each day, or in the school year, to 
create such opportunities.  The evidence from the assessment items corpus strongly 
suggests that there may be something to this: my analysis showed that, over the length of 
the three year corpus, the amount of time (as measured in weeks) devoted to each chapter 
consistently lengthens, with the result that by the end of Year 3 there was no time left for 
assessments devoted to the latter chapters of the textbook.  On the other hand, it is too 
facile to conclude on this basis alone that the curriculum has not been adequately 
covered.  As I showed in Chapter 5, much of the content that would normally be covered 
in the latter chapters of the textbook appears “prematurely” in the assessments of the 
earlier chapters.  But while my analysis does not provide a basis for determining whether 
or not the curriculum has been adequately covered (and indeed, answering such a 
question would require a carful consideration of what “covering” the curriculum even 
 
 325 
means), it certainly seems to be the case that the intention to teach the mathematical 
sensibility forces a change in curricular focus, and may be incompatible with the default, 
“official” timeline of the year as determined by the textbook. 
 
Looking forward 
The theoretical perspectives and methods deployed in this dissertation, and the 
findings reported in it, suggest a number of directions for future research.  In this final 
section I anticipate some of those directions, and discuss how the present work might 
prove instrumental in investigating them. 
One direction concerns the application of the methodology of Chapters 3-5 to 
study other sorts of data.  In particular, my articulation of the dispositions shows in 
Figure 6.1 could be used to look for evidence of the mathematical sensibility in, for 
example, field records, student work, teachers’ lesson plans, and so forth.  Moreover the 
scope of such investigations could be broadened to look beyond the Geometry course, 
and into other areas of K-12 mathematics.  The dispositions could also be useful in a 
study of post-secondary mathematics education, and in particular of how mathematics 
majors and graduate students become enculturated into the rationality of mathematical 
practice. 
A second direction concerns the generality of the findings reported here.  As 
discussed above, it is far from clear to what extent the teaching described in Chapters 4-5 
(as evidenced by the assessments) depended on a particular institutional context: namely, 
a small, private high school with a single section of Honors geometry.  What would 
happen if similar assessments were used in larger schools, or with more heterogeneous 
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groups of students, or by more than one teacher?  Put another way, what different sorts of 
feedback on the teacher would be produced by a different milieu of teaching, and what 
kinds of adaptation might result from that feedback? 
A third direction concerns a broader application of the constructs developed in 
Chapter 4, namely the implied teacher and the implied student.  I believe these constructs 
provide a disciplined way of disentangling teaching from the individual teacher, by 
providing a language for describing the intentio operis as distinct from the intentio 
auctoris.  There is, at present, a rather well-developed body of educational research that 
focuses on teachers’ beliefs and values; without discounting the great value and 
importance of such research, it is also worth considering whether this focus on the 
teacher’s intention has led to the establishment of a version of the “intentional fallacy” in 
the field of education research (see footnote, p. 183 above).  Certainly from the 
practitioner’s point of view intentions matter, and insofar as the education research 
community is concerned with preparing future practitioners the focus on intention is 
appropriate and vital.  But as observers of practice, we also need a way to describe 
teaching without requiring knowledge of the teacher’s intent. 
A fourth direction concerns the potential use of the findings reported here in 
teacher education.  To what extent can teacher education take responsibility for 
cultivating a mathematical sensibility in preservice teachers?  This question is in some 
sense the analogue of the overall research problem of the dissertation, transposed into a 
different context.  For example, could some of the assessment items from the corpus be 
adapted for use in a “Geometry for teachers” course?  What kind of feedback would that 
milieu produce, and how would the items evolve in response to that feedback? 
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One final issue that should be raised here concerns the teacher’s own 
mathematical knowledge, and how that knowledge becomes useful in crafting 
opportunities for students to learn.  Throughout this dissertation I have deliberately 
avoided raising these questions, as my intent throughout was to focus not on the 
individual teacher but on the teaching.  But they are nonetheless questions that should be 
addressed.  At the time that I wrote the assessment items studied here
39
, I had completed 
most of the requirements for a doctorate in pure mathematics.  It would be naïve to 
pretend that this played no role whatsoever in my writing the items.  On the contrary, 
creating problems for students is one of the key activities of teaching in which 
mathematical knowledge for teaching (MKT), and in particular the specialized content 
knowledge of teachers, can be brought into play (Ball, Thames & Phelps 2008).  It 
certainly seems reasonable to at least conjecture that my own mathematical knowledge 
was in some way instrumental here.  But in what way, precisely?  Surely not everything 
that I knew about mathematics was equally valuable in my teaching practice.  What kind 
of knowledge, specifically, played a role? 
In terms of the position I outlined in Chapter 2 — that knowledge of a practice is 
encoded in narratives of practice — it seems reasonable to conjecture that the answer to 
this last question might best be represented by narratives of my own mathematical 
practice.  And indeed, when asked about my own mathematical sensibility, I (like all 
practitioners) do tend to respond with stories and anecdotes.  In studying the range of 
questions associated with teachers’ mathematical sensibility, it may be worth considering 
                                                
39
 Here I drop, at last, the third-person mask I have worn since p. 167.  At issue 
now is not the hypothesized implied teacher, but the actual, flesh-and-blood empirical 
teacher. 
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the proposition that, as scholars and teacher educators, we need to attend to teachers’ own 
stories of mathematical investigation. 
In connection with this last point, in the Fall of 2006 I began a pilot study of a 
“Geometry for teachers” course.  As part of that study I interviewed four preservice 
teachers enrolled in the course.  The final interview questions were, “Have you ever made 
a mathematical discovery of your own?  If so, what was it, and how did you come to 
discover it?”  These questions were designed to elicit stories of mathematical wondering, 
of the student as a problem-poser in an encounter with the unknown.  The results, 
although only preliminary, were nevertheless very suggestive: three of the four students 
had no stories of their own to tell. This suggests that one of the missing links in current 
conceptualizations of MKT may be the storied nature of professional knowledge.  It 
further suggests that one of the goals of teacher education might be the creation of 
opportunities for preservice teachers to acquire their own narratives of practice. 
There is something admittedly paradoxical about this proposal: I seem to be 
suggesting that preservice teachers should pose their own problems and pursue their own 
investigations, and at the same time that these freely-chosen, autonomous investigations 
should be carried out within the institutional boundaries of a mandatory teacher education 
course.  The paradox is essentially the same as that discussed in Chapter 1 in connection 
with the NCTM’s call for all students to learn to become problem-posers.  Recall that in 
my critique of the “Lei” anecdote from the Standards (see p. 3 of this dissertation) I 
pointed out there that it is easier to create a single illustration of an individual student 
engaged in serious mathematical inquiry than it is to describe the work of teaching that 
makes such inquiry possible in a classroom.  The take-home assessment items described 
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in the preceding chapters —in particular, the “antwalk” problem from the Y2 midterm 
and the “duals” research project from the Y2 and Y3 final exam — provide an image of 
what such work might look like.  Those problems both create a context in which students 
are obliged to pose problems, while at the same time bounding the conceptual space in 
which such problem-posing is to be done, and providing resources to support such work. 
It is my hope that further development along the lines described above may help 
to push the goal of cultivating of a mathematical sensibility into the foreground not only 
of teacher education, but also of K-12 education more generally. 
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